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BY THE 39TH CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
My predecessor, General (Retired) Ray Odierno, initiated this in-stride study of the 
U.S. Army’s experience in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) to share lessons, sharpen 
thinking, and promote debate.
I applaud and congratulate the team of warrior-scholars that authored this two-vol-
ume study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War. These Soldiers devoted countless hours of 
intellectual energy to help us understand the operational lessons of OIF. They reviewed, 
analyzed, and synthesized thousands of reports, conducted numerous interviews, and 
examined the events of а war that defined а generation of Soldiers.
This study is an interim work by design. It is а waypoint on our institution’s quest 
to comprehend the OIF experience. We must continue to evaluate and reevaluate events 
and the contexts that frame them. Eventually, our Army will have а comprehensive, offi-
cial “Green Book” history that describes OIF authoritatively, but it will require years of 
research to get there. There is much left to do, but this analysis starts а long-term histor-
ical effort.
We have а professional and moral responsibility to learn the relevant lessons of the 
recent past. OIF is а sober reminder that technological advantages and standoff weapons 
alone cannot render a decision; that the promise of short wars is often elusive; that the 
ends, ways, and means must be in balance; that our Army must understand the type of 
war we are engaged with in order to adapt as necessary; that decisions in war occur on 
the ground in the mud and dirt; and that timeless factors such as human agency, chance, 
and an enemy’s conviction, all shape а war’s outcome.
Our Army is strong, and getting stronger. We are on azimuth to build а more lethal 
force that deters adversaries and is capable of a rapid transition to win the ground fight as 
а member of the joint and coalition forces. Use this work to help you and your team stay 
ready to defeat any future adversary. Understand that this is likely not the final word, but 





BY THE 38TH CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
In July 2013, 18 months after the last of our operating forces departed Iraq, I directed 
that the U.S. Army take steps to capture key lessons, insights, and innovations from our 
more than 8 years of conflict in that country. As the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, I strongly 
believed that having been at war continuously since the attacks of September 11, 2001 
(9/11), it was time to conduct an initial examination of the Army’s experiences in the 
post-9/11 wars, to determine their implications for our future operations, strategy, doc-
trine, force structure, and institutions. The two-volume study, The U.S. Army in the Iraq 
War by the Chief of Staff of the Army’s Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group 
is the first product of that effort.
The story the OIF Study Group has documented of the Army at the operational level 
is one of units and headquarters working in difficult and complex environments, with 
leaders at all levels making tough decisions under the pressure of time. As the group’s 
research emerged, I noted a number of their findings whose important implications I saw 
firsthand as a division, corps, and force commander in Iraq. First and foremost, is the 
concept that while our technological means may have become more advanced, we cannot 
ignore operational art, the principles of war, and the importance of terrain. These funda-
mental concepts were every bit as important to our counterinsurgency and stabilization 
campaigns in Iraq, as they have been in other, more conventional conflicts. Moreover, it 
is clear in retrospect, that those who rejected the idea that there is an operational level of 
war in counterinsurgency were wrong. For our operations to succeed and be sustained, 
we must have a thorough understanding of the operating environment and the local 
political and social consequences of our actions, especially when facing an enemy who 
understands the environment better than we do. When operating among a host nation’s 
population, we must constantly clarify our intentions in order to avoid creating new ene-
mies. In addition, when conditions on the ground change, we must be willing to reexam-
ine the assumptions that underpin our strategy and plans and change course if necessary, 
no matter how painful it may be.
This account of the Iraq War holds some important strategic and institutional lessons 
as well. We must seek better ways of operating effectively with our coalition allies, whose 
constraints are naturally different from ours. We must also employ better ways of gener-
ating and partnering with effective and legitimate host nation forces and of accounting 
for the political pressures that constrain those forces. The Iraq War also teaches us that we 
should improve the ways in which we develop our strategic leaders. The conduct of war 
and the nature of decision-making are becoming more decentralized and, as a result, we 
must develop leaders who are capable of thinking strategically and leading joint, inter-
agency, and multinational teams at an earlier stage in their careers.
We also have seen in the wake of the Iraq War that the United States has entered 
another historical cycle, like those that followed major American wars in the past, in 
which our civilian and military leaders debated the utility of landpower for our national 
objectives. A reading of The U.S. Army in the Iraq War indicates that, even at a much higher 
end strength than they now have, our ground forces were overtaxed by the commitments 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the decision to limit our troop levels in both theaters had 
severe operational consequences. A review of these volumes also indicates that our adver-
saries are unlikely to abandon the way of war they adopted in Iraq, and that landpower 
will remain an important element of strategic deterrence in the future.
For me, as a Soldier of 40 years, the history of the Iraq War is the astonishing story 
of an Army that reached within itself to learn and adapt in the midst of a war that the 
United States was well on its way to losing. It was a formative experience for a genera-
tion of Soldiers and leaders. In addition, it was a field of sacrifice for many thousands of 
our fellow countrymen. Above all, these volumes are meant to ensure their sacrifices are 
never forgotten.
RAYMOND T. ODIERNO
General (Retired), United States Army




In September 2013, then Army Chief of Staff General Raymond T. Odierno directed 
the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group to research and write an operational his-
tory of the U.S. Army’s experience in the Iraq War from 2003 to 2011. This volume of The 
U.S. Army in the Iraq War is the second of two fulfilling that task. It tells how the surge 
counteroffensive in 2007-2008 neutralized both the Sunni insurgency and Shi’a militias, 
bringing Iraq to its most peaceful and stable state since the invasion. It then describes 
how, with political support for the war waning, consecutive Presidential administrations 
began to reduce the number of troops in Iraq while Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 
and later United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) worked hurriedly to prepare the Iraqi military 
to take responsibility for their nation’s security. The speed of the drawdown accelerated 
significantly after the election of President Barack Obama, culminating in an unexpected 
complete withdrawal in 2011.
In scope, the study group members consciously modeled this history after the Army’s 
“Green Book” histories of World War II. As the Green Books did, and as General Odierno 
charged us to do, we focused on the operational level of war. These volumes are narrative 
histories that tell the story of U.S. forces in Iraq, mainly from the perspective of the the-
ater command in Baghdad and the operational commands immediately subordinate to it. 
They focus on the decisions and intent of the senior three- and four-star commanders in 
Baghdad over time. 
In writing this history, we strove to evaluate the major decisions those commands 
faced, to understand what commanders intended to accomplish, and to comprehend 
how the commands interpreted the situation at the time. We also traced many of those 
decisions to the tactical level to judge how strategic and operational intent translated 
into changes on the battlefield. At the same time, we examined the broad trends and 
tactical developments that affected the operational and strategic levels, including missed 
opportunities along these lines. Our team also assessed the impact of changes to the insti-
tutional army, such as modularization and transformation, on the operational conflict in 
Iraq. Finally, we explored the assumptions underpinning the U.S. campaign in Iraq at 
various times and assessed their validity.
We wrote this history with two audiences in mind. For current and future Army lead-
ers, we sought to explain the key operational and strategic lessons from the Iraq War that 
in our estimation should inform strategy, operations, and the Army as an institution. 
In addition, we attempted to write this history in an accessible way so that a civilian 
audience can understand the Army’s experience in the war. We believe too few mili-
tary accounts thus far explain to the American public what the armed forces have gone 
through in the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) wars. If unaddressed, this can lead to a 
gulf between the public and its military.
Although this book is an Army history, we included other military services and inter-
national forces in the story, sometimes in great detail. In contemporary warfare, the Army 
goes to war as part of a joint force and often with coalition partners. It would be impossi-
ble to explain what the Army experienced in Iraq without including the story of the U.S. 
Marines, the British armed forces, and other coalition ground forces.
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We also attempted, to the best of our knowledge and ability, to include the enemy 
perspective, the nature of the operating environment, and the political and social context 
for the conflict. We have done this to explain why various groups and peoples fought 
against or alongside coalition forces, what they hoped to achieve, and how their leaders 
made decisions in response to (or independent of) the coalition’s actions.
This volume of The United States Army in the Iraq War includes a summary of our 
major findings concerning the operational and strategic lessons of the war, but readers 
will see this throughout the themes of our research. The 2007-2008 surge counteroffen-
sive utterly changed the operational situation in Iraq. In late 2006, Iraq was in the throes 
of a civil war, with its government ministries and security forces barely functioning. Its 
survival as a unitary state was questionable. By the end of 2008, Iraq’s Sunni insurgency 
had been quashed, with vast groups of insurgents having switched sides and joined the 
coalition as Sons of Iraq. Similarly, Iranian-backed Shi’a militias had been defeated across 
southern and central Iraq, and even the militia stronghold of Sadr City had been cleared. 
Introduction of the surge brigades and Marine forces, combined with the additional man-
power from the organic Sunni Awakening, and coupled with operational level guidance 
to increase the coalition footprint in order to protect the population, had regained the 
initiative and returned Iraq to a state of near normalcy.
Improvement in Iraq’s situation brought paradoxical changes at the strategic level 
which eventually allowed both Sunni extremist groups and Iranian sponsored militias 
to recover and again threaten the Iraqi state. As Iraq’s security situation improved, its 
government exerted more influence over its own future. Unfortunately, many of the deci-
sions made by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki during this phase proved to be more benefi-
cial to his own political standing and the standing of supportive Shi’a parties than to the 
long-term viability of the Iraqi state. As a result, the Bush administration was unable to 
obtain a security agreement to allow U.S. forces to remain in Iraq long enough to ensure 
the country would not slide off its path toward recovery. Similarly, Iraq’s improved sit-
uation provided sufficient justification to the Obama administration―elected on a plat-
form of decreasing American involvement in the Middle East―to carry out that very 
platform. The “Washington and Baghdad clocks” to which General David Petraeus had 
often alluded had run out. What followed was tragic, but not unexpected. Maliki’s sec-
tarianism and authoritarianism only increased as the U.S. presence decreased, and, fol-
lowing the complete withdrawal of forces in December 2011, his actions hollowed out the 
Iraqi security forces and alienated the Sunni community, leading some of its members to 
rejoin militant extremists in fighting the central government. Iraq’s civil war, which had 
been smoldering since the departure of U.S. forces, reignited. As Iraq’s security forces 
collapsed in the face of an Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) offensive, U.S. forces 
returned less than 3 years after they had departed.
For the Army, the 5-year period encompassing the surge counteroffensive to the with-
drawal of forces from Iraq represents some of the highest and lowest points in its recent 
history. The surge counteroffensive highlighted how leaders and Soldiers at all levels 
learned and adapted to a challenging form of warfare. It showed that when the stakes 
were the highest and the situation most desperate, the Army was able to incorporate 
new equipment, technology, and tactical innovations. As the Sunni Awakening began to 
spread, tactical commanders realized its importance and adopted difficult policies that 
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resulted in negotiations with men who had American blood on their hands. Operational 
and theater-level leaders were similarly able to understand its importance and backed 
their subordinates as they capitalized on opportunities. By the close of 2008, those adap-
tations and decisions achieved results far beyond what had been anticipated. But the 
United States was unable to exploit those gains fully. In the end, those same leaders and 
Soldiers who had seen free Iraqi elections and the tamping down of the civil war wit-
nessed a Shakespearean-level tragedy as their hard work and sacrifice seemingly came 
apart when Iraq nearly collapsed in 2014.
In writing this narrative history, we relied to a great degree on military records from 
U.S. operational headquarters and interviews, most of them not previously accessible to 
scholars. Mixing oral history interviews with archival documentary research creates, in 
our opinion, considerable synergy. Some readers, particularly those within the national 
security community, may be surprised with information revealed in this book. Our study 
benefited tremendously from U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) support in declassi-
fying and/or redacting over 30,000 pages of material selected by our team. We were also 
aided by the products of an earlier effort led by the researchers of General George Casey’s 
book, Strategic Reflections, which had yielded over 10,000 pages of declassified or redacted 
material. To further ensure we properly safeguarded sensitive national security informa-
tion, this manuscript underwent security reviews at the Defense Office of Prepublication 
and Security Review and at the U.S. Army War College. We have also benefited from the 
fact that much more is known today about the enemy and about the actions of the Iraqi 
Government than was known during the early years of the war. From our vantage point 
in 2017, however, we recognize that this is a history of a war that is not yet over. With 
thousands of U.S. and coalition forces back in Iraq campaigning against an enemy that 
is a successor to al-Qaeda in Iraq, we understand that there may be many more accounts 
written before the story truly ends. We do not expect that our work will be definitive. 
Instead, we hope our contribution helps to open the door to future research by others 
whose investigations we fully expect will supersede our own.
The scope of this project and the time available prevented us from covering a number 
of major areas of research that we will have to leave for others to examine. We hope that 
our work at the operational level will point the way for scholars to research and write the 
story of U.S. ground forces at the tactical level. Some histories at that level have begun 
to appear, such as Dale Andrade’s Surging South of Baghdad, but many more are needed.
Another omission in this history is the role of U.S. special operations forces in Iraq, 
who were involved in virtually every major development during the war, but whose 
story we have not been able to adequately tell. The special operations commands are not 
yet ready to grant researchers complete access to their operational records to chronicle 
the often amazing tales they contain. In particular, the Combined Joint Special Opera-
tions Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) consistently produced results far above 
what would normally be expected of a brigade level command, and little has been writ-
ten about their exploits. The sections of our history that recount the special operations 
role in Iraq represent a small fraction of what the special operators actually did, and we 
hope that someday soon that story can be fully told.
We also have not been able to provide a full account of the enemy and Iraqi forces 
of various kinds that fought during the war, though we have worked hard to assemble 
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as much of that information as we can. Neither the enemy forces nor the Iraqi security 
forces have yet told their own story, and, until they do, historians’ understanding of their 
perspective is necessarily incomplete.
A few other areas of research were beyond the scope of this history but should be 
undertaken by researchers, including the shared logistics that supported both Iraq and 
Afghanistan, air power in Iraq, and the maritime component of the Iraq campaign. The 
functional areas of information operations and reconstruction efforts deserve their own 
treatment as well. Even more importantly, the Defense Department needs to produce a 
history of U.S. Central Command in the post-9/11 wars, so that the operational histo-
ries of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars―as well as other smaller operations―can be put 
into their regional and strategic context. The fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) or the 
Islamic State in Iraq was part of a broader campaign against al-Qaeda and its associ-
ated movements. Fighting in Yemen, Somalia, Mali, and other locations was connected 
through a strategic framework―both ours and our enemies’―with the fighting in Iraq 
and Afghanistan. This strategic history should be modeled on the U.S. Army in World 
War II series, The Supreme Command, an overarching history of the Allies in the European 
theater, without which the operational histories of the European theater cannot be fully 
appreciated.
A history set in Iraq will contain many Arabic personal and place names, many of 
which have no standard English spelling. In rendering these Arabic names into English, 
we have followed standard transliteration in many cases, but in others, we have used the 
spelling most common within the U.S. military, whether that spelling followed translit-
eration rules or not. We also generally chose to refer to Iraqis using English formalities 
rather than the more familiar Iraqi style. Therefore, instead of the Iraqi style of referring 
to General Babakir Zebari as General Babakir, we refer to him as General Zebari. For sim-
plicity’s sake, and to reflect U.S. military and Iraqi usage, we have also tended to drop 
the articles from the spelling of place names in the text. The maps are more formal and 
retain the article.
Finally, throughout these volumes, we, the authors, retain full responsibility for all 







These volumes could not have been produced without a team effort by a wide range 
of leaders, experts, and organizations across and outside the Army. Without a doubt, the 
greatest influence and inspiration came from General (Ret.) Raymond T. Odierno, who 
conceived this project, provided continuous encouragement, and was generous with his 
time throughout our work. His support, leadership, and mentorship were invaluable to 
us. We also want to recognize Brigadier General Bradley T. Gericke, our liaison in the 
Office of the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, who helped us overcome dozens of bureau-
cratic obstacles while providing the wise counsel of a senior Army historian. Across the 
Pentagon hallway from General Gericke is Steven J. Redmann, Vice Director of the Army 
Staff, who was a true champion of our work. He ensured that we had the resources we 
needed and provided the help of his accomplished team on many occasions. Similarly, 
Lieutenant General Gary H. Cheek, the Director of the Army Staff, ensured our project 
remained a high priority after General Mark A. Milley became the Chief of Staff of the 
Army. Without his stalwart support, it is unclear whether this book would ever have 
been published. At the National Defense University, Michael S. Bell, Chancellor of the 
College of International Security Affairs (NDU-CISA), in Washington, DC, provided us a 
home for more than 2 years and treated us as colleagues, providing resources and people 
to help us in our work.
We were fortunate to have an external advisory board whose members graciously vol-
unteered their time and advice to help make our work better. Conrad C. Crane and Steven 
Metz at the U.S. Army War College, Kenneth M. Pollack of the Brookings Institution, and 
David A. “Scotty” Dawson of U.S. Central Command spent many hours reviewing and 
rigorously critiquing our draft chapters. Other experts who read all or most of our man-
uscript and provided valuable input included Seth Center of the U.S. State Department, 
Peter Bergen of the New America Foundation, and Lieutenant General Herbert Raymond 
“H. R.” McMaster of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).
As a small team focused on a specific task for a fixed duration, we relied frequently 
on larger Army and joint organizations that generously contributed their input, time, and 
resources. Within the Army, we are grateful to the Center of Military History and the His-
tories Division for providing an array of resources for this project, including historians 
who helped edit chapters and footnotes, shared ideas, and furnished valuable primary 
sources. We also would like to thank the Historical Products Branch for its professional 
editors, cartographers, and visual information specialists who helped turn our manu-
script into printed form. Our team is also indebted to the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 
at the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) for further editing and ultimately publishing 
our work. We owe special thanks to Steve Metz from SSI as well as Conrad Crane and 
Mike Lynch from the USAWC’s Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) for 
the countless hours they spent scrutinizing our final drafts. Their efforts considerably 
improved our product.
Several branches of TRADOC provided us with timely assistance and material sup-
port. At the USAHEC in Carlisle, PA, Colonel Matthew Q. Dawson and Colonel Robert 
A. Harney, Jr., offered their assistance and resources, providing workspace for one of 
our senior fellows and placing their staff at his disposal. USAHEC’s Richard Baker, 
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Ross Webb, Pamela Cheney, Thomas Hendrix, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Leljedal, 
and Beth Shaffer freely offered research assistance and advice. At the Combined Arms 
Center at Fort Leavenworth, KS, Colonel Thomas E. Hanson and Donald P. Wright of the 
Combat Studies Institute provided us their team’s extensive interviews and draft man-
uscripts of several volumes of the On Point series, enabling us to build on their excellent 
work. Fort Leavenworth’s Center for Army Lessons Learned also provided access to its 
extensive unpublished unit-level studies, particularly to valuable interviews and after 
action reports from the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq. At TRADOC Headquarters, 
Brit McCarley, Karen Lewis, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Richard Rinaldo opened TRA-
DOC’s extensive holdings and offered constructive input during the early stages of this 
project. We received similar assistance from Robert  S. Cameron at the Army’s Armor 
Center at Fort Benning, GA.
The Center for Army Analysis gave us access to its extensive research on the Iraq War 
and helped us to understand better the vast data the Army collected while in Iraq. The 
Army’s Intelligence and Security Command assisted us with processing our classified 
and declassified files, without which we could not have fulfilled our mission of establish-
ing a new archive of Iraq War operational records. The Combating Terrorism Center at 
West Point, NY, assisted us in mining terrorism-related data and also provided numer-
ous declassified reports of interrogations of captured insurgents in Iraq. Finally, we are 
grateful to the Natick Operations Center at the U.S. Army Natick  Soldier Systems Center, 
MA, especially to Amir Diengdoh and Jacqueline Hope, for providing workspace and 
many hours of administrative support for one of our senior fellows.
In the joint community and beyond, we owe great thanks to the NDU, which housed 
the main body of our team for the duration of our project. In addition to our colleagues 
at NDU-CISA, we received particular support from Colonel (Ret.) John Agoglia, who 
devoted much time to reviewing our history of the 2003 invasion for accuracy; and from 
Scott Gower, who, as librarian of NDU’s classified collections, generously gave his time 
to help us mine the classified and unclassified archives that he curates. NDU’s Center for 
Complex Operations gave us access to its extensive archive of documents from the Pro-
vincial Reconstruction Teams and other organizations in Iraq.
At the U.S. Central Command History Office, David “Scotty” Dawson and Charles 
Newell helped us comb through archives and provided their own expert knowledge 
about the Iraq campaign. Daniel Darling, one of Central Command’s finest and most pro-
lific intelligence experts, contributed several monographs that helped unlock some of the 
mysteries of the Iraqi insurgency. Major General Michael Garrett, U.S. Central Command 
chief of staff, put his staff at our disposal and accomplished the Army’s most extensive 
document declassification project since World War II in support of these volumes. Their 
work enabled us to declassify almost 30,000 pages of important operational records.
Many elements from the special operations community provided unique and invalu-
able support for our project. At U.S. Special Operations Command, the Command His-
tory team helped fact-check our data, provided archival research and sources, and helped 
us gain access to key leaders. We would also like to thank the Center for Counterterror-
ism Studies and the Command History team at Joint Special Operations Command for 
enabling us to access their lessons-learned studies and historical archives. Special thanks 
across these teams go to Shawn Woodford, Colonel (Ret.) Steven Cage, Gaea Lenders, 
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and Colonel (Ret.) James Herson. Likewise, William Knarr of the Joint Special Opera-
tions University and the Institute for Defense Analyses provided invaluable primary and 
secondary sources on Anbar Province across the war, and his interviews of insurgent 
commanders and Iraqi leaders are unique among the current set of primary sources. We 
would also like to thank Colonel (Ret.) Mark E. Mitchell, who helped review the special 
operations sections of our manuscript for accuracy and strength of argument.
Several coalition partners also contributed to our effort. We are thankful for the sup-
port we received from senior military officers from the United Kingdom who gave us 
interviews and helped us to better understand their campaign in southern Iraq. Italian, 
Danish, and Polish senior leaders were similarly generous with their time and proved 
indispensable in providing perspective and detail about the efforts of our allies.
We are grateful to Gordon W. Rudd of the Marine Corps University at Quantico, 
VA, for his insights and providing us with interviews pertaining to the early post-in-
vasion period. Also at the university, the Marine Corps History Division helped us to 
understand better the Marine Corps’ role in Iraq. Fred H. Allison furnished transcribed 
and digital recordings of key Marine and Army personnel in Multi-National Force-West, 
Nicholas Schlosser facilitated our access to the unclassified archives at Quantico, and 
Annette Amerman and Gregory Cina supplied command chronologies and published 
histories.
At the Institute for Defense Analyses, Kevin M. Woods shared important primary 
source materials on the Iraqi perspective from the 2003 invasion, as well as materials that 
yielded insights into Iraqi irregular forces. He also shared the important memoir written 
by former Iraqi Lieutenant General Raad Hamdani. At the Joint Center for Operational 
Analysis, Albert Musgrove shared very useful materials from the Joint and Coalition 
Operational Analysis’ Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) archives. Kyle Orton, a fellow 
at the London based Henry Jackson Society, provided invaluable assistance with under-
standing al-Qaeda in Iraq and Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in general and their connec-
tions to former Ba’ath officers.  Finally, at the Joint History Office of the Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, Brigadier General (Ret.) John F. Shortal and his team provided access to 
a wealth of material pertaining to the 2003 invasion, including documents from the Joint 
Staff and classified synopses of the Pentagon’s planning for OIF.
Outside the Department of Defense, Seth Center of the State Department History 
Office spent many hours with us discussing his research on the Iraq War and ours, and 
helping us sharpen our historical arguments. At the RAND Corporation, Colonel (Ret.) 
David E. Johnson shared his excellent research on the Battle of Sadr City, and Walter L. 
Perry shared his detailed study on the early phases of the war. At the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), Clayton D. Laurie and the CIA history staff furnished a manuscript that 
covered the invasion period of the war. Outside the U.S. Government, Kimberly Kagan 
and Marisa Cochrane Sullivan of the Institute for the Study of War generously gave us 
access to their maps, primary source material, and published reports on the Iraq War. We 
also owe special thanks to Major General (Ret.) Najim Jabouri of Iraq for his many hours 
of advice and expert input as we developed our manuscript. The ability to draw upon his 
knowledge enabled us to deepen our understanding and interpretation of many aspects 
of the war, and to understand why Iraqis were fighting.
Finally, we would like to thank the scores of individuals who granted us interviews 
or participated in discussions during this project. Their names, except for those who 
wished to remain anonymous, appear in our bibliographical section. These interviews 
and meetings enabled us to improve our understanding of the human factor and of com-
mand decision-making during the Iraq War. The interviewees, some of whom contrib-
uted many hours of their time, helped us clarify topics of concern, provided insight into 
important decisions, and gave us a more nuanced understanding of previously reported 
events. We also wish to thank the U.S. Army’s General Officer Management Office for 








STRATEGY IN CRISIS, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2006
As 2006 drew to a close, U.S. leaders in Washington and Baghdad grappled with the 
reality that the transition strategy the U.S.-led coalition had been pursuing for more than 
2 years had failed to stabilize Iraq. In the months since the February 2006 bombing of the 
Shi’a shrine in Samarra, Iraq had descended into a sectarian civil war, with violence worst 
in the Iraqi capital and its surrounding areas. By mid-October, three successive U.S.-Iraqi 
operations to tamp down the sectarian attacks in Baghdad had failed, and violence had 
only increased. The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) campaign plan had envisioned a 
reduction of U.S. forces to about 100,000 by the end of 2006. Instead, MNF-I Commander 
General George W. Casey, Jr. had been forced to cancel unit redeployments, call forward 
in-theater reserves from Kuwait, and authorize extensions of U.S. units in response to the 
dire security situation in Baghdad.
For more than 2 years, Casey, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander Gen-
eral John P. Abizaid, and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld had been 
the principal architects of U.S. military strategy in Iraq, but their grip on the campaign 
began to slip in the fall of 2006. In December, the ground would shift under their feet as 
a variety of high-profile groups offered alternatives to Casey’s strategy. In the space of 
less than 2 months, President George W. Bush would dramatically change the strategy 
guiding the U.S. campaign in Iraq and would appoint new commanders to implement 
the revised approach.
STRATEGY OPTIONS
Moving Forward After Operation TOGETHER FORWARD
About 1 week after Abizaid’s mid-October message to Casey about the need to change 
the dynamics in Baghdad (see Volume 1, Chapter 22), Rumsfeld arrived at a similar ver-
dict. The top civilian official in the Pentagon noted the rising violence, abruptly con-
cluded that the Baghdad Security Plan had failed, and invited the MNF-I commander to 
convince him otherwise.1
Casey expected the ensuing video teleconference on November 1, 2006, to be another 
session in which to communicate his appreciation of the situation. Instead, the general 
encountered a defense secretary questioning the entire operation. What had been the 
value of committing 3,000-4,000 more Americans to Baghdad in support of Operation 
TOGETHER FORWARD, Rumsfeld wondered, if violence had only escalated? “Do you 
think the Baghdad Security Plan is working?” the secretary pointedly asked.2 “It is keep-
ing the capital from sliding into anarchy,” Casey replied. Sending additional U.S. and 
Iraqi units to Baghdad had “a dampening effect on sectarian violence,” he assessed, but 
“political action” was needed to shore up security gains.3
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General Fil, Jr., (left) SECDEF Rumsfeld (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Nicole Kojetin (Released).
Major General Joseph Fil, Jr., Commanding General, MND-B,  
With SECDEF Rumsfeld.4
Yet making progress on the political front seemed as difficult as it had ever been. This, 
perhaps, was Rumsfeld’s point. To Rumsfeld, the late October 2006 incident (see Volume 
1, Chapter 22) in which the Sadrists had forced Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to demand 
the removal of coalition checkpoints from the outskirts of Sadr City demonstrated that 
Moqtada Sadr exercised more influence over Maliki than the coalition did. The secretary 
seemed puzzled by Casey’s apparent deference to the Iraqi leader and wanted to explore 
what he saw as a mismatch in leverage. Rumsfeld observed that it looked as if Casey 
simply bowed to the Prime Minister’s will to satisfy Iraqi interests in a case where the coa-
lition had compelling interests of its own. Casey responded to Rumsfeld’s prodding with 
an explanation of his relationship to Maliki. He was in the position of merely providing 
military advice, and, as Prime Minister, Maliki could take it or leave it. The general had 
argued that lifting the checkpoints would make recovering the missing American Soldier 
more difficult and would cast the Iraqi leader as a supporter of Shi’a death squads. Casey 
related that Maliki understood the risks but had insisted on suspending the checkpoints 
nonetheless, which had settled the matter in Casey’s mind. “I don’t see it that way,” 
Rumsfeld pointed out. “You don’t work for the PM [Prime Minister].  You report through 
us—Abizaid and SECDEF—then to POTUS [President of the United States]. We decide. 
He’s not your political leader.” Casey acknowledged this fact but noted that he could not 
ignore Maliki, who was, after all, “my partner.” For clarity’s sake, the general added that 
he would never do anything that he felt would disadvantage his Soldiers or jeopardize 
the mission.5
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U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Khalilzad (left) General Casey (center).  
Source: DoD photo by Captain Amy Bishop (Released).
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad With General George Casey, Commander, 
MNF-I, and Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie.6
Rumsfeld persisted. Casey had to make Maliki understand that, in spite of his posi-
tion as Prime Minister, he did not have carte blanche in matters that involved coalition 
military operations. Yes, Maliki had the authority to make decisions, but he needed to 
understand that certain choices came with a price. If the Prime Minister insisted on dis-
mantling the checkpoints along the Army Canal, then Casey should have announced his 
intention to counter with an action undesirable enough to prompt Maliki’s reconsider-
ation. The Iraqi leader was taking advantage of the coalition because he saw no downside 
to doing so. “I don’t want to use the fifty-thousand-mile screwdriver,” the secretary ven-
tured, “but I think that if Maliki is responding to Sadr’s pressure it’s because no pressure 
is being applied from the other side.”7
Applying that pressure, as Rumsfeld saw it, was Casey’s job. When Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 
Eric S. Edelman objected, questioning whether it was fair to expect Casey to be a mili-
tary adviser on one hand while demanding he “push” Maliki with the other, Rumsfeld 
declared, “I don’t know who else it would be!” Adamant to put an end to what he saw 
as a series of “free lunches” enjoyed by Maliki at American expense, Rumsfeld urged 
Casey to make the Prime Minister understand that actions taken contrary to expressed 
U.S. interests had consequences—with troop levels as the most promising lever. 
“Maybe we should reduce the number of our forces in Baghdad? Maybe you should let 
him know that you intend to withdraw troops?” suggested Rumsfeld. “Maybe pull a 
brigade . . . send it after the Iranians and get after EFPs,” he added, using the acronym 
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for explosively formed penetrators.8 Frustrated with Maliki’s sluggishness in reducing 
sectarian violence in Baghdad, Rumsfeld’s immediate recommendation was to withdraw 
American troops from the capital.
Casey and his advisers considered the secretary’s suggestions unhelpfully aggres-
sive and confrontational. Pushing Maliki too firmly would make him more reliant on 
domestic political support and less likely to risk an independent, nonsectarian stand. 
Furthermore, Casey’s determination that MNF-I lacked credible leverage only made his 
bargaining position worse. “The Iraqis know your hands are tied in Washington,” wrote 
one adviser, offering a bleak assessment of U.S. political will. “They want their view of 
Iraqi society more than we want our view—and they both know this and know that you 
know this.”9 With coalition leverage declining, Maliki’s demands for sovereignty grew 
shriller. If Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad responded by taking an even harder line, 
then the Iraqis might well call their bluff. “Are we irrelevant because of our desire to 
withdraw?” the general wondered.10
After the November 1 video teleconference, Rumsfeld continued to dwell on the pros-
pect of reducing troop levels amid Baghdad’s escalating violence. On the eve of congres-
sional midterm elections in the United States, the SECDEF drafted a memorandum that 
listed an assortment of “new courses of action” for Iraq. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are cur-
rently doing . . . is not working well enough or fast enough,” he wrote, and proceeded to 
outline 21 options. Of these, one involved increasing the number of U.S. brigade combat 
teams (BCTs) in the theater, and he categorized it as a “less attractive option” alongside 
continuing on the “current path.”11 Further limiting the roles and responsibilities of U.S. 
forces and reducing their presence through repositioning or drawing down figured much 
more prominently in the list.12 There was no question about where Rumsfeld stood when 
it came to troop levels. The same could be said for the Republican chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, Virginia Senator John W. Warner, who sent a memorandum 
to Casey expressing concern that the MNF-I commander might be considering the pros-
pect of increasing troop strength in Iraq.13
The White House Strategy Review
Casey’s tense exchange with Rumsfeld on November 1 and the secretary’s subsequent 
input both proved inconsequential. Less than 1 week later, the American people went to 
the polls to vote in midterm elections and handed the Democrats control of both houses 
of Congress. Bush used the occasion to replace Rumsfeld, who submitted his resignation 
a day after the administration’s electoral setback, after almost 6 years at the helm of the 
Pentagon.
Since 2005, National Security Adviser Stephen J. Hadley had peppered Casey with 
questions related to Iraq operations and strategy. The barrage intensified in summer 
2006 as the National Security Council (NSC) staff’s slowly developing assessment of the 
conflict gathered momentum. The general, unaware of this quiet review, saw Hadley’s 
inquiries as a nuisance that bordered on intrusive. Nonetheless, he accepted them (and, 
at times, dismissed them) as part of the administration’s well-intentioned effort to gain 
an understanding of the complicated and shifting environment in Iraq.14 Following Had-
ley’s belated trip to Iraq at the end of October, Casey related to Rumsfeld the national 
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security adviser’s comment that the situation in Iraq seemed “really complex!”15 It only 
later dawned on the general that Hadley was asking the questions in order to develop 
alternative measures at odds with Casey’s strategy.
National Security Adviser Hadley (back, far left).  
Source: White House photo by Eric Draper (Released).
President George W. Bush With National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley  
and Vice President Richard Cheney.16
With the election over, the NSC staff ramped up its review of the U.S. Government’s 
Iraq War strategy, considering a broader array of options, to include the deployment of 
additional brigades—alternatives that Rumsfeld had vehemently opposed.17 By late 2006, 
most of the options under consideration were not hasty expediencies, but well-developed 
proposals. Some were the products of several years of analysis by respected voices both 
inside and outside of the Bush administration who had long observed that the U.S. cam-
paign in Iraq was in trouble. Among those outside the government, American Enterprise 
Institute scholar Thomas Donnelly had argued as early as November 2003 that the United 
States should implement a counterinsurgency approach in Iraq with additional American 
troops.18 Brookings Institution scholar Kenneth Pollack had repeatedly argued as early as 
2004 that more U.S. troops were needed in Iraq, and he and Georgetown professor Daniel 
Byman had warned in August 2006 that the strategy of transitioning responsibility to the 
Iraqis and reducing U.S. troop levels would be insufficient to halt Iraq’s civil war, and 
that it might, in fact, make the war worse.19 Within the administration, State Department 
officials Philip Zelikow and James Jeffrey had argued in June 2006 for sending additional 
U.S. troops to restore order in Baghdad.20 These critics of the administration’s strategy 
had been consulted by the White House over time, and as Hadley and the NSC staff 
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explored options for a different Iraq strategy, their thinking would be informed by these 
and other influential scholars and analysts.
On November 8, 2006, the same day as Rumsfeld’s resignation, Hadley submitted 
his observations on the situation in Iraq to Bush, based on Hadley’s visit to Baghdad 
the week before. With its recommendations for “a robust program of embedding coali-
tion forces” and “giving [Maliki] additional control over Iraqi forces” Hadley’s memo-
randum reinforced Casey’s idea of speeding up the transfer of security responsibility.21 
Hadley mentioned the possibility of more American forces to help reduce violence and 
stabilize Baghdad, but he indicated that this idea would be left to the MNF-I commander 
to approve. Beyond these points, however, Hadley noted that the U.S. strategy in Iraq 
depended heavily on the Maliki government’s success in promoting national reconcil-
iation and reforming the Iraqi security forces, two things the national security adviser 
doubted that Maliki had either the ability or the will to do.22
Hadley was questioning the fundamental assumption that underlay MNF-I’s plans, 
and this skepticism showed in an interagency review of the administration’s Iraq policy 
that Hadley undertook at the President’s request. On November 10, deputy national 
security adviser Jack Dyer “J. D.” Crouch launched the review, a step that finally formal-
ized the NSC staff’s 5 months of quiet inquiries in search of alternative approaches. The 
review team included several senior White House officials, including Meghan O’Sullivan 
and Brett McGurk, who had become frustrated with the MNF-I campaign plan and its 
inability to halt the violence in Iraq. Crouch and O’Sullivan were concerned that follow-
ing through on transitioning security responsibility to the Maliki government without 
first extracting meaningful concessions from the Iraqi leader might be counterproductive. 
They also believed the United States needed to be more assertive in pushing the Iraqi polit-
ical factions toward reconciliation. In addition, they consulted U.S.-based defense experts 
about the idea of a temporary surge of U.S. troops into central Iraq in order to arrest the 
sectarian violence before handing security responsibility over to the Iraqi Government. 
Casey had long believed that the United States needed to drawdown its forces in order 
to foster reconciliation among the Iraqi parties, after which violence would recede. The 
senior White House officials working on Iraq had come to the opposite conclusion: that 
U.S. forces needed to remain on the ground in order to tamp down violence and press the 
Iraqi factions to reconcile.
Casey Doubles Down on the Joint Campaign Plan
From MNF-I’s standpoint, the elections and Rumsfeld’s resignation brought a sober 
realization that the country was growing tired and dissatisfied with the war in Iraq.23 It 
lent urgency to the command’s need to reduce sectarian violence in Baghdad and make 
progress toward national reconciliation. Casey himself perceived an unsettling change in 
the President’s demeanor. On November 10, during the first video teleconference since 
the elections, Bush seemed “irritated, distant, and unmistakably cold”—an unpleasant 
departure from his usual “upbeat, warm and friendly” tone. Casey conveyed his obser-
vation to Khalilzad following the meeting and wondered what this stir in the Washing-
ton winds portended.24 He found out soon enough and later recalled that it led “to the 
most complex period of my command.”25
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As the NSC staff continued to explore ways for the United States to regain control of 
the security situation in Iraq, Casey’s response to the changed dynamics in the aftermath 
of the November 7 elections was to recommit to the transition strategy. In mid-Novem-
ber, he formulated a new campaign concept in which MNF-I would continue transferring 
security responsibility to the Iraqis as conditions warranted but would now seek to do 
so at an accelerated pace. The April 2006 campaign plan that had guided MNF-I’s march 
toward the transfer of security responsibilities had already noted that early opportunities 
to achieve Provincial Iraqi Control “must be seized and the pace of transition . . . acceler-
ated whenever possible.”26 In fact, MNF-I had dubbed 2006 as the “Year of the Police” in 
part to highlight the coalition’s effort to accelerate the Iraqi police service’s development 
in order to close the gap between its capability and that of the Iraqi Army.27
The concept of speeding up the transition also fit naturally with the ongoing effort 
to link political benchmarks with mutually reinforcing military action to improve the 
security environment. As early as July 2006, Rumsfeld had called for a set of benchmarks 
that would ostensibly coax the Iraqi Government toward reconciliation and self-reliance. 
He had hoped this publicized roadmap would serve as a “new construct for Iraq” and 
“permit a reduction of coalition forces.”28 When the latest iteration of the Baghdad Secu-
rity Plan failed to make a satisfactory dent in the levels of sectarian violence, benchmarks 
reemerged as an idea whose time had come.29 Casey saw them as political milestones that 
the Iraqis could achieve by January 2007 with coalition help. The benchmarks included 
long-standing issues like establishing a date for provincial elections, delineating the 
powers of provincial governments, de-Ba’athification, hydrocarbon revenue distribution, 
and several other items related to the rule of law, amnesty, and militias.30 Successfully 
tackling this ambitious legislative agenda would set the stage for national reconciliation 
and the transition of security responsibility during the coming year. Seeking to codify 
an Iraqi division of power that addressed the competing interests of Kurdish, Shi’a, and 
Sunni populations, the benchmark legislation formed the basis of an integrated politi-
cal-military plan.31 Yet it depended on Iraqi cooperation, and in the fall of 2006, leaders 
of the competing sects and ethnicities found compromise hard to achieve. Maliki even 
objected to the term “benchmark” as an affront to his leadership and Iraqi sovereignty.32
The crucial question of how long the coalition would be able to exercise its full author-
ity also loomed. MNF-I operated with fairly permissive guidelines under a United Nations 
(UN) security resolution that could be invalidated by the Iraqi Government at any time. 
On November 11, 2006, Maliki requested that the coalition’s mandate be extended for 
another year in its current form. However, U.S. officials in Baghdad widely viewed this 
as the last extension the Prime Minister would grant. Casey fully expected the man-
date to expire on December 31, 2007, and, when it did, the coalition would face severe 
restrictions on the kinds of operations it could conduct.33 Thus, in the last months of 2006, 
MNF-I concluded that it had roughly 1 year to set Iraq on a path toward self-reliance—a 
grim prospect given the self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence and the government’s 
unwillingness to take meaningful steps toward national reconciliation. This factor also 
informed Casey’s thinking as he pursued an accelerated timeline, even as many officials 
in Washington were concluding that the time had come to slow down the transition.
The first public debate about Casey’s new concept began on November 15 as Abi-
zaid testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee. The CENTCOM commander 
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dismissed an accelerated withdrawal of U.S. troops. He advocated instead a “major 
change” in U.S. strategy by augmenting the transition teams and reorienting U.S. units 
from combat operations to training and advising the Iraqi security forces, the very con-
cept that Casey was preparing to implement in Baghdad. When Arizona Senator John 
S. McCain III suggested that the United States should instead surge 20,000 additional 
American troops to deal with the security situation directly, Abizaid argued that a surge 
would be more than U.S. ground forces could handle. He told McCain:
We can put in 20,000 more Americans tomorrow and achieve a temporary effect. But when you look 
at the overall American force pool that’s available out there, the ability to sustain that commitment 
is simply not something that we have right now with the size of the Army and the Marine Corps.34
Taking a more direct role with more U.S. forces would also discourage the Iraqis from 
taking responsibility for their own security, Abizaid said. The senator countered, “I 
regret deeply that you seem to think that the status quo and the rate of progress we’re 
making is acceptable. I think most Americans do not.” It was a stark change from their 
past exchanges, in which McCain had been deferential to Abizaid’s expertise on Iraq and 
the Middle East, and it signaled that those who supported the Iraq War effort were losing 
patience with the Casey-Abizaid strategy.35
The following day, November 16, Casey pitched his new campaign concept to Rums-
feld, now a lame duck serving until the Senate confirmed his nominated successor, Robert 
M. Gates. The MNF-I commander began with his bottom line: “We are at a position in 
the campaign where accelerating and completing the transition of security responsibil-
ity to capable Iraqi security forces is both strategically appropriate and feasible.” When 
Rumsfeld expressed a mix of surprise and doubt, Casey clarified that the revised plan 
would not expand the scope of the ongoing transfer, nor would it entail a change to how 
the transfer would occur. “We are simply saying that there is an opportunity to transfer 
faster,” Casey explained, arguing that the acceleration itself would provide much-needed 
leverage to coax the Shi’a-dominated government down the road to reconciliation with 
Sunni Arabs and Kurds. “I thought the administration wants to speed up,” Casey added.36
Rumsfeld now offered a correction to Casey’s interpretation of where the White House 
desired to steer the U.S. mission in Iraq. “My impression,” began the secretary, “is that 
the president is determined to stay in Iraq for the remainder of his term. . . . He wants 
success.” What the President specifically needed from Casey, Rumsfeld ventured, were 
options that would not only lead to the accomplishment of the coalition’s objectives but 
also allow the President to defend himself from the critics emboldened by the Republi-
cans’ electoral setback. Casey could help the President build political support following 
the election by telling him what needed to be done to win, particularly an alternative to 
any stark policy shift the congressionally funded Iraq Study Group might propose. The 
pace of the transition thus far had been “orderly,” Rumsfeld observed, and he was skep-
tical that a suggestion to speed it up dramatically would be well received. It was true the 
President wanted new options, Rumsfeld said, but “We don’t want to recommend some-
thing to the president that is dumb.”37
Casey went on to propose a five-point plan for an accelerated transition that would 
ostensibly lead to the implementation of an Iraqi-brokered reconciliation program 
ending the violence among competing factions. The coalition would push to complete 
11
STRATEGY IN CRISIS, OCTOBER-DECEMBER 2006
the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqi Government in 2007. Beginning in 2008, 
MNF-I would transition to a new mission and establish a new security arrangement with 
the Iraqis. On its way to this milestone, the force would gradually reduce its presence and 
visibility—both in terms of troop levels and security-related tasks. Increasing the size of 
military transition teams would be the primary means of carrying out the acceleration. 
While these enhanced teams focused on training the Iraqi security forces and coordi-
nating support for their independent combat operations, other coalition forces would 
concentrate on defeating Sunni and Shi’a terrorists and death squads.38 As the coalition 
adjusted its posture to speed up the process of transferring control and improving Iraqi 
capability, Casey expected Maliki’s government to make progress on reconciliation. Spe-
cifically, this entailed taking a harder line against Shi’a militia groups and putting a stop 
to their sectarian cleansing in and around Baghdad. However, the general admitted that 
it was an open question as to whether the Prime Minister had the political will and cour-
age to do so.39
As alternatives, Casey considered maintaining the status quo, raising troop levels, or 
withdrawing on a fixed schedule. He dismissed outright the last option and opined that 
additional forces would provide only a “temporary and local solution”—assuming the 
Iraqis found such a reversal of coalition force levels acceptable in the first place.40 Not 
surprisingly, Rumsfeld panned the choice to deploy reinforcements. “More would not be 
helpful,” he declared. It would amount to just “feeding the alligator.”41
The task of describing how to operationalize the accelerated transition plan fell to 
Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli. The MNC-I commander explained to Rumsfeld 
that the new effort, dubbed the transition bridging strategy, would focus on two elements: 
training the Iraqi security forces and conducting strike operations, both independently 
against high-value extremist targets and in support of Iraqi-led efforts. Reorienting divi-
sions and BCTs onto these two mission sets would allow them to shed manpower-inten-
sive tasks focused on sustained area security, and thus reorganize their formations along 
more functional lines. To illustrate the idea, Chiarelli demonstrated how a U.S. brigade 
would array its forces in a generic province where an Iraqi Army division was assigned. 
A reinforced battalion would devote one company to help Iraqi units secure the border 
and to enhance transition teams at the province’s ports of entry. Another company would 
supplement the coalition police transition teams posted in Iraqi police district headquar-
ters and stations. In the most significant change, four companies would support the 14 
or so military transition teams embedded with the Iraqi Army brigades and battalions 
operating in the province. Each transition team of roughly a dozen U.S. troops could be 
reinforced by one platoon, doubling or tripling the team’s size.42
In theory, this enhancement provided a number of advantages. It would bolster the 
inherent combat power of transition teams and allow them to operate farther afield from 
coalition bases. Additional numbers meant that the team could better supervise the Iraqi 
unit to which it was assigned down to the company level, an issue that had been debated, 
but rejected when the teams were first organized in 2005. Chiarelli later described this 
enhanced capacity as “24/7 coverage” that would deter Iraqi military leaders from imple-
menting sectarian agendas.43 The BCT would also maintain a “strike battalion”—Chi-
arelli compared it to a football team’s free safety—capable of serving as a quick-reaction 
force and conducting offensive operations against high-profile targets. Finally, another 
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battalion would assume responsibility for fixed-site security for providing enablers to 
coalition and Iraqi forces operating in the province.
Two uncertain qualifiers threatened the implementation of the concept at its very 
outset. First, it depended on the evenhandedness of the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Govern-
ment and the willingness of the political elite to make substantive progress toward national 
reconciliation. Second, it required interagency support. If brigades had to reorganize in 
order to accelerate the transition, they would have to shed some of the nonmilitary tasks 
they had been performing due to staffing shortfalls in civilian agencies, Chiarelli said. 
To illustrate, he mentioned building capacity for the Iraqi Ministry of Health, which, at 
the moment, had only one adviser while Iraqi security forces personnel occupied over 80 
percent of the coalition’s military hospital beds.44
As he listened to Chiarelli, Rumsfeld pressed the senior military commanders in Iraq 
to articulate the nonmilitary support they needed in specific terms, such as assistance in 
tackling corruption and sectarianism within the Iraqi police.45 On the whole, although 
Rumsfeld was dubious about Casey’s modified strategy, he seemed sold on the transi-
tion bridging concept by the end of the session. Granting that the specific numbers for 
transition-team enhancement still needed to be determined, he labeled the concept as 
“clear and understandable.” The secretary observed that it “seemed inconsistent with 
‘clear-hold-build’ or whatever,” and he gave every indication of being comfortable with 
that fact.46
The Council of Colonels
Back at the Pentagon, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine Corps General 
Peter Pace, worked on formulating the Joint Chiefs’ input to the White House strategy 
review. Earlier in the fall, retired General John M. “Jack” Keane had suggested that Pace 
form a Council of Colonels to conduct an independent assessment of the Global War on 
Terrorism and generate options regarding the future course of U.S. military policy in 
Iraq, and Pace had accepted the suggestion.47 On November 22, the council presented its 
work to the Joint Chiefs, outlining three broad options for the United States in Iraq: “go 
big, go long, or go home.”48 Colonel Herbert Raymond “H. R.” McMaster, who had com-
manded the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tel Afar, Iraq, from 2005 to 2006, champi-
oned the “go big” option—formally dubbed the “expanded effort”—in which the United 
States would “significantly increase economic, political, and military effort to stimulate 
the economy, strengthen governance, secure the population and regain the strategic ini-
tiative.” Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, whose 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Divi-
sion, had fought against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in Karbala in 2004, argued for the “go 
long” option of deliberately adjusting the provision of resources and support in Iraq and 
adopting a smaller but “sustainable U.S. military presence” that could help the Iraqis 
“defeat the insurgency and quell sectarian violence” in a “long-duration effort.” Marine 
Colonel Thomas C. Greenwood, who had served on the NSC staff in 2003 and had com-
manded the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) in Babil Prov-
ince in 2005, made the case for the “go home,” or “strategic disengagement,” option, a 
phased withdrawal from the country by the end of 2007 along with a much less ambitious 
end state.49
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Over several weeks of deliberations, a majority of the colonels who comprised the 
council advocated the “go long” option, and on November 22, they presented to Pace 
a paper outlining this course of action. “We are losing in Iraq because we are not win-
ning,” and as a result the United States should reorient its current effort, they advised.50 
Iraqi governments at the national, provincial, and local levels lacked both legitimacy 
and effectiveness, as did the indigenous security forces that ostensibly supported them. 
Caught up in the whirlwind of economic distress, inadequate essential services, lawless-
ness, destabilizing foreign influences, and sectarian violence, the country was careening 
toward civil war. “Our modified strategy,” the group explained, “is focused on revers-
ing these trends as we transfer responsibility for governance and security to Iraqis.”51 
The paper went on to outline a strategic design to “accelerate Iraq in the lead” and pave 
the way for success by “changing the political and military dynamic on the ground.”52 
Given an Iraqi commitment to reconciliation, the U.S. military would “shift its main effort 
from a U.S.-led counterinsurgency effort to training and partnering efforts.”53 This would 
entail a gradual, though accelerated, transition of security responsibility. As conditions 
improved and the Iraqi security forces proved capable of independent operations, U.S. 
units would adopt a posture of “regional overwatch” and reach a point of sustainable 
presence in 2008.54
Pace provided a copy of the council’s paper to Casey, who participated by videocon-
ference with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the same day. The MNF-I commander was not 
impressed with the colonels’ work. Casey graded their efforts a “C-plus” and dismissed 
a subsequent version as not very useful. He charged that the colonels had arrived at their 
recommendations by simply assuming away thorny problems, such as achieving unity 
of effort among MNF-I, the Embassy, and coalition partners, and obtaining Iraqi Gov-
ernment cooperation on reconciliation and the reduction of sectarian violence.55 From 
Casey’s perspective, well-intentioned but uninformed officers in Washington had passed 
over the most difficult tasks facing the coalition in Iraq in order to recommend a strategy 
that MNF-I was, for the most part, already pursuing. “We’re doing most, if not all, of the 
operational things mentioned, and have been for some time,” he wrote in an e-mail to 
Pace.56 Casey also believed the chairman’s select colonels had failed to appreciate that the 
struggle in Iraq had everything to do with the struggle for political and economic power. 
To see the fight as a counterinsurgency spiraling downward into a civil war amounted 
to a misdiagnosis, he charged. Sectarian violence had emerged as the greatest threat to 
accomplishing the campaign’s objectives, a change that “leads you to the fact that Iraqis 
have to solve their own problems—including the division of . . . power, and sectarian 
violence,” Casey insisted. “It also leads you to the fact that we have to rely on [the Iraqis] 
to make the tough choices and expect them to move at a pace that is probably slower 
than we want.”57 By incorrectly interpreting the basis of the conflict and stretching out 
the remedy over a long period of time, the Council of Colonels’ strategy failed to put suf-
ficient pressure on the Iraqis to force them to change, Casey believed.
Nevertheless, the reorientation of the current effort proposed by the Council of Colo-
nels generally aligned with Casey’s concept for accelerated transition. The group found 
MNF-I’s timeline for transferring security responsibilities ambitious and considered the 
concept for assuming “overwatch” to be too vague, but besides these two issues, the only 
other major difference revolved around U.S.-Iraqi unit partnership.58 As a mechanism for 
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facilitating transition, the council recommended partnering a U.S. BCT with each Iraqi 
division to provide oversight and support. “We’re way past that,” Casey objected.59 As 
more and more Iraqi units assumed the lead, command and control in a partnered arrange-
ment had become too cumbersome, according to Casey. “We want to cut the umbilical 
cord,” he told Pace.60 Partnership had worked at one time, but now that kind of relation-
ship only hampered progress toward Iraqi self-sufficiency, he argued, even though he 
and Chiarelli had recommended a similar approach in their session with Rumsfeld a few 
days before.
Casey had even stronger objections when the discussion with the Joint Chiefs turned 
to the option of a surge of five U.S. brigades, the same idea that McCain had put to 
Abizaid 1 week before. Casey acknowledged, as he had earlier in the month, that more 
troops would have a “temporary, local impact.” He doubted, however, that, “the tacti-
cal gain was worth possibly unhinging” the ongoing process of transition. Recalling the 
recent churning of Iraqi politics that stemmed from the coalition’s request to commit 
CENTCOM’s MEU reserve to Anbar, the general added that they could not count on 
unconditional Iraqi Government concurrence. Nonetheless, Casey admitted that, if given 
extra troops, he would have no trouble finding missions for them in Baghdad or in the 
rural areas just to the north and south of the capital. Other potential areas where the extra 
forces would be of use were Diyala, Anbar, and other border provinces. Pace told Casey 
that the Army Staff and Joint Forces Command had validated the possibility of a surge 
of 5 BCTs that could bring the force in Iraq up to 20 U.S. brigades from April to October 
2007, but Casey reiterated to Pace that existing troop levels were adequate. As he consid-
ered the matter from Baghdad, Casey dismissed the chairman’s offer as just another staff 
exercise.61
Mixed Messages at Amman
On November 30, 2006, Bush met with Maliki in Amman, Jordan. Seeking Bush’s sup-
port for his revised Baghdad Security Plan, the Prime Minister risked a politically dam-
aging rift with the Sadrists to attend.62 Pleased with the plan’s Iraqi origin, the President 
assured Maliki of U.S. assistance. The delegations also discussed the recommendations of 
the high-level working group on accelerating the transfer of security responsibility.63 This 
group, consisting of Casey, Khalilzad, Iraqi national security adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie, 
and the Iraqi security ministers, had convened the month before and, over the course of 
November, had identified significant Iraqi military capabilities that could be targeted 
for acceleration.64 Bush referred approvingly to this group during a post-meeting press 
conference and acknowledged the importance of speeding up the training of the Iraqi 
security forces. The President expressed his confidence in Maliki as a leader and affirmed 
the Prime Minister’s courage and willingness to enforce the law in an evenhanded way. 
Appearing to see eye to eye on the immediate road ahead, the two leaders also explored 
the development of a long-term strategic partnership.65 “The ultimate solution to stabi-
lizing Iraq and reducing violence is true national reconciliation and capable and loyal 
Iraqi forces dedicated to protecting all the Iraqi people,” concluded the two leaders’ joint 
statement.66
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Source: White House photo by Paul Morse (Released).
President George W. Bush Reaches Out to Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki in 
Amman, Jordan.67
Significantly, however, Bush mentioned his administration’s ongoing strategy review 
and, privately with Maliki, hinted at the prospect of the United States committing tens of 
thousands more U.S. Soldiers to Iraq. The price of this assistance—assuming the Iraqis 
wanted it—was the Prime Minister’s assurance that he would confront JAM and allow the 
Americans to do the same.68 This quid pro quo arrangement must have been confusing to 
Maliki. Casey had been trying to extract the same concession from him in recent weeks 
but had linked it to a promise to reduce U.S. presence and involvement. All the same, 
the Iraqi Prime Minister assured Bush that he would meet this key condition. Casey, for 
his part, left Amman unaware that Bush considered committing additional forces to be a 
serious option.69 In the meeting with the Iraqis—and in public, for that matter—the Pres-
ident’s words seemed consistent with the thrust of MNF-I’s plan to speed up the pace 
of transition. Yet Bush recalled in his memoirs that on the way home from Amman, “I 
thought about the options for a new strategy. Accelerating the handover to the Iraqis was 
not a viable approach. That sounded a lot like our current strategy, which was failing.”70
Whatever doubts the President had had in Amman, Casey took the conference as a 
sign that the President supported his evolving Iraq strategy. In a video teleconference the 
day after the meeting in Jordan, the general told Bush that his “acceptance, in principle, 
of acceleration was a very good thing” and that Maliki definitely appreciated the gesture. 
Sitting alongside Casey in Baghdad, Abizaid agreed, saying that the Prime Minister was 
pleased with the meeting and was “feeling stronger with respect to the Sadr issue.”71
Almost immediately though, Bush expressed his doubts. “Does Maliki view with 
alarm reports that JAM is killing people or that the Sunni are frightened? What will he 
do?” the President asked. Just over a day after putting Maliki on notice about getting 
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tough on JAM, Bush was growing impatient. “I’m reading reports that JAM is getting 
ready to kill more people,” the President said. “Are we saying to Maliki ‘let us take care 
of this [problem]’?” Bush also expressed hesitation about handing power over to Maliki. 
What if the Prime Minister decided to use that power for sectarian purposes once it was 
irretrievably within his grasp? Bush wondered if there was a way to turn over responsi-
bility to the Iraqis without actually giving them control.72 These were not the ruminations 
of a President comfortable with Casey’s strategy.
The Iraq Study Group
Of the strategic reviews occurring outside the walls of the White House, only the 
Iraq Study Group’s review really mattered to Casey. Chartered by Congress in March 
2006, this bipartisan body of elder statesmen, co-chaired by former Secretary of State 
James A. Baker III and former Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, had engaged in a series 
of discussions with officials and experts both inside and outside of Iraq. Many U.S. offi-
cials expected the long-anticipated Baker-Hamilton report to carry some weight once it 
appeared, though for his part, the President appeared to worry little about the fallout 
from the Iraq Study Group’s findings and sensed that his advisers fretted a bit too much 
about it. “Understand that Baker-Hamilton is not setting the orders,” Bush reminded 
video teleconference participants. “I am running this show.”73
Casey had met with the group during its visit to Iraq in August. Then, he had responded 
to questions about troop levels by assuring them that the coalition had sufficient forces 
so long as the Iraqis supplied sufficient numbers of troops and performed adequately. 
When the Iraqi security forces lagged, U.S. units would support them as needed.74 In a 
separate engagement with the group, Chiarelli also rejected the idea of applying more 
U.S. combat power to the problem. One member recalled him saying, “We’re not going 
to win this thing militarily. We’re only going to win it when we provide jobs to people, 
when we meet their basic needs, when we clean the trash up, when we deliver water, 
when we deliver electricity. Until we do that, we’re fighting a losing war.”75 Later, during 
a follow-up video teleconference with the group in mid-November, Casey assured the 
group that “I have the resources I need to succeed,” crossing out the word “win” in 
favor of “succeed” in his talking points. As far as U.S. troops were concerned, the general 
promised the group that he would continue to ask for whatever he believed he needed, 
but he judged it a mistake to overemphasize American troops’ role in a multifaceted 
ethno-sectarian struggle over the division of political and economic power. He outlined 
the danger of ramping up coalition forces: “more [U.S. troops] at this point delays Iraqi 
movement to self-reliance, gives Iraqi leaders more time to avoid hard decisions, and 
blame us for their problems, and complicates the ongoing transition.”76
When it published its findings on December 6, the Baker-Hamilton group proved to 
be a receptive audience for Casey’s message. In its final report, mainly penned by future 
deputy national security adviser Benjamin J. Rhodes, the Iraq Study Group presented 
what it called “a new approach” and a “better way forward.”77 However, its findings 
largely corroborated Casey’s viewpoint and endorsed the strategy of drawing down U.S. 
troops and shifting the coalition’s primary mission to one of supporting the Iraqi Army. 
“The Iraqi government should accelerate assuming responsibility for Iraq security,” the 
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report read.78 That acceleration would be facilitated by the growth of indigenous security 
forces and a rise in the number of embedded U.S. trainers. The group’s philosophical 
stance echoed the central imperative of Casey’s campaign plan, and as Casey and Abi-
zaid had long done, the group assumed that a reduction in the U.S. role would naturally 
prompt the Iraqi factions to reconcile among themselves. “The most important ques-
tions about Iraq’s future are now the responsibility of Iraqis,” the report concluded. “The 
United States must adjust its role in Iraq to encourage the Iraqi people to take control of 
their own destiny.”79 The group also recommended opening negotiations with Iran and 
Syria to address the destabilizing influence those countries had on Iraq’s security.80
At Amman a week before the Iraq Study Group report appeared, Maliki and his 
advisers had pressed Bush for a similar emphasis on handing them security responsibil-
ity in an accelerated fashion. However, other Iraqi leaders responded to the report with 
criticism, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani foremost among them. “As a whole, I reject this 
report,” he told CNN, describing its recommendations for a U.S. troop withdrawal as 
“very dangerous” and a virtual repeat of the 1991 decision to abandon the Iraqi Kurds 
and Shi’a as they fought against the Ba’athist regime.81 In the course of events, Talabani’s 
fear that the United States would adopt the Iraq Study Group’s drawdown recommenda-
tion proved unfounded. Even as the Baker-Hamilton report reached the public, the Bush 
administration was already considering options for increasing the U.S. troop presence, 
not reducing it.
Exploring the Surge Option
Within the Pentagon, U.S. military officials circulated a five-page minority report 
from the Council of Colonels authored by McMaster, which called for the deployment of 
additional U.S. brigades.82 McMaster’s paper acknowledged the need for continuing the 
development of Iraqi security forces and taking steps toward reconciliation, but he argued 
that a revised military scheme of maneuver could help interrupt the cycle of sectarian 
violence. With its main effort in Baghdad, MNC-I could ill afford to strip American units 
from the capital in order to reinforce efforts to disrupt or defeat Sunni and Shi’a extrem-
ists elsewhere. Thus, the United States needed more troops. A brigade posted southeast 
of Baghdad, in Wasit Province, would be able to disrupt the flow of explosively formed 
penetrators into the country from Iran and serve as a tangible counter to Iran’s increas-
ingly malignant influence. One additional brigade would also exploit ongoing success 
against al-Qaeda in Iraq in Anbar while another could be spread across the belt of towns 
and rural terrain north of Baghdad to deny the organization sanctuaries and disrupt its 
campaign to terrorize the capital. Finally, McMaster recommended that a fourth BCT be 
employed as an offensive force anywhere in Iraq, and that the special operations task 
force add Shi’a extremists to its target set.83
McMaster and other members of the Council of Colonels who dissented from the 
group’s majority endorsement of a gradual U.S. drawdown in Iraq got a chance to pres-
ent their ideas for a surge to Pace and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
Edmund P. Giambastiani. Pace was somewhat sympathetic to McMaster’s arguments 
that the transition strategy was bound to fail because it “underestimated our enemies, 
and it overestimated the Iraqi government and security forces’ will and capability.”84 
18
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
McMaster’s ideas would not become part of Pace’s and the Joint Chiefs’ ultimate input to 
the White House strategy review. Instead, the chairman tasked the group to write a mem-
orandum defending the gradual drawdown that Pace could share with the White House. 
McMaster, despite being the most vocal critic of the drawdown option, was selected by 
the group to author the memorandum. Forced to defend an idea he disavowed, McMas-
ter wrote that the only benefit of a drawdown was that it would require no further U.S. 
troops, but deputy national security adviser Crouch did not include the halfhearted 
memo in the papers submitted for the NSC principals.85
Though the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not adopt McMaster’s proposals, the colonel’s 
ideas would soon be closely mirrored by influential work from outside the military, 
where a consensus began to emerge among defense analysts in Washington that a surge 
of U.S. troops into Iraq would be needed to secure the country. Along with a handful of 
other defense analysts, Frederick W. Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 
had been invited by Stephen Hadley to Camp David in June 2006 during the early stages 
of the White House strategy review. The former West Point history professor believed 
the administration had mishandled the occupation of Iraq and took the opportunity to 
suggest to the President that more U.S. troops would be necessary to salvage the war 
effort.86 In the following months, Kagan fleshed out a concept for stabilizing Baghdad 
that emphasized protecting the population rather than transferring security responsibil-
ity to the Iraqis. He saw the development of indigenous forces as essential to progress, 
but he considered MNF-I’s approach inappropriate, given the violence racking the coun-
try. Casey’s strategy of accelerated transition could not succeed rapidly enough, argued 
Kagan. Beefing up the number of embedded trainers in the Iraqi security forces would 
be counterproductive. Shifting the weight of U.S. manpower from combat operations to 
concentrate mainly on an advisory mission would effectively remove trained and ready 
forces from the battlefield and likely lead to an escalation in violence far beyond the capa-
bilities of Iraqi units to handle. The effort to develop local security forces had to continue, 
but hastening the transition without first reducing violence to manageable levels risked 
pursuing a strategy until it plunged off a cliff.87
Kagan also challenged the premise held by Casey and Abizaid that coalition forces 
were antibodies whose disruptive presence should be mitigated by reducing their 
involvement. This theory could not be reconciled with the available data. Marked shifts 
in the levels of violence for a specific area did not correspond with increases or decreases 
in the number of coalition troops posted there. By late 2006, the violence consisted largely 
of Iraqi-on-Iraqi incidents, and a drop in attacks on U.S. forces amid sharply rising civil-
ian casualties did not equate to enduring stability. According to Kagan, long-term suc-
cess required political progress and economic development. However, the equation that 
yielded this result required rebalancing—and soon.88
Retired General Jack Keane had arrived at a similar conclusion. He determined that 
Casey’s Iraq strategy was unraveling under the strain of growing sectarian violence. 
From his perch on the Defense Policy Board, the former Army vice chief of staff had been 
making the case for a new strategy to defeat the insurgency since August 2006. The new 
approach, he believed, needed to start with protecting the population. Doing so required 
a consistent forward presence in Iraqi neighborhoods and, thus, more troops. He advised 
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Rumsfeld and Pace that the focus on transition was wrong and pressed them to replace 
Abizaid and Casey with commanders who would adopt a new approach.89
Keane’s operational expertise and credibility with senior officials prompted Kagan 
to invite him to an exercise at the American Enterprise Institute on December 2-3, in 
which a mix of civilian analysts and retired military officers explored in detail how to 
implement an alternative concept centered on improving population security. Among 
the participants were retired Colonel Joel Armstrong, who just a few months before had 
been McMaster’s deputy commander in Tel Afar, and retired Major Daniel Dwyer, who 
had been McMaster’s chief of plans. The two retired officers brought with them an influ-
ential testimonial that a surge of U.S. troops executing a counterinsurgency approach 
could achieve results, as the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment had done in Tel Afar.90 AEI’s 
Iraq Planning Group concluded that extending the combat tours of forces already in Iraq 
and accelerating the deployment for units next to deploy could “produce a surge of two 
Marine RCTs [regimental combat teams] and five Army BCTs” in March 2007 that could 
be sustained for a full year.91 Most of the reinforcements would help secure Baghdad 
by establishing a continuous presence among the population through small-unit combat 
outposts and foot patrols. The extra Marines would exploit the burgeoning success in 
Anbar, where the early signs of a turnaround under Colonel Sean MacFarland and his 
1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, could be seen. Kagan originally figured 
it would take around 10 additional BCTs. Keane had arrived at his own estimate earlier, 
placing the number between 8 and 10.92
Participants in the exercise looked more deliberately into the forces required to deal 
with the threat groups plaguing each of Baghdad’s diverse neighborhoods and then bal-
anced this need with what was possible given the Army’s slate of ready and available 
units. Keane later learned from the Army staff that five brigades were indeed the max-
imum that could be committed to any “surge.”93 Rather than full regiments, the Marine 
Corps would send two more battalions. This aside, the exercise confirmed to Keane not 
only the rationale for dispatching additional troops but also a plan for how they might 
be applied.94 As it turned out, the specifics of this blueprint did not directly inform coali-
tion planners in Baghdad.95 However, the AEI process of deriving it equipped Keane and 
sympathetic U.S. officials with evidence to argue for a surge of U.S. forces to Iraq.
THE SURGE DECISION
U.S. Leaders Grope for the “New Way Forward”
As the White House continued with its review, the NSC staff began to assemble strat-
egy input from the Pentagon, State Department, CENTCOM, and MNF-I, all of which the 
NSC principals would consider in a series of meetings beginning December 8. In formu-
lating his input, Casey had to account for some of the competing ideas that had begun to 
emerge from other quarters in Washington, including the idea of a surge of U.S. troops. 
In an e-mail sent to Pace and Abizaid on December 6, Casey wrote that if a troop increase 
was considered, he favored a temporary surge of three Iraqi brigades to Baghdad and 
remained open to the idea of supplementing this force with coalition units already in 
Iraq. Alternatively, he could consider moving the 82d Airborne Division’s ready brigade 
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to Kuwait from Fort Bragg, NC. Though conceding that the security situation was grim, 
Casey was not inclined to ask for more troops that first week of December. In spite of 
the Iraqi security forces’ well-known shortcomings, the general gave them the benefit of 
the doubt. He made a distinction between “poor to fair” police forces and “fair to good” 
army units and believed that, on balance, they all would continue to improve steadily 
with coalition support and oversight.96 In Casey’s view, a “fully resourced counterinsur-
gency strategy” of the kind that the McMaster paper advocated should consist of more 
U.S. civilian expertise embedded in provincial reconstruction teams, adequate economic 
investment, and meaningful outreach by the Government of Iraq to assuage the popula-
tion’s grievances.97 It should not mean sending additional American troops.
On the eve of the NSC principals’ meetings, Casey worked to extract political guar-
antees from Maliki that the Iraqi leader would support the accelerated transition strategy 
Casey hoped to execute. For some time, Casey and Khalilzad had been urging Maliki 
to realign his base of political support and allow MNF-I greater latitude in attacking 
Moqtada Sadr’s military organization. However, Maliki’s conception of the dominant 
threat to Iraq differed from the coalition’s. In consultations with Casey, the Prime Minister 
insisted that a Ba’athist resurgence presented the gravest danger to stability. Admitting to 
a variety of threats, Maliki preferred to approach each in a different way. Terrorists and 
former regime elements (that is, the Iraqi Government’s Sunni enemies) were best dealt 
with militarily, he asserted, while Shi’a militias were more effectively handled through 
the political process.98 The fact that Maliki’s political survival relied on an accommoda-
tion with the Sadrists explained his reluctance to confront JAM in Baghdad and allow 
the Americans to conduct raids into the militia’s Sadr City sanctuary. MNF-I’s apparent 
fixation on JAM also made the Prime Minister suspicious. On December 6, to allay Mali-
ki’s fear that the coalition might ally with the Sunnis in an all-out war against the Shi’a, 
Casey summoned the coalition’s special operations task force commander to Baghdad to 
brief the Prime Minister on a long-running string of operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq 
and Ansar al Sunna. The task force’s relentless pace (five to seven operations per night, 
on average), its ability to strike throughout the country, and its focus on Sunni extrem-
ists seemed to impress Maliki.99 The task force commander presented the Prime Minister 
with a compelling case that the coalition had been pulling no punches in its fight against 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
However, more could be done to undermine the threat posed by Shi’a death squads. 
When the task force commander explained that JAM’s campaign of violence and intim-
idation tended to drive Sunni citizens into the arms of AQI for protection, Maliki con-
curred. Admitting that militias were not the all-around positive force that many Iraqis 
believed, the Prime Minister took the task force commander’s point and turned it on its 
head: Sunnis needed to be persuaded to seek protection only from legitimate government 
forces.100 Unsurprisingly, the question of the Prime Minister’s willingness to confront 
JAM would figure prominently in the White House’s strategy review.
Back in Washington, Rumsfeld—still serving as SECDEF as Robert Gates prepared to 
take over—provided his own input to the President on December 8, the same day that 
the NSC principals began their deliberations. Outlining a strategy for what he called a 
“new phase,” Rumsfeld advised that the United States should “accelerate the transition, 
refocus the partnership, and stabilize the region,” recommendations that drew heavily 
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from the bridging concept briefed by Casey and Chiarelli. “The U.S. military is prepared 
to do its tasks as recommended in the proposal,” Rumsfeld wrote on the cover page. “The 
test will be whether or not the non-military tasks—the critically needed political objec-
tives—can be achieved and whether we are able to get the necessary cooperation from 
the Government of Iraq.”101
From December 8 to 15, the NSC principals met in an intense series of daily discus-
sions, with Abizaid present and Casey participating remotely from Baghdad. Though not 
all of the participants realized it, by the time these sessions began, Bush had committed 
to a “new way forward” and intended to announce it in a speech before Christmas. Only 
the “way” itself was not fully formed. The President wanted to hear options. On the first 
day of discussions, Crouch, addressing the question of Iraqi security force readiness, laid 
out two proposals that mainly differed in terms of the level of U.S. military involvement. 
Neither satisfied the President, who did not want to hand control over to the Iraqis if they 
were not ready, but also did not want to wait 6 months until the effects of retraining and 
reform materialized. No one had a problem with transition per se. Bush agreed that the 
“new way forward” would be about “giving it to the Iraqis,” but the question was how 
fast that transition should take place and under what conditions. He asked Casey what 
“yardstick” the Prime Minister would use to determine when his military could actually 
shoulder the burden of independent counterinsurgency operations.102
Casey reminded the President about what had been discussed at Amman. The Iraqis 
would have control over all 10 of their divisions by spring. Baghdad Province was 
expected to pass to provincial Iraqi control in the summer. In the meantime, U.S. forces 
would reduce their presence in urban areas and gradually assume an overwatch role. “So 
6 more months of the same stuff?” the President asked skeptically. Casey tried to correct 
what he viewed as an oversimplification of his approach, but Bush’s frustration was obvi-
ous. Although barely more than a week old, the arrangement struck at Amman seemed 
stale in the President’s eyes. “Does this argue for more U.S. forces as a bridge?” Bush 
asked the general. “If the Iraqis commit to end sectarian violence and ask us for help, then 
we should seriously consider adding more forces. But to do this without their commit-
ment or to do it unilaterally? Then that is something we should not do,” Casey replied.103
When it came to Maliki’s commitment to stand up to JAM and mitigate its overtly 
sectarian agenda, the President voiced similar doubts, finding it ironic that the Iraqi 
Prime Minister seemed to be the principal “roadblock” to a renewed U.S. effort to stabi-
lize the country. “How do we give [Maliki] responsibility without causing a disaster?” 
Bush asked. When Casey mentioned that Maliki “lacked political will,” the President 
responded, “One option is to find someone else.” In its discussion the following day, the 
group revisited the possibility of replacing the Prime Minister. Abizaid observed that 
he had “yet to see Maliki show backbone on anything” and thus saw danger in basing 
the “new way forward” on the Iraqi leader’s political will. Bush reiterated his desire for 
something “dramatic” or “game-changing.” The “new way forward”—whatever form it 
took—would have to “put us in a position where we can win.” He again suggested that 
it might be “time to choose somebody else,” but Khalilzad and the secretary of state con-
vinced him that positioning Maliki for success was the more prudent course.104
Reportedly, the Prime Minister had boasted to his close advisers in early Decem-
ber that senior U.S. officials needed him more than he needed them. The Americans, 
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he reasoned, would avoid actions likely to bring about the fall of his government. Nor 
would they press for a wholesale change in leadership. In the meantime, he could work 
to consolidate state power.105 Though a bit overconfident, this stance apparently left some 
room for give and take. Following their video teleconferences with the President, Casey 
and Khalilzad made an evening visit to Maliki on December 10 to argue that no illegal 
armed group, Sunni or Shi’a, should be left with a sanctuary anywhere in Iraq, let alone 
in the capital. The general began by explaining that coalition and Iraqi staffs were hard 
at work putting the Prime Minister’s revised security plan in place. Transition based 
on the Amman agreement remained a central element, but a key characteristic of the 
impending set of operations was the aggressive targeting of all criminal elements. Maliki 
agreed with Casey in principle and used the acknowledged sectarian behavior of the 
Iraqi security forces as a lever to press for more specially trained units under his close 
control. The Prime Minister hoped to dominate the militias not through kinetic opera-
tions against their fighters, but by demonstrating the government’s unmatched ability 
to go after Sunni terrorists. Jumping on Maliki’s admission that neither terrorists nor 
militias should be permitted sanctuary, Casey inquired about whether the coalition could 
carry out raids into Sadr City. The Prime Minister consented to raids led by Iraqi special 
operations forces with coalition support, to include armor and air assets as required.106
When the NSC principals resumed their discussions the following day, Casey reported 
to the President that Maliki had taken a more positive stance on launching raids into Sadr 
City. The President accepted this news, but the question still lingered: would the Prime 
Minister “lose his nerve” when it came time to press the fight against the Shi’a militias? 
Would he balk when MNF-I ramped up its targeting of Shi’a extremists?107 In its attempt 
to persuade Maliki to confront the Shi’a militants, the White House had aimed to place the 
Prime Minister at the head of a proposed bloc of Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish “moderates” 
(defined by the White House as those who rejected violence and extremism) including 
Grand Ayatollah Ali Husayni Sistani, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, and Tariq Hashimi. Hadley 
and Crouch suggested in the December 11 deliberations that marginalizing extremists 
on both sides of the sectarian divide would theoretically allow the Prime Minister to act 
more boldly from a moderate stance.108 The fact that those viewed as moderates in Iraqi 
politics had failed thus far to arrive at a basic consensus regarding the future course of 
Iraq presented an imposing problem, Hadley pointed out.109 For the President, the pleas-
antries exchanged at Amman had not satisfied doubts about Maliki’s motives and his 
vision for Iraq. Bush wanted the “new way forward” speech to signify a clearly identifi-
able departure point, and he wanted Maliki unreservedly along for the ride. The Prime 
Minister must “stand up” and publicly say that the Iraqi Government will be “going after 
all outside the law,” Bush insisted.110
Having upped the ante on what he expected from Maliki, Bush sent Casey and Khalil-
zad back to the Prime Minister on December 12 for a follow-on discussion in which they 
obtained new assurances. Maliki would issue a written order directing the Iraqi secu-
rity forces to pursue and apprehend all lawbreakers regardless of sect and to eliminate 
their safe havens. Again, the Prime Minister asked about acquiring additional Iraqi forces 
under his direct control. Casey promised him that he was working on this, as well as 
the implementation of the revised Baghdad Security Plan. This visit also affirmed the 
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understanding between Casey and Maliki that upcoming operations would be set in the 
context of an accelerated transition based on the Amman agreement.111
The President Decides
Despite Casey and Maliki’s discussions, it would soon become clear that the President 
of the United States had no intention of proceeding along the lines that Casey and Maliki 
believed had been agreed to in Amman. In explaining the violence in Iraq as the result of 
a complex communal struggle for power, Casey may have been correct in his diagnosis. 
However, Bush had come to disagree with the general’s prescription of drawing down 
to win. After months of holding his cards close to his chest, the President would finally 
make this explicitly clear.
Bush’s deepening skepticism of Iraqi political initiatives as the solution to Iraq’s chaos 
reflected the fact that after almost 2 years of relying on an Iraqi political process as the 
key to stability, the President had become convinced that alternative paths to victory in 
Iraq were available, in particular the deployment of additional U.S. troops. Soon after 
the Amman conference, the White House had asked Casey to address the feasibility of a 
surge, to include how more forces might mitigate the risk inherent in an accelerated tran-
sition.112 The President engaged Casey on this question in the NSC principals’ discussions 
on December 8 and outlined four options for the employment of additional U.S. units in 
the deliberations of December 9.113 Repeatedly, Bush queried Casey and Khalilzad about 
the utility of sending more troops, asked if Maliki knew that he could request Ameri-
can assistance in the form of more troops, and emphasized that he—the President—was 
willing to deploy more troops.114 The United States was running out of time in Iraq, but 
a surge could buy some back, Bush said, while also demonstrating American commit-
ment.115 The window was closing on Casey’s strategy of accelerated transition as well. On 
December 11, amid the NSC principals’ deliberations, the President met with Keane and a 
coterie of defense intellectuals in the White House. Keane pitched AEI’s detailed concept 
for how additional brigades might salvage the war effort and enable MNF-I to secure the 
population of Baghdad, a task that Bush had already decided to make the centerpiece of 
any new strategy.116 Overall, Keane provided the President an external validation of his 
instincts in favor of a troop surge and lent the idea the credibility that could come from a 
well-regarded former military leader of Keane’s stature.
The following day, December 12, Casey formally provided the President and the other 
NSC principals his input to the strategy review, unaware that Keane had met the Pres-
ident the day before to recommend a troop surge. Casey offered a recapitulation of his 
plan to accelerate transition in conjunction with the Government of Iraq’s commitment to 
reconcile, two initiatives that he believed might serve as the “new way forward” the Pres-
ident was looking for. His rationale remained essentially unchanged from what he had 
briefed many times before. Iraqis were engaged in a communal struggle for power, with 
sectarian violence presenting the gravest threat to stability in the near term. Reconcilia-
tion among the competing factions would serve as the basis for the only lasting solution, 
and this long-term process was something that—ultimately—only the Iraqis themselves 
could undertake. By reducing its presence and passing security responsibility to Iraqi 
authorities, the coalition could satisfy a burgeoning Iraqi desire to exercise sovereignty 
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while buying the additional time needed to bolster indigenous military and governance 
capacity. In Casey’s estimation, the coalition could successfully arrive at its end state in 
2009 or 2010. Casey concluded his presentation by commenting on the potential impact 
of surging additional U.S. forces into Iraq. Of the eight bullet points listed, only two were 
positive.117
Casey did not yet know it, but the President had already decided against his transi-
tion strategy. On December 13, the day after Casey’s proposal, the President visited the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon to discuss the options on the table and sound them 
out about his preferred option of surging troops. Some of the groundwork had already 
been laid: on December 11, the same day Keane visited the White House, Pace had visited 
the White House separately as well and, according to Bush’s memoirs, had assured the 
President that though he would hear some concerns from the Joint Chiefs, they were pre-
pared to support him in a surge decision. Pace also reportedly told Hadley that it would 
require a surge of 5 brigades, or about 20,000 troops, to make a difference in Iraq.118
Even so, once the Pentagon meeting began, Pace presented the Joint Chiefs’ collective 
military advice, which did not recommend a surge option. Before the Council of Colonels 
had disbanded in mid-December, Pace had asked the group to summarize a draft of the 
military advice that the Joint Chiefs of Staff could provide the President. The chairman 
had softened the colonels’ hard-hitting assessment of the war to read “we are not losing, 
but we are not yet winning,” but aside from this equivocal rephrasing, the resulting pre-
sentation echoed the group’s earlier recommendations to “go long” by gradually reduc-
ing forces and shifting the main effort to the support of the Iraqi Army.119 Among the 
Joint Chiefs themselves, Army Chief of Staff General Peter J. Schoomaker was most vocal 
in making the case against a U.S. troop surge, telling the President that a five-brigade 
surge would not reduce the violence and would impose too great a strain on the U.S. 
ground forces. He also asserted that the impatient U.S. public would not support a surge 
or allow enough time for a troop increase, to which the President reportedly replied that 
the Joint Chiefs need not concern themselves with domestic political factors that were 
the President’s to manage.120 Schoomaker’s concern that the nation’s twin wars and other 
military commitments would hollow out and “break” the Army—a concern he shared 
publicly in congressional testimony on December 14—was shared by many other Army 
and Marine generals who had served as junior officers in the 1970s and concluded that 
the Vietnam war had devastated the military. But to the argument that escalating the U.S. 
commitment in Iraq would break the U.S. ground forces, Bush observed that suffering 
another humiliating defeat as in Vietnam would be more likely to break the force than 
a five-brigade troop surge, a point the Joint Chiefs conceded. Some of the service chiefs 
expressed concern that committing the U.S. strategic reserve to Iraq might be unwise 
in the event that a conflict flared up elsewhere, such as the Korean Peninsula, but the 
President replied that he would prefer to win the ongoing war in Iraq rather than hedge 
against a hypothetical one.121 “What I want to hear from you is how we’re going to win 
. . . not how we’re going to leave,” the President reportedly said.122 After this tense but 
open discussion—and against their advice—the President informed the Joint Chiefs of 
his decision to execute the troop surge.123
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Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Giambastiani (right).  
Source: White House photo by Eric Draper (Released).
President George W. Bush With Vice President Richard Cheney, General Peter Pace, 
Admiral Mike Mullen, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral  
Edmund P. Giambastiani.124
The Arrival of III Corps
Along with a strategy on the cusp of change, December 2006 brought a shift in one 
of Casey’s major subordinate units. On December 14, the day after Bush’s session with 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon, Chiarelli relinquished command of MNC-I to 
General Raymond Odierno in Baghdad. Odierno’s arrival introduced another significant 
factor into the question of whether and how to conduct a U.S. troop surge. For more 
than a year, his skepticism of the transition strategy had grown. First, as he observed the 
Iraq campaign from his post as senior military adviser to Secretary of State Condoleeza 
Rice, and then as he accompanied retired General Gary Luck on a 2005 assessment trip 
that pronounced Iraqi forces unready to assume responsibility for the country’s security. 
Before deploying to Iraq, the III Corps commander reluctantly had concluded that the 
campaign would fail if it maintained its projected course. In November, he had had a 
candid conversation at Fort Hood, TX, with his next-door neighbor, 4th Infantry Divi-
sion Commander Major General James. D. Thurman, who had arrived home after giving 
up command of Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) just days before. Thurman 
related to Odierno the failures of Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and II and the 
destabilizing role played by some of the Iraqi security forces, the same concerns he had 
voiced to Abizaid in October. Thurman emphasized how limitations in U.S. combat 
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power had hindered him from securing the Iraqi capital. “Just off-ramping is not going 
to work,” he contended. It was a path destined for failure.125
General Chiarelli (right) General Odierno (left).  
Source: DoD photo by Curt Cashour (Released).
General Peter Chiarelli Transfers Responsibility of Command of MNC-I to  
General Raymond Odierno With General George Casey Officiating.126
Thurman’s grim assessment made a deep impression on the future MNC-I com-
mander and validated Odierno’s own instinctive skepticism about the transition strat-
egy. As III Corps had prepared for its Iraq rotation in summer and fall 2006, Casey’s plan 
had envisioned the corps inheriting a force of just 13 U.S. BCTs—down from the 15 then 
deployed throughout Iraq, and Odierno had expected to oversee a continued reduction. 
As Odierno war-gamed how to employ a shrinking force, he detected a clear mismatch 
between ends and means. As Thurman had observed, it would be exceedingly difficult to 
reverse the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad without sufficient coalition troops 
to confront Iranian meddling, rein in corrupt National Police units, halt an “active Shia 
plan to control Baghdad,” and deal with an Iraqi Government that viewed everything 
through a “sectarian lens.” Meanwhile, in northern Iraq, Odierno also contemplated the 
worsening Arab-Kurd tensions along the Green Line, a problem he himself had had to 
confront as commander of Multi-National Division-North Central (MND-NC) in 2003-
2004. Iraq’s Arab-Kurd conflict would persist even as transition proceeded apace, and 
there was danger in prolonging the issue as coalition presence and influence dwindled.127 
In Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), Major General Benjamin R. “Randy” Mix-
on’s 25th Infantry Division was having trouble figuring out how to reduce its force from 
four BCTs to three without losing the operational flexibility needed to deal with the 
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complex northern Iraq conflict. Taken together, these dynamics left Odierno troubled by 
the prospect of continuing the transition.128
What the III Corps commander learned from Chiarelli only deepened his concerns. 
Shortly after Odierno’s arrival in Baghdad on December 5, Chiarelli shared the results of 
MNC-I’s 120-day assessment of the Baghdad Security Plan.129 Despite “successful tactical 
efforts,” MNC-I concluded, coalition and Iraqi forces had been “unable or not allowed to 
achieve the stated objectives.”130 The “clear-hold-build approach” seemed sound in con-
cept, but the Iraqis were not up to the task. Anchored to largely ineffective checkpoints, 
unsupported by key ministries, and infiltrated in many cases by JAM, Iraqi units suffered 
in terms of both quality and numbers. They proved unable to hold and protect cleared 
areas, and the reinforcements promised by the ministries had yet to arrive in Baghdad. 
Furthermore, Prime Minister Maliki had shielded the Shi’a militias from harm by with-
holding his approval for certain military operations and denying security forces access 
into sanctuaries like Sadr City. Perhaps most disturbing to Chiarelli, the Prime Minister’s 
government seemed bent on a course leading to Shi’a dominance in Baghdad, a factor 
that was driving moderate Sunnis into a “marriage of convenience” with al-Qaeda in 
Iraq.131 “The self-sustaining cycle of sectarian violence will continue as long as the [Gov-
ernment of Iraq] and certain citizens of Iraq do not see it as a terminal problem for their 
nation, exercise restraint, and take the appropriate actions to facilitate reconciliation,” 
Chiarelli’s assessment somberly concluded.132
Though faced with this bleak prognosis for stability in Baghdad, Odierno jumped 
into a whirlwind of activity in the days leading up to MNC-I’s December 14 transfer of 
authority from V Corps to III Corps. From Casey, the incoming commander received 
a charge to “change the dynamics in Baghdad” and “break the cycle of sectarian vio-
lence.”133 This meant, in effect, adopting an offensive mindset almost immediately, while 
executing the transition bridging strategy that Chiarelli had been developing. The corps 
also was falling in on the process of sketching out the revised Baghdad Security Plan with 
its emphasis on U.S.-Iraqi cooperation and the creation of a unique command-and-con-
trol structure. On the evening of December 6, Odierno had wrapped up his first full day 
in Iraq by joining Casey for a meeting with Maliki’s top security advisers in which the 
MNF-I commander introduced his idea for a “New Year’s Offensive” that would demon-
strate the Iraqi Government’s commitment to imposing law and order. In Casey’s mind, 
the offensive could involve as many as five Iraqi Army divisions operating in the capital 
and would build much-needed momentum in preparation for the anticipated transfer of 
responsibilities.134 Odierno was cheered by his interaction with the heads of Iraq’s two 
key security ministries, but he remained concerned about a rushed transition and saw 
little prospect for securing Baghdad without significantly more American troops.135 These 
views would put him squarely at odds with Casey as the weeks passed.
Confusion Over the Surge Implementation
Although the President had decided in favor of a troop surge on December 13 and all 
the discussions Bush had held with the NSC principals—Joint Chiefs of Staff and outside 
surge advocates such as Keane—had revolved around the figure of 5 brigades and at 
least 20,000 troops, he had yet to direct explicitly that the surge would consist of all 5 of 
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the available brigades. As a result, when it came to the exact size of the surge the Presi-
dent had ordered, an astonishing lack of clarity persisted through Christmas, with Bush, 
Gates, Casey, and Casey’s subordinates all making long-term plans based on different 
strategies. In the absence of explicit Presidential guidance to deploy all five brigades, 
many senior military leaders continued to work toward preserving the basic framework 
of the existing transition strategy by making the troop increase as small as possible.
Casey was foremost among them. In the second week of December, he and Khalilzad 
published their own progress review of the April 2006 joint campaign plan acknowl-
edging that much had changed for the worse since the spring, but envisioning no major 
changes to the existing strategy and discounting the benefits of a troop surge. The coali-
tion had failed to achieve its objectives “within the planned timeline” and an increasingly 
complex threat, the cycle of sectarian violence in Baghdad, and the Iraqi Government’s 
more conspicuous expressions of sovereignty only seemed to promise a harder, slower 
road ahead.136 The central tenet of the campaign—that “enduring strategic success will 
only be achieved by Iraqis”—remained “universally accepted.” Casey and Khalizad’s 
review held out a shred of hope that potential surge operations, coupled with politi-
cal progress, could reduce violence and bring stability in the coming year, but assessed 
the chances of that as “low-medium,” particularly because coalition forces “enmeshed” 
in an ethno-sectarian struggle might actually be “acting as a catalyst” for violence.137 
Worse still, Casey and Khalilzad’s report predicted that the coalition would see many of 
its powers stripped away or heavily restricted when the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council resolution expired at the end of 2007, implying that there was little time left for 
ambitious initiatives like a surge.138
MNF-I’s lack of enthusiasm for the President’s troop surge, coupled with the fact 
that Bush had yet to specify that all five brigades would be sent to Iraq, ushered in a 
period of maddening confusion for subordinate units. In his first days as MNC-I com-
mander, Odierno was keen to obtain reinforcements for the Baghdad fight and to exploit 
the opportunities presented by the Anbar Awakening. First, Odierno wanted to extend 
the deployment of the 2,200-man 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU). Casey had 
requested the MEU, CENTCOM’s theater reserve, to reinforce MNF-I’s offensive efforts 
in Ramadi, and the unit had arrived in November.139 Recognizing that Ramadi would 
not be secure before the expeditionary unit was scheduled to leave, in mid-December, 
Odierno raised the question of extending the unit.140 Doing so would not only strengthen 
coalition efforts in Anbar, but would also allow Odierno to commit any incoming Army 
units to Baghdad.141 Odierno also discussed expanding the size of the Marine contin-
gent in Anbar with I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander Lieutenant General 
James N. Mattis, who noted that there was a possibility that the rotations of two Marine 
rifle battalions scheduled to leave Anbar in March 2007 could be extended.142 Given this 
opening, Odierno pressed the issue. Prolonging the deployments of these two battalions 
by 60 to 90 days while the units slated to replace them flowed in on schedule would see 
Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) through a critical spring and summer.143 It would 
also offset the inevitable loss of the 15th MEU, which could not remain in Iraq beyond 
April.
Casey did not view the situation with the same sense of urgency that Odierno did. He 
doubted that additional forces in Anbar would be decisive in defeating AQI and looked 
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to Marine Major General Richard C. Zilmer, commander of MNF-W, to back him up. 
Zilmer did the opposite, siding with Odierno and recommending the addition of one 
reinforced BCT for employment in Ramadi and Hadithah. While not persuaded, Casey 
partially relented and on December 17 agreed to extend the 15th MEU.144
This debate over additional manpower in Anbar took place as Casey and his subor-
dinate commanders, prompted by the intense policy debate in Washington, DC, consid-
ered the larger question of what Bush’s new surge strategy would entail. For his part, 
Odierno judged that the United States would require several more brigades to address 
the security situation in Baghdad.145 In his first week in command, Odierno presented a 
number of surge alternatives to Casey: a “small surge” of three additional brigades in 
place by early March 2007; a “large surge” of five brigades on the ground by late April; 
and a “local surge” that would see the deployment of the 82d Airborne Division’s ready 
brigade (the division’s 2d Brigade Combat Team) to Baghdad and the extension of one 
Marine regimental combat team in Anbar. To these three, Odierno added a fourth option: 
combining the extension of the MEU with the commitment of the 2d Brigade Combat 
Team, 82d Airborne Division, and the call-up of a heavy BCT already postured in a “pre-
pare to deploy” status.146 Possible locations for the surge units—in addition to Baghdad 
and Anbar—included Diyala, southern Salahadin, the Lake Tharthar region just north-
west of the capital, the southern belts, and along the Iranian border in Wasit Province.147
Casey responded by expressing disappointment that the corps commander had 
seemed to “put the cart before the horse.” It was premature to make a decision on the size 
of a surge at this point, the MNF-I commander said.148 The broad span of employment 
options also left Casey with the impression that MNC-I was attempting to disguise a lack 
of in-depth analysis. For example, Casey thought it foolish to position a brigade in Wasit, 
where the unit would likely have no impact on the fight in Baghdad. Finally, dubious 
about the need for more American troops in the first place, he directed that future plans 
on the flow of additional forces should include built-in decision points for staunching 
that flow. There would be no open spigot if the MNF-I commander could avoid it.149
The exchange put Odierno in an uncomfortable position. The MNC-I commander 
believed that virtually all the surge discussions among U.S. leaders in Washington, 
including the President and the Joint Chiefs, had revolved around a five-brigade surge 
(with which Odierno strongly agreed), but that Casey intended to shape the implemen-
tation of the decision and prevent the full five available brigades from coming to MNC-I. 
Instructed by the MNF-I commander to continue planning and executing the transition 
bridging strategy, Odierno sought to buy time until the matter of the surge could be clar-
ified. Under his guidance, MNC-I created a plan under which the implementation of the 
transition bridging strategy would be drawn out for several months. Rather than start the 
transition right away, coalition and Iraqi forces would generate momentum with offen-
sive operations through the spring of 2007, leaving the augmenting of advisory teams 
and the reduction of the coalition presence aside until the conditions were in place for the 
Iraqi military to become the country’s dominant security force.150 Even this drawn-out 
timeline was based on far-fetched assumptions that the Iraqi factions would make quick 
progress on reconciliation and economic development alongside security operations. For 
Odierno, drawing up the unrealistic plan was a necessary expedient as he waited for an 
expected change in strategic guidance from Washington.
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Meanwhile, Casey continued to operate as though the implementation of the surge 
would be subject to his control and Maliki’s concurrence. On December 20, a week after 
the President’s decision, Casey told Maliki that Bush had promised his full support—
including more American troops if the Iraqis wanted them.151 Major General Joseph F. Fil, 
Jr., whose 1st Cavalry Division had arrived in November to assume control of MND-B 
from Thurman’s 4th Infantry Division, already had asked Casey and Odierno for two 
additional BCTs for immediate operations in Baghdad. Despite discussions on increas-
ing the size of U.S. forces in Iraq by two or three brigades, Casey proposed to Maliki an 
increase of just one. This modest rise was necessary, Casey told the Iraqi leader, in order 
to have enough coalition battalions to partner with each Iraqi brigade operating in the 
city. Even so, the MNF-I commander placed more emphasis on the movement of three 
additional Iraqi Army brigades to the capital than on additional U.S. troops. Making a 
virtue of the bureaucratic and logistical missteps that had led to prolonged delays in 
the deployment of these units, Casey described their anticipated arrival on a staggered 
timeline as a way of maintaining momentum. The periodic infusion of additional Iraqi 
and American combat power over the course of January and into February would make 
it easier to sustain progress, the general said. A second U.S. brigade would move into 
Kuwait as the theater reserve and would be available after mid-February—but only if the 
situation called for it. Though reluctant about deploying more foreign troops into Bagh-
dad, Maliki approved this scheme.152
On the same day that Casey persuaded the Iraqi Prime Minister to accept a small and 
temporary spike in U.S. force levels, he sought to convince the new U.S. SECDEF not to 
push for too large an increase. Gates, having replaced Rumsfeld 2 days earlier, landed 
in Baghdad on December 20 with a team of advisers that included then-Colonel Mark 
A. Milley. A veteran of four Presidential administrations, Gates had previously visited 
Baghdad as a member of the Baker-Hamilton Iraq Study Group but had resigned from 
the group once he had been nominated for the SECDEF position. Joining Pace and Abi-
zaid for consultations with Casey and his generals, Gates discussed the possibility of a 
more robust surge than the two-brigade option that Casey advocated, however, he left 
Iraq satisfied that the situation—though tenuous—was on the right track. In spite of the 
violence, it appeared to Gates that Casey’s strategy of preparing the Iraqis to assume 
the lead for security appeared to have turned a corner. Only a “modest increase of up to 
two brigades” would be necessary as a bridge to allow the Iraqis to take full control of 
the capital by summer.153 The SECDEF sensed a “whiff of disagreement” between Casey 
and Odierno, but the latter, while notably pessimistic, did not openly challenge his boss’ 
assessment that no more than two brigades were needed.154 Thus, Gates mistakenly came 
away with the impression of a consensus on the way ahead among the U.S. command-
ers in Baghdad. He returned to Washington and presented his recommendation to the 
President, essentially “parroting” (as Gates himself later ruefully described it) the MNF-I 
commander’s advice.155 In a separate matter before his departure, Gates offered Casey the 
Army chief of staff job, and the general, who had served some 30 months in Iraq by that 
point, accepted.156 The move was not a surprise; as U.S. leaders in Washington had settled 
on a new strategy, they had also implicitly agreed that new MNF-I and CENTCOM com-
manders would be appointed to implement it, and within days speculation would begin 
on whom those new commanders might be.
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Back in Washington, Gates set the Joint Staff to work on plans for a surge of two Army 
brigade combat teams and two Marine battalions.157 As the end of the year approached, 
Casey’s intention to hold the line in defense of his strategy, in spite of all the chatter about 
a surge of considerable size, appeared to be working. Since the beginning of December, 
Casey had seized on the Iraqi desire to recast the Baghdad Security Plan as an opportu-
nity to further his strategy of accelerated transition. Among the initiatives devised by the 
Iraqis were standing up a new operations command to coordinate army and police activ-
ities in the capital and establishing joint security stations in each administrative district. 
Casey found this newfound Iraqi energy—along with a tentative willingness on the part 
of the Prime Minister to target Shi’a militants—encouraging. The MNF-I commander had 
yielded ground by conceding to MND-B’s request for additional brigades and by allow-
ing the division to resurrect unit partnership, but as Casey had related to an uneasy 
Maliki, though he indeed had requested the temporary deployment of two more BCTs, 
the circumstances under which he actually would commit the second brigade to Baghdad 
were quite constrained.158
Casey’s subordinate commanders in Baghdad saw things differently. At MND-B, Fil 
had already factored the second surge brigade—initially thought to be a heavy BCT from 
Fort Stewart, GA—into his scheme of maneuver. In fact, the launching of new operations 
in Baghdad depended on the brigade’s timely arrival. Fil planned to use the new bri-
gade’s battalions to reinforce the three BCTs already operating in the capital in order to 
“assist with partnership.” With its subordinate battalions parceled out among MND-B’s 
other units, the newly arrived brigade headquarters would oversee Baghdad’s enhanced 
transition teams as the capital passed to Iraqi control and the division’s main effort shifted 
to the belts.159
Odierno concurred with Fil’s plan. Troubled by an approach that tied coalition 
success to Iraqi combat performance, the MNC-I commander worried privately about 
whether “we have underestimated the number of coalition forces needed and overesti-
mated the capability and motivation of the Iraqi security forces (ISF).” Additional Amer-
ican brigades could serve as a “mitigating factor,” he judged.160 The general believed it 
was infeasible to launch a combined U.S.-Iraqi offensive while simultaneously parceling 
out platoon-sized contingents to enhance transition teams. The manpower requirements 
associated with each concept were in “direct competition,” Odierno wrote in his per-
sonal notebook on December 28. “We cannot do both at once with the current force struc-
ture.”161 In his view, the requirement for significantly more U.S. troops was clear, but this 
judgment was putting him at sharp odds with Casey. Odierno would later recall that the 
2½ months he spent as the corps commander under Casey would be the most difficult 
period of his 39-year career.162
Back in Washington, the U.S. military apparatus had begun work over the Christmas 
holidays to implement a two-brigade, two-battalion troop surge—much smaller than the 
five-brigade surge Bush had discussed with the NSC and the Joint Chiefs. The “2+2” 
option was aligned with the recommendations of Abizaid and Casey but seemed danger-
ously wrongheaded to Keane, who had just 2 weeks before advised the President that the 
task in Iraq required at least five additional brigades. Over the previous weeks, Keane 
had also been in discreet contact with Odierno and knew that the III Corps commander 
had concluded that a surge of that size would be required to make a serious change 
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in the security situation in Baghdad.163 Roused by the Pentagon’s baffling insistence on 
committing fewer troops than he believed the commander in chief had authorized, the 
retired general again reached out to his contacts in the administration and made the case 
for sending five brigades to reinforce the U.S. forces in Iraq.164 He gained support from 
Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, commander of the Combined Arms Center, who 
had been brought into the conversation at various points as both a counterinsurgency 
expert and a potential replacement for Casey. In separate discussions with Keane, Gates, 
Pace, and White House staffer Meghan O’Sullivan, Petraeus opined that the security sit-
uation, as he understood it, called for all the additional BCTs the Army could spare. If it 
came down to a choice between five and two, then the answer was obvious.165 Like Keane, 
Petraeus cautioned that these forces should be approved and committed as a single con-
tingent, not as individual units dispatched based on discrete requests from the theater.166
On December 28, Bush finally clarified that he intended to conduct a full five-brigade 
surge and asked for a video teleconference with Maliki within the week to inform the 
Iraqi Prime Minister that the surge was coming.167 Pace conveyed the news to Odierno 
the following day.168 Concerned that Maliki’s government might undercut the surge of 
additional American troops by openly condemning it, Bush intended to obtain the Iraqi 
leader’s tacit support for the modified U.S. strategy, as well as his pledge to continue 
the fight to secure Baghdad until the job was finished. Bush also wanted Maliki’s assur-
ance that the Baghdad Security Plan would target all lawbreakers, regardless of sect or 
political affiliation, and that Maliki would give the coalition a freer hand in operations 
against Shi’a militias.169 The President communicated these conditions to Maliki by video 
teleconference on January 4, and the Prime Minister largely complied in a stirring speech 
2 days later.170
The President planned to announce the new round of troop deployments publicly in 
early January, having already postponed plans for a pre-Christmas speech to allow Gates 
an opportunity to visit Iraq.171 The deployment of the 15th MEU would be extended, as 
would those of the two Marine battalions. The 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne 
Division, would arrive in Iraq on January 15, 2007. A heavy BCT would follow, moving 
into Kuwait in mid-February. Three more brigades would make their way across the 
Atlantic at a rate of one per month, beginning in March.172
***
Home for a short leave following Christmas, Casey learned of Bush’s guidance about 
a five-brigade surge from Pace on December 29. He also learned from a reporter that he 
would be replaced months earlier than he had anticipated and that White House offi-
cials had already informed The New York Times. While disappointed that the President 
had rejected his best military advice, the MNF-I commander was also flabbergasted that 
administration officials were denigrating his strategy in the press and blaming him for 
Iraq’s descent into violence.173 “The White House is throwing you under the bus,” one 
contact reportedly informed him.174
On January 2, Casey spoke with The New York Times, giving what amounted to a cri-
tique of the surge decision and a defense of the transition strategy he had formulated 2 
years before. Casey said:
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The longer we in the U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq’s security, it lengthens 
the time that the government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing 
with the militias . . . [and] they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq’s problems, which are at base 
their problems.175
Responding to criticism that he had declined to ask for more troops when they were 
needed, the MNF-I commander said, “I have worked very hard to ask for what I need, 
for what I thought I needed to accomplish the mission. . . . It’s always been my view that 
a heavy and sustained American military presence was not going to solve the problems 
in Iraq over the long term.”176
Casey repeated that argument to Pace and Abizaid 2 days later, charging that the 
impending troop surge would be counterproductive to the long-term campaign. He ques-
tioned whether the Iraqis would consent to a U.S. troop increase of the size the President 
had ordered and saw U.S. military presence in general as “grating on the population, par-
ticularly in large urban areas.” “We should acknowledge up front that more [coalition] 
troops won’t solve what . . . is inherently a political problem,” he insisted.177 However, 
the time for protest had passed. On the same day Casey sent his e-mail, January 4, 2007, 
the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, began its journey to Baghdad. The 
surge was underway.
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EVE OF THE SURGE, DECEMBER 2006-FEBRUARY 2007
The final days of 2006 were an uncertain time for the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. Pres-
ident George W. Bush had made the decision to deploy five surge brigades, but almost 
2 months remained until a new commander, General David Petraeus, would arrive to 
implement a new U.S. strategy. In the meantime, General George Casey, Jr., remained 
in command in Baghdad, overseeing operations under new strategic guidance from the 
President that Casey had advised Bush not to issue. The 2 months between the surge deci-
sion and the arrival of Petraeus would see a widening rift between Casey and his opera-
tional commander, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, as Odierno began sending his 
troops forward into Baghdad’s neighborhoods and instructing U.S. units to retake lead 
responsibility for security operations from their Iraqi counterparts. Odierno’s approach 
amounted to a reversal of the course Casey had set for MNF- I more than a year earlier.
One issue on which Casey and Odierno agreed was that the coalition and Iraqi secu-
rity forces immediately should renew operations to secure Baghdad. As a new Baghdad 
security plan got underway in early 2007, the warring parties in central Iraq—the coa-
lition, the Iraqi security forces, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a 
militant groups—braced themselves for the coming U.S. counteroffensive. In the intensi-
fied fighting that resulted as the plan was implemented, the long-deferred war between 
the coalition and the Iranian regime’s militant proxies would reignite.
In the first weeks of 2007, coalition leaders also would shift their attention to the belts 
that surrounded Baghdad, guided by a new realization that only by controlling the cap-
ital’s hinterlands could the coalition and its Iraqi partners secure the city itself. Finally, 
far beyond Baghdad, renewed fighting in northern Iraq would show that even with the 
coming five-brigade troop surge, there would be important areas of Iraq beyond the coa-
lition’s means to pacify, at least in the short term.
THE HANGING OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
The end of 2006 brought with it the end of Saddam Hussein, who had been in U.S. 
custody since his December 2003 capture. A consummate manipulator, he had cast him-
self as something of a grandfather to his bemused American guards, dispensing personal 
advice to those who saw him on a daily basis. In a similar vein, he politely needled the 
senior officer who visited him every other week at the coalition detention center on Camp 
Victory, Iraq, where he was held. “You Americans are naïve,” he told Major General John 
D. Gardner, commander of coalition detention operations. “You will be unable to keep 
the Shi’a, the Sunni, and the Kurds together because you are too kind.”1
Convicted of “crimes against humanity” for the killing of 148 people in the mainly 
Shi’a town of Dujail, and sentenced to death by hanging in November 2006, the former 
dictator learned of the denial of his final appeal on December 26. The Iraqi Government 
was eager to move forward with the execution but had to satisfy a number of adminis-
trative requirements before the United States would transfer custody. The extent of these 
outstanding legal issues led coalition leaders to assume that the execution was at least 1 
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to 2 weeks away. When Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s representatives notified the U.S. 
Embassy late on the evening of December 29 that the Iraqi Government intended to hang 
Saddam the following morning, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and Casey both 
were out of the country. Scrambling to try to delay the execution, the Embassy arranged 
a call between Khalilzad and the Prime Minister and even elevated the matter to Secre-
tary of State Condoleezza Rice. The ambassador and U.S. military officials pressed for a 
postponement, arguing that the rush was unseemly—particularly given that December 
30 was Eid al-Adha, an important religious holiday for both Sunni and Shi’a Muslims. 
However, Maliki insisted on moving forward, asserting the execution was a matter of 
Iraqi sovereignty.2
Around 3:00 a.m. on December 30, U.S. officials yielded to the Iraqi request and flew 
Saddam by helicopter from Camp Victory to the Iraqi-run Camp Justice in the Kadhimi-
yah District of Baghdad. The U.S. military transported Iraqi national security adviser 
Mowaffaq Rubaie and other Iraqi officials from the Green Zone to the execution site by 
helicopter as well.3 Saddam met his fate before sunrise amid a raucous crowd of Ministry 
of Justice officials and Shi’a militiamen chanting, “Moqtada, Moqtada, Moqtada,” a scene 
captured on cell phone video by Rubaie himself.4
For 3 years, the coalition had kept Saddam alive and healthy during his confine-
ment—accommodating his lawyers’ demands for access, force-feeding him during his 
two hunger strikes, and choreographing his safe passage back and forth to the trial—
only to accede in the end to the Iraqi Government’s haphazard handling and provocative 
timing of the execution. Maliki’s office had brushed aside U.S. concerns over executing 
Saddam on the day of Eid, stating that it would hang the former dictator well before sun-
rise. However, citing this technicality as a mitigating factor was merely a smokescreen. 
The Maliki government fully intended to send a message with the execution. Later that 
day, Iraqi state television broadcast Rubaie’s cell phone video of the former dictator’s last 
moments, and an aide to the Prime Minister labeled Saddam’s death as “an Eid gift to the 
Iraqi people.”5 The message was not lost on Sunni Arabs. In a meeting with Khalilzad in 
Riyadh, for example, an outraged King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia accused the U.S. Gov-
ernment of complicity in the controversially timed execution.6 A defiant Maliki answered 
regional critics 1 week later, “We look strangely at the statements made by some gov-
ernments who pretend to mourn the dictator for being executed on a sacred day,” he 
intoned, “although these governments know very well that Saddam had desecrated all 
the sacred things [for] 35 years [while] these governments stood silent.”7
At coalition headquarters, the incident deepened Odierno’s suspicions of the Iraqi 
Government. The coalition had hoped the execution could be an opportunity for Iraqis to 
move forward in unity, but news that the government had allowed the event to devolve 
into a sectarian spectacle dashed these hopes. A disappointed Odierno next found 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) embroiled in a dispute over the disposition of the 
former dictator’s remains. The corps transported the Salahadin governor and Saddam’s 
kinsmen to Baghdad for consultations with the Prime Minister’s representatives and later 
flew the body to Tikrit for burial after the issue was decided. Unimpressed with how the 
central government had handled these negotiations, Odierno was dismayed by the reali-
zation that Maliki’s aides seemed to be harnessing the powerful emotions associated with 
the hanging to stoke the sectarian flames. “Rubaie, I believe, has deep ties with Sadr” and 
“a clear bent toward . . . the protection of Shia extremism,” the MNC-I commander wrote 
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after he learned of the national security adviser’s involvement, adding that Rubaie “basi-
cally turned the execution over to the Sadrists.”8 The distasteful experience left Odierno 
and other senior U.S. leaders questioning whether the Iraqi Government’s partisan stance 
would derail the impending campaign to secure Baghdad.
THE BAGHDAD SECURITY PLAN
The Maliki Government’s New Plan
Saddam’s execution took place against a backdrop of intense preparations by Iraqi 
and U.S. leaders for a renewed Baghdad security plan. Throughout December, as U.S. 
leaders in Washington hammered out the specifics of a large-scale surge of American 
troops, Casey and his Iraqi counterparts formulated plans for a surge of Iraqi troops into 
the capital and additional measures to try to tamp down the sectarian violence there. 
Casting the operation as a campaign to enforce the law against any militant groups that 
violated it, Maliki and his officials named the new plan Operation FARDH AL-QANOON, 
Arabic for “Enforcing the Law.” With coalition assistance, the Iraqis developed a unique 
command-and-control framework for FARDH AL-QANOON that became a mainstay of 
future operations in the capital.
Representatives from the ministries of defense and interior as well as Maliki’s office 
of the commander in chief would establish a single command—the Baghdad Operations 
Command (BOC)—to oversee all Iraqi security forces in the capital. Two subordinate 
commands would divide the city into nine administrative districts: the Rusafa Area 
Command would oversee the five districts east of the Tigris River, including Sadr City; 
while the western half’s four districts would fall under the jurisdiction of the Karkh Area 
Command. Police stations in each district would serve as hubs where Iraqi Army units, 
National Police, and coalition forces would coordinate operations with local police to 
secure surrounding neighborhoods. Iraqi generals from the army and National Police 
would lead the Karkh and Rusafa subcommands, respectively, each with a deputy from 
the other service—an Iraqi-crafted measure instituted to build trust within the security 
forces and facilitate “joint” operations.9 The Iraqis’ insistence on integrating elements 
from the ministries of defense and interior into the same headquarters at multiple eche-
lons throughout the capital seemed overly complicated to U.S. officers, but understand-
able given the pervasiveness of destructive sectarianism. Increasing the linkages among 
the army, police, and coalition forces meant, in Casey’s words, “everyone . . . would be 
watching each other.”10
For simplicity’s sake, Casey pushed for a combined U.S.-Iraqi command led by Major 
General Joseph F. Fil, the Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) commander, and 
Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan, the commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command 
(IGFC). Using an existing headquarters building and an experienced staff for the BOC 
made sense to Casey, who had witnessed MNF-I’s own growing pains and also wanted 
to begin operations quickly.11 Maliki, however, had other ideas. For weeks, the Prime 
Minister had pressed the coalition to grant him a responsive military force that reported 
directly to him. To meld the new command with the IGFC would tie it bureaucratically 
to the Ministry of Defense rather than directly to the Prime Minister. Creating it as a 
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combined headquarters, meanwhile, would fuse American and Iraqi leaders and staffs 
together, an idea that Maliki rejected because it seemed to enable the Americans to dodge 
responsibility for security while providing them with a veto over Iraqi operations. The 
BOC should be answerable ultimately to the Iraqi Prime Minister alone, Maliki argued. 
The Prime Minister also had no intention of locating the BOC in the middle of Camp 
Victory, far from the Green Zone but only a 5-minute walk from MNC-I’s headquarters. 
Preserving his freedom of action mattered more than the strictly military considerations. 
Instead, the BOC would move into a wing of Adnan Palace near the Green Zone with an 
ad hoc staff of Iraqi officers from the ministries of defense and interior.12 Although the coa-
lition would provide a large advisory team, the BOC would be an Iraqi-run organization.
It also did not serve Maliki’s political interests to place the IGFC commander, Ghaidan, 
in charge. Maliki’s office instead floated the name of General Mohan al-Freiji as the future 
Baghdad commander, but MNF-I drew the line at this nomination. At Multi-National 
Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey 
judged Freiji “a bad piece of work.” Odierno also balked at the proposal, characterizing 
Freiji as an officer with “extreme Shi’a views,” who would be incapable of leading “fair 
and balanced operations.”13 As a result, the Prime Minister moved on to Lieutenant Gen-
eral Abud Qanbar, a Shi’a officer virtually unknown to the coalition, but a Maliki kins-
man who recently had directed the praetorian-like Office of the Commander in Chief. In 
naming him, Maliki passed over three Iraqi generals Casey had recommended.14
 
Staff General Abud Qanbar (left). Source: DoD photo by Sergeant David Hodge (Released).
BOC Staff General Abud Qanbar, During a Groundbreaking Ceremony in Baghdad.15
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The coalition headquarters scrambled to assess Baghdad’s new commander. Odierno 
dispatched MNC-I’s chief Arabist and political adviser, Colonel Robert Newman, to head 
the BOC advisory team and report his impressions. Qanbar’s postings since 2003 had 
given him little exposure to the coalition, and he did not yet trust its leaders, tending 
toward “rudeness” and “a profound lack of respect” in interactions with American and 
British generals, Newman observed. The American colonel was struck by what he inter-
preted as the Iraqi commander’s baseless self-confidence and dearth of military experi-
ence. “[Lieutenant General] Abud believes that he can do anything he wants to do because 
of his support from the Prime Minister’s [PM’s] office,” Newman reported. “And there 
is a good chance that most of what he will do will be motivated by sectarian interests.”16 
Casey’s operations director, Major General David A. Fastabend, met Qanbar soon after 
his appointment and came away with a similar impression: “Strong hints of Shi’a bias. . . 
. An officer of average Iraqi competence in the tactical/lower-operational realm. No sign 
of a grasp of operational/strategic/political complexities. This is not Colin Powell.”17
However, there was little Casey could do. The security ministers backed Maliki’s 
choice, and the MNF-I commander judged he lacked the influence to contest it. Contro-
versy aside, the BOC was the price the coalition had to pay for a level of Iraqi Govern-
ment support absent in the Baghdad operations of 2006.
The New Year’s Offensive
It would take more than a new commander and headquarters to enforce the law in 
Baghdad. Early in the process, the Iraqis determined that the revised plan would require 
a total of 19 brigades from the Iraqi Army and National Police; five more than were actu-
ally available.18 To help correct this shortfall, three additional army brigades were slated 
to deploy to the capital no later than the end of February.19 However, the Iraqi plan left 
many matters unresolved. First, it focused on military details to the exclusion of political 
and economic issues.20 Besides a vague reference to raids and patrols, the concept lacked 
both a scheme of maneuver for units to follow and a prioritization of key terrain in the 
city. “This is a plan about checkpoints,” summarized Fil, the MND-B commander. “There 
is no mention of the actual offensive.”21 The Iraqi plan went into exhaustive detail about 
the staffing of static positions, including the Baghdad Barrier, a series of checkpoints 
ringing the perimeter of the city and an Iraqi  fixation that coalition leaders saw as a vir-
tual sinkhole for platoons that could be better employed elsewhere. “We have our doubts 
on the efficacy of the Baghdad Barrier,” commented Fastabend, “but if we unilaterally 
bring it down it will be the ‘Big Excuse’ . . . on why things are not going well.”22
Beyond the matter of the Iraqis’ static approach, MND-B recognized that the Iraqi 
plans did not adequately address the problem of Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other Shi’a 
militants—the same shortcoming that had helped to doom the Baghdad security plans of 
summer and fall 2006. For the past several months or more, JAM elements had been car-
rying out a systematic campaign of violence and intimidation designed to bring the cap-
ital under exclusively Shi’a control. Sunnis had responded by forming “neighborhood 
watches” to defend their communities and, increasingly, to launch their own extrajudi-
cial killing raids against Shi’a. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) exploited this growing sectarian 
rift and co-opted many of these Sunni groups.
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Source: U.S. Army photo by Lieutenant Colonel Scott Bleichwehl (Released).
Major General Joseph Fil, Commanding General of MND-B in the Rusafa Market. 23
MND-B had limited troops at its disposal to address these problems. At the time, 
three U.S. brigade combat teams (BCTs) operated in the city. The departure of the 172d 
Stryker BCT from Baghdad without replacement forced MNC-I to relocate Colonel Ste-
phen J. Townsend’s 3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, from Mosul to the capital 
city in December to become MND-B’s mobile strike force. Besides these U.S. units, Fil 
had operational control of seven Iraqi Army brigades and eight National Police brigades 
in Baghdad. Fil and his division had assumed responsibility for conducting patrols with 
Iraqi units throughout the city and for holding five “focus areas”—mixed neighborhoods 
that had witnessed heavy sectarian violence. All these lay in the western half of Baghdad, 
except for the Sunni enclave of Adhamiyah.24 MND-B also controlled three U.S. BCTs 
operating outside the city in the so-called belts—one to the north and two to the south.
To arrest the sectarian violence in Baghdad, Fil and the 1st Cavalry Division argued 
for collapsing the Baghdad Barrier to free up the Iraqi units that manned it—nearly a bri-
gade of Iraqi combat power—and use them to help clear areas inside the city. They also 
proposed reinforcing the Army Canal checkpoints on the edge of Sadr City—the same 
checkpoints Chiarelli unsuccessfully had urged Casey not to remove in late October, just 
2 months earlier. The 1st Cavalry Division wished to maintain the checkpoints that lim-
ited access to the focus areas, while minimizing other checkpoints to encourage more 
patrolling and an offensive spirit in Iraqi units.25 With renewed offensive operations and 
an extended curfew, MND-B hoped to “surge combat power on focus areas to protect the 
population.”26
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 8. Before the Surge, Disposition of U.S. Forces Baghdad, January 2007.
Political pressure accelerated the launch of the new security plan, as Maliki was eager 
to show progress and Bush was intent on demonstrating the specifics of his “new way 
forward.” On December 22, with Casey and Odierno in attendance, Fil told Iraq’s security 
ministers that a long-term operation would begin within days and last into the summer. 
During the last week of December, Colonel J. B. Burton’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Divi-
sion, would clear Ghazaliyah, a tough Sunni neighborhood astride a sectarian fault line 
in west Baghdad. Most MND-B units in the city would spend the first 2 weeks of the new 
year increasing their presence inside previously cleared areas while conducting raids and 
patrols to disrupt Sunni and Shi’a militants elsewhere. Meanwhile, Townsend’s Stryker 
brigade would undertake a series of clearing operations across the capital as the divi-
sion’s strike force.27
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As a strike force, Townsend’s brigade would not have a single sector of its own, but 
instead would lead the effort to remove enemy forces from specific neighborhoods in 
other BCTs’ battle space and to eliminate any support zones or sanctuaries. The unit’s 
additional maneuver battalion and its comparatively large contingent of infantrymen, 
combined with the Stryker vehicle’s mobility, made it well suited for a rapid series of 
discrete clearing missions. In these operations, coalition and Iraqi troops would move 
with care through hot-spot neighborhoods, building by building, following up on intel-
ligence or tips from locals to try to find militant operatives, safe houses, weapons, or 
other aspects of enemy organizations.28 Clearing operations had been a major part of the 
coalition’s approach in Iraq’s urban areas throughout the war, and they often resulted in 
large-scale captures of enemy operatives and weapons or sparked violent engagements 
with enemy fighters.
After the New Year, Fil intended for the 3d Stryker Brigade to clear Sha’ab/Ur to the 
north of Sadr City and prepare the area for the mid-January arrival of the 2d Brigade, 
82d Airborne Division, the first of the surge brigades. Townsend’s troops would then 
conduct similar operations over the next several weeks in the troublesome Kadhimiyah, 
Rashid, and Mansour districts. As the strike force shifted to each follow-on assignment, 
the American BCT owning the recently cleared battle space would maintain a physi-
cal presence there in direct support of Iraqi Army or National Police units. As Sunni 
and Shi’a militants sought to reassert their influence in these still-contested areas, Iraqi 
and U.S. formations would remain to protect the population, an element absent from 
the TOGETHER FORWARD operations in 2006. With a sustained reduction in violence, 
security forces would turn the cleared areas into “gated communities,” as the soldiers 
liked to call them, surrounded by concrete barriers and with access points controlled by 
the security forces. As supporting U.S. units reduced their footprint in these areas, the 
Iraqi Army and National Police would be responsible for ensuring the enemy was not 
able to reestablish a foothold—though the issue of Iraqi security forces reform would 
have to be addressed.29 The traditional counterinsurgency imperative of police primacy 
informed MND-B’s plans. As security improved, control would gradually pass from coa-
lition forces to the Iraqi Army or National Police and finally to local police.30
The concept was an advance beyond the flawed approach of Operation TOGETHER 
FORWARD, but its reliance on the idea of police primacy proved problematic. Putting 
the Iraqi police on the front lines of the civil war in early 2007 amounted to sponsoring 
one warring party in a civil war against the other, except in those rare places and units in 
which the police were thoroughly apolitical and professional. The guiding principle for 
population security and control within a civil war should have been to prevent all groups 
from using violence against one another, including the group in control of the govern-
ment and its security forces. By placing a premium on police primacy while security still 
hung in the balance, MNF-I had misapplied counterinsurgency doctrine and endangered 
the operation itself.
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Fil’s plan also fleshed out the Iraqi concept for joint security stations where Ameri-
can troops, local police, and Iraqi Army and National Police units operating in the same 
general area would co-locate their headquarters to monitor and synchronize operations. 
Coalition commanders hoped this move, and its injection of American forces inside Iraqi 
headquarters, would limit sectarian behavior by Iraqi security force (ISF) members. 
Starting from a baseline of 9 or 10 “district” joint security stations, MND-B instructed its 
subordinate BCTs to set up “satellite” stations in the surrounding neighborhoods where 
company-sized U.S. and Iraqi units would coordinate combined operations, manage rou-
tine patrols, process detainees, and engage the local population. Spurred by MNF-I’s 
insistence that the plan complement its transition goals, the division initially proposed 
that platoons rotate through the company’s sector, patrolling in 12-hour shifts before 
returning to a forward operating base rather than residing in joint security stations. In the 
view of Casey and MNF-I, the joint security stations were a mechanism for transition as 
the coalition postured itself for a phased withdrawal from the city.31
To ramp up the U.S. and Iraqi security presence on the streets of the capital, MND-B 
revived the concept of partnership that Casey had eschewed the previous month. The 
Baghdad Security Plan aligned Iraqi unit sectors and district boundaries, facilitating the 
pairing of U.S. and Iraqi units that shared battle space. Each of the dozen or so Iraqi Army 
and National Police brigades posted across the capital’s nine security districts would part-
ner with a coalition force battalion. Unlike the 12-man military transition teams advising 
Iraqi field-grade leaders and their staffs, the newly partnered U.S. units were directed “to 
increase the capabilities of Iraqi security forces through combined operations and coach-
ing, teaching, and mentoring at all levels.”32 Notably, as additional Iraqi brigades arrived 
in the capital, more U.S. battalions would be needed to pair with them.
As Fil and his officers saw it, it would take several months of operating within the 
city before the coalition could transition Baghdad’s security to Iraqi control and shift 
coalition attention to the AQI-dominated areas surrounding Baghdad. Once the threat 
was sufficiently reduced, local police would take the lead for providing security, allow-
ing the coalition to take the fight into the enemy support zones surrounding the capital 
while shifting to an “overwatch” posture inside the city itself.33 Given the forces avail-
able, including the two surge BCTs the division hoped to receive from outside the the-
ater, launching a coordinated assault into Baghdad’s belts would have to wait until a 
semblance of stability was restored to the city’s core, Fil and his staff judged.34
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Source: DoD photo by United States Forces Iraq (Released).
American and Iraqi Soldiers Wait as U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk Helicopters Ap-
proach Their Landing Zone Near Mahmudiyah.35
Likewise, a major incursion into Sadr City would not be forthcoming. Washington’s 
interest in the possibility of “taking care of JAM” had prompted a deeper look by Casey 
in early December. Clearing the densely populated Shi’a slum could be done with the 
Iraqi and American forces already in and around Baghdad, he concluded. However, if 
MND-B concentrated its forces on Sadr City, it would leave the west side of Baghdad 
uncovered, resulting in a high degree of risk.36 The prospect that engaging JAM in its Sadr 
City sanctuary could trigger a countrywide backlash gave the MNF-I commander pause 
as well. “We would expect a tough fight for a week or two,” Casey related in an e-mail to 
Pace and Abizaid, “but we would prevail if the government held tough.”37 Whether the 
Maliki government would hold remained in question. Maliki had authorized targeted 
strikes into Sadr City, but he had no appetite for an open confrontation against JAM on 
its own turf. This suited MND-B just fine. Focused on sectarian fault lines throughout 
the capital, the division judged that a costly clearing operation into the long-time mili-
tia stronghold would likely not end Shi’a death squad activity and argued in favor of a 
delay. At all levels, U.S. military leaders agreed that it was better in the near term to iso-
late the stronghold, disrupt JAM through frequent raids against its leadership, and work 
to weaken the militia’s position vis-à-vis the local Iraqi security forces.38
To reinforce FARDH AL-QANOON, Odierno ordered MNC-I’s units to keep the 
enemy off-balance with a flurry of simultaneous offensive activity.39 MND-B had no short-
age of hot spots, and Fil quickly began using Townsend’s Stryker brigade to address them. 
The full complement of Townsend’s BCT arrived from Mosul in mid-December, ending 
a 3-week gap during which MND-B operated without a Stryker brigade headquarters 
or dedicated mobile strike force. The BCT commander’s first exposure to Baghdad had 
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come the previous month on a patrol with the unit his brigade was replacing. Townsend 
had been struck by the absence of American troops in the neighborhoods. “In 5 hours, 
we saw one other coalition patrol,” he recalled.40 Under the auspices of FARDH AL-QA-
NOON, BCTs across Baghdad would now initiate operations to reintroduce U.S. military 
presence throughout the city.
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Lance Wail (Released).
Colonel Stephen Townsend, Commander of the 3d Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry  
Division, With Major General Abdul Ameer al-Lami, Commander of the  
Iraqi 6th Division.41
Battalion-sized strike operations were the raison d’être of Townsend’s unit in Bagh-
dad. With his reconnaissance squadron already attached to another BCT, the commander 
aligned his three remaining maneuver battalions geographically so that they coincided 
roughly with the sectors of “ground-owning” U.S. brigades, thereby improving respon-
siveness. Townsend’s first large operation occurred in Salman Pak, the mixed-sect 
town on the southeastern outskirts of the capital where JAM and Sunni militants long 
had struggled for control and where hundreds of bodies of murdered Baghdadis had 
washed up from the Tigris in 2005-2006. The second, in New Baghdad, involved three 
of Townsend’s battalions and sought to disrupt Shi’a militant operations while creating 
the false impression that U.S. forces were gearing up for a major push into Sadr City.42 
During the first week of January, the BCT shifted its combat power to the opposite side 
of the capital in order to clear the Kadhimiyah District’s densely populated Hurriyah 
neighborhood. Meanwhile, following clearing operations in Ghazaliyah and Ameriyah, 
Burton’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, sought to disrupt the Shi’a militants’ hold 
on northern Kadhimiyah and prevent their ongoing forays into Sunni areas just to the 
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south. Two of Townsend’s battalions supported this fight. From there, half of the Strykers 
launched clearing operations in Dora. Remaining in Hurriyah, 1st Stryker Battalion, 23d 
Infantry Regiment, held the neighborhood, along with an Iraqi Army unit, and waited 
until reinforcements from the first surge BCT arrived to relieve it.43
The Battle of Haifa Street
As FARDH AL-QANOON got underway with these operations in early January 
2007, the most difficult fighting emerged around Haifa Street, a busy byway paralleling 
the west bank of the Tigris River in the Karkh District. Just 2½ miles north of the U.S. 
Embassy, the neighborhood had become an AQI stronghold and a sectarian battlefield. It 
lay in the area assigned to Colonel Bryan Roberts’s 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, but 
had received scant coalition attention for much of 2006—due to the limited forces avail-
able and the fact that Dora, in the same BCT sector, was far more violent.
Roberts considered Karkh an economy of force mission. One of his squadrons had 
responsibility for the area in and around the international zone, with roughly one troop 
running patrols and monitoring Iraqi checkpoints at any given time.44 Haifa Street itself 
ran through a locale inhabited largely by Sunnis, but many Shi’a lived in a neighborhood 
a few blocks to the west. This sectarian fault-line had become more pronounced in 2006 
as Shi’a militants and AQI battled to expand their control.45 The well-to-do professional 
class that had once resided in Haifa Street’s high-rise apartment buildings had fled as the 
violence grew intolerable, and those who remained were under the sway of Sunni terror-
ist groups promising protection in the face of militia intimidation. Just blocks away, in the 
Shi’a-majority area, a makeshift sign hung on the side of a children’s hospital (roughly 
translated) proclaiming: “Congratulations, President Moqtada al-Sadr, for executing 
Saddam.”46 As U.S. troops geared up for operations in places like Kadhimiyah, Mansour, 
and Rashid, Odierno eyed the sectarian tinderbox of Haifa Street as a “big problem.”47
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
High Rise Apartment Buildings on Haifa Street, the Location of Intense Battles in 
Early January 2007.48
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Matters came to a head during the first week of January 2007. On January 6, a sharp 
clash in the Haifa Street neighborhood between Sunni gunmen manning a fake check-
point and Iraqi forces left 30 Sunni fighters dead. Sunni militants retaliated by executing 
a near-equal number of Shi’a civilians and dumping their bodies in an alleyway, after 
which emboldened Sunni fighters patrolled the streets practically unchallenged over the 
next 2 days.49 When troops of the 1st Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, arrived from 
nearby Hurriyah to reassert government control, they found themselves overmatched 
almost immediately. At the request of the commander of an ambushed Iraqi convoy, 
the 1st Stryker Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, dispatched two companies to help.50 
By daylight on January 9, more than 1,000 Iraqi and American troops were engaged in 
a pitched battle with Sunni insurgents, with the sound of the fighting heard in the U.S. 
Embassy and MNF-I headquarters a little more than 2 miles away. The enemy appeared 
well organized and highly trained, maneuvering from position to position, and delivering 
coordinated mortar fire in support. Defenders occupied several apartment towers some 
20 to 30 stories high, making deliberate building-to-building, floor-to-floor, and room-
to-room clearing operations infeasible. According to the U.S. commander on the scene, 
the complexity of the terrain far exceeded the capabilities of available Iraqi-American 
manpower. When insurgents opted to stay and fight it out rather than melt away after 
an initial exchange as they typically did, coalition forces employed firepower to bridge 
the gap. Close air support from rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft targeted snipers. Marking 
the battle’s climax, precision rocket fire from Fallujah some 40 miles away destroyed a 
heavily defended building with virtually no collateral damage. As darkness fell on Jan-
uary 9, the combined American-Iraqi force consolidated its positions. Over the course of 
the 11-hour fight, it had suffered six casualties—four American and two Iraqi wounded. 
About 50 enemy fighters were killed and at least 15 captured, with a handful of Syrians 
and Egyptians among them.51 By comparison, the same battalion had netted 16 detainees 
while reporting no enemy killed the previous week during 5 days of clearing operations 
in Hurriyah.52
Over the next week, the Stryker battalion reduced its forces and left security on Haifa 
Street in Iraqi hands. The American withdrawal set the stage for the unit’s return later 
in the month. Without U.S. troops present, Haifa Street soon became a scene of sectarian 
conflict again. JAM, the Badr Corps, and other Shi’a militias renewed their campaign 
of intimidation in nearby areas and exploited their infiltration of Iraqi forces to target 
Sunnis. Meanwhile, Sunni extremists also returned to Haifa Street. When their harassing 
sniper fire paralyzed Iraqi Army units, the Strykers returned to restore stability. On Jan-
uary 24, the battalion attacked with a large force of Iraqis, as well as a troop belonging to 
2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division. The units undertook more thorough clearing operations 
than on the previous occasion and over a number of days instituted population-control 
measures by cordoning off key areas and limiting access to pedestrian traffic. A troop 
from 4th Squadron, 9th Cavalry Regiment, established a combat outpost alongside troops 
from the 6th Iraqi Army Division.53 However, this small presence could not contain the 
expansion of the Shi’a militias, which imposed a “mafia-like” grip on the neighborhood 
that persisted for several more months.54
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The fighting around Haifa Street showcased the shortcomings of the Iraqi security 
forces in Baghdad relative to the threat. Some of the Iraqi Army troops involved in the 
early stages of the confrontation appeared to have abandoned their posts. Even the unit 
sent to Haifa Street to restore order fell victim to an ambush, ran out of ammunition, and 
was unable to resupply itself.55 Coalition officials characterized the first day’s battle as 
a success, describing Iraqi forces as maneuvering “aggressively” and enduring “fierce 
firefights,” but in actuality, the Iraqi troops were still no match for the Sunni extremists 
confronting them.56 The same units also seemed reluctant to contest the rise of Shi’a mili-
tia influence once American forces withdrew from the area.57 At the same time, the raid-
ing approach of the U.S. units around Haifa Street resembled the failures of Operation 
TOGETHER FORWARD: U.S. units arrived on the scene reacting to a local security crisis, 
neutralized the threat, and then pulled out—only to be ordered back when the same 
problem soon reemerged.
MNC-I, AQI, AND THE BAGHDAD BELTS
During Odierno’s fall 2006 preparations to assume command of MNC-I, he noted the 
lack of corps-level operations in Iraq throughout the previous year. From his perspec-
tive, as U.S. units had transitioned battle space and consolidated onto large bases, the 
U.S. commands had effectively stopped maneuvering and executing at the operational 
level. Rather than synchronize the multinational divisions toward a common operational 
goal, MNC-I had tended to structure its campaign as multiple division-sized fights in 
which subordinate units worked for local economic development, good governance, and 
trained Iraqi security forces. During summer and fall 2006, this approach had meant that 
the coalition campaign to secure Baghdad had fallen solely on MND-B and its three U.S. 
brigades in the city, with the other divisions conducting operations largely disconnected 
from MND-B’s task in the capital.
As the operations of January 2007 got underway, Odierno sought to restore the coa-
lition’s operational perspective. From Odierno’s vantage point, the coalition’s war in 
Iraq was more properly viewed as countrywide, rather than as a set of discrete prov-
ince-based campaigns. As MNC-I’s main effort, MND-B would establish joint security 
stations throughout the city, partner with Iraqi units, and adopt a posture that enabled 
them to maintain a 24/7 presence in their sectors.58 As Odierno saw it, reversing the cycle 
of sectarian violence required more than protecting the people of Baghdad and attacking 
the Sunni and Shi’a militants operating within the city. Any attempt to secure the capital 
required a concurrent effort to stop violent actors and weapons before they made their 
way into Baghdad, such as the car bombs that often originated in the belts surrounding the 
city on their way to targeting Shi’a neighborhoods. Under Odierno’s instructions, MNC-I 
tasked MND-N and MNF-W to support MND-B by interdicting these “accelerants” to 
violence.59 By focusing all three U.S. divisions on Baghdad, the corps could create a new, 
shared responsibility for Baghdad’s security and give better shape to the priorities of the 
outlying divisions. This was particularly true for Major General Benjamin R. Mixon and 
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 9. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, December 2006.
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THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
Multi-National Division-North (MND-N). MNC-I’s emphasis on controlling the northern 
belt running from the Lake Tharthar region into Diyala Province proved more helpful 
as a guide for managing risk than MNF-I’s 2006 framework based on “strategic cities”—
four of which lay dispersed across MND-N’s vast battle space.60 Odierno’s plan made 
clear to Mixon that the sectarian battleground between Baghdad and Baqubah should 
be MND-N’s top concern.61 However, the same principle did not really extend to the 
non-U.S. divisions. More distant from Baghdad, Multi-National Division-Central South 
(MND-CS) and Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE) would remain focused on 
other security problems as the U.S. divisions concentrated on the capital.
Odierno’s emphasis on Baghdad’s hinterland was new for the coalition, but not for 
the Iraqis. For quite some time, Iraqis had recognized the areas just beyond Baghdad 
as crucial to controlling the city, a fact that Defense Minister Ali Allawi had pointed 
out to Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) in spring 2004. Saddam, too, had viewed 
controlling the belts as essential and had developed plans to position Republican Guard 
divisions in defensive zones around the capital.62 The Iraqi Shi’a leaders saw the problem 
similarly, with Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) officials iden-
tifying the belts as key terrain in conversations with CJTF-7 officers in 2004. Similarly, 
in late 2006, Maliki reportedly told his advisers that, after the government successfully 
excluded the coalition from greater Baghdad, Iraqi forces should move quickly to clear 
and control an area spanning from Diyala to the southern and western areas of the cap-
ital.63 Within the coalition commands, in 2005 MNC-I commander Lieutenant General 
John Vines’s concern about insurgent support zones in the belts had led him to disagree 
strongly with Casey’s plan to move a division’s worth of U.S. combat power from the 
Baghdad region to the Syrian border zones. To some degree, Casey and MNF-I appre-
ciated the importance of the belts around Baghdad as a support zone for AQI before 
October 2006, but their focus on transition to Iraqi control, as well as a shortage of U.S. 
forces, had precluded significant coalition operations in the belts. When Iraqi leaders 
had insisted on establishing the ring of Baghdad Barrier checkpoints around the city in 
an attempt to control the routes from the outlying areas into the capital, MNF-I quickly 
judged it a pointless drain of Iraqi combat power. They missed the key point underly-
ing Iraqi fixation with the ring of checkpoints: securing the city required controlling the 
outlying rural areas to the north and south. “The role of the support zones in controlling 
Baghdad is a perceived historical fact to them,” Fastabend observed.64 In their desire to 
sideline the misguided tactic of staffing stationary checkpoints, coalition leaders before 
December 2006 had overlooked the significance of this key terrain.
The Taji Documents
One of the most important discoveries of the war validated Odierno’s and the Iraqis’ 
instincts about the importance of the Baghdad belts. On December 19, 2006, U.S. Soldiers 
from 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, conducting a routine patrol in the Taji market 
north of the capital, captured a map and other documents that revealed AQI’s strategy to 
control Baghdad. As the U.S. patrol investigated a suspicious vehicle, the men occupying 
it fled. One wore a suicide vest that detonated when the Americans opened fire. Another 
claimed to be a hostage. Left in the vehicle was a laptop computer, 450 gigabytes of data, 
and a hand-drawn map of Baghdad and its environs.65
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The map and the accompanying Taji documents, as they became known at MNF-I, 
brought clarity to the coalition’s understanding of AQI’s battlefield geometry, which was 
more structured than coalition officials had realized. AQI leaders treated Baghdad as a 
separate zone, distinguishing between the “metro area” and the surrounding belts, but 
there was a connection between the two. Securing the key terrain of Rusafa, which AQI 
leaders seemed to consider a high priority, required the systematic sectarian cleansing 
of the belts, which would cut off Shi’a lines of communications into east Baghdad and 
increase the flow of displaced persons to locales known to have poor infrastructure. AQI 
leaders assumed these developments would tax the already dysfunctional Iraqi Govern-
ment beyond its capacity and trigger a collapse. “The most important battle, which is 
happening now,” an AQI leader had written in late 2006, “is the Battle of the Baghdad 
Belt.”66
The Taji documents showed that AQI leaders believed it was time to intensify this 
fight. Within Baghdad, they considered the notorious Rusafa car bomb network their 
principal instrument of violence. Led by an AQI commander called Abu Nur, this net-
work was responsible for the large-scale car bombs that plagued east Baghdad in late 
2006 and early 2007. Its sustained success encouraged AQI leaders to accelerate a sec-
tarian conflict with Baghdad’s Shi’a they felt confident they could win.67 From within 
the Shi’a-majority Rusafa District, Abu Nur’s car bombers could easily target the adja-
cent Sadr City and were also close to a base of support in Adhamiyah, the only Sunni 
enclave east of the Tigris River. Rumors circulated that some of Abu Nur’s operatives 
were former Shi’a whose Shi’a identities enabled them to move freely in east Baghdad’s 
Shi’a-majority districts, all of which had transitioned to Iraqi police control. Abu Nur’s 
immediate objective was to displace the Shi’a population of central Baghdad into districts 
like Sadr City and Kadhimiyah, corralling them into besieged pockets for more efficient 
extermination. At the same time, AQI leaders sought to expand Sunni strongholds in the 
Ghazaliyah and Ameriyah neighborhoods of west Baghdad, a step toward making the 
entire northwest quadrant of the capital an “extension of Anbar.”68
 
The Handwritten Map Depicting AQI’s Strategy for Dominating the Baghdad Belts.69
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According to the Taji documents, AQI had divided its campaign in the belts into three 
areas: east, south, and north. The northern belt included Taji, where the documents had 
been found, and stretched to the lower Diyala Province. Meanwhile, the eastern belt 
stretched from Salman Pak up through the largely Shi’a Mada’in Qada to the southern 
reaches of Diyala Province. AQI’s emir in the eastern belt, an obscure operative known 
as Asim, had responsibility for cutting the Kut-Baghdad road and securing a land bridge 
from the outskirts of the capital up the contested Diyala River Valley to Buhriz and Baqu-
bah. These tasks had been reinforced by AQI in mid-2006.70 The southern belt stretched 
west of the Tigris River from Arab Jabour to the border of Anbar Province near Zaidon, 
an area where a low-grade sectarian civil war pulsed through the key population centers 
that dotted the heavily irrigated farmland. Arab Jabour remained a Sunni stronghold, 
as did Yusufiyah at the far end of this portion of the belts. In between, though, JAM and 
other Shi’a militias were increasing their footholds in the traditionally Sunni towns of 
Mahmudiyah and Iskandariyah. The stakes were high. Control of Yusufiyah, for exam-
ple, was vital to AQI, because without it, Baghdad’s southern points of entry would be 
practically inaccessible.71
From the coalition’s perspective, security in the southern and eastern sections of the 
belts suffered from a general dearth of friendly forces. At the beginning of 2007, two U.S. 
BCTs under MND-B had responsibility for the area. With the culturally significant cities 
of Karbala and Najaf in its sector, Colonel Michael X. Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry 
Division, short one of its maneuver battalions, could project relatively little combat power 
into the belts adjacent to the capital.72 The battlegrounds of Arab Jabour and Salman 
Pak saw little coalition presence, save for forays aimed at disrupting enemy activity. The 
latest had occurred in December when a battalion from Townsend’s 3d Stryker Brigade, 
2d Infantry Division, hit high-value targets in Salman Pak.73 In terms of available troops, 
2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, was not much better off in the so-called Triangle 
of Death just southwest of Baghdad, but did have the advantage of a smaller area of 
operations. Its commander, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw, decided early in his tour to 
maintain a forward presence among the population through a network of patrol bases, 
an approach that by early 2007 seemed to be clamping down on AQI’s freedom of move-
ment.74 For example, Abu Dunyah, emir of the southern belt, reported in late 2006 coming 
under “pressure from the enemy,” a development causing infighting among his subordi-
nate leaders.75
According to the Taji documents, AQI placed its greatest hope in the operations of 
Abu Ghazwan, the emir of the northern belt. Imprisoned at Camp Bucca and released 
from coalition custody in 2005, Ghazwan oversaw the area arcing eastward from Abu 
Ghraib to the outskirts of Baqubah. He financed himself by extorting money from con-
tractors working for the coalition. He also co-opted local Sunni officials, engaged Sunni 
tribes in order to cultivate popular support, and steadily pressured Shi’a civilians to relo-
cate at a measured and almost unnoticeable pace of two to three families per day.77
AQI’s vision of a purely Sunni northern belt underscored the area’s operational sig-
nificance. Critical lines of communications ran through this slice of rural terrain. The 
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north-south corridor from Tarmiyah/Taji through Saab al-Bour ran just west of the Tigris 
into Baghdad’s Kadhimiyah District. On the other side of the river, near-parallel roads 
from Baqubah passed through Hussainiyah and Khan Bani Sa’ad before reaching the 
fringes of Adhamiyah and New Baghdad, respectively. Large numbers of vehicle-borne 
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) made their way from the Sunni city of Taji into 
the capital, along with funding for Abu Nur’s network. Ghazwan thus managed an indis-
pensable logistical hub for AQI.78 For its part, JAM enjoyed a safe haven in Hussainiyah, 
an explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) hot spot that bedeviled the coalition. The Shi’a 
militia’s presence there became problematic for AQI as local JAM intimidation increased 
and Sunni extremist links to Baqubah grew in importance.79 As in the south, fighters on 
both sides of the sectarian divide struggled for control of key crossroads. One distinction 
of the northern belt, however, was its role as a linchpin in the Sunni terrorist organi-
zation’s operational infrastructure. The area connected the foreign fighters flowing into 
Iraq from Syria with the targets they eventually struck in Baghdad. Making their way 
south along the Tigris River by way of a pre-positioned facilitation network, many for-
eign fighters paused in Tarmiyah or Taji before making the final leg of their journey to 
join Abu Nur in the city. Ghazwan’s grip on most of the area also enabled AQI to more 
easily exploit the seam at the convergence of three U.S. division sectors southeast of Lake 
Tharthar—another safe haven due to the absence of coalition forces.80
It was in this area near Taji that Sunni insurgents likely associated with Ghazwan 
set up deliberate ambush positions, attacking coalition helicopters traversing the busy 
air routes between Taji and Camp Victory or Balad and Camp Victory, shooting down 
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several helicopters in the early months of 2007. In one engagement on February 2, 2007, 
insurgents hit the AH-64 Apache helicopter flown by Army Chief Warrant Officer Keith 
Yoakum, a pilot in the 1st Cavalry Division’s aviation brigade. After flying his aircraft 
safely clear of the ambush zone, Yoakum returned into enemy fire to mount a counter-
attack against the insurgent antiaircraft positions. He was able to strike several enemy 
positions with rockets before his severely damaged helicopter crashed, killing him and 
his copilot instantly. For his bravery, Yoakum was posthumously awarded the Distin-
guished Service Cross.
Odierno Changes MNC-I’s Operational Concept
MNC-I leaders considered the captured AQI plans from Taji a “serendipitous gold-
mine.” The documents confirmed that the terrorist organization continued to adhere to 
Abu Musab al- Zarqawi’s strategy of inciting sectarian conflict as a way to overthrow the 
Iraqi Government and eventually annihilate the Shi’a population. For Odierno, the Taji 
documents confirmed the importance of the Baghdad belts and the risks of maintaining a 
too-limited coalition presence in those areas. Odierno would use the refined understand-
ing of the enemy that the documents yielded to help guide the emplacement of the surge 
brigades as they arrived. Surprisingly, it had become clear that AQI relied on a conven-
tional battlefield architecture. Even terrorist organizations and guerrillas required open 
lines of communications to conduct resupply, maintain freedom of movement, and shift 
forces from one geographic area to another. They maintained support zones and rear 
areas and maneuvered from those places to attack zones. They had command-and-con-
trol nodes to orchestrate these movements.
Equipped with this knowledge, Odierno was determined to marshal his available 
forces to strike the different components of the enemy system simultaneously where he 
could.81 With assistance from his staff, the MNC-I commander sketched out three differ-
ent kinds of areas that U.S. and Iraqi units needed to deny the enemy in order to secure 
Baghdad. First came the operating zones where the militants attacking Baghdad carried 
out their attacks, such as Rusafa or Dora. Odierno would seek to deny AQI and its allies 
access to these and to deny them freedom of movement along the avenues of approach 
into Baghdad.
Odierno made the next priority the support zones around and beyond the city, the 
areas such as Adhamiyah, Taji, and the Triangle of Death where AQI and other groups 
gathered their combat power among local Sunni populations and staged their attacks 
into the operating zones. In these areas, Odierno intended to employ U.S. and Iraqi units 
to attack enemy command-and-control hubs, safe houses, and operatives. Finally came 
the sanctuaries beyond Baghdad usually in quiet, remote areas such as Lake Tharthar, 
untouched by the coalition or the ISF, where AQI could locate its rear logistics bases, 
training camps, car bomb factories, and even lodging for its fighters and their camp fol-
lowers without challenge. In these areas, Odierno intended to disrupt the insurgents, 
forcing them to abandon their bases and making them more vulnerable to coalition raids 
while on the move. As the surge units arrived, Odierno and his planning team determined
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where to place them to put simultaneous pressure on all three categories of enemy zones. 
Of the five surge brigades that Odierno expected to receive, two would flow into Bagh-
dad itself. Exactly where the rest would deploy following their arrival in Kuwait had 
not been decided, but it was clear to Odierno that a considerable portion of their combat 
power would need to go into the belts rather than the city.82 MNC-I’s “main security 
effort” would be “Baghdad and the Baghdad belts, where identified support zones and 
avenues of approach are used by extremists to accelerate sectarian violence.”83 Over time, 
MNC-I intended to extend its operating zone, support zone, and sanctuary framework to 
the fight against Shi’a militants as well.
If the emphasis outside of Baghdad was on disrupting enemy support zones and sanc-
tuaries and interdicting accelerants to violence, then inside the city it was on population 
control applied in mixed-sect areas in a balanced way. Along with control measures like 
joint security stations and concrete barriers, Odierno envisioned precision strike opera-
tions against extremist operatives and leaders. Units would provide security first, stand-
ing ready to follow up with economic development and reconstruction efforts.84
Odierno’s operational concept signaled a change in the trajectory of the coalition pres-
ence and a delay in the coalition’s assumption of a mostly supporting role. “There will be 
no rush to move from [secured] areas to new areas,” he decreed. Likewise, “there will be 
no rush to transition control of security to the ISF, unless the ISF are ready and capable 
of success.”85 Odierno was determined not to repeat the error of Operation TOGETHER 
FORWARD II by handing over cleared areas to the Iraqis only to see them slip back 
into violence. Just as plainly, he did not believe, as Casey had, that “transition” could be 
used in the near term as leverage over Iraqi factions competing in a violent, high-stakes 
struggle.
Odierno’s difference of opinion with Casey came partly from the MNC-I command-
er’s distrust of the Iraqi Government leadership. Prime Minister Maliki had indicated his 
support for security operations against lawbreakers on either side of the sectarian divide, 
but in Odierno’s judgment, “It becomes more clear everyday (sic) that [Iraqi leaders] 
just want us out of the way,” as the MNC-I commander noted to himself in his journal. 
“They see us as an impediment to progress.”86 Odierno’s fundamental view of the con-
flict crystallized during his second month in command. Like Casey, he viewed the war in 
Iraq as not simply a counterinsurgency, but as a complex communal struggle for power 
and resources. There were several distinct categories of threat throughout the country, 
Odierno judged, and each of these “different fights” in “different areas” would require 
“different approaches.” The ubiquitous term “AIF” or “anti-Iraqi forces” was not suffi-
cient to describe threats as diverse as sectarian violence, Sunni and Shi’a militias, AQI’s 
terrorist activities, Kurdish expansionism, Shi’a infighting, malign Iranian influence, and 
an evolving Sunni insurgency consisting of armed groups open to reconciliation given 
the right conditions.87 Putting his own stamp on it, the MNC-I commander visualized the 
overall problem as a “gap” between Iraqi citizens and the government whose job it was 
to provide their basic needs. The general’s definition of near-term success would be sta-
bility, which, if sustained over time, could lead to the “ultimate goal of self-reliance” on 
the part of the Iraqi Government.88 Given that the Iraqi Government itself, in Odierno’s 
view, was a threat to stability because of its systemic and often sectarian-based corrup-
tion, as well as its lack of capacity and experience, self-reliance was far down the road. 
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In the meantime the coalition’s primary task, as Odierno saw it, was to assist the Iraqi 
Government in its efforts to “fill the gap,” including, whenever necessary, by direct coa-
lition action.89 It was an approach to addressing the problems in Iraq that would differ 
markedly from that of MNF-I under Casey.
THE SHI’A MILITANTS ON THE EVE OF THE SURGE
AQI and its Sunni militant allies were not the only group aiming for control of the 
belts around Baghdad. JAM and other Shi’a militant groups, including the Badr Corps 
and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, had begun to expand their operations in an effort to seize Sunni 
towns north and south of Baghdad and control the lines of communications running into 
the capital. The JAM expansion in fall 2006 to Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad, served as 
one of the more dramatic examples. Over the course of 90 days, JAM wrested control of 
the town through a campaign of targeted killings and the seizure of public services. By 
October, using Mahmudiyah as a springboard, JAM had begun to conduct similar oper-
ations in the nearby town of Yusufiyah.90 MNC-I’s operations to establish control of the 
belts would have to take the Shi’a militants into account.
During the previous summer, MNF-I had sensed the growing threat that Shi’a militias 
posed to coalition objectives, though Casey had resisted categorizations that portrayed 
them as a greater danger than AQI. Militant factions led by one-time Sadr loyalists made 
the landscape of the Shi’a threat even more complex. Isma’il Hafiz al-Lami, known as 
Abu Dura, had broken with Sadr in 2004 but still orchestrated death squad and kidnap-
ping operations out of Sadr City, a role that led Western reporters to dub him “the Shia 
Zarqawi” in 2006.91 Another former JAM leader who defied Sadr, Abu Gharawi, ran a 
major EFP network out of Amarah.92 Some Badr Corps operatives were involved in the 
shadowy war against the coalition as well. Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani rose to prominence 
as an intelligence officer and front commander in the Badr Corps before supposedly fall-
ing out with the Hakims before the war. In July 2003, he received $40 million from the 
Iranians to organize a logistics network that would funnel weapons to Shi’a militants.93 
The elusive Sheibani drew upon his prewar experience in clandestine operations, as well 
as his deep pool of contacts in the Badr Corps to build a potent EFP network. He went on 
to finance and supply other key networks and remained a key node in the Quds Force’s 
controlled distribution of advanced weaponry.94
These and other Shi’a militant networks with shared associations, shifting loyalties, 
and divergent political aims made for a complex battlefield. Iranian regime support was 
the common denominator. The major Shi’a militant networks all owed their potency—
and even existence—to the Iranian regime’s Quds Force and its powerful commander, 
Qassem Soleimani. The lethal materiel supplied through these networks entered Iraq 
through ports of entry along the eastern border. Key cities across the southern provinces 
served as waypoints for the smuggled goods as they traveled hundreds of miles over 
roads and “ratlines” and passed through multiple tribal areas. Amarah was a major cross-
roads, from which EFPs were funneled south to Basrah or north through Kut—another 
critical hub—and Numaniyah, Suwayrah, and eventually Baghdad. Alternatively, facili-
tators shipped EFPs west from Amarah to Diwaniyah and Najaf and then north through 
Hillah and Karbala before reaching the outskirts of the capital.95 A separate “ratline,” 
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with the help of Kurdish contacts, began at the border town of Khanaqin and ran south 
through Diyala Province. Besides providing weapons, training, and periodic sanctuary, 
Soleimani’s Quds Force paid the fighters belonging to JAM Special Groups; supplied 
their leaders with cars; and offered bonuses for recorded footage of successful rocket, 
mortar, and IED attacks on coalition forces.96 In the short term, the Quds Force funneled 
EFPs to JAM-affiliated or Special Group surrogates using Badr Corps connections. It did 
so with a view toward the long haul, maintaining financial ties to SCIRI and other players 
with solid political legitimacy.97 In short, the Iranian regime was content to fund, train, 
and supply all parties willing to attack the U.S.-led coalition.
Seeking multiple points to apply leverage in Iraq, the Quds Force also formed a new 
Shi’a militant group, Kata’ib Hizballah, in early 2007. Its leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, 
had the distinction of being a member of the Iraqi Parliament from the SCIRI-Badr bloc, 
a former Badr Corps commander, and a deputy of Qassem Soleimani. He also had been 
sentenced to death in absentia by a Kuwaiti court for his role in the 1983 bombings of the 
American and French embassies in Kuwait City. More so than even Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq 
(AAH), Kata’ib Hizballah was designed as a small, disciplined, specially equipped orga-
nization of a few hundred highly trained fighters. It remained under the tight control of 
the Quds Force and would grow in political prominence over time to become one of the 
most important militant groups in Iraq.98
The Quds Force and its Iraqi surrogates were the primary instruments employed by 
the Iranian regime to wage a proxy war against the United States at minimal cost. Since 
2003, the Islamic republic had pursued a regional strategy that sought to promote insta-
bility, maximize American casualties, and steadily increase its control over Iraq’s Shi’a 
heartland while maintaining plausible deniability.99 The politically influential Soleimani 
reported directly to Iran’s supreme leader and oversaw a carefully organized and sus-
tained cross-border operation. His subordinate Ramazan Corps managed the effort in 
Iraq, with three subcommands responsible for the northern, central, and southern sec-
tors, respectively. Two to three regional offices operated out of each sector.100 Hundreds 
of agents were involved, not least Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Kazemi Ghomi, 
who served as an undercover Quds Force officer. The consulate in Basrah functioned as 
a similar hub of covert activity for Soleimani.101
The level of this network’s activity against the coalition in Iraq appeared to have 
changed over time. In the early months of the war, the Iranian regime seemed to have 
been careful not to confront the United States, even through proxies, most likely out of 
fear that the United States might choose to invade Iran next. By 2005 and 2006, the Ira-
nian calculus had apparently changed. As U.S. troops became bogged down in Iraq, the 
chances of an American invasion of Iran diminished, and it seems likely that Supreme 
Leader Ali Khamenei and his regime decided to ramp up their anti-U.S. proxy war in 
Iraq, confident they could so with relative impunity. It is also likely they considered the 
U.S. outreach to Iraqi Sunni groups in 2005-2006 to be a danger to the Iranian regime’s 
Shi’a and Kurdish client parties. The expanded Iranian role both against U.S. forces and 
in support of Shi’a sectarian cleansing in central Iraq were probably intended, in part, 
to counter the American strategy of giving Iraqi Sunnis a greater share of state power. 
Whatever the motives, by the end of 2006 the Iranian regime’s new level of destabilizing 
activity in Iraq was a threat the coalition could not ignore.
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U.S. Special Operations Efforts to Counter Iranian Influence
As the special operations arm of MNC-I, the Combined Joint Special Operations 
Task Force-Arabian Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) had seen convincing indicators of nefar-
ious Iranian involvement as early as 2005. However, Casey had been skeptical at the 
time, concluding that a major shift in MNF-I’s campaign was not justified because, in his 
judgment, the CJSOTF had found no “smoking gun” implicating Iran’s Government.102 
MNF-I’s intelligence staff had established a cell to focus on Iran in spring 2006, but it 
had atrophied. In summer 2006, Chiarelli had assembled undeniable evidence that the 
Iranian regime was responsible for the EFPs causing mounting American casualties and 
had pressed Casey and MNF-I to take action against the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militant 
groups. In late 2006, after months of tracking the increasing strength of the Iranian-spon-
sored Shi’a militant groups, coalition leaders finally reorganized their forces to counter 
the growing threat. With EFP attacks on the rise and the quality of ordnance improv-
ing, Casey concluded that the Iranian regime had ramped up its campaign in Iraq. On 
November 7, 2006, he asked his intelligence officers if Iranian support to Shi’a extremists 
was having a strategic effect and had solicited ideas on how to disrupt Iranian activity. 
Given the dearth of intelligence on Quds Force agents and infrastructure in Iraq, the coa-
lition had few actionable targets to strike right away. Casey hoped to spin up the effort 
quickly in the event Iran responded to Western pressure on its nuclear program by retal-
iating against MNF-I.103
Outside U.S. headquarters in Iraq, others took a fresh look at malign Iranian influ-
ence as well. Before joining Odierno’s headquarters as a senior operations adviser in late 
2006, Colonel James Hickey led a project at the Institute for Defense Analyses that had 
documented in detail the presence and activities in Iraq of the Quds Force and its proxies, 
including the EFP smuggling networks in the south. At about the same time, the White 
House gave the go-ahead for the Joint Staff and CENTCOM to develop a plan to counter 
Iran’s destabilizing activities. Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld also had 
proposed a more aggressive stance, such as broadening the target set of the special oper-
ations task force based in Iraq. A subordinate element of the task force had been boring 
into Sunni terrorist and insurgent groups with devastating effect. As evidence of Ira-
nian involvement in Iraq mounted, Casey considered applying some of that manhunting 
capability toward the attrition of their extremist counterparts on the Shi’a side, to include 
Quds Force agents operating in Iraqi territory. Discoveries inside Iraq of ordnance with 
2006 Iranian factory markings reinforced Casey’s thoughts on this score, as they con-
vinced the MNF-I commander that the Iranians had become more brazen in their lethal 
support of Shi’a extremists.104
Undertaking the new mission of countering Iranian influence introduced tension 
between the Green Berets of the CJSOTF and the special operations task force in the 
country. While the high-end operators had concentrated chiefly on AQI, the U.S. Army 
Special Forces groups rotating in and out of Iraq during their tours as the CJSOTF had 
mapped out the Shi’a extremist threat. Special Forces detachments had gone after Shi’a 
death squads, primarily in partnership with Iraqi special operations forces, but without 
the far greater quantities of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets that the 
high-end operators controlled. The CJSOTF’s broad mission set, which included training 
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indigenous commandos, partnering with Iraqi conventional forces, and providing human 
intelligence, also meant that it had wider responsibilities than simply killing or capturing 
militants.105 Casey wanted MNF-I’s campaign against Iranian agents and their surrogates 
in Iraq to assume a greater level of intensity and focus comparable to other SOF ele-
ments’ war on AQI—without forsaking the institutional knowledge painstakingly gained 
through the CJSOTF’s years of engagement with tribes and other local networks.
Casey directed the CJSOTF and the special operations task force to cooperate in cre-
ating a new subordinate command focused on Shi’a militants that clearly would be sep-
arated from the AQI mission set. Since the special operations task force initially would 
have to rely on the CJSOTF for many targets, as well as the troops to attack them, a coop-
erative command-and-control relationship was established between the two special oper-
ations commands, despite the great disparity in rank between the three-star commander 
of the special operations task force and CJSOTF commander Colonel Kevin McDonnell. A 
fusion cell in McDonnell’s headquarters at Balad air base in November 2006 was the first 
embodiment of this focused effort to counter Iranian influence. It would grow in capabil-
ity in the coming months as both Casey and the commander of the special operations task 
force sent intelligence specialists to work alongside the CJSOTF.106 McDonnell thought 
the new attention on Shi’a extremists also would yield additional unmanned aerial vehi-
cle support for the CJSOTF.107 However, the special operations task force commander 
would be the obvious billpayer in this transaction, and he was reluctant to share if it 
meant reducing his task force’s operational tempo against AQI. To better posture itself 
for countering Iranian influence, the CJSOTF planned to shift four additional U.S. Special 
Forces detachments to the Shi’a south to join the seven already posted across the south-
ern provinces. Another Special Forces company headquarters also would relocate to the 
south, bringing the total there to two. The repositioned teams would establish a CJSOTF 
presence during early 2007 in cities that had long gone without coverage, including the 
hot spots of Diwaniyah and Amarah.108
The original command-and-control arrangement supporting the new Shi’a militant- 
focused task force did not produce the operational effectiveness that Casey had hoped. 
Limitations in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets hampered the new 
task force’s operations, as did differences in approach.109 Reliant primarily on human 
intelligence, McDonnell’s CJSOTF tended to conduct operations more deliberately than 
the special operations task force, which, by contrast, adhered to a rapid, self-sustain-
ing cycle of raids that generated intelligence leading to attacks on subsequent targets.110 
As part of a broader coalition mission to “deny Iranian oppositional influence,” MNF-I 
had instructed the CJSOTF to make direct action against major EFP networks its main 
effort. McDonnell countered that his main effort should be information operations com-
plemented by well-planned assaults. Working “by, with, and through” indigenous 
forces and Shi’a tribes was crucial as well, McDonnell argued, and he advocated build-
ing popular support so that Iraqis themselves would call for constraining the Iranian 
regime’s destabilizing influence.111 The special operations task force was impatient with 
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McDonnell’s holistic approach and saw the special operations role in the mission to be 
primarily “man-hunting.”112 Partnership, tribal engagement, and information operations 
lay outside its realm of highly refined expertise.
To resolve the competing views about the importance of the Shi’a extremist threat 
and to address the inherent inefficiencies of the cooperative command-and-control rela-
tionship between the CJSOTF and his own command, the special operations task force 
commander proposed that all special operations forces in Iraq be unified under one 
command. This change might have mitigated McDonnell’s shortfalls in helicopters, sur-
veillance assets, and detention facilities, but it also would have amounted to a hostile 
takeover of the CJSOTF by another special operations element with a completely differ-
ent vision, and as a result, McDonnell fought the proposal. Outgunned in a bureaucratic 
fight with a three-star officer, McDonnell turned to Odierno for support and convinced 
the MNC-I commander that the corps still required control of the CJSOTF to partner with 
elite units of the Iraqi security forces and to maintain situational awareness through a 
countrywide network of contacts.113 By persuading the MNC-I commander to intervene 
on the CJSOTF’s behalf, McDonnell managed to block the idea of a unified special oper-
ations command and maintain his CJSOTF’s independence. He also may have ended his 
own career. Despite his visionary role in confronting the serious but neglected threat 
posed by the Quds Force and its proxies, the special forces colonel ultimately was passed 
over for promotion, becoming one of only three wartime CJSOTF-AP commanders—out 
of 11—not promoted to general officer rank. Despite these disputes over SOF organiza-
tion and focus, by the end of 2006 the coalition was postured for the first time to apply its 
potent special operations capabilities to the Shi’a militant networks operating in Iraq. The 
result in the months to come would be the largest confrontation between the coalition 
and the Shi’a militants since the battles of August 2004.
The Realignment of the Shi’a Parties and Fracturing of the Sadr Movement
As the coalition was deciding to fight a special operations war against the Shi’a mili-
tant groups and, by extension, their Quds Force sponsors, the alignment of the Iraqi Shi’a 
parties that had given the Sadrist militants political top cover against coalition opera-
tions for almost 2 years was changing. In fall 2006, Moqtada al-Sadr and his party con-
tinued to pursue the same basic goals they had since 2004: continuing de-Ba’athification, 
expanding the political and cultural influence of the Sadrist movement, and forcing a 
withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq.114 As the Sadrists and their militant followers 
largely had been unconstrained by the Baghdad security operations of summer and fall 
2006, it had seemed to MNF-I that Sadr’s political stock was rising and that the Shi’a cleric 
had the power to mobilize broad swathes of the Iraqi population against the coalition if 
he so chose.115 The fact that Maliki, who owed his election as Prime Minister to the votes 
of Sadrist Parliamentarians, had intervened repeatedly to block MNF-I from conducting 
operations against Sadrist militants in Sadr City reinforced this idea.
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Yet, when the Sadrist Parliamentary 
bloc walked out from Parliament on 
November 30 in protest against Maliki’s 
meeting with Bush at Amman, it became 
clear that the Sadrists had overreached. 
Suspending their participation in the 
central government, politicians affiliated 
with Sadr had approached other Members 
of Parliament with a proposal for an alli-
ance that would demand coalition with-
drawal, while JAM units had flexed their 
muscles to intimidate provincial councils 
and Iraqi security forces across the Shi’a 
south.116 These moves were a direct threat 
to the 6-month-old government of Maliki, 
and in response, Maliki and his Da’wa 
Party allies began to change their political calculus. A few days after the Sadrist walkout 
from Parliament, Maliki’s party struck a new agreement with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and 
the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, cementing a governing coalition that 
might be powerful enough to hobble the Sadrists’ political and military position.118 At the 
same time, Maliki and his Da’wa advisers began seeking ways to fracture Sadr’s political 
front and forge alliances with Sadrist leaders disenchanted with Sadr’s leadership. The 
prime target for Maliki’s political outreach was the militant organization AAH, headed 
by Sadr’s longtime lieutenant Qais al-Khazali, who since late 2004 had grown into a de 
facto challenger to Sadr’s leadership within the Sadr movement.119
Khazali had disagreed with the political overtures that JAM made toward the Iraqi 
Government after the 2004 Najaf showdown, and along with fellow Sadrist militant 
Akram al-Kabi he had led a breakaway faction of JAM that allied itself with Iran’s Quds 
Force. For 2 years, Khazali had remained loosely within Sadr’s movement, but he had 
grown more independent over time.120 As MNF-I puzzled over the array of Shi’a extrem-
ists it confronted, analysts differentiated between JAM groups that remained firmly under 
Sadr’s control and “Special Groups” or “secret cells” led by the likes of Khazali.121 What 
allowed AAH to operate separately from JAM was the support of Iran’s Quds Force. While 
uncooperative JAM members could be isolated if they failed to “toe the line,” Khazali’s 
network maintained its own supply channels and received funding and special training 
from Iran. JAM had received such support since 2004 or earlier. In 2006, Iran’s Quds 
Force reorganized its effort in Iraq and sought to develop a military organization there 
similar to the Lebanese Hizballah when Sadr began to appear too powerful for the Ira-
nian regime to control. Still, mainstream JAM continued to derive much support from its 
vibrant Iranian connections, and Mustafa al-Yaquoubi, Sadr’s most trusted adviser, con-
tinued to make trips to Iran and Lebanon.122 As Iranian officials became more concerned 
about Sadr’s future pliability, they sought to strengthen his potential competitors. With 
combat-experienced leaders, access to the same Sadrist popular base as JAM, and fighters 
more malleable to Iran’s agenda, Khazali’s faction fit the bill. By late 2006, Quds Force 
commander Qassem Soleimani had dispatched senior Lebanese Hizballah operative Ali 
Source: Photo published by Muslim Press.
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Musa Daqduq to serve as an adviser to AAH 
and to act as a liaison between Khazali and 
the Quds Force.123
In MNF-I’s view, AAH, with its connec-
tions to the Quds Force and its significant 
role in the sectarian cleansing of Sunnis from 
Baghdad, was the most dangerous of the spe-
cial groups and a prime target for the newly 
empowered coalition special operations task 
force. In Maliki’s eyes, however, Khazali 
was an important potential political ally 
who could be used to reduce Sadr’s political 
power and to co-opt some of the grassroots 
Sadr movement into the Da’wa Party base, 
thereby securing Da’wa’s long-term leader-
ship of both the Shi’a political bloc and the 
entire government.124
Maliki and MNF-I now approached the 
Iraqi Shi’a militant problem in nearly oppo-
site ways: MNF-I tended to refer to loyal 
followers of Sadr as “mainstream JAM” who could be dealt with on a political level, 
while the special groups were “rogue JAM,” irreconcilable extremists who would have 
to be destroyed through military operations. Maliki, meanwhile, considered Sadr and 
his loyalists to be political extremists who needed to be constrained, if not destroyed, for 
the sake of stability, and considered the special groups the more reasonable faction that 
could be reconciled to the government by political means.
Maliki’s newfound hostility to Sadr, in time, would make it easier for the coalition to 
employ its new anti-JAM task force. However, these sharply different approaches toward 
the Sadr movement and the special groups created more than a year of tension between 
Maliki and MNF-I that would give way to an Iraqi Shi’a civil war in 2007 and 2008.
The Raid on SCIRI’s Baghdad Compound
Within weeks, the anti-Shi’a militant task force began to have a significant impact. 
The first high-profile operation came in December 2006, and it swept up ostensible U.S. 
allies along with Shi’a militant targets. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, the United 
States had worked to build a political alliance with SCIRI and its long-time military wing, 
the Badr Corps, partly to counter the Sadr movement and partly to sever the two Shi’a 
parties from the Iranian regime, which had created them during the Iran-Iraq War. The 
Badr Corps had maintained its close connections to Soleimani’s Quds Force after the 
fall of Saddam’s regime and had deliberately integrated into the nascent Iraqi security 
forces, thus acquiring an institutional foothold that JAM lacked.126 Because of this devel-
opment, many of the confrontations between Shi’a extremists and Iraqi Army units were 
manifestations of an ongoing intra-Shi’a civil war. Stewing for decades, antipathy and 
distrust between Sadr’s forebears and the Hakim family, the exiled founders of SCIRI 
and the Badr Corps, only exacerbated the tension. In this struggle, the United States had 
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unabashedly taken sides with the Hakims and 
their allies. Recalling the affiliations of Iraqi Spe-
cial Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) commanders 
in key southern cities, one Special Forces officer 
deadpanned, “We were basically partnering with 
the Badr Corps.”127
A large organization, the Badr Corps enrolled 
many who found it hard to distance themselves 
from the lucrative business of arms smuggling. 
Nonetheless, the coalition had given Badr the ben-
efit of the doubt. It was true that some operatives 
facilitated the flow of EFPs into Iraq, but MNC-I 
analysts rationalized that they did so against the 
wishes of Badr Corps commander Hadi al-Amiri 
and SCIRI chairman Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, both 
of whom U.S. analysts believed desired a stron-
ger relationship with the United States in the 
near term.128 In any case, in terms of the number 
of casualties it inflicted on coalition soldiers, the 
Badr Corps was not comparable to JAM.129 Still, 
both Badr and its SCIRI affiliates had had a major 
hand in the bloody sectarian cleansing of 2005 and 
2006, but the coalition had penalized neither.
Coalition assumptions about SCIRI and Badr were shaken on December 21, 2006, 
when coalition commandos raided a SCIRI compound on the Karada Peninsula in central 
Baghdad in pursuit of Iranian military official Mohsen Chizari, head of the Quds Force 
operations department. Eluding capture earlier in the day, he had absconded to a safe 
house in a section of the compound belonging to Amiri himself. The special operations 
task force trailed him there and detained 10 people at the house, including Chizari and 
three more with connections to the Iranian Embassy. The other six were affiliated with 
Badr.131
Besides living space, the safe house contained a military operations center with maps 
outlining the Sunni and Shi’a areas of Baghdad and graphics identifying points in the 
capital apparently where key events had occurred—a visual depiction of the sectarian 
struggle for Baghdad and its belts that to some degree mirrored the AQI map captured 
in Taji just 2 days before. When he briefed Maliki on the raid, Casey suggested that the 
graphics marked the locations of recent (or planned) assassinations and kidnappings. 
The commandos also recovered computers, videotapes, notebooks, Badr order of battle 
information, and receipts that logged weapons shipments from Iran. It would take the 
coalition 14 days to process the volume of material seized.132 The evidence confirmed the 
strong links that remained between Quds Force and Badr—not to mention the mutual 
interests both organizations had in solidifying Shi’a dominance in Iraq. When he had met 
with U.S. Vice Presidential adviser John Hannah in October, Amiri had denied that his 
organization was involved in any sectarian activities or that Iranian intelligence agents 
had infiltrated Badr.133 Now, 2 months later, MNF-I had captured a high-ranking Quds 
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Force representative in Amiri’s house mulling over Baghdad’s sectarian fault lines along-
side Amiri’s men—some of whom were EFP facilitators.
When U.S. commandos stormed into their compound, it no doubt came as a surprise 
to Amiri and SCIRI leader Hakim, but it was no less surprising to the White House. 
Hakim had visited the White House at Bush’s invitation earlier in the month, a signif-
icant milestone in the Iraqi political party’s nascent strategic dialogue with the United 
States. When told by Abizaid on January 8 that MNF-I “found Iranians in bed with the 
Iraqis,” Bush seemed dumbfounded. “Is SCIRI involved with Iran?” he asked. “Deeply 
involved,” Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice replied. “So they are involved with ter-
rorists?” Bush asked, clearly dismayed. “So I had this guy into the Oval Office who kills 
our troops?” “No,” Rice responded, explaining that SCIRI’s military wing did not kill 
Americans directly, but trained those who might.134
Back in Baghdad, the Iranians protested the detentions stridently enough to worry the 
Maliki administration about potential repercussions. Though not happy with the Quds 
Force’s calculated efforts to destabilize the country, the Prime Minister refrained from 
taking a hard line, and President Jalal Talabani’s pronouncement after the raid that two 
of the Iranian operatives had come to Iraq at his invitation weakened the coalition’s case 
for holding them. It mattered little that they had crossed the border illegally, under false 
names. U.S. leaders were not inclined to press publicly for the prolonged detention of 
Hassan Chizari and his cohorts. The coalition released all four prisoners with ties to the 
Iranian Embassy by December 25, in time for the visit of Iran’s deputy foreign minis-
ter. Though bowing to this expected pressure, Casey found satisfaction in the signal the 
raid sent to Iran and the irrefutable evidence it provided to Maliki regarding Iranian 
intentions.135
The Erbil Five
Three weeks after the December raid on SCIRI’s compound, the coalition’s anti-Shi’a 
militant task force crashed another meeting between Iranian agents and their U.S.-allied 
Iraqi hosts, this time in Kurdistan. The January 11, 2007, raid originally had targeted Brig-
adier General Mohammad Ali Ja’afari, suspected of guiding Quds Force activities in Iraq, 
and Hamid Taghavi, the Ramazan Corps operations chief, but somehow the two evaded 
capture. Ja’afari, incidentally, would take command of Iran’s entire Islamic Revolution-
ary Guards Corps just 8 months after the raid.136 Illustrating the Quds Force’s pervasive 
hands-on involvement, Ja’afari’s comrade, Mansour Taghavi, would be wounded later 
in 2007 during a gunfight with Iraqi security forces in Diwaniyah and would be killed in 
December 2014 while advising Iraqi Army units and AAH militiamen as they cleared the 
Sunni town of Jurf al-Sakhr.
Nonetheless, in January 2007, the special operations task force missed its primary 
target. U.S. special operators landed by helicopter at Talabani’s guesthouse and Erbil 
airport and hauled away five mid-level Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps officers. 
Known as the Erbil Five, they would remain in coalition custody for more than 2 years. 
In response to this second successful raid against its operations in Iraq, the Iranian regime 
shut down its Iraqi consulates for a time and instructed Iranian companies doing busi-
ness in Iraq to remove their computers or to delete all files, lest American commandos 
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capture the information they contained. The Quds Force also scaled down its operations 
inside the country, recalling many Quds Force officers back to Iran.137
The Attack on the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center
Nine days after the raid in Erbil, Soleimani’s Iraqi proxies struck back in an apparent 
attempt to capture American hostages who could be traded for the Erbil Five. Late in the 
day on January 20, Khazali’s AAH militants launched a sophisticated raid against U.S. 
troops in the government center in the city of Karbala. The small, two-block compound 
in the middle of a busy neighborhood contained a number of buildings, including the 
provincial police headquarters and a barracks for the 30 U.S. Soldiers pulling week-long 
rotational duty there.138 Toting M4 carbines and wearing American-style combat fatigues, 
about a dozen AAH fighters arrived at the front gate in a convoy of five-to-seven black 
sport utility vehicles, and an Iraqi guard waved them through. The vehicles converged 
on the multi-storied police headquarters, where U.S. advisers, military police, and Sol-
diers from the 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, in ground-floor offices were wrapping 
up their daily activities. Outside the headquarters, several AAH attackers moved briskly 
to the entrance, where they shot and wounded two American guards before bursting 
into the building and unleashing a hail of grenades and small-arms fire. The operatives 
surprised and overwhelmed the small U.S. contingent, killing one and wounding three 
others inside, while seizing four more. Within 30 minutes, the raid was over, and as 
darkness fell, the militants made their escape with their prisoners, blowing up two High 
Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) in the process.
Alert Iraqi policemen from nearby Babil Province picked up the trail that evening 
after the attackers careened through a checkpoint on their flight east toward Hillah.139 
During the pursuit, the attackers either panicked or realized the fruitlessness of evad-
ing Iraqi and coalition troops with prisoners in tow. When police found the abandoned 
vehicles soon after, they found discarded digital camouflage uniforms and the abducted 
American Soldiers, all of them shot in the chest and head execution style. Two remained 
handcuffed in the rear of one vehicle while another lay dead on the ground. The fourth—
barely alive when the Iraqis recovered him—died of his wounds within the hour.140
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Sean A. Foley (Released).
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The brazen raid provoked a vigorous response from the coalition but also sent a chill 
up and down the chain of command. MND-B had dispatched Apache helicopters to the 
scene, but they arrived too late to break up the attack and prevent the abduction. The 
division also mobilized its quick reaction force, sending two companies of Strykers south 
to help track down the perpetrators once the Iraqi police recovered the remains of the 
missing Soldiers.142
Although it ended quickly, the AAH raid prompted some reflection by U.S. com-
manders. For a division about to ramp up its forward presence in Baghdad through the 
construction of dozens of joint security stations and combat outposts, the episode in Kar-
bala provided a sober reminder of the risks involved.143 Occurring as it did in one of 
the outlying provinces, the attack also suggested to some coalition officers that MND-B 
might be overstretched. In the emerging debate over possibly reassigning Baghdad’s 
southern belts to another division headquarters, the assault on the Karbala provincial 
joint control center underscored the arguments of those who favored reducing MND-B’s 
span of control.144
The attack bore the marks of an inside job, carried out with the complicity of the Kar-
bala police. The intruders had detailed information about the compound’s security mea-
sures, including where and when the unsuspecting Americans likely could be taken. As 
the gunfire erupted, the Iraqi garrison was absent or inactive, and those officers walking 
the upstairs halls of the headquarters building or working at their desks showed no inter-
est in organizing a defense. U.S. military policemen racing room to room in search of their 
comrades swept past Iraqis engaged in hushed conversations. To American troops on 
rotational duty at the Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC), the incident seemed 
to cap a period of veiled threats and a nagging feeling of insecurity and distrust of their 
supposed Iraqi partners.145 The peculiarities of the day made sense in retrospect: the scar-
city of local residents that normally did business in the compound, the early closing of 
the barbershop and market, and the arrival of a delegation of 15 to 20 “policemen” from 
Baghdad who had met with local Iraqi commanders ostensibly to plan security for the 
Ashura celebration. Some had taken pictures of restricted areas. A few had lingered into 
the evening. A report later concluded they were an advanced team for the attackers.146
Within 3 days, six suspects were in custody, and the coalition quickly determined that 
the perpetrators were AAH members.147 Not only did the shadowy group’s suspected 
past operations—including the assassination of Lieutenant General Amer Hashimi in 
October 2006 and the Ministry of Higher Education kidnappings in November—resem-
ble the Karbala attack, but a cell phone belonging to Laith Khazali, the younger brother 
of AAH’s leader, had been active in the local area.148 The perpetrators made amateurish 
mistakes during the raid, from grievously wounding their intended captives to leaving 
behind multiple undetonated explosive devices, suggesting that experienced Quds Force 
cadre had not participated directly. However, MNF-I saw strong indicators of a Quds 
Force hand in training AAH and preparing its fighters for the difficult mission.149 Coali-
tion officers later would discover the existence in Iran of a mock facility, apparently mod-
eled on the Karbala provincial headquarters compound that the Quds Force had likely 
used to train AAH operatives for the operation.150
MNC-I initially explored the theory that the raid stemmed from the Sadrists’ desire 
“to save face” amid mounting pressure and to reassert JAM’s dominance in Karbala. 
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However, given the attack’s timing and the tenuous relationship between Khazali and 
Sadr, the command judged the operation was far more likely an attempt to acquire hos-
tages to trade for the Erbil Five.151 It was also an escalation in the Iraq-based shadow war 
between the United States and the Iranian regime.
The Sadrists and the Baghdad Security Plan
The same day that Khazali’s operatives were killing U.S. Soldiers at the Karbala PJCC, 
MNF-I was negotiating with Prime Minister Maliki over the coalition’s aggressive new 
posture against Shi’a militia leaders under the auspices of the Baghdad Security Plan. The 
day before, January 19, MNF-I had detained the well-known Sadrist cleric and notorious 
JAM operative Abdul Hadi al-Daraji at his compound just south of Sadr City. Those affil-
iated with Sadr labeled the detention as a disastrous and foreboding blow.152
MNF-I had carried out the Daraji raid with the understanding that, as part of his polit-
ical battle with the Sadrists, Maliki had loosened restrictions on the coalition’s targeting 
of Shi’a militants in Baghdad. On January 20, the day after the raid, Casey reported to 
Bush that he noted a marked difference in the Prime Minister’s stance. Throughout the 
fall, Maliki had been “quite agitated” whenever MNF-I conducted operations near Sadr 
City and often had intervened to secure the release of Sadr allies. Over the intervening 
months, Casey reported, the situation had eased, allowing MNF-I to target Shi’a militia 
leaders “without a peep” from the Prime Minister. “We have no present restrictions on 
Sadr City operations,” he declared, adding that this change had diminished senior JAM 
leaders’ boldness and reduced Shi’a death squad activity by 35 percent over the previous 
5 weeks.153 It was perhaps a premature assessment considering that MNF-I already had 
decided to defer operations against Sadr City and other Shi’a militant strongholds in the 
capital.
It also was premature where Maliki was concerned. The Prime Minister expressed sur-
prise and irritation over Daraji’s detention, thinking the Sadrist cleric had been granted 
immunity from arrest by the Iraqi interim government in 2004. Despite Maliki’s competi-
tion with Sadr, his administration was not yet on the same page as the coalition, and his 
representatives immediately sought to use Daraji’s capture by dangling the prospect of 
the cleric’s release in exchange for the Sadrists’ return to Maliki’s cabinet. Hoping to cut 
its losses and wrest some guarantees of protection from the New Year’s Offensive, Sadr’s 
party announced its intention to return to the government on January 21. Casey pro-
tested, however, pointing out that Daraji had links to sectarian violence that more than 
justified his prolonged detention. The issue escalated into the political realm quickly, 
and Bush himself directed the MNF-I commander to keep the JAM leader in custody. 
Mentioning the prisoner to Casey by name, the President viewed his arrest as a test of 
Maliki’s commitment to evenhandedness. In spite of the political discomfort of having to 
forego his potential deal with the Sadrists, the Prime Minister yielded to the coalition in 
this case.154 The exchange showed that just days after the U.S. Government had extracted 
commitments from Maliki to take action against the Sadrist militants, it would be a chal-
lenge to keep the Prime Minister on board.
The Daraji arrest and other coalition operations in January 2007 appeared to put the 
Sadrists off-balance. Sensing that their top cover had evaporated in the aftermath of the 
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surge announcement, many Shi’a militia commanders hunkered down and adopted 
a “wait-and-see” approach.155 Many of those who believed they had made a name for 
themselves feared capture and fled Baghdad.156 Confirming this trend, reports reached 
MNF-I in late January that the Iranian Embassy had issued some 200 special passports 
to Shi’a militia members. Sadr himself secretly departed for Iran around this time.157 The 
flight of the Sadrist leaders within days of the surge announcement illustrated that the 
psychological effects of the surge would be as important as its physical effects, both in 
cowing the coalition’s enemies and in emboldening its partners. The same effect applied 
to Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who reportedly fled to Iran at the end of January.158
Hoping to lower JAM’s profile as it braced for more frequent and intense coalition 
and Iraqi attacks, Sadr called for his militia to stand down following the kickoff of the 
revised Baghdad Security Plan. Mainstream JAM units generally obeyed. Many leaders 
that spurned Sadr’s instructions did so not for strategic or ideological reasons but to 
sustain their lucrative criminal enterprises. Groups of loyal fighters formed. The Najaf-
based “Golden JAM” and Baghdad’s “Noble JAM,” as they called themselves, attempted 
to persuade rogue elements to comply with Sadr’s wishes or purged them altogether, 
showing that the Shi’a militants were fighting one another even as they postured to fight 
the coalition.159
The Battle Against the Soldiers of Heaven
Far from Baghdad, another confrontation took place on the eve of the surge that high-
lighted the complexity of the Shi’a militant problem. Iraqi and coalition troops found 
themselves in a strange battle against a Shi’a militia with no ties to the Sadr movement or 
any other Shi’a extremist faction known to the coalition. Early on the morning of January 
28, 2007, 10 miles north of Najaf, Iraqi security forces became embroiled in an unexpected 
gunfight. The first coalition unit on the scene—a U.S. Special Forces detachment from 
Najaf—arrived to find dozens of police and troops from the 1st Brigade, 8th Iraqi Army 
Division, locked in combat with a dug-in, battalion-sized foe reportedly equipped with 
heavy machine guns, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades. As the fighting intensified, 
the enemy’s identity and how the battle began remained a mystery to the Americans. 
Under fire themselves, the Green Berets called for close-air support as reinforcements 
consisting of Iraqi special operations forces and U.S. advisers from nearby Hillah made 
their way to the sound of the guns. Multiple strafing and bombing runs from F-16 Falcon 
jets and A-10 Thunderbolts failed to suppress the enemy position. Rocket fire brought 
down one AH-64 Apache helicopter that had arrived to help, killing the two pilots when 
it fell from the sky into no-man’s-land between the opposing sides. A U.S. Army transi-
tion team returning to the coalition base in Diwaniyah after training with its Iraqi bat-
talion attempted to secure the crash site, but gunfire kept the American Soldiers pinned 
down. The precarious situation stabilized only when two U.S. Stryker companies arrived 
at dusk, along with another Iraqi Army company.160 Taking control of the operation that 
evening, the Strykers bombarded the enemy position through the night and launched an 
assault shortly after dawn as the militants began to surrender en masse. The battle ended 
in a lopsided victory for U.S. and Iraqi troops, with reports of up to 400 militants killed 
and another 400 people detained.161
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The coalition soon discovered that the mysterious armed group was a cult-like orga-
nization called the Soldiers of Heaven, which had established a commune of sorts on a 
compound outside Najaf. There, the group’s militant members lived with their families, 
many of whom were detained by the Iraqi troops that overran the compound as the battle 
ended. Holding a peculiar view of Shi’a Islam, the Soldiers of Heaven believed that the 
Twelfth or Hidden Imam—who had reputedly disappeared in the 9th century—was on 
the verge of returning. Their leader, Dhia Abdul Zahra Kadhim, killed in the January 28 
fighting, seems to have convinced his followers that he was a reincarnation of the Imam 
Ali.
No definitive explanation of the origin of the January 28, 2007, battle has ever come 
to light. Despite its extreme beliefs, the group had displayed no previous violent activity. 
In the days after the fighting, controversy swirled as details emerged about the group’s 
intentions and the Iraqi Government’s motivations surrounding the incident. According 
to Iraqi Government spokesmen, the Soldiers of Heaven had hoped to hasten the day of 
the Hidden Imam’s return by carrying out a bloody assassination campaign targeting 
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani and other Shi’a leaders in Najaf and occupying the Imam Ali 
Mosque. While some accounts reported that Iraqi security forces had stumbled into an 
ambush, others indicated that the troops instigated the conflict but soon found they had 
kicked over a hornet’s nest.162 Official explanations further clouded the matter. Asad Abu 
Ghalal, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) governor of Najaf, tarred the Soldiers 
of Heaven as Sunni extremists who had foreign fighters among their ranks. A day later, 
Major General Qais Hamza al-Mamouri, Babil Province’s chief of police, attempted a 
clarification, describing the group’s leader as a Sunni militant masquerading as a co-reli-
gionist of his exclusively Shi’a followers. The confusion lingered, with some Iraqi officials 
speculating about ties to al-Qaeda, while others alleged Iranian connections.163 One ana-
lyst argued that the fighting was a political vendetta against a tribe that locally opposed 
the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq and Maliki’s Da’wa Party.164 Related to this was 
another assertion that Maliki had intended to teach the Sadrists a lesson by confronting a 
weaker fringe group, thus signaling his readiness to crack down on defiant Shi’a militias, 
but the operation had met greater resistance than anticipated and had required coalition 
intervention.
U.S. troops had hastened to answer Iraqi calls for assistance, committing ground, 
air, and special operations forces with scarcely a thought toward the battle’s origins or 
underlying purpose. Having passed control of security in Najaf province to Iraqi civil 
authorities in mid-December 2006, MND-B commander Fil naturally highlighted the coa-
lition’s military reaction and how it had shored up an unraveling situation. Units had 
learned about exercising command and control “on the move,” Fil observed, as well as 
valuable lessons on leveraging the operational reach of Stryker formations and marshal-
ing resources for rapid response.165 Portrayed as a model of how to support contingencies 
in provinces under Iraqi control, the operation had lacked a logic that connected it to the 
coalition’s broader campaign. Though it was a large battle by Iraq War standards, the 
government had kept its plans secret until security forces required help. Then, the Amer-
icans stepped in and rescued them without knowing who the enemy was, decisively 
intervening in what may have been an intra-Shi’a political or religious rivalry disguised 
as a battle against extremists.166
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Though on Iraq’s political and social fringe, the Soldiers of Heaven had maintained 
offices across the southern provinces. Just as they did not suddenly emerge on the eve of 
the January 28 battle, neither did they disappear in its wake. Nearly a month later, a joint 
U.S. and Iraqi force captured over 180 Soldiers of Heaven in a raid in western Qadisi-
yah Province.167 Other operations against them would arise in 2008 as well. The sudden 
appearance of this little-known cultish group showed coalition leaders that stabilizing 
southern Iraq would likely take more energy and troops than they had expected.
The Zamili Arrest
Barely a week after the battle in Najaf and 3 weeks after the arrest of Daraji, another 
arrest of a high-profile Sadrist leader suggested there would be some bite to the coali-
tion’s bark against the Shi’a militant groups. On February 9, U.S. Special Forces advisers 
and Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Ministry of Health compound in downtown Bagh-
dad and arrested Hakim Zamili, the Sadrist politician who served as a Deputy Minister 
of Health. Since 2005, Zamili—a militia commander who purportedly maintained a per-
sonal security detail of over 100 men—had masterminded a campaign of terror against 
Sunni citizens. Under his instructions, government ambulances doubled as troop and 
weapons carriers for Shi’a death squads, and hospitals became killing grounds for sick or 
injured Sunni patients. Zamili also was implicated in the November 2006 kidnapping and 
murder of Ammar Saffar, the other Deputy Minister of Health and Maliki’s Dawa Party 
colleague. Saffar had been compiling a list of the ministry’s JAM-sponsored atrocities 
with the intention of revealing the crimes publicly before gunmen abducted him from 
his home and eventually murdered him. Seeing Zamili as a mounting liability, Maliki 
decided to cut ties with the odious health official and authorized MNF-I to detain him so 
long as it occurred outside of Sadr City. The operation to seize Zamili involved the Iraqi 
commandos disguising themselves as wounded personnel requiring medical assistance. 
In this way, they penetrated the outer ring of Zamili’s militiamen guarding the com-
pound and captured their quarry without firing a shot.168
 
Source: Photo by Public Relations Department, Ministry of Defence Republic of Serbia.
Hakim Zamili, Iraqi Deputy Minister of Health.169
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Removing this prominent symbol of corruption and sectarianism from the govern-
ment sent a powerful signal that the impending surge would involve action against not 
just Shi’a militant leaders on Baghdad’s streets, but potentially against well-connected 
Shi’a militant politicians. For Casey, evidence pointing to the deep connections between 
disreputable Iranian actors and their Iraqi partners also suggested something about the 
difficulties ahead. In one of his last engagements before he departed Iraq in February, 
the MNF-I commander visited Vice President Adel Abd al-Mehdi and warned him that 
SCIRI’s associations with sectarian thugs threatened the future of his country. Casey had 
a similar message for Hadi al-Amiri after the Badr Corps chief attended the general’s 
farewell reception: It was time to choose Iraq over Iran and the militias. To Talabani, the 
MNF-I commander pointedly asked how it was possible for the Iraqi President to thank 
the United States for the blood and treasure it had expended while maintaining a cordial 
relationship with Soleimani, whose responsibility for the deaths of American Soldiers 
now was beyond doubt.170 By February 2007, the question Casey had put to his staff 4 
months before had been answered. The strategic effect of Iranian influence indeed was 
substantial, if not decisive, with the Quds Force-managed proxy war against MNF-I serv-
ing as the clearest indicator.
THE NORTHERN IRAQ CONFLICT BEFORE THE SURGE
With the coalition’s focus drawn to Baghdad throughout 2006, the fight in northern 
Iraq, like that in Basrah and the south, had remained an economy of force operation. 
Casey’s decision to move the Strykers of Colonel Townsend’s 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry 
Division, south from Mosul confirmed the growing centripetal force of the deteriorating 
state of security in the capital. The Stryker brigade’s departure from Mosul in late Novem-
ber left only one U.S. combined-arms battalion from 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in 
a dense, urban area of nearly 2 million people―replicating the situation before the city’s 
collapse in 2004.171 Mosul itself was a divided city in physical, demographic, and military 
terms. The Tigris River bisected it, and Sunni Arab and Kurdish enclaves dominated the 
western and eastern halves, respectively. Mosul similarly was split between the jurisdic-
tions of two Iraqi Army brigades, with a predominantly Sunni Arab unit operating in the 
west and a former peshmerga unit in the east. The city lay along a fault line where Kurd-
ish expansionism abutted long-time Sunni Arab and Sunni Turkoman interests. Reset-
tling the Mosul area following the collapse of Saddam’s regime, the Kurds had secured a 
strong political position with the help of the Sunni boycott of the 2005 elections and had 
dominated Ninawa’s provincial government ever since. Exacerbating the sense of Sunni 
disenfranchisement, aggressive peshmerga units routinely crossed the Green Line that 
marked the western boundary of the Kurdistan Regional Government to establish check-
points to control the movement of the local population and stake out broader Kurdish 
territorial claims.172
This Arab-Kurd struggle—and a related struggle between Kurds and Sunni Tur-
komans—provided an opening for AQI and other Sunni insurgents as they moved to 
solidify their hold on critical terrain. While Baghdad was the prize AQI sought to win, 
Iraqi Sunni leaders judged that the terrorist group needed Mosul to survive.173 The city 
was a crossroads connecting northern Iraq with Syria through the Sinjar-Tel Afar corri-
dor—the same corridor in which Casey had placed the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment to 
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disrupt foreign-fighter flow in the summer of 2005. Mosul proved relatively hospitable to 
al-Qaeda in Iraq not only because of its Sunni Arab population’s resentment of Kurdish 
encroachment, but also because it boasted a sizable number of former army officers and 
Ba’athist officials who opposed the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad.174 Groups 
like Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri’s New Ba’ath Party that sought to expel the coalition and infil-
trate Iraq’s nascent security apparatus found a relative safe haven in and around Mosul 
and in the Za’ab Triangle to the south.175 On the day of Saddam’s execution, Douri’s 
militant loyalists in these areas publicly announced the formation of the “Naqshbandi 
Army,” which would function as the militant arm of Douri’s wing of the Ba’ath Party. 
Their heartland was an operationally significant rural area where the only major road 
between Anbar Province and the upper Tigris River Valley emerged from the southern 
reaches of the Jazeera Desert to intersect with the Hamrin Ridge running northwest from 
central Diyala. This combination of factors made it difficult to dislodge AQI, the Naqsh-
bandis, and other militants from Mosul and its environs.
MND-N’s Complex Problem Set
Mosul was just one of a host of problems that Mixon’s 25th Infantry Division head-
quarters was responsible for managing. As MND-N commander, Mixon supported the 
main effort in Baghdad principally by attempting to interdict accelerants of violence ema-
nating from Baqubah and the capital’s northern belt.176 This approach translated into the 
standard tasks of neutralizing VBIED networks and death squads and denying them safe 
havens. MND-N’s area of responsibility extended from the outskirts of Baghdad north to 
Turkey and along an east-west axis from the Iranian to the Syrian border, an expansive 
area whose widely scattered population centers precluded a concentration of ground 
forces and rapid mutual support between Mixon’s units.
General Mixon (right), Governor Duraid Kashmoula (left).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Major Roderick Cunningham (Released).
Major General Benjamin Mixon, Commander MND-N, With Ninawa Provincial 
 Governor Duraid Kashmoula.177
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In early 2007, Mixon dispersed his four BCTs across the four provinces of Diyala, 
Salahadin, Kirkuk, and Ninawa, which together formed an area the size of Indiana. Each 
province held unique problems that added to the dizzying complexity of MND-N’s mis-
sion. In the far north, the division’s complications included the presence of the Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK), an organization that had conducted a 2-decade insurgency against 
the Turkish Government from bases deep in the mountains of northern Iraqi Kurdis-
tan. The PKK’s terrorist attacks inside Turkey sometimes provoked a response from the 
Turks in the form of limited cross-border operations.178 Iraq’s northern oil fields around 
Kirkuk and the refinery at Bayji also came within Mixon’s purview, saddling him with 
the unenviable job of assisting the Iraqi Government with improving its oil infrastructure 
and disrupting smuggling networks that partially bankrolled the insurgency. Given the 
influx of foreign fighters, the arduous task of border interdiction on the Syrian frontier 
stretched MND-N’s forces even further. Adding to this list of tasks, MNC-I directed the 
division to neutralize AQI in key cities along the northern Tigris River Valley and to dis-
rupt insurgent activity in the Za’ab Triangle.179 In the vast territory under Mixon’s charge, 
few areas were unimportant.
MND-N may not have benefited directly from the surge of the first few U.S. bri-
gade combat teams to central Iraq, but the arrival of these forces in Baghdad halted the 
bone-scraping diversion of coalition combat power from the division’s area of opera-
tions. Mixon managed the risks posed by a vast, undermanned and trouble-strewn sector 
in part by leveraging his combat aviation brigade and a recently formed IED-hunting 
aerial surveillance unit called Task Force ODIN. With these, he organized airmobile pla-
toon and company-sized strike packages targeting insurgent leaders across his area of 
operations.180 Given Diyala’s connection to the northern belt and the fight in Baghdad, 
Mixon designated the province and its capital of Baqubah as MND-N’s priority effort, 
and when additional forces began to arrive during spring 2007, Mixon would deploy 
them there.181 The BCT stationed in Ninawa thus found itself in the doubly uninviting 
position of serving as the economy of force element within a division that was itself the 
corps economy of force.
“Hold Mosul”
Colonel Stephen M. Twitty, the commander of the 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, 
understood that MNC-I’s primary focus in early 2007 was on reducing the violence in 
Baghdad, a fact that Odierno made clear in a visit to Mosul. “I know you need more 
forces,” he told Twitty. “But I can’t give them to you. . . . Just hold Mosul for us, and 
don’t let it fall. That is your mission.”182 With that guidance, the BCT commander chose 
to keep his strongest battalion posted at Forward Operating Base Marez on the edge of 
the city and used these troops to staff combat outposts within the city alongside two 
Iraqi Army brigades. With his remaining forces, Twitty covered the Syrian border and 
Tel Afar to the west, and Qayyarah to the south. Twitty’s thinly stretched units in Mosul 
faced the same problems that had emerged during Operation TOGETHER FORWARD 
in Baghdad. Clearing operations in a specific area temporarily lowered levels of violence, 
but attacks rose again after the limited surge of U.S. and Iraqi troops moved on to other 
zones. Twitty could hold Mosul, but the ebb and flow of security developments was such 
that he could not consolidate his gains with the available forces. The reassignment of 
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three local Iraqi Army battalions to Baghdad as part of the Baghdad Security Plan only 
lessened his chances of doing so.183
 
Colonel Twitty (right) with Major General Wathiq al- Hamdani (left).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Major Roderick Cunningham (Released). 
Colonel Stephen Twitty, Commander, 4th BCT, 1st Cavalry  
Division, With Ninawa Provincial Director of Police  
Major General Wathiq al-Hamdani.184
The U.S. commanders in the north judged that the intensifying pressure on the enemy 
in Baghdad could have a related and undesirable impact elsewhere, as had been the case 
when the Sunni insurgency responded to the coalition’s November 2004 attack in Fallujah 
with devastating coordinated attacks in Mosul.185 Local politics did not help. Aggressive 
peshmerga behavior along with brazen exhibitions of Kurdish nationalism resembled the 
violent and intimidating activities carried out by some Shi’a-dominated military units in 
and around Baghdad. Heavily Kurdish outfits lacked legitimacy in the eyes of Mosul’s 
Sunni Arab citizens—often for good reason, and the practice of employing them in Sunni 
Arab areas constituted a risk to be managed carefully.186
Nevertheless, while Casey and Chiarelli’s transition bridging strategy had been jetti-
soned as a corps-wide approach to accelerated transition, Mixon still believed that con-
ditions in MND-N warranted using augmented transition teams to develop the Iraqi 
security forces in areas where the coalition lacked sufficient combat power to partner 
with Iraqi units. The continuing improvement of the 2d and 3d Iraqi Army Divisions in 
Ninawa made the downside of this contentious allocation of manpower more palatable. 
Both divisions had passed from coalition control to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command 
by December 2006, just as Twitty’s brigade had arrived.187 In Ninawa, Mixon decided to 
attach a maneuver squad to the 12-man military transition teams paired with each Iraqi 
Army battalion and, similarly, one maneuver company covered the brigade of Iraqi border 
troops posted along the Syrian frontier.188 For Twitty, this translated into having an entire 
squadron devoted to training and advising security forces throughout the province.189
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A crucial part of holding Mosul in early 2007 involved managing the tense relations 
between local army units and the city’s police force. The police in Ninawa’s provincial 
capital were almost exclusively Sunni Arab, making their cooperation with the Kurd-
ish-majority brigade of the 2d Iraqi Army Division difficult. Instances of violence between 
Iraqi soldiers and police occurred frequently enough for them to be a major concern to 
Twitty and other U.S. commanders.190 “That was my biggest worry,” Twitty recalled. “If 
I lost the police and the army, I only had one [U.S.] battalion in Mosul.”191 The dearth of 
troops meant the coalition was in a precarious situation in a province that would prove 
to be the most important insurgent stronghold in Iraq. Mosul and the north would pose a 
thorny problem whether the impending surge operations pacified Baghdad or not.
***
On the eve of the surge counteroffensive in January 2007, U.S. commanders had man-
aged in a matter of weeks to reinitiate a campaign to secure Baghdad. However, the 
events occurring during the 2 months between Bush’s December 2006 decision to deploy 
the surge troops and the eventual arrival of Petraeus in February deepened senior U.S. 
leaders’ distrust of Prime Minister Maliki and his government. This left them question-
ing whether an Iraqi Government riven by sectarianism had the will and ability both to 
attack AQI and rein in Baghdad’s Shi’a militant groups.
Yet even before the surge troops began to arrive, the dynamics of the conflict in cen-
tral Iraq started to change as the warring parties anticipated the additional American 
troops. Clear signs emerged of what was to come in the remainder of 2007. The coali-
tion’s fight against AQI would shift from the streets of Baghdad to the rural areas and 
suburbs surrounding the city, where AQI had long enjoyed support zones on the edge 
of the capital. War between the coalition and the Iranian regime’s Shi’a militant proxies, 
relatively quiet since the Sadrist uprising of August 2004, again intensified. War between 
the Maliki government and the militant arm of the Sadr movement appeared imminent 
as well, leading to a new alignment of Iraq’s Shi’a political parties. Tension grew between 
MNF-I and the Maliki government over how best to address the Shi’a militant threat, 
with the two sides appearing to adopt diametrically opposing strategies. There was ten-
sion within the coalition command as well, as Odierno began to anticipate the surge and 
to reverse the transition campaign plan his commander, Casey, had created. Finally, as 
the coalition commanders gathered U.S. and Iraqi combat power for another Baghdad 
security plan, the northern Iraq security problem and the Arab-Kurd conflict continued 
to fester, with neither the coalition nor the Iraqi Government possessing the means to 
resolve either issue. These were the challenges Petraeus would inherit when he took com-
mand of MNF-I in early February 2007.
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THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007
In a televised address to the nation on January 10, 2007, President George W. Bush 
announced his decision to change the U.S. strategy in Iraq. Speaking from the Oval Office, 
Bush outlined a plan “to help the Iraqis carry out their campaign to put down sectarian 
violence and bring security to the people of Baghdad.” The President explained the plan 
in unusual detail, to include the new Iraqi command-and-control structure in the capital 
and the intent behind joint security stations (JSSs). In the past, Iraqi and U.S. force levels 
proved insufficient to hold “cleared” neighborhoods, he said. This was a primary reason 
for recent failures, along with unwarranted restrictions on coalition operations against 
terrorists and insurgents. Explaining how these shortcomings would be addressed, Bush 
cited Nuri al-Maliki’s supportive public comments and revealed his own decision to 
commit roughly 20,000 additional American troops to Iraq. Besides the 5 brigade combat 
teams (BCTs) slated to deploy in and around Baghdad, the President mentioned the 
imminent arrival of another 4,000 Marines in Anbar. While security was the “most urgent 
priority for success,” the plan contained elements covering political, economic, and dip-
lomatic concerns. During his address, the President referred to a “new approach” or a 
“change” in strategy over a half-dozen times.
A new commander would implement the revised strategy. General David H. Pet-
raeus would take command of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) from General George 
Casey, Jr., in early February, ending Casey’s nearly 3-year tenure in Baghdad. Within 
days of his arrival in Iraq, Petraeus would reverse the course of the MNF-I campaign 
plan, sending American troops off their bases and back into Baghdad’s neighborhoods to 
conduct operations against both al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Shi’a militant groups. The days 
of the transition strategy were over.1
PETRAEUS TAKES COMMAND
“Hard is Not Hopeless”
The White House consulted with then-Lieutenant General Petraeus during its fall 
2006 Iraq strategy review, and his name had been floated as a potential replacement for 
Casey in December by Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, former Vice Chief 
General Jack Keane, and Casey himself.2 Schoomaker had recommended Petraeus to Sec-
retary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld as a potential successor to Casey as early 
as fall 2005, when Petraeus had given up command of Multi-National Security Transition 
Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) to oversee the Army schools at Fort Leavenworth, KS, with 
the charter to revise the service’s counterinsurgency doctrine in light of the Iraq cam-
paign.3 Schoomaker also had informed Petraeus at that time that he was the most likely 
candidate to succeed Casey at MNF-I, a consideration that lent more urgency to Petrae-
us’s work. Other senior officers, including Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, had been 
mentioned as potential new MNF-I commanders, but by the time the President visited 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in mid-December to issue his guidance to deploy the surge 
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brigades, Petraeus had become the leading candidate. In early January, the President 
nominated Petraeus for the post. The general enjoyed broad support in Congress and 
popularity in the media; and the administration looked for him to assume command in 
Iraq as soon as possible.
Petraeus’s two previous tours in Iraq had helped to frame his basic sense of what 
the coalition’s future course should be, and his recent assignment overseeing the devel-
opment of the Army’s new counterinsurgency manual, Field Manual 3-24, provided a 
doctrinal foundation on which to proceed. The key principle of the new manual—that 
of population security—was noticeable in Petraeus’s January 23 confirmation hearing 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, where Petraeus’s remarks amounted to 
a point-by-point repudiation of the transition strategy. “The mission of Multinational 
Force Iraq will be modified, making security of the population, particularly in Baghdad, 
and in partnership with Iraqi forces, the focus of the military effort,” he told the com-
mittee, adding that to secure Baghdad’s neighborhoods, “a persistent presence in these 
neighborhoods will be essential.” This change away from a focus on transitioning to Iraqi 
control was necessary, he explained, because “The escalation of violence in 2006 under-
mined the coalition strategy and raised the prospect of a failed Iraqi state.” Like many 
of the committee members, Petraeus said he believed the long-term solution to Iraq’s 
problems required more than security, but it was “exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi gov-
ernment to come to grips with the toughest issues it must resolve while survival is the 
primary concern of so many in Iraq’s capital.”4 This fact made a renewed emphasis on 
“military action to improve security” necessary.
The surge forces would require significant time to flow to Iraq and gain enough under-
standing of the situation to operate effectively, Petraeus cautioned, taking care to pre-
empt calls to limit explicitly the duration of the surge or to assess its progress too early. 
“None of this will be rapid,” Petraeus said, adding that MNF-I would face “a determined, 
adaptable, barbaric, enemy . . . [that] will try to wait us out.” Perhaps mindful of criticism 
that Casey had stuck too long with a failing transition strategy, Petraeus assured the sen-
ators that “should I determine that the new strategy cannot succeed, I will provide such 
an assessment.” He finished his presentation by cautioning against defeatism, offering, 
“The way ahead will be very hard . . . But hard is not hopeless.”5
The President’s decision to change commanders in Baghdad prompted a change of 
commanders at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) as well. Like Casey, General John 
Abizaid recommended against the U.S. troop surge and was skeptical that the addition of 
five brigades would have a lasting impact on Iraq’s security situation. However, Abizaid 
and other U.S. leaders recognized that a significantly changing strategy would require 
different commanders in both Baghdad and Tampa, FL. Abizaid had already served at 
CENTCOM for 3½ years, an unusually long tenure, and was scheduled to retire in April, 
so moving up his transition was relatively easy. To replace Abizaid and serve as Pet-
raeus’s immediate superior, SECDEF Robert M. Gates and JCS Chairman General Peter 
Pace recommended that Bush select Admiral William J. “Fox” Fallon, then serving as the 
commander of U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).
CENTCOM would be Fallon’s fourth post as a four-star admiral, making him the most 
senior four-star commander in the U.S. military. Petraeus would be the most junior. At 62 
years old, Fallon had more than 4 decades of experience in the U.S. Navy and also carried 
the endorsement of now-retired General Keane, who had worked closely with Fallon 
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in the Pentagon when the two men were vice chiefs of their respective services. Keane 
believed Fallon’s experience as a military diplomat in the Pacific region had equipped 
him to fill the role of a CENTCOM commander who could engage Middle Eastern lead-
ers across the region to try to mitigate outside intervention in the Iraq conflict.6 He also 
believed Fallon would be content to let Petraeus set the U.S. course inside Iraq without 
interference from CENTCOM, but this was a belief that Fallon soon would dispel.
The Departure of General Casey
Casey tried to put his best foot forward as he entered the home stretch of his pro-
longed Iraq tour. However, the transition period was far from smooth. Since the summer 
of 2006, the MNF-I commander had struggled to explain the crux of his approach to the 
Bush administration—how the United States had to drawdown its forces, transition tasks 
to the Iraqi security forces (ISF), and get out of Baghdad’s neighborhoods in order to 
win. He had persisted in this line of argument through the exhaustive external strategy 
review. Surprised and puzzled on occasion as the White House adjusted its Iraq policy, 
the general believed, in retrospect, that Bush had settled on the surge largely to buy time 
and build domestic support rather than to achieve success on the ground.7
As the administration put its final touches on the “new way forward,” Casey found 
himself again addressing what he considered misperceptions of the approach he had 
championed for years. In support of the President’s January 10 speech, for example, the 
White House sought to highlight how the revised strategy differed from the preceding 
one. A list of “key operational shifts” noted that MNF-I’s previous security focus had 
been on transition, while the way ahead would be chiefly characterized by protecting the 
population.8 During a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Gates, Pace, and 
Stephen J. Hadley, the MNF-I commander protested what he viewed as an incomplete 
and simplistic depiction of his approach. Casey insisted the coalition had been conduct-
ing a counterinsurgency campaign throughout his tenure, adding that he understood the 
central focus of counterinsurgency as securing the people. He resented the insinuation 
that MNF-I had neglected it during his watch.9 The statesman-like Gates cautioned his 
colleagues against the inclination to set Casey and Abizaid on one side and the “White 
House, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and the new people” on the other. “We 
need to make it seem as if we are all on the same side,” Gates advised.10 This would 
become increasingly difficult as the MNF- I change of command loomed.
Despite the clear decision in Washington to change course, those at MNF-I watching 
the President’s speech believed they still detected support for the transition bridging 
strategy. The White House had emphasized protecting the population and identified this 
as a deviation from the MNF-I campaign plan.11 However, Bush also mentioned embed-
ding more American advisers and described the training of Iraqi forces as “the essential 
U.S. security mission in Iraq.” The President also announced a doubling of the number 
of provincial reconstruction teams, a step meant to help “speed the transition to Iraqi 
self-reliance.”12 The supporting information briefings by the National Security Council 
(NSC) staff labeled the way ahead as Iraqi-led.13 Extending these points, Casey claimed 
at a press conference a few days later that the new plan would “[allow] us to sustain the 
agreement in Amman . . . to accelerate development of the ISF and the passage of security 
responsibility.” He also described the flow of additional forces as flexible with the ability 
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to “evaluate progress as we went,” even though nearly all senior U.S. policymakers by 
that point had decided that all five surge brigades would deploy.14
Back in Baghdad, the process of transition from Casey to Petraeus began uneasily and 
remained so throughout. Knowing that in his Senate confirmation hearing he would be 
asked for his opinion on the size of the surge, Petraeus thought it prudent to consult Gen-
eral Raymond Odierno, the operational commander on the ground. Over the phone from 
Iraq, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander told Petraeus he needed all five 
brigades, a judgment that matched Petraeus’s own.15 Casey, however, considered the 
incoming commander’s probing as improper meddling and barred Petraeus from com-
municating directly with MNF-I’s subordinate units until after the change of command.16
In the brief, one-on-one time the two commanders shared during this rushed transi-
tion, Casey observed to his successor, “What we’re seeing here is a major shift in strategy 
from [the Iraqis] doing it to us doing it.”17 Fully aware that Petraeus favored a reversal of 
his initiative encouraging more Iraqi-led operations, Casey worried about how American 
troops would adapt to what would effectively be a change of mission. “Whatever you do, 
whatever you decide, just be clear about it,” Casey urged, “because it’s a major change.”18 
It was indeed, Petraeus agreed, and he was determined to be very clear about it.19
The New Commander’s Intent
Petraeus took command of MNF-I on February 10 in a ceremony presided over by 
Abizaid. His introductory letter to the troops issued on that day emphasized security 
as the foremost task, one that the coalition would achieve in partnership with the Iraqis. 
Petraeus noted it would require living and fighting alongside those partners. Though 
the incoming commander echoed the central tenet of his predecessor (“In the end, Iraqis 
will decide the outcome of this struggle”), not a word was mentioned of transition.20 The 
immediate concern was to “gain the time” the Iraqis needed to “save their country.”21
General Petraeus (second from left), General Casey (right).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Laura M. Bigenho (Released).
General David Petraeus Takes Command of MNF-I From General George Casey.22
THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007
99
Meeting with his subordinate leaders at Al Faw Palace immediately following the 
change of command ceremony, Petraeus stated that the high level of violence in Iraq 
had invalidated the current strategy and that a “modification of priorities” was required. 
Transition remained important, he said, but security had to be recognized as a “prerequi-
site for the way ahead.”23 Commanders should look for opportunities to put Iraqi security 
forces in the lead, Petraeus said, “But if we don’t get a grip on the violence, then it doesn’t 
matter who is in charge.”24
As for improving security, Petraeus stressed that how commanders employed the 
additional surge forces would matter more than sheer numbers. Operationally speak-
ing, the five additional BCTs would be dispatched to help secure Baghdad and interdict 
accelerants to violence in the surrounding belts, and thus reduce overall violence in the 
capital. Petraeus considered violence against the population to be the “key metric,” and 
said that tamping it down would be a months-long venture requiring an offensive mind-
set throughout the process. At the tactical level, adopting a forward presence would be 
critical, and Petraeus endorsed the construction of JSSs and combat outposts—an effort 
he would seek to accelerate considerably over time.25 The first of these had achieved ini-
tial operating capability in Ghazaliyah, and there would ultimately be another 76 stood 
up in Baghdad alone during the surge.26 However, the new commander branded the 
JSS concept with his own guidance. Casey originally envisioned JSSs as a mechanism to 
help Baghdad’s police assume control of the city as coalition forces withdrew over time. 
Each station would serve as a base of operations in a given neighborhood and coordi-
nate patrols. However, Petraeus saw JSSs and combat outposts as a means to ramp up 
coalition presence on the streets of the capital, and he made clear that he expected each 
U.S. battalion to locate its command post within the battalion’s area of operations, not on 
distant forward operating bases. The only way to secure the people was to live among 
them, Petraeus said.27
In making clear that coalition commanders had responsibility for bringing violence 
under control in their areas of operations, Petraeus was not dismissing the importance of 
cultivating relationships with the Iraqis. He urged leaders to “embrace Iraqi units” and 
encouraged the rekindling of partnerships with local security forces, a change that would 
involve BCT commanders more deeply in the daily affairs of Iraqi units with which they 
shared battle space.28 Petraeus considered transition teams an important part of this 
equation, but he intended to attach them formally to the BCTs partnered with the Iraqi 
formations they advised, thereby making BCT commanders responsible for the develop-
ment of the security forces in their sectors. Over time, he aimed to work with the Army to 
deploy the transition teams simultaneously with the BCTs in whose areas of operations 
they would operate.29
Unity of effort extended to relations between the coalition and the Government of 
Iraq as well. Here, Petraeus, like Casey, signaled his preference to work with the Prime 
Minister rather than lobby Washington to seek an alternative. “Maliki is our guy,” he told 
his subordinate commanders.30 Petraeus saw his job—along with Ambassador Zalmay 
Khalilzad—as facilitating reconciliation and helping the Prime Minister’s government 
improve its capacity. Believing reconciliation to be “key in the long run,” the general 
hoped to draw Maliki to the center by driving a wedge between him and the Sadrists and 
thus make the government’s tribal outreach to Sunnis more credible.31
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As he sat in the palace luncheon, Odierno jotted down the guidance he heard. The 
new MNF-I commander, he noted, was not interested in plans for the consolidation of 
headquarters or schemes related to the so-called BRAC-for-Iraq in which the coalition 
closed down facilities.32 After months of disagreements between MNF-I and MNC-I on 
the way ahead, it appeared the new MNF-I commander and his principal subordinate 
were at last on the same page.
The Race against Time
As he set about his work in his first weeks in command, Petraeus described MNF-
I’s mission as “an enormous race against time,” and the general intended to do what 
he could to buy more of it.33 Petraeus saw the two most concerning security threats as 
Sunni car-bomb cells and Shi’a death squads. It would be a tough slog against both, and 
he wanted audiences in Baghdad and Washington to know this. With just one of the 
five surge BCTs operating in Baghdad and a second on the ground preparing for action, 
Petraeus emphasized that the coalition counteroffensive would take months to develop. 
Looking ahead to the arrival of more brigades in March, April, and May, he explained to 
Gates, “It’s much too early to tell how long we’ll need to maintain the additional forces.”34 
He had an idea, though. The MNF-I commander reassured Odierno of his intent to sus-
tain the surge at 20 BCTs through December 2007.35
In the meantime, units in Baghdad continued what they had begun with Operation 
FARDH AL-QANOON: clearing neighborhoods and establishing a permanent presence 
in JSSs. This approach, Petraeus believed, “is helping convince Iraqi citizens that we will 
stick it out with them rather than moving to the next hot-spot.”36 Yet it would take more 
than forward presence to protect the population in the capital. “We will not be able to 
reduce substantially the VBIEDs [vehicle borne improvised explosive devices] until we 
get the final brigades on the ground and can go after the bomb factories that we believe 
are located in the ‘belts’ around Baghdad,” Petraeus warned.37
Well before Petraeus assumed command of MNF-I, he had understood the pressing 
need to reduce sectarian violence in Baghdad. After falling slightly from December to 
mid-January, the number of observed incidents of ethno-sectarian violence in the capital 
leveled off at 150 for over 2 weeks before spiking again to 183 the first week of Febru-
ary. Unsurprisingly, most of the violence had occurred along Sunni-Shi’a fault lines in 
western Baghdad and across the river in the Sunni enclave of Adhamiyah.38 Apart from 
the statistics, the general’s impressions after a firsthand look at the bleak conditions in 
Ghazaliyah and Dora were much worse than he had anticipated. AQI’s need for support 
zones from which to launch attacks inside the city had led to the group’s takeover of 
Sunni areas. The Shi’a militias’ campaign of sectarian cleansing further terrorized these 
besieged Sunni pockets, while pervasive violent crime, like kidnapping, made conditions 
for families unlivable.
As he traveled around the city in his first days in command, Petraeus was struck 
at how far conditions had deteriorated since his departure from MNSTC-I 17 months 
before, though he noted a few bright spots. To Petraeus, Prime Minister Maliki seemed 
committed to improving security along evenhanded, nonsectarian lines, though he was 
clearly under heavy Shi’a political pressure. Indeed, Maliki recently had announced to 
the Iraqi security forces that impending operations in Baghdad would “target anyone and 
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everyone who violates the law” and that “no one can hide behind any political party.”39 
After weeks of coordinating with the Iraqis, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-
B) had begun to position some of its units in JSSs across the capital. In preparation for 
the kickoff of the revised security plan, the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) was 
establishing itself, albeit slowly. The combination of targeted raids and clearing opera-
tions seemed to take their toll on extremist groups, particularly Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM). 
Sectarian murders in February decreased by 50 percent from January’s total, and popu-
lation displacement in Baghdad appeared to have stopped. However, Petraeus hastened 
to put these encouraging signs into their broader, less encouraging context. While some 
categories of violence had improved slightly from January, late January had been a hor-
rific period of bloodshed, with the Ministry of Interior announcing that more than 1,000 
Iraqis had been killed in a single week. February had witnessed the highest number of 
VBIED attacks in the past year with 77—up slightly from January’s 72.40 There had been 
44 VBIEDs in Baghdad alone in February, the most in the capital in any month of the war. 
The commander expected to see similar levels in the coming weeks as Sunni extremists 
responded to the new American approach.41
“Get Off the FOBs:” Forward Presence Shakes Up East Baghdad
The first surge brigade, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, was also among the first to 
implement Petraeus’s and Odierno’s guidance to move directly into its battle space and 
operate alongside Iraqi partner units among Baghdad’s population. The brigade’s arrival 
in late January had brought the number of U.S. BCTs in the Baghdad security districts 
to five and marked the start of the surge. Though headquartered in Camp Taji 20 miles 
to the north, the brigade assumed responsibility for coalition operations in the capital’s 
northeastern security districts of Adhamiyah and Sadr City. With aggressive Sunni and 
Shi’a elements vying for control, the area seethed with sectarian violence. In the densely 
populated slums of Sadr City, Sha’ab, and Ur, Shi’a militiamen found safe havens from 
which to launch raids against Sunni enclaves throughout the city. Adhamiyah, an upscale 
residential area for military officers and government professionals during the Saddam 
era, was one such Sunni zone. Nestled along the eastern bank of the Tigris, this neighbor-
hood had served as a support base for al-Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) Rusafa network, which 
included the most active and deadly car-bomb ring in the country.42 In January 2007, 
amid these two formidable antagonists stood an overmatched U.S. battalion that quar-
tered only one company in the sector. The remainder of the battalion’s combat power 
operated from Camp Taji.43
The first surge BCT’s deployment to northeast Baghdad effectively increased the 
number of battalions in the sector from one to three. The first priority for 2d Brigade, 
82d Airborne Division, as it formally assumed control of its new section on February 12, 
was to establish a forward presence with two-thirds of the BCT’s combat power. “Get off 
the FOBs [forward operating bases],” Colonel Billy Don Farris, the brigade commander, 
told his subordinate leaders.44 Following several days of targeted raids and cordon 
and knock/search operations, two battalions from Farris’s incoming BCT established 
combat outposts in their newly assigned sectors in Sha’ab and Ur. The already present 
1st Battalion, 26th Infantry, consolidated its position around Old Adhamiyah.45 The new 
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combat outposts allowed the brigade’s three battalions to reduce movement back and 
forth from the Taji base to their respective sectors, and facilitate interaction with the local 
population.46
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michael Pryor (Released).
Colonel Billy Don Farris, Commander of 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Meets With 
Civic Leaders of Sadr City’s First Joint Security Station.47
In the coming weeks, Farris’s brigade tightened its grip on an area that had seen 
sparse coalition presence. While combat outposts enabled constant forward presence for 
U.S. units, JSSs served as command and control nodes for both coalition and Iraqi forces. 
Farris anticipated that each of his battalions would establish one JSS in existing police sta-
tions or government buildings to coordinate local security operations, advise the Iraqis, 
and encourage their security forces to be an active presence in the community.48 How-
ever, this was problematic, given the lack of Iraqi troops. When Odierno visited Farris 
on February 24, the BCT commander reported significant shortages in the ranks of the 
National Police battalion in Sha’ab and Ur—an issue compounded by the Iraqi high com-
mand’s reluctance to send its army units there.
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Joann Makinano (Released).
U.S. Army Soldiers Search a House in Zaghiniyat During the  
Early Days of the Surge.49
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Initially, Farris was content to isolate Sadr City, given the limited number of maneu-
ver units under his control. He faced practical restrictions when it came to dispatching 
conventional forces into the dense, inhospitable urban area where JAM dominated. The 
base of the Iraqi National Police brigade responsible for this security district sat on the 
northeastern corner of the Shi’a slum, making it difficult for American transition teams to 
provide oversight. A new JSS planned for the southwestern edge of Sadr City would alle-
viate this particular problem but introduced another.50 Committing to a JSS provocatively 
close to the Sadrist militia’s main stronghold would strain the BCT commander’s combat 
power and, in his view, jeopardized clearing operations in Sha’ab and Ur as well as Old 
Adhamiyah. “These were two very tough nuts to crack,” he explained.51
Odierno surprised Farris by asking him if he could use another battalion. As Farris 
mulled this over, the general told him that he and his brigade were doing exactly what 
Odierno wanted them to do: “Getting into the neighborhoods and integrating the ISF.”52 
Petraeus reiterated this guidance in his own visit to Farris’s sector 2 days later, telling 
Farris’s Soldiers, “We need to live in the neighborhoods we operate [in]; [we] must break 
the FOB mentality; [and we] cannot allow ourselves to ‘commute’ to the fight.”53
Source: U.S. Army Photo by Staff Sergeant Michael Pryor (Released).
Iraqi Police and Paratroopers From 2d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Patrol  
Adhamiyah in February.54
Soldiers of 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, established their JSS on the outskirts 
of Sadr City during the first week of March 2007. U.S. troops cleared the surrounding 
area using a “soft knock” approach, and Petraeus reported that the population seemed to 
appreciate it. The National Police battalion proved helpful, its presence apparently set-
ting the people at ease, but the area remained volatile. The Sadr City mayor, after seeking 
an accommodation with the coalition as it stepped cautiously into the Shi’a militant safe 
haven, survived an assassination attempt by Shi’a militants on March 15. The following 
week, the capture of Qais Khazali and other Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) leaders in far-
away Basrah stirred fears of another Sadr City uprising. To avoid provoking a large-scale 
confrontation, Odierno required any raids against high-value targets based in the Sadr 
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City district come to him for approval. For the time being, the strategic importance of 
maintaining calm in Sadr City outweighed whatever tactical inroads might be made.55
Just south of Farris’s area of operations, Colonel Jeffrey Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 2d 
Infantry Division engaged in a similar fight to root out Shi’a extremists while protecting 
the populace from car-bomb attacks. Before the surge, Bannister’s sector had included 
all of east Baghdad. The BCT had four battalions under its control, but one of these units 
operated outside the security districts in the sprawling rural Mada’in area. In the neigh-
borhoods for which the brigade was responsible, AQI’s Rusafa car-bomb ring had car-
ried out devastating attacks against mostly Shi’a civilians for more than a year. Several 
market areas in Bannister’s sector had been struck by deadly car and truck bombs in late 
2006 and early 2007, some of them repeatedly. AQI had bombed the Sadriyah market in 
December, killing 50 Iraqis, and then struck the market again on February 3 in a massive 
truck bombing that was one of the war’s worst, killing or wounding almost 500 Iraqis. 
What was likely the same gang followed up on March 5 with a bombing of Baghdad’s 
famed open-air book market on Mutanabi Street, named for Iraq’s most famous poet, 
which killed 26 Iraqis and left the market in ruins.
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Jason T. Bailey, U.S. Air Force (Released).
A U.S. Patrol Passes the Ruined Facade of Baghdad’s Mutanabi Book Market,  
Destroyed by an AQI Car Bomb in March 2007.56
The arrival of Farris’s brigade enabled Bannister and his brigade to compress their 
battle space and focus on securing the frequently bombed districts of New Baghdad, 
Rusafa, and Karada. As Farris’s BCT assumed responsibility for Adhamiyah and Sadr 
City, Bannister positioned one of his battalions in each of the three remaining security 
districts for which he now had responsibility.57 From the two FOBs in his sector—Loyalty 
and Rustamiyah—his units began to “flood the zone,” pushing two-thirds of their combat 
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power forward into a net of combat outposts and converting selected Iraqi police stations 
into JSSs. Bannister benefited from a small surge of Iraqi security forces as well. The idea 
to bring Iraqi Army units to Baghdad from less volatile regions of the country had had 
an unfortunately long gestation, but in January two Iraqi brigades finally arrived. One 
of them went to Karada, where, according to Bannister, the timely appearance of the 
additional Iraqi troops helped offset the loss of National Police units pulled offline for 
much-needed retraining.
SECDEF Gates (center) with Colonel Bannister (right). Source: DoD photo by Cherie Thurlby (Released).
SECDEF Robert Gates Tours a Joint Security Station With  
Colonel Jeffrey Bannister.58
Bannister’s BCT eventually reached a total of 6 battalions, enabling it to establish 
12 combat outposts and 9 security stations from which his troops and local Iraqi forces 
would attempt to put an end to the AQI attacks ravaging Rusafa.59
The Surge in West Baghdad
In west Baghdad, Colonel J. B. Burton was gratified to hear Petraeus’s guidance for 
coalition forces to increase their presence on the streets of the capital. The commander 
of 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, had seen the need for that same approach when his 
headquarters assumed responsibility for the security districts of Kadhimiyah, Mansour, 
and west Rashid in November 2006. Here, AQI operatives infiltrating Baghdad from 
the “ratlines” running east from Anbar through Abu Ghraib collided with JAM, AAH, 
and other Shi’a militants. From support zones in eastern Kadhimiyah, Shi’a militiamen 
pushed into Sunni neighborhoods in a deliberate effort to expand Shi’a militant control. 
Like others, Burton understood the problem facing him as more complicated than simple 
counterinsurgency. His BCT was a third party to an ongoing sectarian war.
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Colonel Burton (left) with Major General Abdul Al-Ameer (right).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Benny Corbett (Released).
Colonel J. B. Burton, Commander, 2d BCT, 1st Infantry Division, With  
Major General Abdul Al-Ameer, Commander of the 6th Iraqi Army Division.60
The solution, Burton believed, was to insert his forces into the maelstrom. “When 
I took over, I made it the first order of business to deploy off the FOBs and establish 
what we called ‘combat outposts’ along sectarian fault lines,” he later said.61 Combat 
Outpost Casino, established in the Sunni enclave of Ghazaliyah, was the first of what 
would become a set of 14 combat outposts and JSSs in Burton’s sector.62 Before the surge 
announcement, Burton’s BCT had been relieved of its responsibility for Abu Ghraib on 
the outskirts of Baghdad. When 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, arrived in January, 
one of its battalions was attached to Burton, bringing his total to four. He assigned the 
incoming paratroopers to the Shi’a militia strongholds in Harbiya and Hurriyah and wel-
comed them there in the aftermath of a clearing operation conducted by the division 
strike force.63
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Tierney Nowland (Released).
U.S. and Iraqi Soldiers Search for Weapons Caches Near Janabi in March.64
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In Petraeus’s view, the U.S. battalions in Mansour and Rashid faced the toughest 
security challenges in Baghdad. For months, these areas had been the scene of the most 
intense death squad activity, sectarian ISF abuses, and AQI infiltration. The second surge 
BCT to arrive, Colonel Ricky Gibbs’s 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, alleviated some 
of the pressure in those areas when it hit the ground in mid-February. Its arrival allowed 
Burton’s BCT to concentrate on the northwest quadrant of the capital. In March, 2d Bri-
gade, 1st Infantry Division, combined with Colonel Stephen J. Townsend’s Stryker BCT 
to launch a month-long clearing operation in Mansour. In 35 days of grueling actions, 
Townsend’s units progressively moved through the district, neighborhood by neighbor-
hood, with battalions assigned to Burton establishing cordons in support or patrolling 
on the flanks. In one of these major clearing operations, U.S. and Iraqi troops discovered 
components for more than 3,000 IEDs and took 160 suspected insurgents into custody. 
Forty of these were sent to long-term detention facilities, a number Townsend judged 
remarkably high for such a short period.65 Nonetheless, the persistent violence in sectors 
such as Ameriyah following the departure of the Strykers again showed that clearing 
operations alone were not enough to solve the problem.66
The Rashid District seemed just as troublesome, especially the eastern half of the dis-
trict centering on the al-Qaeda bastion of Dora. Colonel Bryan Roberts and 2d Brigade, 
1st Cavalry Division, had attempted to clear Dora, but the once-flourishing market there 
remained a battleground when Gibbs and 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, assumed 
responsibility for the area on March 15. As Gibbs moved into the sprawling district that 
nearly stretched the length of southern Baghdad from Camp Victory to the Tigris River, 
Roberts shifted his forces to the center of the capital, turning his brigade’s attention to the 
international zone and the still-smoldering Haifa Street. Roberts took an attached Stryker 
battalion with him, but he left two infantry battalions to add to Gibbs’s cavalry squadron 
and another infantry battalion—bringing the total number of such units to four where it 
had been three. Gibbs’s BCT also inherited a partnership with elements of three National 
Police brigades, though they were of dubious utility since National Police units tended to 
be infiltrated by Shi’a militiamen.67
Colonel Gibbs (left) with Ambassador Crocker (front right).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class Robert Timmons (Released).
Colonel Ricky D. Gibbs, Commander, 4th Infantry BCT, 1st Infantry Division,  
With Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker in April.68
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Moving into Rashid in mid-March, Gibbs encountered a dichotomous threat like 
other BCT commanders in the capital. The western half of the district was largely Shi’a, 
with JAM and the Special Groups posing the greatest danger. In the mostly Sunni neigh-
borhoods east of Route Jackson, AQI ruled, intimidating the local population and using 
the area as a launching point for violence elsewhere. Instructed on arrival to deploy his 
subordinate units forward in sector, Gibbs conducted a preliminary operation to estab-
lish company-sized combat outposts in hot spots throughout the district.69 Over the next 
month, 4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division built 11 outposts and JSSs—stocking cranes, 
trucks, and concrete barriers location by location and taking about a week to fortify each 
position. The move of U.S. units from FOB Falcon back into the Iraqi neighborhoods did 
not go uncontested. As the new U.S. and Iraqi outposts went into place, they came under 
frequent attack by Sunni fighters who recognized the danger they posed, such as the 
March 24 suicide truck bombing against a police station in Dora that killed more than 
20 Iraqis, most of them policemen. Militants conducted 711 lethal attacks against Gibbs’s 
troops in March, a monthly figure that would rise to 928 later in the spring.70 With its for-
ward presence set, the BCT began a long fight in Dora against what would prove to be a 
fortified AQI headquarters.71
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Sean A. Foley (Released).
Soldiers From 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, Fire at Insurgents in Dora.72
The Division Fight in Baghdad
At the turn of the New Year, Major General Joseph Fil and the Multi-National Divi-
sion-Baghdad (MND-B) had had only three U.S. BCTs and a brigade-sized strike force to 
cover all of Baghdad, but the arrival of both American and Iraqi surge forces in February 
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and March significantly changed the troop density and character of MND-B’s operations 
in the capital. By the end of March, with the arrival of Farris and Gibbs, MND-B had a full 
five BCTs that owned battle space in the city. More importantly, the territory assigned to 
each brigade was significantly smaller than it had been in 2005 and 2006, allowing bri-
gade commanders to concentrate more U.S. troops in smaller areas of operations. East of 
the Tigris, Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, saw its area of operations shrink 
by nearly half while gaining two battalions. Burton’s command across the river benefited 
from the same doubly favorable transaction, employing two more battalions in a sector 
half the size of what it had been in early January. Finally, Roberts retained control of three 
battalions, but these massed in Karkh as he shed responsibility for east Rashid. In the 
coming months, the concentration of American troops in the capital would only grow, 
and this concentration would factor directly into MND-B’s fight against Sunni and Shi’a 
militants.73
The new U.S. troop density also allowed MND-B to partner U.S. forces in Baghdad 
with Iraqi units at lower echelons as the Iraqi troop density also increased. Senior U.S. 
commanders had clamored since the previous fall for additional Iraqi battalions to be 
dispatched to Baghdad. By the first week of March, all had arrived, and by the end of the 
month, troop strength totaled 61,000 Iraqi security forces in Baghdad, along with 32,000 
coalition troops.74 Another 20,000 Iraqis and 13,000 Americans operated in the belts.75 
In the months ahead, the number of U.S. battalions patrolling the streets of the capital 
would nearly double from what it had been in late 2006, peaking at 25. Among other 
things, the additional combat power enabled the rapid creation of more JSSs. After just a 
month in command, Petraeus noted that 25 already had been established.76
This influx of forces gave MND-B far greater means to implement the Baghdad Secu-
rity Plan than Fil’s predecessor, Major General J. D. Thurman, had had for Operations 
TOGETHER FORWARD I and II. In a broad sense, MND-B’s focus remained the same as 
it had been in late 2006: conduct operations in keeping with the “clear, hold, and build” 
framework of Operations TOGETHER FORWARD I and II, with an emphasis on neigh-
borhoods located along sectarian fault lines. Yet the marked shift from transition to pop-
ulation security entailed a process whereby areas, once cleared, would be controlled and 
retained with much more extensive coalition involvement and oversight. This meant insti-
tuting more rigorous population control measures—the kind that a persistent forward 
presence allowed. In one case, a battalion commander in Dora maintained two platoons 
in Iraqi neighborhoods and began an “ongoing census” that fostered relationships with 
the locals and helped put a name and a face to friendly and enemy parties.77 Similarly, in 
northwest Baghdad, Burton found that the dozen or so JSSs his units created gave Iraqi 
locals “a constant touch point of security and information inside their neighborhoods.”78
At the same time, MND-B launched “safe neighborhood” and “safe market” initia-
tives under which BCTs would erect barriers around vulnerable public areas to frustrate 
the AQI car and truck bombings that had ravaged Baghdad’s markets and open spaces 
for months. As various kinds of concrete “T-walls” went up throughout Baghdad by the 
thousands, U.S. troops nicknamed them according to size. The shortest barriers, 3 feet 
high, were “Jersey barriers.” Intermediate-height barriers were either “Virginia barri-
ers” or the slightly taller “Texas barriers.” The tallest, over 10 feet high, were “Alaska 
barriers.” In an operation aptly named VIRGINIA CREEPER, Burton’s troops lined the 
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route running west out of his sector toward Abu Ghraib with concrete barriers in order 
to hamper AQI’s freedom of movement on this important road.79 Meanwhile, east of the 
Tigris River, Farris and 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, built a so-called Great Wall of 
Adhamiyah to limit unwanted access to the Sunni enclave and adopted a similar tactic to 
help isolate Sadr City. In all, Farris’s units would lay more than 30 miles of concrete bar-
riers during their 15-month deployment.80 Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, 
hardened nine markets across east Baghdad by enclosing them with concrete T-walls 
and leaving only a few controlled entrances, converting scenes of former VBIED attacks 
into pedestrian zones.81 This barrier sought to deny access to militants on both sides of 
the sectarian divide, including JAM and other Shi’a militants, and it seemed to have a 
rapid effect. In one notable case, with the support of local Sunni leaders, Burton’s 2d Bri-
gade, 1st Infantry Division, erected concrete walls around northern Ghazaliyah to stymie 
JAM death squads, after which the neighborhood’s murder rate dropped by 50 percent 
the following week.82 As these preventive measures appeared around Baghdad, MND-B 
continued its raids to kill or capture the most dangerous militants, launching the division 
strike force—3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry Division—on a 2-week clearing operation in 
March focused specifically on two of Baghdad’s major VBIED networks.83
For MND-B, more U.S. units in Baghdad also meant more headquarters elements 
with which to engage Iraqi officials and to partner with ISF units. Fil met regularly with 
the mayor of Baghdad while his deputy division commanders, Brigadier General John 
Campbell and Brigadier General Vincent Brooks, engaged with district and neighbor-
hood advisory councils.84 When General Abud Qanbar and his new Baghdad Operations 
Command began functioning on March 1, Fil assigned Campbell, MND-B’s deputy com-
manding general for operations, to partner directly with Qanbar, interacting with the 
Iraqi general and his staff almost daily and encouraging unity of effort between U.S. 
and Iraqi forces throughout the capital region. MNC-I and Odierno contributed as well, 
assigning the British deputy corps commander, Major General Gerald Berragan, the task 
of coaching Qanbar’s staff at its Adnan Palace headquarters.85 These and other related 
measures mitigated the risk of placing an inexperienced headquarters over Iraqi oper-
ations in the capital. Partnerships and transition teams at multiple echelons, including 
Colonel Robert Newman’s newly formed advisory team posted in the BOC itself, were a 
necessary reinforcement for the Iraqi command as it took control of the 6th and 9th Iraqi 
Army Divisions and the 1st and 2d National Police Divisions.86
Another Division Headquarters: The Creation of MND-Center
To help enable MND-B to secure Baghdad, it was crucial for MNC-I to ensure that the 
division did not have to focus on matters beyond the city. As some of the arriving surge 
units began focusing on the belts around Baghdad, Odierno wanted an additional divi-
sion headquarters to manage those outlying operations. The division’s proposed scheme 
of maneuver involved taking the fight to the belts sequentially—after securing the capital 
and withdrawing coalition forces to its periphery. However, Odierno intended for oper-
ations in these areas to occur simultaneously and strongly believed that separate entities 
needed to direct them.87
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 11. MND Areas of Operation, June 2007.
By mid-March, Odierno decided that the third surge BCT arriving later that month 
would deploy into the portion of the belts south and east of the city, near Salman Pak. 
The fourth, when it arrived, would cover battle space in the northern belt, near Tarmi-
yah—at the nexus of Abu Ghazwan’s fiefdom and astride AQI’s line of communications 
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appeared, likely would go into the southern belts, but Odierno would finalize that deci-
sion at a future date.88
According to Army doctrine, commanders positioned units two levels below them 
in the operational chain. Odierno believed the tactical situation demanded a break with 
doctrine. Given his limited forces—even with the surge—and the numerous points that 
required U.S. military presence, Odierno arrayed battalions three levels below him. The 
break with doctrine displeased some of his division and brigade commanders, but Odierno 
believed the tactical situation demanded it. While he disliked breaking up organic bri-
gades—as did his brigade commanders—parceling out battalions allowed him to commit 
a BCT headquarters and one or two of its battalions to the belts while sending the balance 
into the capital itself, where more manpower but not additional brigade headquarters 
were still needed. While only 2 of the 5 surge BCTs deployed to the security districts 
inside the city, more of their maneuver and artillery battalions—12 of 25—took up 
positions there.89
For MND-B, the relief of responsibility for the southern belts meant a loss of respon-
sibilities and resources that Fil and his division preferred to keep for themselves. They 
were convinced the best use of the additional U.S. forces was to employ them in secur-
ing Baghdad itself, leaving the belts for later, and therefore were skeptical about Odier-
no’s approach and the creation of Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C). MND-B’s 
repeated requests for battalions from the later surge BCTs created tension between the 
corps and division staffs and pestered Odierno to the point of annoyance at least once.90 
MND-B also saw the shifting of battle space as disruptive because it threw unit and 
municipal boundaries out of alignment, complicating leader engagements with Iraqi civil 
authorities.91 This, however, was a small price to pay in Odierno’s view: the belts would 
require their own separate battle, he determined, led by a division dedicated to that task.
THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN EARLY 2007
As the American commander who oversaw the staffing, equipping, and training of 
Iraqi military and police formations, Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey regarded the 
surge of U.S. troops with doubt. In the December 2006 deliberations about the surge, 
Dempsey had advised Casey against asking for more U.S. troops. “If the ultimate goal . . . 
is to settle the situation to enable better dialogue toward reconciliation,” he offered, “then 
the introduction of additional coalition forces is the wrong answer. [Iraqis] will not rec-
oncile simply because we are separating them.”92 A U.S. troop surge, Dempsey thought, 
would also give the Iraqis the impression that the U.S. military was inclined to sweep in 
and take control of every crisis, thus inadvertently holding back the development of their 
own security forces. The MNSTC-I commander saw more promise in the transition bridg-
ing strategy of reinforcing the coalition’s advisory effort and the assistance it provided to 
Iraqi units.93 Briefing the newly arrived Petraeus on February 17, Dempsey repeated his 
chief concern that, by putting security responsibility back on the coalition’s shoulders, 
the surge threatened to cause a “loss [of] momentum” for the ongoing transition to the 
Iraqis. He proposed instead that the surge troops might be used to implement fully the 
bridging strategy.94 However, this was an idea Petraeus already had told his subordinate 
commanders—including Dempsey—a week before that he did not intend to follow.
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The Iraqi security forces had grown significantly 
in the interval since Petraeus had given up com-
mand of MNSTC-I in 2005. By early 2007, 10 Iraqi 
Army divisions operated across the country in sec-
tors established largely along provincial lines. In the 
far north, the 2d Division—with its mix of Kurdish 
and Sunni Arab brigades—controlled a sector that 
included Mosul and half the Kurdish region while, 
to the west, the Kurdish-majority 3d Division cov-
ered most of Ninawa Province. To the south of these 
two divisions, the brigade sectors of the 4th Division 
aligned with Salahadin, Kirkuk, and the Kurdish 
province of Sulaymaniyah. The 5th Division had 
responsibility for Diyala Province, while the 6th 
and the 9th Divisions, the latter the Iraqi Army’s 
only mechanized formation, operated in and around 
Baghdad. In Anbar, the 1st Division sector centered 
on Fallujah, while the 7th Division spanned much of 
the Western Euphrates River Valley and extended 
south across desert terrain to the Jordanian and Saudi 
borders. Two divisions split the southern provinces, 
with the 8th Division responsible for Najaf, Karbala, Babil, Qadisiyah, and Wasit and the 
10th Division covering Muthanna, Dhi Qar, Maysan, and Basrah.
When first organized, each division had fallen under the operational control of the 
coalition, but in 2006, MNF-I had begun to pass responsibility for the day-to-day com-
mand and control of certain units to the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). By the 
time Petraeus took command, the IGFC controlled five divisions operating in the north-
ern and southern portions of the country. The remaining five, based in Anbar, Baghdad, 
and Diyala, were slated for transition in the coming weeks and months.96 At the tactical 
level, 103 Iraqi Army combat battalions had been fielded. Of these, 93 had the lead for 
counterinsurgency operations in their areas of responsibility, according to MNF-I.97 It was 
a problematic metric that seemed to assess the Iraqi security forces more optimistically 
than justified. In a late February review conducted at the request of the newly arrived 
Petraeus, Keane found that virtually all Iraqi units, including those formally in control 
of territory, still required substantial coalition assistance.98 The result across Iraq was a 
collection of Iraqi headquarters that supposedly exercised operational control while their 
units largely depended on the coalition.
The standing up of the BOC was a promising initiative, and Petraeus reported favor-
ably in March that Qanbar was “leading from the front.” While the Iraqi commander was 
“technically in charge,” his headquarters had very limited capacity.99 Similarly, as clear-
ing operations in Baghdad continued, BCT commanders paid deference to Qanbar’s sub-
ordinates in Karkh and Rusafa, but they could plainly see that Iraqi units still required a 
great deal of coaching and material support.100 Colonel Farris, for example, railed against 
the Iraqis’ cultural inclination to reduce military operations to the practice of staffing 
checkpoints. He insisted his partnered unit conduct more patrols, pointing out that, even 
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant 
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with a “ridiculous amount” of checkpoints in his sector of northeast Baghdad, “we didn’t 
catch one single noteworthy bad guy” at any of them.101 However, there were bright 
spots: Roberts partnered with an Iraqi general in Karkh whom he considered “as good as 
any brigade commander I have ever served with in the United States.”102 Petraeus, in his 
weekly reports to Gates, noted otherwise unremarkable feats, like staffing fixed positions 
or establishing outer cordons, as examples of Iraqi competence.103 Yet, even such ordinary 
capabilities were absent in many Iraqi units.
Sectarianism and Corruption in the Iraqi Security Forces
In addition to the ISF’s uneven capabilities, sectarianism pervaded the force. The 
transition bridging strategy, with its augmented advisory teams, had been developed by 
Casey and Chiarelli in part to discourage sectarian behavior in the Iraqi security forces. 
Though he opted for a different prescription, Petraeus recognized the problem as well 
and, referencing a list of the 20 worst sectarian actors that he carried in his pocket, often 
expressed concern to Maliki about its widespread impact.104 Maliki’s own office of the 
commander in chief was part of the problem, adding an unhelpful layer of bureaucracy 
to Iraqi military operations and subjecting the Iraqi commands to strong sectarian bias.105 
Among Iraqi tactical units, the sectarian behavior that Thurman and his 4th Infantry 
Division had observed in Baghdad in fall 2006 was undiminished by spring 2007. In his 
late February assessment, Keane observed that many Iraqis had come to view the secu-
rity forces as predators, not protectors.106 In one high-profile case aired by al-Jazeera, 
a Sunni woman claimed to have been raped by militia-linked Shi’a police in Baghdad. 
When Prime Minister Maliki subsequently cleared the policemen of any charges, out-
raged Sunnis protested, incensed at the tone-deaf nature of the official response.107
National Police units in and around Baghdad also remained notorious for their sectar-
ian behavior. MNSTC-I had instituted a “re-bluing” program in the fall of 2006 following 
the implication of the 8th Brigade, 2d National Police Division, in the kidnapping and 
execution of Sunni civilians in west Baghdad. The coalition had arrested its officers and 
pulled the unit off the streets for dedicated vetting and training. In the aftermath of the 
scandal, the other 8 National Police brigades rotated through a similar, month-long pro-
cess of re-bluing, so that by March 2007, 5 of the 9 National Police brigade commanders 
had been replaced, and approximately 2,700 national policemen had been removed from 
the rolls.108
In early April, Petraeus reported that the effort to mold the National Police into 
an effective and nonsectarian institution was progressing, but its tarnished reputation 
would be hard to refurbish.109 At the tactical level, the opinion of the National Police was 
even less sanguine. The population of east Baghdad still viewed the National Police as 
an extension of JAM, recalled 2d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division’s Bannister.110 It was not 
a case of mere perception. Soldiers assigned to Townsend’s Stryker brigade discovered 
that they were especially subject to attack in close proximity to National Police check-
points.111 In Rashid, Gibbs found the National Police to be nothing but trouble, recall-
ing later how formations of Shi’a national policemen would storm into the mixed-sect 
neighborhood of Saidiyah, randomly kill civilians, and force families from their homes.112 
When a Sunni mosque guarded by the National Police in west Rashid blew up, MNF-I 
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concluded that JAM infiltrators had compromised the unit there.113 When Prime Minister 
Maliki’s initiative to grow the Iraqi security forces included a proviso to establish another 
National Police brigade to provide security for the Samarra mosque, coalition leaders 
were understandably wary, especially after Maliki’s office produced a roster of recruits 
for the brigade that was almost 100 percent Shi’a.114
Corruption was a related problem. The well-known practice of padding unit rolls 
with “ghost soldiers” allowed unit commanders to pocket the government salaries of 
troops who existed only on paper.115 Systemic corruption stemmed from more than greed, 
however. Factions competing in a civil war and posturing for an eventual American 
withdrawal had plenty of incentive to husband resources for themselves, which helped 
explain missing equipment as well as the general lack of accountability in the security 
forces.116 The Iraqi Facilities Protection Service (FPS) typified the problem. This loose affil-
iation of security details guarded government buildings and officials. Dispersed across 
27 ministries and 8 directorates, its 150,000 armed men had a reputation for violence 
and indiscipline. Attempting to impose order and accountability over the FPS, the Prime 
Minister had authorized its consolidation under the Ministry of Interior in December 
2006, but by late spring 2007, Dempsey reported virtually no progress on this initiative. 
Unenthusiastic about shedding FPS salaries from their budgets and thus losing leverage 
over their security guards, the ministries resisted the measure.117
General Dempsey and the Gaps in Iraqi Security Forces Development
The ISF suffered not only from state-sanctioned and state-engineered sectarianism 
and corruption, but from a lack of institutional capacity as well. Their numerical strength 
in early 2007 stood at 136,000 soldiers, 135,000 police, 24,400 National Police, and 28,400 
border troops, for a total force of 323,800 that many outside commentators judged was 
not nearly enough to meet Iraq’s security needs.118 An army expansion initiative devel-
oped by the Prime Minister sought to alleviate this shortfall by fielding two additional 
division headquarters, six more brigades in central and southern Iraq, and another Spe-
cial Forces battalion. Implementing this initiative throughout 2007, along with a separate 
measure to raise the assigned strength of combat battalions, would grow the Iraqi Army 
by 54,000 men, alongside a more modest increase of roughly 6,000 in Iraq’s local and 
National Police.
Nevertheless, Dempsey concluded in a written “In-Stride Assessment” on the eve of 
his departure from MNSTC-I that the Iraqi security forces were unprepared to assume 
full security responsibility, and that the plan for their growth had been far from ade-
quate. The first months of Operation FARDH AL-QANOON had invalidated some of the 
coalition’s key assumptions about the composition and size of units the Iraqis needed, 
Dempsey judged. The coalition had designed the Iraqi Army with the expectation that it 
would operate from fixed geographical points in an environment in which the counter-
insurgency campaign already had been won. Consequently, when Iraqi units deployed 
away from their home stations, as several did to support the Baghdad Security Plan, they 
lacked the logistics and communications capabilities to operate on their own.119
The coalition filled this technical gap for the most part, but compensating for a lack 
of tactical depth proved more difficult. Loath to leave their home bases and battle space 
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unsecure, Iraqi commanders opted to leave, on average, a quarter of their combat power 
behind when ordered to deploy their units elsewhere for a time.120 This tendency com-
pounded an already serious personnel shortage. In late 2006, the coalition had decided 
with the Ministry of Defense to man Iraqi battalions at 110 percent of their authorized 
strength to compensate for the army-wide practice in which a quarter of a unit’s rank and 
file were away on home leave at any one time. But in the spring of 2007, even this cor-
rective measure appeared insufficient, prompting Petraeus to direct Dempsey to adjust 
the manning goal to 120 percent, the equivalent of 20,000 extra soldiers, so that the Iraqi 
divisions could field 80 to 90 percent of their authorized strength even without those on 
leave.121
The additional troops were needed to address another flawed assumption as well. 
Rather than steadily decreasing over time as coalition planners had predicted, levels 
of violence had continued to climb. Sunni and Shi’a extremists had shown unexpected 
resilience and adaptability, and in sustained campaigns against them, the Iraqi security 
forces had labored under constant troop shortages. According to Dempsey, Iraqi combat 
units had no “tactical staying power or sufficient capability to surge forces locally”—a 
critical vulnerability, given the tendency of enemy groups to shift fighters quickly from 
sector to sector.122 Furthermore, Iraqi units did not necessarily improve as the months 
and years passed and as leaders and soldiers accumulated experience. Instead, tactical 
skills often deteriorated under the combined strains of prolonged combat and unit attri-
tion. This loss of proficiency meant periodic training of Iraqi units was essential, but 
the Iraqi Army’s generous leave policy, potential out-of-sector deployments, demands 
of routine maintenance, and continuing requirement to secure bases and facilities made 
it unlikely the Iraqis would develop a sustainable rotation scheme that allowed for col-
lective training and reconstitution. Dempsey concluded that adding more division and 
brigade headquarters, uniformly raising the number of battalions per brigade from three 
to four, and bolstering each battalion with more soldiers would go far toward remedying 
this shortfall.123
Turning to issues of quality, Dempsey found that “the Iraqi Security Forces are, for 
the most part, well-trained, and where military training teams have been present, increas-
ingly well-led,” demonstrating both “resolve and capability in battle.”124 Petraeus made 
a similar report to Gates around this time, noting the Iraqis had been “steadily engaged,” 
suffering an increasing number of combat deaths as Operation FARDH AL-QANOON 
progressed.125 Nonetheless, the MNSTC-I commander judged the capabilities of the Iraqi 
security forces quite harshly relative to the threat they faced. Posing questions as to 
whether the Iraqis were properly armed, adequately protected, or sufficiently mobile, 
Dempsey answered “no” on all three counts. They lacked the armor-protected vehicles 
and weaponry to dominate small-unit engagements and were particularly vulnerable to 
improvised explosive device (IED) attacks. Maneuvering outside their assigned sectors 
consistently exceeded their capabilities.126 “If you pointed them in the right direction, [the 
ISF] could seize a town, cordon a village, or attack a target,” Dempsey recalled later, “but 
they had nothing—I mean literally nothing—to support that” in the areas of communi-
cations, intelligence, logistics, and transportation.127 He proposed a number of solutions 
to address these gaps in 2008, including the creation of a corps headquarters for northern 
Iraq, an engineer regiment for route clearance, an artillery regiment to provide standoff 
fire support for infantry units that had only 60-mm mortars assigned to them, and the 
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continued enhancement of a logistics architecture that would match the ongoing growth 
of tactical forces.128
As for funding, Dempsey requested that the U.S. Government commit to a budget 
of $5.5 billion in support of Iraqi security forces development, more than doubling his 
initial request made less than 1 year before in September 2006.129 He had worked hard to 
convince the security ministries to adopt U.S. foreign military sales as the key element of 
their acquisition process, and believed the more regulated approach had begun to pay off 
for the Iraqis. “We were able to merge our budgets to advance the issues . . . in a way that 
we simply could not have [done] if they continued spending money in brown paper bags 
and flying to Malaysia to buy patrol boats,” Dempsey later recalled.130 In January, Maliki 
had agreed to Dempsey’s recommendation to grant the Ministers of Defense and Interior 
greater authority to approve foreign military sales contracts, raising the amount the two 
cabinet ministers could spend independently from $5 million to $50 million.131 Months 
later, though, maddening problems hampered the handling of foreign military sales on 
the American side, where the Washington apparatus treated contracts with Iraq on a 
routine basis and not with the wartime urgency Dempsey and all other senior U.S. com-
manders in Baghdad believed they deserved.132 The U.S. Government had to “squeeze 
all bureaucratic slack out of the FMS [foreign military sales] process,” he argued as his 
MNSTC-I tour ended. “Time remains the most critical resource,” he observed, echoing 
Petraeus’s theme of a “race against time.”133
After 3 years in which U.S. leaders such as Casey, Rumsfeld, and Abizaid had argued 
for pulling U.S. troops back from security operations in order to spur the Iraqis to step 
forward and defend their own country against a complex insurgency and the Shi’a mili-
tants, Dempsey’s “In-Stride Assessment” showed how deeply flawed that idea had been. 
The MNSTC-I commander’s report documented in great detail the areas in which the 
Iraqi security forces simply lacked the capacity to take over security responsibility from 
the coalition, no matter how intensely coalition leaders wished otherwise. As Dempsey 
made clear, the Iraqis were far from ready for the changeover that Casey and the transi-
tion strategy had envisioned for 2007.
ECONOMIES OF FORCE, SOUTH AND NORTH
Trouble in Diwaniya
As the surge brigades began to arrive in the Baghdad region to carry out Petraeus’s 
and Odierno’s new guidance for security in the capital and its hinterland, security prob-
lems elsewhere in the country continued to simmer, but without sufficient coalition and 
Iraqi forces to resolve them. Some 80 miles south of the capital, one such problem began 
to boil over. Across the Shi’a south, the anticipated transition to provincial Iraqi control 
set the stage for a political battle in which Sadrist foot soldiers and Supreme Council for 
the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) operatives squared off. Restrained somewhat in the 
holy city of Najaf, JAM members felt freer to challenge the Badr-infused ranks of the Iraqi 
security forces in Diwaniya, a Shi’a city of 400,000 and the capital of Qadisiyah Province. 
Located halfway between Baghdad and Basrah, it sat along the coalition’s primary line 
of communications running south to Kuwait and astride the east-west road connecting 
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Najaf with the provinces bordering Iran. The governorship of Qadisiyah belonged to 
SCIRI, and the officer corps of the 8th Iraqi Army Division included a number of former 
Badr Corps members. However, the Sadrists enjoyed the loyalty of about 1,000 local 
police, a factor that gave JAM fighters far greater freedom of action in the city than Iraqi 
or coalition forces could claim.134
Diwaniya was therefore a safe destination for many of the Shi’a militia leaders and 
fighters who decided to flee Baghdad in January 2007 when the new Baghdad Security 
Plan began to clamp down on JAM and other groups in the capital. By early March, the 
number of Shi’a militiamen operating in the city had increased from about 600 to over 
1,000, and the growing strength of JAM and the Special Groups in Diwaniya became more 
than the local coalition contingent and the Iraqi Army units posted in Qadisiyah Province 
could handle.135 The Polish-led Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) was 
not staffed or equipped for a forceful campaign against the local Shi’a militias and had 
long been prevented by national guidance from taking too aggressive an approach in any 
case, meaning that militia control of Diwaniya spread relatively unhindered in early 2007. 
The locally based 8th Iraqi Army Division lacked the capability to conduct an aggressive, 
anti-militia campaign as well, though its commander, Major General Othman Ali Far-
hood al-Ghanimi, did as much as he could with his meager troop levels and resources. A 
Shi’a officer who had served in Saddam Hussein’s army as well as a sheikh of the local 
Ghanam tribe, Othman had been one of Casey’s top three Iraqi picks for the Baghdad 
command and was respected by U.S. leaders for his apolitical stance toward the domi-
nant Shi’a political parties. Proud of the professional reputation he had earned, Othman 
labeled Badr, JAM, and Iran all as potential enemies of the Iraqi state.136 As the influence 
of these three grew across southern Iraq in early 2007, there was only so much that one 
division commander could do.
General Odierno (center), Major General Pawel Lamla (right) and Major General Othman al-Ghanimi 
(left). Source: DoD photo by Specialist Jessica Kent (Released).
General Raymond Odierno, With Polish Major General Pawel Lamla,  
MND-CS Commander, and Major General Othman al-Ghanimi, Commander  
of the 8th Iraqi Army Division.137
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When Petraeus ventured into downtown Diwaniya on patrol with Othman and 
MND-CS Commander Major General Pawel Lamla in late February, the city had appeared 
“vibrant, with heavy traffic in the city center.”138 However, this surface impression of 
a bustling urban area masked growing tensions and violence. The security situation 
in Diwaniya deteriorated rapidly in early 2007 as the Sadrist militants expanded their 
presence there and increased weapons smuggling, intimidation tactics, and murderous 
activities. IED attacks and indirect fire against local coalition and Iraqi troops mounted 
as well, especially against the MND-CS headquarters at Camp Echo on the outskirts of 
the city. MND-CS routine business such as conducting security patrols and supervising 
checkpoints would not be enough to retain control of this key terrain along the coalition’s 
primary supply route. Petraeus, Othman, and Lamla all agreed on the need for a com-
bined operation against JAM in the city.139
While Petraeus sought Maliki’s endorsement for coalition plans to confront JAM in 
Diwaniya, MNC-I and the 8th Iraqi Army Division began planning for an operation to 
be launched following the Muslim holiday of Arba’een. Throughout March, the militia 
groups expanded their hold on the city, securing support zones and staging areas from 
which the militiamen maintained a continuous presence in Diwaniya’s northern districts. 
JAM fighters staffed checkpoints in defiance—or with the compliance—of local police 
and sallied forth to attack Camp Echo with indirect fire. After one such attack wounded 
eight Polish soldiers, coalition analysts determined that militia groups were bombarding 
the base from more than a dozen firing points spanning the entire width of the city.140 
The discovery indicated that the ISF in the area were no longer effective. As he reviewed 
plans for Operation BLACK EAGLE, the impending coalition-Iraqi operation to secure 
the city, Odierno realized that the Iraqi police in Diwaniya were in a state of collapse and 
had ceased coordination with the Iraqi Army. To the MNC-I commander’s frustration, 
however, the overly optimistic police transition reports from MND-CS did not reflect this 
reality or the fact that most of the police were intimidated or under militia influence. This 
led Odierno to direct that all police transition team reports from Wasit and Qadisiyah 
Provinces should come directly to him for review.141
Source: DoD photo courtesy of Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (Released).
Military Transition Team Members and Iraqi Soldiers During  
Operation BLACK EAGLE.142
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Following a week of small-scale strikes by U.S. and Iraqi special operations forces, 
BLACK EAGLE launched on the evening of April 5. The Iraqi and Polish division com-
manders hoped that the situation could be remedied with the capture of six local JAM 
leaders, but as the action unfolded, it became clear the operation would require more than 
that.143 Despite the intense battle for Baghdad going on at the time, MNC-I allocated addi-
tional forces, intelligence specialists, and aviation assets to the Polish-led headquarters to 
support raids to kill or capture influential militiamen in Diwaniya.144 More importantly, 
Odierno dispatched his operational reserve to the city, sending a battalion-sized Stryker 
task force from Townsend’s brigade in Baghdad that helped the 8th Iraqi Division and 
MND-CS surprise the local militia enemy. With the Strykers on hand, more than 3,000 
coalition and Iraqi troops conducted a series of cordon and search operations that over-
came organized resistance and resulted in the capture of 107 JAM fighters over 2 weeks. 
The population, for its part, appeared to accept the unfamiliar and relatively large-scale 
presence of U.S. Soldiers in the city. Following this rapid insertion of combat power, Iraqi 
and coalition troops established two JSSs on the opposite ends of the troublesome north-
ern districts, while the Sadrist militants fell back on rhetoric and propaganda to seek local 
tribal support.145 Indirect-fire attacks on Camp Echo—a long-time magnet for rocket and 
mortar fire—dropped to a historic low.146 The pause in attacks provided MND-CS and its 
local Iraqi partners what would be a few weeks’ respite from militia pressure as the two 
sides gathered their strength for the next battle.
A Shift in Focus for Operation SINBAD
South of Diwaniya, Basrah also proved precarious for the coalition. The ongoing Oper-
ation SINBAD, begun by Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE) Commander 
Major General Richard Shirreff in October 2006, had originated as a plan to subdue JAM 
and other Shi’a militant groups and restore Basrah to government control, rescuing the 
British expedition in Iraq from a downward spiral toward humiliation in the process. 
However, when Shirreff handed command of MND-SE to Major General Jonathan Shaw 
in January 2007, the new British commander concluded that SINBAD was a case of too 
little, too late. Though Shirreff slated the operation to continue for several months, Shaw 
quickly shifted MND-SE from Shirreff’s counterinsurgency approach to a scaled-back 
course inclined toward a political solution.147
In doing so, Shaw was following clear guidance he had received on the eve of 
his departure from Great Britain. In London, the pressure was on to decrease Brit-
ish forces in Iraq in order to increase them in Afghanistan, and it mattered little that 
the United States had decided that same month to take a divergent path by surging 
five additional BCTs to the theater. “What the Americans do isn’t our concern,” Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, Great Britain’s Chief of Defence Staff, had told Shaw.




Source: DoD photo by Cherie A. Thurlby (Released).
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“You’re to continue to carry on and get out of Iraq.”149 This explicit guidance provided 
Shaw with a sharp bottom line. Given his command’s limited resources and Britain’s 
waning political will, Shaw deemed SINBAD’s goals too ambitious, and the approach he 
inherited from Shirreff a mismatch of ends and means. Beyond the policy and resource 
constraints, Shaw believed SINBAD’s formula of district-by-district clearing operations 
followed by police training and focused reconstruction projects was the wrong way to sta-
bilize Basrah. To Shaw, Basrah’s turbulent local politics resembled “Palermo, not Beirut,” 
meaning that an accommodation among mafia-like groups stood a better chance of stabi-
lizing the city than large-scale clearing operations combined with police development. As 
Shaw saw it, most of the violence in Basrah took place simply because the British troops 
were there, so reducing MND-SE’s local involvement and force levels would remove the 
major cause of instability in the city. Instead of using SINBAD to subjugate Basrah’s mili-
tias and bring them under government control, the general chose to use the operation to 
facilitate the British drawdown and the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis, the 
same approach Casey had taken in Baghdad the previous summer.150
Shaw’s change of approach in Basrah promised to widen the gap between MND-SE 
and its American-led higher headquarters that was about to launch a large-scale counter-
offensive. The divergence became clear when Shaw explained his rationale to Petraeus
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 4 days after the latter arrived in Baghdad in February 2007. Stripping out anti-coalition 
attacks, the struggle in Basrah boiled down to “power, politics, and gangsterism,” Shaw 
told the new MNF-I commander.151 The dearth of attacks against local infrastructure sug-
gested to Shaw that intra-Shi’a violence was “self-limiting.” Unlike the nihilistic Sunni 
extremists wreaking havoc in northern and central Iraq, no party vying for power in the 
Shi’a south was interested in destroying the sources of Basrah’s wealth.152 According to 
the MND-SE commander, withdrawing coalition forces in Basrah would not only dra-
matically reduce violence in the city by removing a major source of Iraqi rage, but it also 
would compel Iraqi leaders to address the intra-Shi’a problem—presumably in a way 
that the coalition would find in its interests.153 “The best realistic goal,” Shaw argued, 
would be “a stable linkage” among elements of the Iraqi state, the tribes, and the militias 
competing for power and resources in the southern provinces. A “pragmatic stability” 
could only be reached through an accommodation among the key competitors, and any 
deal had to account for malign Iranian influence and the disruptive activities of death 
squads.154 The coalition could not impose a solution in Iraq, Shaw told Petraeus. Rather, 
one had to emerge out of the natural forces existing in Iraqi society. Outsiders could not 
“fight the soil,” Shaw contended, and because he considered JAM to be one of those nat-
ural forces in Basrah, he believed that trying to defeat the militia in the city was futile. 
“An outright victory for one side is likely to prove a goad to revenge within a culture of 
‘blood feuds’,” the British commander argued. “An accommodation that gives honor to 
all reconcilable sides is likely to prove more enduring.”155
As Petraeus politely noted, Shaw’s approach was out of sync with the new U.S. strat-
egy and troop surge. It quickly emerged that the British general’s concepts were fully in 
sync with senior British civilian and military leaders in London. On February 21, 2007, 1 
day after the 10th Iraqi Army Division passed from coalition control to the control of the 
Iraqi Ground Forces Command, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced a gradual 
drawdown from 7,100 to 5,500 of his country’s troops in Iraq.156 A steady handover of 
British bases during SINBAD’s final weeks followed. By May, British troops had trans-
ferred control of three bases to the Iraqis and were operating out of just Basrah Palace 
and the large air base on the outskirts of the city. A few incidents in the course of the 
operation had cast greater doubt on the local Iraqi forces to which MND-SE was trans-
ferring responsibility. In the worst episode, on March 5, Iraqi special operations forces, 
U.S. advisors, and British troops had raided the Interior Ministry’s intelligence bureau in 
Basrah—which reported to Engineer Ahmed157 at the Interior Ministry in Baghdad—and 
had found 30 prisoners being held there in brutal conditions.158 Despite these indicators 
of the ISF’s unreliability, Shaw anticipated a shift to Iraqi control of the province as early 
as November 2007.
Elsewhere, MND-SE transitioned Maysan to Iraqi control in April despite the prov-
ince’s churning intra-sectarian strife and the fact that British troops had no freedom of 
movement into the provincial capital of Amarah. According to Shaw, this made “ready-
ing Maysan for [provincial Iraqi control] . . . hard and very much in the hands of the 
Iraqis.”159 The British resolve to withdraw gradually, coupled with their view that the 
“political soil” was impervious to any sort of meaningful retilling, lent a sense of inevi-
tability to MND-SE’s slow yielding of control over the Shi’a south.160 “The accommoda-
tion that JAM and Badr . . . made [in Maysan] seemed to look reasonably steady,” Shaw 
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recalled later, judging that “it was as good as it was ever going to get.”161 When he rec-
ommended transferring the province to Iraqi control, his American military superiors in 
Baghdad reluctantly agreed to take the risk.
By the time Operation SINBAD ended in May, British and Iraqi forces had killed 
over 340 militia fighters. The damage inflicted on the Basrah militias was substantial but 
had come at a cost of 46 British troops killed and 350 wounded, a level of casualties that 
the British Government and public were unwilling to bear on a sustained basis. While 
the Iraqi security forces had grown in capability and confidence since the October 2006 
beginning of SINBAD, they still lacked the wherewithal to conduct a determined cam-
paign against JAM, as the coming months would show.162
Making Much With Little in Mosul
On the opposite end of the country from Basrah, Petraeus viewed the evolving secu-
rity situation in the north with measured optimism as he took command. As early as 
March, he expressed the hope of reaching a “sustainable level of violence” in Mosul by 
summer, despite worrisome incidents like the well-orchestrated insurgent assault on the 
Badush prison on March 6, which freed about 70 inmates and exposed long-standing 
corruption in the Iraqi-run facility.163 As the weeks passed, Iraqi-led operations seemed to 
be working well enough to keep a lid on the security situation while the coalition’s main 
effort focused on Baghdad. Enabled by tips from local civilians, Iraqi troops captured 
sizable enemy caches in mid-March, and, in the face of a large, coordinated AQI attack 
in Mosul in May, Iraqi units maintained their cohesion and fought back as a determined 
force, something they had failed to do in late 2004.164 In contrast to the grim assessments 
of other government agencies at the time—which predicted Mosul’s imminent collapse—
Petraeus tended to cast the security scene there in hopeful terms, partly due to the crucial 
role played by the coalition’s special operations task force in the city.165 The task force 
provided depth to an otherwise thin coalition presence in the north, honing its ability 
to work with conventional units to amplify the effects of both.166 The special operations 
forces (SOF) contingent formed a “fusion cell” of operations and intelligence analysts 
with the BCT, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) elements, and 
interagency partners in Mosul to counter the Sunni extremist networks seeking to rees-
tablish a stronger foothold there. Therefore, the SOF contingent was able to keep AQI 
leaders in northern Iraq off-balance  even while Baghdad demanded the preponderance 
of MNF-I’s attention and resources. Reflecting on the close relationship among the task 
force, conventional units, and other U.S. governmental agencies in Mosul, one BCT com-
mander who had deployed throughout Iraq reported that he never observed a better 
partnership anywhere else.167 Despite relegating Mosul to an economy of force effort in 
2007, Petraeus thought the provincial capital’s security arrangement of “competent Iraqi 
security forces in the lead, a relatively small U.S. unit in partnership, and a strong special 
ops capability,” might be a model for the future.168 In the course of events, however, Pet-
raeus would not hold this judgment for long.
AQI’s response to combined operations in and around Mosul provided some insight 
into the terrorist organization’s strategy as it sought to reestablish control over this vital 
area. VBIED attacks in early 2007 increasingly targeted the ISF, indicating a focused 
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attempt to intimidate the army and police and disrupt their activities.169 Petraeus saw this 
as a sign that Ninawa’s insurgents considered the ISF’s growing effectiveness and sense 
of control a serious threat.170 Such a pattern may have been related to the enemy’s assess-
ment of security force quality, but more likely it suggested that after the departure of 
Townsend’s Stryker brigade for Baghdad in December 2006, the small remainder of U.S. 
troops in Mosul no longer impinged on AQI’s freedom of maneuver to the extent their 
ISF counterparts did. Sunni extremist targeting of the ISF in the north continued into the 
spring with multiple VBIED strikes in Mosul and Kirkuk.171
High-profile attacks against civilians to stoke ethno-sectarian conflict remained a key 
part of AQI’s strategy in the north as well. Most notably, on March 27, two massive truck 
bombs struck a market in Tel Afar in one of the largest attacks of the entire war. The 
bombs collapsed the surrounding buildings, killing 152 Iraqis and wounding almost 350 
more, the vast majority of them from Tel Afar’s significant Shi’a minority community. 
Within hours, enraged Shi’a Tel Afari police retaliated by murdering as many as 70 Sunni 
men and boys elsewhere in the city, with the executions only ceasing once Iraqi Army 
troops arrived on the scene and arrested the policemen. The incident was a test of the 
central government’s responsiveness and impartiality toward affairs in the distant Sun-
ni-majority province, with MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy trying (but largely failing) to 
impress on the Maliki government the danger the situation posed to the government’s 
already tenuous legitimacy there. In the end, the Shi’a policemen arrested for the killings 
of Tel Afari Sunnis were never punished. Meanwhile, the Tel Afar episode illustrated 
AQI’s penchant for stoking ethno-sectarian tension, as well as its desperate need to main-
tain control over the foreign-fighter pipeline from Syria.172 Disconcertingly for coalition 
leaders, the group demonstrated its operational reach with coordinated attacks on two 
bridges, an Iraqi-run prison, and several police stations in Ninawa’s provincial capital 
on a single day in May.173 AQI’s resilience in Mosul and the far north meant those areas 
would eventually have to become the coalition’s main effort, if and when Baghdad and 
central Iraq could be pacified.
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Samantha Stryker (Released).
Residents of Tel Afar Dig Through Rubble in the Aftermath of the  
March 27 AQI VBIED Attack.174
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TOWARD A NEW JOINT CAMPAIGN PLAN
The Joint Strategic Assessment Team
While MNF-I aimed to regain the initiative through multiple, simultaneous thrusts 
into long-held al-Qaeda in Iraq sanctuaries, Petraeus and newly arrived U.S. Ambassa-
dor Ryan C. Crocker judged that long-term stability in Iraq would require far more than 
security operations. Together they intended to develop a comprehensive campaign plan 
to address the diverse array of problems that beset Iraq, from governance and economic 
development to rule of law and detention. They also hoped to create conditions to foster 
reconciliation between the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government and a Sunni population 
that had been deeply skeptical of the new government since its inception. While Petraeus 
judged that the surge operations would visibly improve Iraq’s security as the months 
passed, there were few indicators of progress in Iraqi politics, the area that the U.S. Con-
gress and many critics of the strategy had come to regard as the principal benchmark by 
which to assess the U.S.-led campaign.
 
SECDEF Gates (right) with Ambassador Crocker (left).  
Source: DoD photo by Cherie Thurlby (Released).
SECDEF Robert Gates Meets With Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Baghdad.175
As a new commander implementing a new strategy, Petraeus enjoyed some reprieve 
from these external stressors. However, pressure was building. In mid-March, Petraeus 
and Crocker recruited a team of more than a dozen civilian and military experts to review 
the strategic situation in Iraq and revamp the coalition campaign plan.176 To lead the team, 
Petraeus assigned Colonel Herbert Raymond “H. R.” McMaster, then on a fellowship in 
London, while Crocker summoned senior diplomat David D. Pearce from embassy duty 
in Rome. The two had extensive experience with Iraq and the Middle East. McMaster 
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had led the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tel Afar in 2005-2006, earning high praise 
from Bush for the counterinsurgency operations his unit waged there. More recently, he 
had served on the Council of Colonels organized by Chairman of the JCS General Peter 
Pace in late 2006 and had accompanied Keane during the latter’s assessment trip to Iraq 
in February. Pearce was a career foreign service officer who had held sensitive posts in 
Damascus and the Gulf region, in addition to heading the State Department’s Iraq desk 
from 2000 to 2003.
Comprised of distinguished senior officers, diplomats, and scholars, the Joint Strate-
gic Assessment Team (JSAT) represented an unusually comprehensive interagency and 
multinational effort and was a sharp contrast to normal Army campaign planning efforts. 
Besides Pearce and McMaster, the team was comprised of regional experts and intellec-
tuals, including Robert S. Ford, an Arabist then serving as ambassador to Algeria, and 
Molly Phee, a fluent Arabic speaker and Foreign Service officer who had served as the 
Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) governor of Maysan in 2003-2004.177 Regis W. 
Matlak, a long-time veteran of the U.S. intelligence community, joined the team, as did 
Colonel Rick L. Waddell, a Rhodes Scholar and Army reservist with extensive business 
experience in the oil and gas industry who previously had investigated corruption at the 
Bayji oil refinery in 2005.178 Dr. Chris Schnaubelt, a former Air Force colonel who had 
joined the State Department, served as the U.S. Embassy’s lead strategic planner on the 
team. Former Australian army officer and counterinsurgency specialist David J. Kilcul-
len served on the team as well, along with civilian scholar Stephen D. Biddle, an Army 
War College professor and senior fellow for the Council on Foreign Relations who had 
been among the security experts invited to the White House in December 2006 to discuss 
Iraq War strategy with Bush.179 Several British standouts participated, including Toby 
Dodge, author of two books on Iraq, and Andrew Rathmell, a veteran of the CPA and the 
chief of an advisory team in Iraq’s embattled Ministry of Interior. Emma Sky, Odierno’s 
political adviser, also contributed to the team, as did the British MNF-I planner Colonel 
James Richardson. The group also included two U.S. Army foreign area officers special-
izing in the Middle East: Colonel Philip J. “P. J.” Dermer, who had served with the CPA 
and recruited most of the new Iraqi general officer corps; and Colonel Martin Stanton, 
renowned within the Army for his ill-fated Kuwait City holiday in August 1990. After 
calling in reports on the Iraqi invasion from his hotel room, then-Major Stanton became a 
prisoner of war and later an involuntary human shield at Bayji oil refinery.180
The JSAT completed its work on April 20, following a 4-week whirlwind of unit visits 
and senior leader briefings that informed rounds of debate and discussion. The team’s 
final recommendations to the MNF-I commander and U.S. ambassador highlighted the 
implications of the communal struggle for power in Iraq. Though primarily sectarian 
in nature, the conflict in Iraq was exacerbated by terrorist activities and external actors, 
making engagement with reconcilable groups and renewed diplomatic initiatives criti-
cal to success. Iraq’s communities needed to be pushed toward political accommodation 
through both bottom-up and top-down efforts, the JSAT recommended, and the coalition 
should shift to a new strategy that emphasized protecting the population and sought to 
establish security conditions that would allow for the growth of inclusive governance. It 
recognized that a transition to Iraqi forces would need to take place, but, by emphasiz-
ing population security, it acknowledged the intertwined nature of security and political 
THE NEW WAY FORWARD, FEBRUARY 2007-APRIL 2007
127
problems. Population security would lay the groundwork for a political accommodation 
between Iraq’s warring factions that, in turn, would remove support for both AQI and 
the Shi’a militias.
In addition to a lack of political will among Iraq’s warring parties, the JSAT held 
that a “chronic lack of state capacity” hampered efforts to improve stability. It was thus 
not enough to press the Iraqis to step up and assume responsibility.181 Transition to 
Iraqi responsibility had to be conditions-based, and one of those conditions entailed the 
removal of “malign actors” from Iraq’s Shi’a-dominated government and security forc-
es—a task that required more muscular MNF-I and embassy involvement in the near 
term. Pointing out that many factions in Iraq were already jockeying for position in a 
conflict sure to escalate following the coalition’s withdrawal, the team hammered home 
the need to sustain the surge for as long as politically possible.182 The team’s assessment 
struck Petraeus as “accurate, forthright, and a bit disheartening.”183
The JSAT paved the way for a new, comprehensive joint campaign plan that sought 
to achieve “sustainable security” by spring 2008.184 Describing the plan to Gates, Petraeus 
posited that two “big ideas” differentiated it from previous coalition efforts: the empha-
sis on securing the population, and a focus on a political “line of operation.”185 To resolve 
the conflict, the JSAT concluded the coalition’s military objectives should at all times 
be supportive of and subordinate to political objectives, and the political objectives, in 
turn, should focus on actions that would enable—or compel—the warring parties to seek 
their goals through the political process instead of violence.186 Moreover, Petraeus and 
Crocker did not assume that Iraqis would reconcile of their own volition over time, and 
they intended to use the coalition’s military operations and political advantage both to 
bring Sunnis to the negotiating table and to force the Shi’a parties in power to end their 
sectarian abuses.
The JSAT’s leaders believed their most important finding was that Iraq was clearly 
in the midst of a sectarian civil war and that the Iraqi Government itself had become an 
accelerant of the conflict. The transition strategy had failed, they judged, because the 
coalition had worked too uncritically and unconditionally with the government even as 
the new Iraqi state became captured by sectarian parties who used the machinery of the 
state to pursue narrow sectarian agendas. The only answer, they argued, was to hold the 
government leaders accountable for the destabilizing behavior of government-affiliated 
sectarian killers, and to force the political centrists to purge the extremists—using U.S. 
military power to compel them if necessary. Too often, McMaster and Pearce concluded, 
coalition leaders had taken for granted that their job was to empower their government 
partners, without considering whether those partners might be making the conflict worse 
with de facto coalition help. The coalition would need to start by forcing the removal 
of the worst sectarian actors within the Iraqi security forces, especially in the Interior 
Ministry.187
Beyond security, the JSAT’s final report laid out detailed analyses and recommended 
ways forward in more than a dozen areas. To take advantage of the Sunni tribal awak-
ening that had swept Anbar and parts of the Baghdad hinterland, MNF-I should create 
a strategic engagement cell to coordinate initiatives to split reconcilable militant groups 
from irreconcilable ones and persuade as many insurgents as possible to switch sides. 
To reduce the popular discontent with the Iraqi Government that was fueling militant 
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groups on all sides, the coalition should take specific steps to spur economic growth 
and to get the machinery of the Iraqi state working again, not just in Baghdad but in the 
provinces as well. There were specific steps the coalition should take to defuse the Arab-
Kurd conflict, the JSAT judged, or else the coalition would risk mission failure by the 
outbreak of a new civil war along the Green Line in the north. This and other aspects of 
the Iraqi civil war would require the United States to undertake a major diplomatic effort 
to persuade or coerce Iraq’s regional neighbors to cease their destabilizing interventions 
in the Iraqi conflict—especially Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The coalition would need to take 
urgent measures to reform its detention operations and its support for rule of law in Iraq, 
both of which were near the point of collapse.188
In addition to its new ideas, the JSAT was an unusual, ad hoc innovation in joint and 
interagency assessment and planning, an area for which almost no U.S. doctrine existed. 
With little precedent to guide them, the JSAT’s leaders had managed to integrate input 
from across the multinational coalition and the U.S. and UK (United Kingdom) inter-
agencies, producing recommendations that reflected deep expertise no single agency 
could have mustered by itself. Unlike the MNF-I red teams of the previous 2 years, which 
had themselves been nondoctrinal innovations, the JSAT had been empowered by senior 
coalition military and civilian leaders in Baghdad to change the coalition approach to the 
war. Petraeus, Odierno, and Crocker would use the same JSAT-type model repeatedly to 
tackle complex problems during their tenures in Iraq and beyond.
Political Violence
The JSAT observed that violence in Iraq was a political phenomenon, a symptom of 
the war for power and survival among the major Iraqi factions. In the day-to-day bomb-
ings and death squad killings, the political motive was sometimes hard to see. Several 
events during Petraeus’s first few weeks in command were examples of political violence 
that brought the struggle among the Iraqi parties into clear focus. On  February 26, as 
Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi was giving a speech at the Ministry of Public 
Works, a suicide bomber blew himself up inside the building in what appeared to be an 
assassination attempt, wounding both the Vice President and the Minister and killing 
four directors general who had gathered for the occasion.189 On March 16, assassins shot 
to death the head of the Adhamiyah district council, a senior Sunni politician, just as 
they had assassinated his predecessor 3 months earlier. On March 23, less than a month 
after the attempted assassination of Mahdi, another assassin came close to killing Iraqi 
Deputy Prime Minister Salam Zobaie in his Baghdad home, setting off a suicide bomb 
that seriously wounded Zobaie and killed nine others.190 The Zobaie bombing came just 
5 days after Iraqi and coalition troops raided the Green Zone home of Dhafer al-Ani, one 
of the leaders of the Sunni Parliamentary bloc, and confiscated 65 AK-47s and four cars 
that bore traces of TNT.191
The Ani raid added evidence to the frequent assertion by Shi’a leaders that Sunni 
politicians were engaged directly in terrorist activities. On April 12 came even stronger 
evidence. On that day, a suicide bomber entered the Iraqi Parliament building and blew 
himself up in the building’s cafeteria as Members of Parliament were breaking for lunch. 
The explosion wounded 22 Iraqis and killed a senior Parliamentarian from the Iraqi 
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National Dialogue party headed by Saleh Mutlaq. Iraqi officials believed the bomber had 
entered the compound in the entourage of a Sunni Parliamentarian. Over time, Iraqi pol-
iticians came to suspect the Speaker of Parliament, Mahmud Mashhadani, with the assis-
tance of Khalaf Ulayan, a Sunni Member of Parliament from Anbar who moon lighted 
as an insurgent commander in Jaish al-Islami; and Nasser Janabi, another Member of 
Parliament who secretly commanded the wing of Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri’s Naqshbandi 
Army based south of Baghdad, orchestrated the bombing.192 Reacting to the brazen April 
12 attack, Maliki government spokesman Ali Dabbagh told reporters, “There are some 
groups that work in politics during the day and do things other than politics at night.”193
The Sunni Parliamentarians were not the only senior militants inside the govern-
ment, however. On February 23, just 2 months after U.S. forces had detained IRGC com-
mander Mohsen Chizari in a SCIRI-Badr compound in Baghdad, U.S. special operators 
detained SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s son Ammar after intercepting his convoy 
crossing from Iran into Iraq. The American troops had discovered a massive collection of 
weapons and large quantities of money among the vehicles and had concluded that the 
younger Hakim was up to no good. To minimize the political fallout sure to result from 
the detention of the SCIRI patriarch’s son, Petraeus ordered Ammar al-Hakim’s immedi-
ate release.194 In this case, Petraeus saw greater strategic benefit in looking the other way, 
and Bush agreed. The President told the MNF-I commander the following week to keep 
SCIRI “in the tent” and to treat Hakim and his party as potential allies, despite their ties 
to the Iranian regime.195
In a few cases, the Iranian regime was involved directly in politically motivated mil-
itant events. On March 20 in Basrah, coalition commandos captured AAH leader Qais 
Khazali and his brother Laith, who had masterminded the January 20, 2007, attack 
against U.S. Soldiers in Karbala. Along with the Khazali brothers, the coalition troops 
had captured an unidentified man who pretended initially to be mute but turned out to 
be senior Lebanese Hizballah commander Ali Mussa Daqduq, the man whom the IRGC 
Quds Force had assigned to advise AAH in militant operations a few months before. The 
capture of the Khazalis shocked Prime Minister Maliki, who had hoped AAH could be 
used as a political counterbalance to Moqtada Sadr and who required explicit evidence of 
Qais al-Khazali’s guilt from Petraeus before he agreed to allow MNF-I to hold Khazali in 
detention. The capture also robbed Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani of one of 
his most effective Iraqi proxy leaders, and the Iranian regime immediately looked for an 
opportunity to secure Khazali’s release. Three days after the capture of the AAH leaders, 
the IRGC Navy took 15 British sailors hostage in the Persian Gulf, falsely claiming they 
had strayed into Iranian waters, most likely intending to trade them for the release of 
the Khazalis and the detained IRGC officials known as the Erbil Five.196 The February 4 
kidnapping of a senior Iranian Embassy official also may have been related to the hostage 
negotiation. After the unknown gunmen who had abducted the Iranian official released 
him on April 3, the IRGC released the British sailors the following day.197 The high profile 
political posturing of Petraeus’s first few weeks in command showed that Iraqi politics 
remained a turbulent business, with outside powers often closely involved, as the JSAT 
had found.
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“Not in Sync with Us:” Admiral Fallon and the Surge Strategy
Viewing the broader challenge as one of buying time for the Iraqi Government to 
develop capacity and make progress toward reconciliation, Petraeus hoped to prolong the 
surge well into 2008. In this aim, he met unexpected pushback from the newly appointed 
CENTCOM commander. Despite being selected for command as part of Bush’s “new way 
forward,” Fallon was deeply skeptical of the U.S. troop surge the President had ordered, 
and was unsure that Iraq could be stabilized at all. During his January 30, 2007, confir-
mation hearing before the U.S. Senate, Fallon had admitted plainly enough that “what 
we’ve been doing is not working,” and that the coalition required a different approach to 
meet its objectives in Iraq.198 He had declined to endorse the ideas that Petraeus already 
had put forward in public. When testifying before the same committee a week earlier, 
Petraeus had stated his intention to shift the primary mission of U.S. forces from transi-
tion to population security, but in his own hearing, Fallon characterized Petraeus’s idea 
as a mere “proposal.”199
Admiral Fallon (center) and General Mixon (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Serena Hayden (Released).
Colonel David W. Sutherland, Commander 3d BCT, 1st Cavalry Division, Briefs Ad-
miral William Fallon, CENTCOM Commander, and Major General Benjamin Mixon, 
Commander of MND-N.200
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Fallon even had seemed to indicate the surge itself was still in question. Though Bush 
already had clarified that he intended to send all five available brigades to Iraq, the admi-
ral told senators that he did not yet know how many more troops were needed. “Frankly, 
I aim to find out and have my own opinions,” he avowed.201 In Fallon’s view, the Pres-
ident’s statements about the surge were just expressions of policy. It would take a con-
certed effort to transform the policy into a coherent strategy, and the admiral intended 
to have a direct role in formulating it. “I’m going to . . . work with General Petraeus and 
our commanders to figure out how to make an effective strategy,” Fallon informed the 
senate committee.202 He seemed unaware that Odierno already had begun implement-
ing a new strategy in line with what Petraeus recommended and what the President 
had envisioned when he approved the surge. There was a similar divergence where the 
duration of the surge was concerned. Whereas Petraeus and Odierno intended to sustain 
the troop surge as far into 2008 as possible, Fallon spoke to the senators of being able “to 
wrap this up and get our troops back,” and he cast the campaign in terms of weeks and 
months, not years as Petraeus did.203
Further indicators of future friction emerged the weekend after Fallon took the helm 
at CENTCOM on March 16, when he held a 2-day commander’s conference with rep-
resentatives from CENTCOM’s subordinate commands, including MNF-I. During the 
proceedings, the admiral reviewed the array of challenges across CENTCOM’s area of 
responsibility and told his new subordinates he believed MNF-I should pursue a much 
more modest set of objectives, implying that the surge forces either would have no impact 
or might even make matters worse over time.204 Fallon’s views echoed the accelerated 
transition strategy that Casey and Abizaid had advocated and that the President had dis-
carded 3 months before—only with more troops, while they lasted. In contrast, Petraeus 
and Odierno already were gearing up for a surge of U.S.-led offensive operations once all 
five additional brigades arrived in Iraq in the early summer.205 When Fallon visited Iraq 
later that month, Odierno recorded in his journal that the new CENTCOM chief “believes 
[the] surge will go through October at the latest,” and added that Fallon “clearly has a 
timeline in his mind that is not in sync with us.”206
Throughout Casey’s tenure at MNF-I, he and CENTCOM Commander Abizaid had 
maintained close alignment in their strategic views, but they were frequently at odds 
with whomever happened to be MNC-I commander at the time. Now, at the outset of the 
surge, the tables had turned: under Petraeus and Odierno, MNF-I and MNC-I would act 
in concert, but at odds with Fallon’s CENTCOM. The disconnect between the new CENT-
COM commander and his key subordinate commanders in Iraq stemmed partly from the 
fact that Bush had long since come to consider the MNF-I commander in Baghdad as the 
main leader of the Iraq campaign, bypassing the CENTCOM commander in Tampa in 
order to maintain a direct line first to Casey and now to Petraeus. In selecting new com-
manders in December 2006, Bush had directly tapped Petraeus as MNF-I commander, 
but he had not been involved in the selection for the CENTCOM post and simply had 
accepted the Pentagon’s recommendation for what he considered merely a supporting 
command role. As a result, Fallon had taken command at CENTCOM erroneously pre-
suming to operate under a Presidential charter to oversee the Iraq campaign.207 These 
misconceptions would cause tension between the different echelons of command in the 
months to come.
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***
By early April 2007, 2 months after he had arrived in Baghdad, Petraeus commanded 
a force that was postured very differently than it had been in January. Within days of 
his arrival, Petraeus had given MNF-I a new mission based on population security and 
had begun work with U.S. Ambassador Crocker on a new campaign plan that would 
involve much more direct coalition intervention in Iraqi affairs than had been the case 
in 2006. The coalition also had begun to employ its much-needed surge reinforcements 
to regain the initiative in Baghdad after a year of worsening sectarian civil war. In the 
MND-B area of operations, five U.S. brigades held territory where previously there had 
been only three. Five additional Iraqi Army brigades had arrived as well, bringing the 
total of U.S. and Iraqi forces inside the city to 93,000—far more than had been on hand for 
the TOGETHER FORWARD operations of summer and fall 2006. Petraeus and Odierno 
also had narrowed MND-B’s focus, reassigning its vast territory south of Baghdad to 
the new Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) that would prosecute a simultaneous 
campaign in southern belts with more than 30,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops. The additional 
troops inside and outside the capital city enabled the coalition to intensify its operations 
on both the east and west sides of Baghdad, and to expand its footprint dramatically in 
the city after 2 years of steadily shrinking it. By mid-April, Petraeus and Odierno had 
overseen the creation of more than 20 new U.S.-Iraqi outposts in Baghdad’s neighbor-
hoods, a presence that would eventually increase to 77 outposts by the end of the surge. 
The two U.S. generals had accomplished this significant shift without the support of the 
new CENTCOM commander, Fallon.
The new approach was not without its serious costs. As U.S. troops fanned out into 
Baghdad’s districts once more, they came head to head with both Sunni and Shi’a mili-
tants in the city, and U.S. casualties rose as a result. In February and March, MNF-I suf-
fered 162 U.S. Soldiers killed and another 1,140 wounded, with a worse toll to come in the 
spring and summer. “We are getting into the fights with both Sunni and Shi’a extremists 
we knew were coming,” Petraeus explained to Gates in early April.208 MNF-I suffered 35 
troops killed in action during the first week of April alone, a number 60 percent higher 
than the average weekly death toll since December, and Petraeus expected this grim trend 
to continue as U.S. troops moved farther into enemy-dominated territory.209
AQI responded to the new coalition operations with counterattacks of its own, defi-
antly carrying out some of the war’s largest car-bomb attacks against Shi’a civilians both 
in Baghdad and in the far north and south of the country. Meanwhile, after lying rel-
atively low in January, JAM and other Shi’a militants had responded to the arrival of 
additional U.S. troops by bombarding the Green Zone periodically, in one case killing 
two Americans at the U.S. Embassy billeting office a few yards outside Petraeus and 
Crocker’s office windows.210
As more U.S. and Iraqi troops moved into Shi’a-militia-dominated neighborhoods, 
a portion of Baghdad’s Shi’a militants had displaced to Diwaniyah, Basrah, and other 
southern cities and had begun to threaten coalition partners in those territories. While 
never strong, MND-CS’s slipping grip on Diwaniyah and MND-SE’s similarly weak hold 
on Basrah and Amarah in early 2007 were the latest manifestations of a problem that had 
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dogged the U.S.-led occupation since 2003. Operating with coalition partners had been 
meant to bolster the strategic legitimacy of the U.S.-led campaign, but at the operational 
level, those same partners often had neither the capability nor the will to achieve the 
objectives of the U.S.-crafted campaign plan. The deteriorating conditions in the southern 
cities indicated that MNF-I and MNC-I would eventually have to conduct more extensive 
operations there after bringing Baghdad under control.
In these areas away from the capital, the coalition could not yet count on Iraqi forces 
to fill the gap, as Dempsey made clear in his final assessment of the ISF as he prepared 
to leave command of MNSTC-I; the ISF simply had too many capability gaps to make 
a transition bridging strategy feasible. Nor could the coalition yet look to Iraqi politics 
to mitigate security problems in Baghdad or anywhere else. The battles on Iraq’s streets 
were symptoms of the political struggle among Iraq’s major parties, not the other way 
around, reinforcing Carl von Clausewitz’s dictum that war was a continuation of politics 
by other means. The impetus for political reconciliation would have to come from beyond 
the Green Zone, as the events of spring and summer 2007 were about to demonstrate.
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THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM
During the spring of 2007, the surge of U.S. forces, General David Petraeus’s change in 
strategic guidance, and Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno’s shift in operational pos-
ture combined to alter the balance of security in the Baghdad region and halt the advance 
of sectarian forces that had been underway for more than a year. During the same months, 
coalition commanders compounded these modifications by enabling—or in some cases 
coercing—the Sunni population of central Iraq to switch sides and take a stand against 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other Sunni extremist groups. From Multi-National Forc-
es-Iraq (MNF-I) down to the lowest tactical level, coalition commanders worked in con-
cert to expand the Awakening that had begun in Anbar and used it to amplify the effect 
of the surge. A wave of local cease-fires was about to sweep across western and central 
Iraq, bringing tens of thousands of Sunni insurgents into a new alliance with the coalition 
troops they had fought for almost 4 years.
THE EXPANSION OF THE ANBAR AWAKENING
As he prepared to take command of MNF-I, Petraeus had noted with interest the 
significant changes taking place in Ramadi, where a city once dominated by AQI and 
its allies had become a stronghold of a new, anti-AQI Sunni movement. During his first 
weeks, Petraeus encouraged his subordinate commanders to watch for opportunities 
beyond Ramadi to strike local cease-fires with Sunni fighters to turn one-time enemies 
into allies—or at least into neutrals. If local Sunnis indicated their willingness to come to 
an agreement with coalition units, then Petraeus believed coalition commanders should 
take advantage of the opening. At MNF-I, some of the coalition’s senior leaders already 
had been on the lookout for such overtures. As MNF-I’s British deputy commander since 
September 2006, Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb had begun exploring the possibil-
ity of reaching accommodations with select Sunni insurgent leaders along the lines of 
the Awakening. The former Special Air Service commander believed in negotiation with 
even staunch enemies. To fellow coalition commanders who might be skeptical about 
dealing with insurgents responsible for the deaths of American Soldiers, Lamb argued 
that it would be foolish to bar influential resistance leaders from wading into the political 
process because they had “blood on their hands.”1 To press his point, the British general 
often remarked that he himself shared the same condemnable quality, having fought ter-
rorists in Northern Ireland with whom he later negotiated.
Creating a small cell of analysts and military officers on loan from the special oper-
ations task force and intelligence agencies, Lamb mapped out the widening rifts in the 
Sunni insurgency and looked for opportunities to pry loose “reconcilable” factions will-
ing to make a separate peace with the Iraqi Government from the “irreconcilables” not 
inclined to do so.2 In keeping with his unorthodox character, the British general occasion-
ally arranged for captured insurgent leaders to be transported individually to his living 
quarters in the Green Zone to have a discussion over tea and assess whether their release 
might lead to cease-fires with the groups they led.3 In December 2006, Lamb arranged 
for the first “strategic release,” setting free the detained Ansar al Sunna cleric Abu Wail 
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without conditions in the hope that his return to the insurgent group would lead to a rift 
with AQI.4
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sergeant Dawn M. Price (Released).
Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, Deputy Commander, MNF-I.5
Petraeus encouraged Lamb to continue his efforts and confirmed the coalition’s basic 
approach to reconciliation as “target[ing] the ‘irreconcilables’ of either sect to reduce 
their capability and influence, while simultaneously reaching out to those who are rec-
oncilable.”6 Lamb’s outreach extended to enemy fighters still at large. Treading lightly to 
avoid antagonizing Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and his advisers, Petraeus and Lamb 
would keep an eye out for Sunni resistance leaders who recognized the potential for rec-
onciliation at a time when the insurgency seemed increasingly divided. The main effort 
of MNF-I’s Sunni outreach in 2006 had been the U.S. Embassy and Major General Rick 
Lynch’s high-level talks with exiled insurgent (or pro-insurgent) Sunni figures in Jordan 
and Syria. But under Petraeus, MNF-I’s main Sunni outreach effort would shift to a more 
bottom-up process in which the senior coalition commanders authorized brigade and 
battalion commanders to follow the openings that presented themselves in their local 
areas. As those opportunities emerged, the coalition commands in Baghdad would sup-
port them with funding or political top cover, and would run interference with the Maliki 
government as the need arose.
The course of the Awakening in eastern Anbar changed the way Multi-National 
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) approached its operations as well. When Odierno had assumed com-
mand of MNC-I in late 2006, he had seen reconciliation primarily as a top-down process 
by the Iraqi Government to gain Sunni allegiance through key legislation and improved 
essential services.7 However, as reports of armed Sunni groups seeking agreements with 
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U.S. units floated up the chain of command, he recognized the Awakening of the tribes in 
Anbar as significant and explored with Petraeus and Lamb the prospect of reproducing 
that phenomenon elsewhere.8 Though MNC-I’s collective mindset remained skeptical, 
and though it would take Odierno a few months to interpret this new development and 
“decide whether we thought it was real or not,” he would soon seize the chance for tacti-
cal military leaders to broker local cease-fires and work with former insurgents to defeat 
AQI.9
Visiting Anbar during his first week in command, Petraeus learned of the unexpected 
progress made in the provincial capital of Ramadi. Days from turning the area over to his 
successor, Colonel Sean B. MacFarland related how dramatically the security situation 
had changed since the arrival of his 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, in June 2006. Daily 
attacks on U.S. and Iraqi forces in Ramadi had plummeted. With local tribes dispatch-
ing their young men to serve as policemen and hunt down AQI operatives, MacFarland 
reported that his brigade had “an embarrassment of riches” compared to the meager local 
Iraqi cooperation it had found when it arrived 6 months earlier. “We have more friendly 
forces than we almost know what to do with,” MacFarland related.10 He described the 
Brigade Combat Team’s (BCT) tactical approach: quickly establish combat outposts in 
the city, deliberately expand a forward presence, and cement it with an aggressive infor-
mation operations campaign.11 Petraeus approved. Most notably, though, MacFarland’s 
brigade had isolated Ramadi and cut AQI’s lines of communications by reaching an 
accommodation with Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and other local leaders whose tribes 
comprised the Awakening.12
However, this new agreement between MacFarland and the Awakening sheikhs led 
to a disagreement between MacFarland and his superiors at the two-star Marine head-
quarters on Camp Fallujah. While Major General Richard C. Zilmer of Multi-National 
Force-West (MNF-W) had tolerated MacFarland’s engagement effort in Ramadi, he had 
been dubious about its long-term effects and mindful of its potential to undermine what 
the Marine command saw as the more strategically promising track of discussions with 
the well-connected expatriate sheikhs in Jordan.13
Zilmer’s successor began his tour intent on emphasizing one approach at the expense 
of the other. Major General Walter E. Gaskin’s II Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) 
assumed responsibility for MNF-W on February 9—1 day before Petraeus took the reins 
at MNF-I. In attendance at MacFarland’s meeting with Petraeus, the new Marine com-
mander questioned the relative utility of the BCT’s tribal engagement in Ramadi, labeling 
Sattar a “road thief” and the sheikhs behind the Awakening “small fish.”14 MNF-W’s 
ongoing dialogue with the sheikhs in Jordan had poisoned the well. Alarmed by Sat-
tar’s rapid rise to power, many leaders of the more established tribes had denigrated 
the upstart sheikh as a murderous smuggler to their Marine interlocutors.15 MacFarland 
acknowledged Sattar’s shady background but suggested to Gaskin that the improved 
security situation in his sector spoke for itself. When the BCT commander recommended 
that Petraeus meet with Sattar, Gaskin objected, arguing that such a gesture would lavish 
the sheikh with undeserved credibility and thus undermine more significant engage-
ments.16 Nevertheless, persuaded that MacFarland’s effort held great promise, Petraeus 
threw his weight behind it and told Gaskin to put a priority on supporting the Awaken-
ing.17 “This is counterinsurgency,” he pressed. “This is how these endeavors end.”18
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Major General Gaskin (right) and General Pace (left).  
Source: DoD photo by U.S. Air Force Staff Sergeant D. Myles Cullen (Released).
U.S. Marine Corps Major General Walter Gaskin, Commander MNF-W, and General 
Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tour Ramadi.19
Gaskin had inherited a dynamic situation. As a supporting effort to Operation FARDH 
AL-QANOON, he understood his task to be interdicting accelerants to Baghdad’s sectar-
ian violence, but he oversaw a province that his superiors considered ripe for exploita-
tion.20 At the time of Gaskin’s arrival in February 2007, the Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) area of operations included three brigade-sized sectors. Flanking the Army BCT 
in greater Ramadi were two newly arrived Marine regimental combat teams (RCTs). To 
the west, Colonel H. Stacy Clardy’s RCT 2 had responsibility for the Euphrates River 
Valley west of the provincial capital to the Syrian border, including the cities of Hit, Had-
itha, Rawah, and Al Qa’im. Reinforced by the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 
its sector extended south of the river over a wide expanse of sparsely populated desert 
area traversed by a highway and the coalition’s main supply route from Jordan. Notably, 
municipal government had rebounded in al Qa’im as MNF-W’s local accommodation 
with the Albu-Mahal tribe held steady, and Haditha and other population centers had 
seen drops in violence as well when operations in November caused AQI to disperse. The 
Marines went on to bulldoze berms around the cities and erect internal barriers to better 
control access to neighborhoods. Between Ramadi and Baghdad, RCT-6 under Colonel 
Richard L. Simcock operated in and around Fallujah. Thirty miles from Iraq’s capital, Fal-
lujah had offered the most promise in Zilmer’s eyes in early 2006, but the situation there 
seemed tenuous in comparison with Ramadi as Gaskin assumed command 1 year later.21 
Major tribes in the area, like the Jumaili and Zobai, still tended to favor AQI. Extremists 
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held sway in the villages surrounding the city and the long-time sanctuary north toward 
Lake Tharthar remained.22
For the MNF-W commander, the surge meant the extension of the 15th MEU and 
the imminent arrival of two more formations: 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, which he dis-
patched to Ramadi in March, and 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, which fell under the com-
mand of RCT-2 out west.23 The surge of U.S. BCTs to Baghdad also reduced the chances 
that MNC-I would peel away Army units from MNF-W in order to tamp down violence 
in the capital—a concern not far from the minds of Marine commanders.24
Most importantly, following Petraeus’s guidance in Ramadi, MNF-W redoubled its 
support of the Awakening, with Gaskin’s deputy, Brigadier General John R. Allen, visit-
ing Sattar at Petraeus’s urging. Sattar impressed his guest by assembling more than 100 
notables from the surrounding tribes the day of the meeting.25 The Marine headquar-
ters broadened this promising channel even as it continued talks with the exiled sheikhs 
biding their time in Jordan. Gaskin sustained tribal engagement along with efforts to 
build capacity in the Iraqi security forces. He soon discovered there was a direct correla-
tion between the two.26
Finishing the Job in Ramadi
On February 18, Colonel John W. Charlton and 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, took 
over the Ramadi sector from MacFarland’s brigade. Though the situation in the city had 
improved markedly, Charlton saw the fight as far from over. West of the city, tribes 
loyal to the Awakening dominated, while to the east in Sufiyah cooperation between the 
coalition and the Albu Soda tribe had disrupted AQI command and control and logistics 
nodes.27 Meanwhile, the participation of Albu-Fahad sheikhs in a January reconstruc-
tion conference signaled the powerful tribe’s new receptivity to the Awakening and thus 
indicated that the belts surrounding the provincial capital would grow more inhospita-
ble to Sunni militant groups.28 In Ramadi itself, MacFarland’s new combat outposts and 
security stations manned jointly with the newly formed police force had tamped down 
violence around the embattled government center.29
Yet AQI and its allies had not conceded the struggle. In the northern half of Ramadi, 
1st Battalion, 6th Marines, stood poised to advance into the Qatana District in the city’s 
center while Army battalions converged on its southeastern quadrant. MacFarland’s bri-
gade had secured a foothold downtown, but the enemy contested it daily with mortar, 
rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), and small-arms fire.30 AQI placed particular empha-
sis on attacking local police outposts with suicide car bombs—so much so that Odierno 
expressed concern for Iraqi morale following a string of such attacks, including a Febru-
ary 14 explosion that killed the western Ramadi police chief.31 Multiple AQI cells clung 
to safe havens in the central and eastern portions of the city, where they had arrayed 
improvised explosive device (IED)-laced defenses, manned temporary checkpoints, and 
enjoyed at least the passive support of the local population. Despite improvements in 
the overall security situation, six Americans were killed in action during February and 
another 31 wounded. Fifty-nine IEDs had exploded that month in Ramadi, revealing two 
major hot spots around the al-Qudar Mosque in the Marine battalion’s sector and in the 
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Mula’ab District on the city’s eastern edge.32 U.S. and Iraqi forces had not established a 
sustained forward presence in either area.
Colonel Charlton (left) and General Petraeus (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Colonel John Charlton With General David Petraeus.33
To maintain MacFarland’s hard-won momentum, Charlton launched a series of clear-
ing operations that began the day his brigade assumed control of Ramadi.34 The first 
focused on Mula’ab, a bad part of town MacFarland had intended to clear late in 2006 
before diverting the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, east to rescue the Albu-Soda 
tribe in its close-run struggle with AQI in Sufiyah and Julaybah.35 In February 2007, 
Charlton returned to MacFarland’s original plan and dispatched the same combat-ex-
perienced battalion into eastern Ramadi after physically isolating the district overnight 
with the well-choreographed placement of concrete barriers. Two of Charlton’s other 
battalions, accompanied by 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, helped to block fleeing 
enemy fighters as the U.S. formation cleared Mula’ab. In the first week, the combined 
force established a fully functional combat outpost, discovered an IED factory, and killed 
35 militants.36 Another clearing operation followed in the sector assigned to 1st Battalion, 
6th Marines, repeating the approach of isolating the area and sweeping through it block 
by block while establishing mutually supporting outposts. The second sweep resulted in 
about 15 additional insurgents captured, and it enabled more than 200 Iraqi policemen to 
return to cleared neighborhoods that had been an Ansar al Sunna safe haven.37
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 12. Ramadi, February-March 2007.
By mid-March, Petraeus assessed that the coalition had about 70 percent of the pro-
vincial capital under control, but entire neighborhoods still were without a credible U.S. 
presence.38 On March 17, Charlton launched a third clearing operation, this one in the 
south-central district of Iskan, where the largest concentration of AQI fighters had sought 
to regroup.39 To reinforce the operation, Charlton swapped his smaller but more mobile 
cavalry squadron for MNF-W’s 1,000-man 2d Battalion, 5th Marines, thereby gaining 
another 500 infantrymen. Charlton committed two infantry battalions—one Army and 
one Marine—to the final clearing operation.40 The fighting remained intense, with the 
Marines calling for a long-range rocket strike to support their offensive.41
Charlton’s 6-week endeavor to clear Ramadi ended on March 31, a day on which there 
were no attacks in the provincial capital. The BCT commander remembered that day 
as “eerily quiet” without the usual cacophony of air strikes, artillery, tank rounds, and 
machine-gun fire.42 The Ramadi operations of February 18-March 30 resulted in 36 enemy 
killed, 8 wounded, and 114 captured. During this period, there had been 515 insurgent 
attacks in Ramadi, including 82 IED strikes. American troops had suffered 9 killed and 
40 wounded.43 In the aftermath of this tactical victory, U.S. and Iraqi forces consolidated 
their presence in about 40 positions in the city and began the laborious task of reconstruc-
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With violence in the city under control, Charlton set about solidifying his gains. Mil-
itary operations in Ramadi’s tribal belts in April and May coincided with engagement 
efforts aimed at expanding the Awakening.45 A breakthrough came when Sattar and 
Charlton traveled together to the Julaybah area east of the Sufiyah District and met with 
sheikhs from Albu-Fahad. Though powerful, the tribe had mixed loyalties, and its leader, 
Khamis Abdul Karim, fled to Jordan in late 2005 following the murder of his brother at the 
hands of AQI supporters.46 Once cool to the prospect of aligning with Sattar’s movement, 
tribal elders now treated the Abu Risha sheikh like a “rock star,” recalled Charlton, who 
attributed the warm reception to a growing sense that the tide had turned decisively.47 
When the Albu Fahad joined Sattar, the Awakening’s influence spread east into the Hab-
baniyah area, constricting AQI’s freedom of movement along the Ramadi-Fallujah corri-
dor. By early May, MNF-I reported that these developments and Charlton’s operations 
in the belts around Ramadi were forcing AQI’s remnants to displace east to Fallujah and 
Baghdad or north into the remote Lake Tharthar region.48
Watching the events in Ramadi, Petraeus quickly latched onto the significance of 
the connection between local tribal outreach and improved security. He sought to use 
mounting tribal opposition to AQI by involving the Iraqi Government in a constructive 
way.49 He cajoled Maliki into visiting Anbar in early March and hoped the gesture would 
generate trust among restive Sunnis. Nonetheless, he confided to Gates that considerable 
challenges remained, pointing out that Sattar took little care to mute his hatred not just 
of AQI but also of the Iraqi Islamic Party, whose Sunni members dominated the prov-
ince’s elected government. With marked understatement, Petraeus noted, “Reconcilia-
tion work, even intra-sect, is obviously difficult.”50
The momentum generated by the Awakening in Ramadi reverberated across the 
province. U.S. casualties in Anbar plummeted by 80 percent during the second week 
of March.51 Occasional setbacks took place, such as a massive truck bomb that killed 
13 policemen in late April.52 By May, MNF-W witnessed days with fewer than 10 total 
attacks in all of Anbar Province. During the second half of 2006, attacks in greater Ramadi 
had averaged 18 per day, with periodic spikes to as many as 40, but from June 2007 to the 
end of Charlton’s tour in March 2008, the daily attack average in Ramadi fell to less than 
one per day—with some “attacks” nothing more than the discovery of an IED.53 Petraeus 
described the overall progress as “stunning,” and noted that the security situation in 
Anbar was “simply unthinkable 6 months ago.”54
The growth of the police was another indicator of progress. Volunteers came forward 
in droves after the clearing of Ramadi, gradually adding auxiliaries to the 2,000 police-
men Charlton had available and allowing him to hold the city’s neighborhoods with few 
manpower constraints.55 The Ramadi police force eventually would grow to 9,000 by the 
end of the surge.56 The undermanned Iraqi Army brigades operating in Charlton’s area of 
operations also received a boost from the Awakening after the BCT persuaded Sattar to 
provide local men as army recruits. The sheikh agreed to provide soldiers on the condi-
tion that the Sunni men who joined would be posted in Anbar for a minimum of 2 years, 
thus ruling out deployment to Shi’a provinces where militias might target them, a proviso 
that coalition leaders readily approved. Five hundred men enlisted at the next recruiting 
drive for the 7th Iraqi Army Division, exceeding the number of slots the Marines had 
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designated for basic training. Streaming into Sattar’s compound to sign up, truckloads of 
40 to 50 men rumbled past the gate where the sheikh stood cheering them on.57
If security improvements and the continued growth of local security forces firmed up 
the gains of the Awakening militarily, so too did modest political progress. An enhanced 
provincial reconstruction team led by a State Department diplomat joined 1st Brigade, 
3d Infantry Division, in April, soon after Ramadi had been cleared. Viewing the embed-
ded provincial reconstruction team as a “governance transition team” best employed 
in partnership with the mayor’s office, Charlton built a small compound for it adjacent 
to the government center.58 The city council held its first meeting on April 14, and the 
provincial council returned on May 6, convening after an unproductive year in Bagh-
dad. In a concession to Sattar, the council included for the first time representatives 
from the Awakening.59 By July, Petraeus could report that Ramadi was “well into the 
reconstruction phase,” characterizing “the number and breadth of activities” as “very 
impressive. . . a true example of what right looks like.”60 That same month, during a con-
ference that brought several of Anbar’s influential sheikhs, the governor, and the direc-
tor of police together for the first time, the Sunni leaders “pledged support for Iraq and 
opposition to al-Qaeda.”61
A meeting engagement in the desert that same week demonstrated how far AQI’s for-
tunes had fallen since the previous fall when its supporters had marched in armed pro-
cession through the streets of Ramadi celebrating the declaration of the Islamic State of 
Iraq. Acting on a tip, a patrol from Charlton’s battalion operating south of the provincial 
capital made contact with 40 to 50 AQI fighters hiding in a hay-filled flatbed truck. The 
group had taken months to infiltrate from outside the province, south around Lake Hab-
baniyah, to an assembly area on the outskirts of Ramadi. The fighters—many wearing 
suicide vests—engaged the U.S. patrol in the tall grass around a placed dubbed “Donkey 
Island.” Calling in helicopter support, the Americans killed over 30 fighters and recov-
ered a large assortment of weapons at the site, including sniper rifles, grenades, mortar 
rounds, IED components, and dynamite.62 The mission of this relatively large AQI force 
had been to infiltrate into the city and assassinate the leaders of the Awakening, indicat-
ing that the terrorist group was now directing much of its resources and men to try to 
stop their new tribal enemies.
The Awakening in the Western Euphrates River Valley
By summer 2007, the situation looked equally grim for AQI in the population centers 
to the northwest. Security operations in late 2006 had disrupted the extremist group in the 
cities between Al Qa’im and Ramadi, but the struggle for the Western Euphrates River 
Valley remained in question as the New Year began. AQI had cowed and weakened the 
Jughayfi tribe around highly contested Haditha. To the south in Hit, the Albu-Nimr tribe, 
unfazed by AQI, tilted strongly toward the coalition but it seemed the coalition had done 
little to exploit this stance.63
Commanding a mechanized infantry battalion attached to RCT-2, Army Lieutenant 
Colonel Doug Crissman arrived in Hit during February 2007 and surveyed the situa-
tion with increasing unease. Home to over 100,000 Iraqis, the district had approximately 
650 policemen present for duty, most of them outside the city limits in the Albu-Nimr 
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tribe’s traditional strongholds across the river. In Hit itself, Crissman’s predecessor had 
established a single police station under the charge of a charismatic but corrupt Iraqi 
colonel who showed no reservations about standing up to AQI.64 All the same, according 
to Crissman, operations in the city consisted of “going out and hoping you [didn’t] get 
blown up each day, going around, waiting for something to explode, [and] then going 
after the guys you think might have done it.”65 Finding this pattern unsustainable, the 
commander, with substantial Iraqi input, compiled a list of some 70 targets and orches-
trated a clearing operation led by the police and backed by U.S. transition teams, Com-
bined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) advisers, and conventional patrols. 
As the combined force swept through Hit in pursuit of insurgents, it established two new 
police stations and set up checkpoints manned by Iraqis under close American supervi-
sion. The battalion facilitated similar operations in towns just to the south.66
The expansion of U.S. operations and the tightening of police control in and around 
Hit coincided with Sheikh Sattar’s outreach to the senior Albu Nimr sheikhs. Eager to 
replicate the gains observed in Ramadi and to strengthen its position vis-à-vis AQI, the 
tribe joined the Awakening and began boosting the personnel ranks of local security 
forces with hundreds of recruits.67 Violence in Hit dropped sharply, enough so that 
during a visit to the city in early March, a surprised Petraeus reported to Gates that he 
had not expected to find himself “walking through the market in Hit in a soft cap eating 
ice cream this soon.”68 In September 2006, the weekly attack average in Hit and Had-
itha had reached 67 and 58 attacks, respectively. Six months later, these averages had 
dropped to eight and three.69 The dramatic change in security conditions came along with 
changing popular attitudes. Later in March, MNF-I reported that an intense rejection of 
AQI’s extremist ideology had emerged as the predominant theme among the population 
of western Anbar.70
The insurgents still vied for control of the population through a persistent murder 
and intimidation campaign, but they were now losing ground, as well as allies, because 
of it. On April 27, a suicide car bomber attacked the residence of the Hit police chief, kill-
ing 3 policemen and 10 civilians but leaving the chief himself unscathed.71 Such efforts 
failed to stem the spread of local resistance against AQI. By the end of April, the tribal 
sheikhs of Haditha joined the Awakening and began reporting clan members who contin-
ued to support AQI. Sunni resistance fighters of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades based 
in Hit also switched sides and aligned themselves with Sattar’s movement around this 
time.72 By May, cooperation among U.S. and Iraqi forces and local tribes created enough 
pressure on AQI that the terrorist group’s local leaders began to explore the prospects 
of amnesty.73 Sunni insurgents maintained a presence throughout villages between Al 
Qa’im and Rawah, but the struggle for popular allegiance in the Western Euphrates River 
Valley undoubtedly had shifted against them and in favor of the Awakening.
For tactical commanders like Crissman, this turn of events translated into accelerated 
recruiting for the Iraqi security forces as the tribes mustered their young men for service 
in the army, police, or government-sanctioned emergency response units. It also meant 
making peace with shady characters who had once populated coalition target lists, as 
well as organizing deliberate, by name detainee releases to demonstrate goodwill and 
win over local leaders. The effects of such unorthodox actions were not always quanti-
fiable, but Crissman believed one particular metric illustrated the shift: in Hit between 
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February and September 2007, when his battalion relocated to Rutbah, he lost none of his 
Soldiers in action.74
The Turning of the Fallujah Tribes
The wave of tribal uprisings against AQI that spread across Ramadi and western 
Anbar in spring 2007 was slower to reach Fallujah, the restive city that twice had been 
the scene of large-scale fighting in 2004. Fallujah’s significantly different tribal and social 
character proved the main reason for the delay. In Ramadi, the tribes had been able to 
combine and serve as the foundation for improved security, but those in and around Fal-
lujah were in greater disarray and suspect of the idea of allying with the coalition against 
Sunni insurgents. The city lay at the convergence of four major tribal areas of influence. 
Three of these tribes—Mohemdi, Jumayli, and Zobaie—remained sympathetic to AQI in 
early 2007, while the fourth, the Albu Issa, had split on the issue. With their sheikhs out of 
the country, all four tribes had lacked senior tribal leadership for some time, making them 
susceptible to intimidation and internal and external squabbling.75 A further tribal fault 
line cut through these tribes’ territories, with the Zobaie tribe falling under the Shammar 
confederation, while the Albu Issa, Mohemdi, and Jumayli belonged to the rival Dulaim 
confederation.76
The Zobaie tribe’s area of influence in particular had been fertile ground for insurgent 
groups since 2003. Dr. Harith al-Dhari, Sunni cleric and chairman of the Association of 
Muslim Scholars, was a Zobaie tribal leader who also served as a spiritual head of the 
Sunni insurgency. Dhari’s insurgent roots ran deep. His grandfather purportedly had 
triggered the 1920 revolution in Iraq with the assassination of a British colonel near Fal-
lujah. From his refuge in Jordan, Dhari—a longtime senior member of the Iraqi branch 
of the Muslim Brotherhood—provided religious endorsement and financial support for 
insurgent groups such as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, a Muslim Brotherhood-as-
sociated group in which Dhari’s own son was a commander.77 The Zobaie tribe’s strong 
Salafist culture also proved amenable to the extremist ideology of AQI when it arrived 
on the scene.78
Fallujah’s involvement in regional politics was different from Ramadi’s as well. The 
tribes around Ramadi loathed the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) and included the removal of 
IIP Governor Mamoun al-Alwani as a demand in the original draft of the September 
2006 proclamation announcing the Awakening.79 In contrast, the Albu Issa tribe main-
tained close ties with senior IIP leaders such as Rafi al-Issawi, an Albu Issa member and 
medical doctor who had treated insurgents in a Fallujah hospital during the November 
2004 battle before entering politics. Becoming Maliki’s first Minister of State for Foreign 
Affairs, Issawi would rise to the post of Deputy Prime Minister in 2008. The Zobaie tribe 
had its high-level connections as well, not only to vehement critics of the Iraqi Govern-
ment like Harith al-Dhari, but also Salam al-Zobaie, a member of the IIP-led Sunni Parlia-
mentary bloc who had become Iraq’s Deputy Prime Minister in May 2006.
Conditions in Fallujah in early 2007 were not ideal for the kind of changes taking 
place in nearby Ramadi. Two developments in 2006 had worsened Fallujah’s security sit-
uation. First, between 30,000 and 50,000 internally displaced Sunnis fleeing the sectarian 
violence in Baghdad had settled in Fallujah, a heavy burden for the city of 400,000.80 Next, 
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insurgent fighters driven from Ramadi by MacFarland’s brigade and the Awakening had 
migrated to the rural villages surrounding Fallujah, areas that had been a sanctuary for 
AQI and its allies since they had fled the coalition attack of November 2004.81 There the 
insurgents had authority, staffing checkpoints and enforcing curfews in places that saw 
only intermittent coalition presence. Wedged between the Euphrates River and the Fallu-
jah-Abu Ghraib highway, Zaidon to the southeast stood out as a safe haven that offered 
access to Baghdad’s crucial southern belt, while Karmah to the north served as an AQI 
logistical hub and transit point. During a mid-February 2007 raid, U.S. and Iraqi troops 
discovered an elaborate IED factory in Karmah with multiple car bombs in various stages 
of production, most likely intended for use in Baghdad or its suburbs. Beyond the town 
of Saqlawiyah to the northwest, AQI enjoyed relative respite in the seam separating the 
coalition units in Fallujah from those in Ramadi.82 In these areas within striking distance 
of Fallujah, AQI and other insurgents gathered their strength and prepared for a confron-
tation with the coalition and the Iraqi security forces.
The ISF in Fallujah proved unreliable. In keeping with the MNF-I campaign plan, coa-
lition troops had focused on transition mission rather than operating against the insur-
gents. The Marine regimental combat team in Fallujah shifted responsibility for the city’s 
security to the 1st Iraqi Army Division and afterward maintained only 300 Marines within 
the city’s boundaries.83 As a result, the security picture was mixed. While recruitment 
and training woes hampered the Iraqi 1st Division’s effectiveness in keeping the city 
secure, the Fallujah police chief, Colonel Faisal Ismail Hussein, operated against AQI in 
tandem with the Awakening’s militia arm, the Thawar al-Anbar. The two groups had fair 
results, hauling in 282 suspected AQI fighters in February 2007 alone.84 Faisal, a former 
Republican Guard commando and one-time insurgent, formed the “special missions 
group,” which proved especially effective in the hunt for high-value targets, capturing 
former Ba’athist and prolific AQI financier Brigadier General Ali Dawud Sulayman Nayil 
al-Khalifawi in March. Khalifawi, prominent in coordinating the insurgency in Fallujah 
since 2004, continued to support the violence through his ties to the influential Sheikh 
Abdullah Janabi, whom he visited frequently in Syria.85 Faisal Hussein also struck cease-
fires with Jaysh Muhammad, Jaysh al-Islami, and 1920 Revolutionary Brigades opera-
tives in the city, which likely benefited local police but not U.S. troops.86
As for governance, Marine commanders were optimistic for Fallujah’s city council, 
one of the few functioning in Anbar. However, the situation in the city in early 2007 was 
more fragile than they realized.87 One week after Colonel Richard Simcock and RCT-6 
assumed responsibility for Fallujah in late January 2007, the city council secretary was 
assassinated—the same fate his predecessor had met 6 months earlier.88 The targeted 
killing led the council to adjourn for 1 month and, under the uninspired leadership of a 
corrupt mayor, the municipal government nearly collapsed.89
Tribal outreach in Fallujah had yielded far less than in Ramadi by early 2007. In an 
attempt to build a “tribal wall” around Fallujah and make the eastern tip of Anbar inhos-
pitable for AQI, deputy MNF-W Commander Major General John R. Allen traveled to 
Amman, Jordan, every 2 weeks to talk with prominent sheikhs in exile. He managed to 
extract a few promises to support police recruitment, but he initially failed to persuade 
many to return and rally their tribes. Sheikh Mishan al-Jumayli, for example, rejected a 
direct appeal from Allen in the spring, even though Jumayli had driven all night from 
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Damascus to meet with the Marine general in Amman. Even after assurances that the 
coalition would fortify his compound and train his personal security detail, the sheikh 
decided to wait, as did most others like him.90
The sheikhs of the Albu Issa proved the exception, and they provided an opening 
that eventually changed Fallujah dramatically. Courted by Allen’s predecessor, Sheikh 
Aifan Sadoun al-Issawi had a checkered history with the Americans. Mistakenly shot by 
U.S. troops in 2003, the sheikh later was imprisoned at Abu Ghraib for 9 months. How-
ever, as an early outspoken Anbari voice against AQI, he had taken part in the initial 
CJSOTF efforts to mobilize tribal auxiliaries in 2004-2005, and had been forced to flee 
with his family to Amman after a failed AQI assassination attempt against him. Follow-
ing an appeal by Sheikh Sattar, however, he returned and sought to extend the Awaken-
ing to Fallujah, a step that put him at odds not just with AQI, but with some members of 
his own tribe.91 In early February, the embattled Sheikh Aifan found himself defending 
his compound outside Fallujah with the help of Marines as he worked to organize an 
emergency response unit there, a complete turn from his earlier hostility to U.S. troops.92 
Later that month, Iraqi police and Sheikh Aifan’s armed Albu Issa fighters, supported 
by Marine artillery, fought a 2-day battle against 300 Sunni insurgents that resulted in at 
least 40 insurgents killed. A few weeks later, AQI struck back by launching chlorine-laden 
suicide car bombs against the Ameriyah Fallujah police station and nearby residence of 
Sheikh Aifan, just one of many attacks in 2007 in which AQI attempted to use chlorine 
gas as a chemical weapon.93 It was also just one of three assassination attempts against 
Sheikh Aifan that year, all of which he survived, only to be killed by a suicide bomber 
while serving in the Iraqi Parliament in January 2013.94 The war against AQI was costly 
for the Albu Issa, with the tribe losing scores of fighters. In one incident, AQI killed at 
least 40 Albu Issa tribesmen, dumping them in a mass grave.95
Sheikh Aifan’s turn against AQI coincided with and benefited from intensified coali-
tion security operations in the Fallujah area in the spring of 2007. With three Marine bat-
talions and two battalion-sized Army units, Simcock had more U.S. forces at his disposal 
than any of his predecessors in eastern Anbar.96 Violence inside Fallujah’s city limits was 
a problem, but at an average rate of less than two attacks per day during April, it was not 
out of control. Thus, the RCT commander focused first on the rural areas south of Fallu-
jah, conducting an operation to secure the route connecting the Ameriyah Fallujah police 
station to its logistical base near the city.97 The RCT then shifted its main effort to Zaidon 
and proceeded counterclockwise around Fallujah’s belts, moving north to Karmah and 
on to Saqlawiyah, where Simcock had the least developed tribal relationships.98 Ade-
quate U.S. troop levels, along with three Iraqi Army brigades and the establishment of 
two emergency response police units, enabled the RCT commander to maintain a per-
manent presence in these outlying areas, even as he turned to clearing Fallujah, where 
enemy sniper attacks and suicide car bombs were increasing.99 In late March, for exam-
ple, insurgents carried out a complex chlorine-augmented IED attack against Fallujah’s 
government center using two suicide truck bombs and two suicide vest bombers, as well 
as mortar and small-arms fire. Iraqi police disrupted the attack before it caused major 
damage, but the incident indicated AQI still had a potent presence in the city.100
As the Albu Issa tribe was fighting AQI near Ameriyah Fallujah, large portions of the 
Zobaie tribe joined the battle against AQI as well. As in the Albu Issa area, fighting in the 
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Zobaie tribal area of Zaidon took the form of an intra-tribal war with the 1920 Revolution-
ary Brigades fighters loyal to the Dhari house turning against members of al-Faris, a clan 
closely affiliated with AQI. While the struggle was in part due to Zobaie anger over AQI’s 
indiscriminate targeting of civilians as well as cultural differences like forced marriage, 
the rival clans’ main objective was a grab for power. Observing this Sunni-on-Sunni vio-
lence in early March, MNF-W interpreted it simply as insurgents targeting each other.101
The conflict began in earnest when squabbling over an inter-clan marriage gone badly 
and the unrelated murder of a sheikh’s son-in-law aggravated an already tense situa-
tion. Pressure mounted as related economic factors brought into question which family 
would control the potentially lucrative transportation corridor running from Fallujah to 
the outskirts of Baghdad.102 The internal Zobaie rivalry bled over into Baghdad, with the 
unsuccessful March 23, 2007, assassination attempt against Deputy Prime Minister Salam 
Zobaie reportedly carried out by a fellow Zobaie tribe member allied with AQI.103
The dispute between the two sides of the Zobaie tribe tipped into open war on March 
27, when AQI carried out a suicide attack against the home of Thahir al-Dhari, the most 
senior sheikh of the Zobaie tribe and the half-brother of Harith al-Dhari. The attack killed 
Sheikh Thahir’s son, a leader of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades.104 Angry tribesmen 
swelled the Revolutionary Brigades’ ranks and began fighting AQI in Zaidon. What fol-
lowed was effectively a switching of sides not only by the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, 
but by several other Sunni insurgent groups as well. By mid-May, elements of the 1920 
Revolutionary Brigades were negotiating with MNF-W about how best to achieve the 
common objective of expelling AQI from Anbar.105 Harith al-Dhari broke publicly with 
AQI, declaring that it had “gone too far” and that the central leadership in distant Paki-
stan did not “represent Iraqis.”106
Joining the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades in its public rupture with AQI was Jaish 
al-Islami, one of the largest Sunni insurgent groups in Iraq. Just days after the attack on 
Thahir al-Dhari, Jaish al-Islami announced its decision to “disunite” from AQI.107 The 
group’s spokesman, Ibrahim al-Shammari, told al-Jazeera News that the informal alliance 
between the two groups had frayed after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 
2006 because of AQI’s targeting of Jaish al-Islami operatives and its commitment to an 
expansive Islamic state. Indicators of this rift had come in February 2007, when former 
Iraqi Parliamentarian Mishan al-Jabouri, who fled the country in late 2005 after his indict-
ment for funneling government money to the insurgency, denounced AQI over the air-
waves of the Syrian-based television station he owned. The network typically churned 
out propaganda for insurgent groups like Jaish al-Islami, but Jabouri used it on this occa-
sion to lambast AQI’s campaign of suicide bombings against Shi’a neighborhoods and 
its cutthroat tactics to intimidate and control rival sheikhs and emirs. The terrorists had 
done little to make Sunnis in Iraq more secure, Jabouri charged.108
In early May, Jaish al-Islami, Jaysh Mujahideen, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, and 
a portion of Ansar al Sunna declared themselves members of a new Jihad and Reform 
Front united against AQI, a major blow to AQI’s support base in Anbar.109 The turn against 
AQI in the Fallujah area did not necessarily translate into active partnerships with coa-
lition forces, however. Harith al-Dhari, for example, remained staunchly opposed to the 
occupation from his perch in Jordan. Nonetheless, local realignments often meant fewer 
enemies for American troops at the tactical level. Engagement with former insurgents 
THE AWAKENING GATHERS MOMENTUM
159
could develop cease-fires into something more, as the Awakening and the fielding of 
emergency response units had proved. Along these lines, Jaish al-Islami’s break from 
AQI in spring 2007 would pave the way for the eventual expansion of the Awakening 
beyond Anbar to Abu Ghraib and the southern belts of Baghdad. Within Anbar, tribal 
rejection of extremist groups like AQI grew quickly in the late spring, taking firmer root 
in Ameriyah Fallujah and Zaidon and branching out toward Jumayli territory around 
Karmah to the north.110
As Fallujah’s hinterland turned increasingly hostile to AQI, RCT-6 and the Fallujah 
police launched operations in early June to clear the remaining insurgents from the city 
itself and put an end to large-scale AQI attacks. With the support of a Marine battal-
ion, police units and their coalition advisory teams erected concrete barriers and vehicle 
checkpoints before sequentially moving through each of the city’s 10 precincts, standing 
up neighborhood watch groups and gathering biometric data in support of ISF recruiting 
as they went.111 The cornering of terrorist cells in the city led to some sharp engagements. 
One U.S.-Iraqi patrol that discovered a car-bomb factory came under attack by AQI opera-
tives wearing suicide vests. After killing seven enemy fighters, the patrol dismantled two 
trucks carrying thousands of pounds in homemade explosives.112 Later in June, another 
combined patrol in the city discovered an insurgent cache containing over 25,000 gallons 
of nitric acid, enough to produce a large number of IEDs.113 These deliberate clearing 
operations by coalition and Iraqi units pushed AQI’s remnants out of the city and toward 
remote areas where they attempted to regroup. With Zaidon and Ameriyah Fallujah no 
longer hospitable to them, many insurgents headed toward the sparsely populated area 
north of Karmah, near Lake Tharthar. There they would seek to reestablish themselves, 
setting up a further round of fighting against coalition and Iraqi troops that would come 
in the summer.114
Cementing Security Gains in Anbar
The rapid improvement of the situation in Anbar created an unexpected decision 
point for Petraeus and Odierno. Petraeus had been reluctant to shift forces out of Anbar 
while the situation around Fallujah remained precarious, but the MNF-I commander 
could not ignore the option, given the province’s breathtaking turnaround. With major 
fighting underway in Diyala and Baghdad, he reported to Gates in late May that Odierno 
was drafting plans to transfer one Army battalion from Anbar to the southern belts.115 
That adjustment eventually would occur in midsummer when 3d Battalion, 509th Infan-
try Regiment (Airborne), left eastern Anbar and returned to its parent organization, Col-
onel Michael Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, south of Baghdad. Separately, 
Odierno entertained the possibility of moving Charlton’s BCT to Baghdad, but decided 
against this significant reallocation of combat units as long as AQI retained enough latent 
striking power to pose a threat in Anbar.116
By early July, Petraeus considered the military fight largely won in Ramadi and Fal-
lujah, judging both cities to be in the “consolidation phase,” and with fighting in the 
urban areas dropping off, the coalition commands moved into a period of cementing 
the security gains in the province.117 For MNF-W, the first aspect of this phase was pur-
suit operations using the additional troops that had come to Anbar as part of the surge. 
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Between the 13th MEU and 2 more rifle battalions, an additional 4,000 troops arrived in 
the province by summer 2007, enough manpower to “put us over top” in the words of 
Allen, MNF-W’s deputy commander.118 Across the province, north and east of Fallujah, 
south of Haditha, and north and east of Rutbah, the MEF dispatched troops to disrupt 
long-time AQI safe havens without having to leave the Euphrates River Valley popula-
tion centers vulnerable. The aim of this widespread pressure was to drive AQI fighters 
into deserted wadis where unmanned aerial vehicles could find them and indirect fire 
or airstrikes could target them with little risk of collateral damage, a process that would 
continue for months.119
Back in Anbar’s populated areas, MNF-W continued to enroll tribesmen in the secu-
rity forces and draw formerly hostile or neutral Anbaris into new alliances with U.S. 
troops. In Allen’s judgment, the coalition and the tribal Awakening had been mutually 
reinforcing. The Awakening had been the idea of the Ramadi tribal leaders, but it “could 
not have gotten off the ground if it hadn’t been supported by coalition forces,” he later 
told historians.120 Tribal leaders who were skeptical about Anbar’s provincial govern-
ment had resisted MNF-W’s entreaties to reconcile, Allen explained, noting that “As long 
as AQI was a nightmare in their lives every day if they appeared to be aligned with 
the government . . . then [tribal sheikhs] were on the fence.”121 To encourage reconcil-
iation, MNF-W’s strategy had been to empower the sheikhs, connect them to the local 
government, support them with indigenous security forces, and then provide “security 
top cover through constant conventional and special operations.”122 By early summer, 
this multi-pronged approach had paid off, as the tribes had come down on the coalition 
side of “the fence” and had raised eight emergency response units that changed the secu-
rity balance in Anbar.123 The rapid formation of these armed tribal levies had taken AQI 
by surprise, Allen observed, and the Marine general compared their appearance to the 
sudden “uncloaking of Klingon warships” in Star Trek.124
The resulting numbers were vast. By midsummer 2007, the combined strength of the 
police and emergency response units in Anbar Province exceeded 20,000. MNF-W aimed 
to solidify these gains through steps such as the establishment of a large police academy 
at Habbaniyah that eliminated the logistical and security burden of transporting local 
recruits to places like Mosul and Jordan.125 The addition of so many trained policemen in 
the province enabled the coalition and ISF to hold population centers far more effectively 
than in previous years, Allen judged. Clearing operations in the past had resembled a 
boat plying the water, he described, with insurgents returning to an area as the ship’s 
wake settled. However, the growth in police forces had changed this trend. “If you come 
rolling back into . . . town as al-Qaeda now,” Allen observed in late June 2007, “chances 
are you’re going to find yourself in somebody’s basement shackled to a pipe until we get 
around to your case.”126
As the Awakening grew and security in Anbar improved, MNF-W persisted in its 
effort to bridge the gap between the tribes and the much-despised provincial govern-
ment, with mixed results. As they had attempted to do in 2006, MNF-W tried to con-
nect Governor Mamoun and the provincial council in Ramadi with Anbar’s outlying 
municipalities and press provincial officials to be more responsive to local communities’ 
needs. Mamoun labored under a deficit of goodwill due to the provincial government’s 
long-standing ineffectiveness. To help placate indignant municipal leaders, MNF-W 
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requested an infusion of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) money 
from MNC-I to enhance the governor’s ability to deliver local reconstruction projects, and 
Odierno responded by approving an additional $50 million.127 MNF-W also frequently 
ferried the governor to Baghdad to establish connections with the ministries and favor-
ably facilitate the flow of Iraqi Government money and projects to the province.128 How-
ever, Mamoun and his provincial officials had not played a significant role in Anbar’s 
turnaround between September 2006 and summer 2007. The key Iraqi players instead 
had been the Anbari sheikhs—particularly local tribal leaders whom the coalition ini-
tially had not considered important. In Ramadi, western Anbar, and Fallujah, the turning 
of the tribes had come because of local dynamics and coalition outreach to local leaders 
rather than through negotiations with senior Anbari sheikhs in Jordan. The expatriate 
sheikhs had not led events, but as conditions in eastern Anbar changed, they followed 
them, joining their more junior tribal leaders who, in some cases, had already expelled 
AQI from their tribal territories. In early July, as Marine commanders had long wished 
him to do, Jumayli finally made his way back to Iraq after one of his sons was killed by 
an IED northwest of Fallujah. The presence of Mishal and others like him provided his 
tribesmen with the psychological lift for which the Marines had hoped, but not until the 
security situation had already turned.129
In mid-June, the Marines began holding meetings with senior sheikhs who had 
returned to Anbar after an absence of several years to join forces with Sattar and the 
Awakening.130 On June 25, an AQI suicide bomber attacked a number of these sheikhs 
and Awakening leaders who traveled to the Mansour Hotel in Baghdad for meetings 
with central government officials. The bomber killed 10 Iraqis, including former Anbar 
Governor Faisal al-Gaood and Tariq al-Assafi, Sattar’s security adviser and a leader of 
the Awakening in his own right.131 Though not present, Sattar himself had expected to 
attend and would have been present in the targeted party had he done so.132 Reflecting on 
the near miss, Allen summarized the fragility of the progress in Anbar: “You’re only one 
bomb blast away from the entire calculus changing.”133
THE AWAKENING IN THE BAGHDAD BELTS
Pacifying the “Triangle of Death”
The Awakening and its associated war within the Sunni tribes did not stop at Anbar’s 
borders. As though channeled by the Euphrates River and the highway system running 
toward the capital, the tribal movement seeped in early 2007 from MNF-W’s area of oper-
ations into the sector south of Baghdad dubbed the “Triangle of Death” due to its chronic 
violence and insurgent influence. AQI and its allies valued this area for its proximity to 
Baghdad and the access it offered Sunni fighters intent on launching attacks into the cap-
ital. The Triangle was an ideal insurgent sanctuary, with many areas difficult for coalition 
troops to reach. Thousands of small farms dotted a landscape that was crisscrossed by 
irrigation ditches and 20-foot wide canals, which restricted the movement of U.S. patrols 
to IED-strewn levee roads. This was the area in which Sunni militants in June 2006 had 
captured two Soldiers from 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, killing the captive 
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Americans at an abandoned Russian-built power plant in Yusufiyah that had become an 
insurgent headquarters for the area.134
The western edge of the Triangle of Death was Zobaie tribal land that extended into 
the areas of Anbar where the Dhari family turned against AQI in spring 2007. Just east of 
the Zobaie, though, the territories of the Janabi and Karghuli tribes remained particularly 
hostile to coalition troops and had served as insurgent support bases for several years. 
In demographic terms, the Triangle was roughly 70 percent Sunni, but with a large Shi’a 
minority clustered in population centers along Highway 8, the north-south road that fed 
into southwest Baghdad’s troubled Rashid District.135 These communities were torn by a 
sectarian struggle for control of the southern belts playing out in Mahmudiyah and Lutu-
fiyah, with Shi’a militias successfully shifting the demographics in those traditionally 
Sunni towns before expanding toward Yusufiyah 8 miles to the west.
Since September 2006, this area had been the responsibility of Colonel Michael M. Ker-
shaw’s 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, assigned to Multi-National Division-Bagh-
dad (MND-B) at the time. Kershaw and his troops found themselves facing a violent 
sector in which the 48th BCT of the Georgia National Guard and the 2d Brigade, 101st 
Airborne Division, had suffered heavy casualties in the previous year and a half. The 
brigade’s main effort was in the Mahmudiyah area, which in the Saddam Hussein era 
had been home to the Republican Guard’s Medina Division and the location of a major 
weapons facility—two factors that explained why the area had the ordnance and human 
capital to sustain a large-scale insurgency.136
Colonel Kershaw (right) and Colonel Rapp (left).  
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Colonel Michael Kershaw and Colonel William Rapp With Awakening Members in 
the Triangle of Death Area.137
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To tackle this troublesome insurgent sanctuary, Kershaw had adopted two approaches 
that were out of step with the MNF-I campaign plan of 2006. First, he had partnered 
his units with the large 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, embedding his field artil-
lery battalion directly in the brigade rather than simply relying on transition teams. He 
had worked closely with the Iraqi brigade commander, Brigadier General Ali Freiji, to 
develop a combined plan for the Triangle of Death. Freiji, a well-regarded nationalist 
Shi’a officer whom Minister of Defense Abdel Qader described to coalition officers as 
“the best officer in the Iraqi Army,” had a mix of Sunni and Shi’a officers and unusually 
did not shrink from carrying out operations against Sunni or Shi’a militants alike.138 Freiji 
had five battalions of Iraqi troops at his disposal, but few police with whom to partner 
because the insurgent-dominated area had resisted the establishment of police outposts.
Next, Kershaw had circumvented guidance from MNF-I and MNC-I to close patrol 
bases in his sector, choosing instead to deploy his companies forward into the area of 
operations, away from the brigade’s base at Camp Striker on the Victory Base com-
plex.139 “Push units as far forward as possible,” the brigade commander advocated in late 
November 2006, “operate decentralized; gain and maintain contact with the people.”140 
By the end of November, 11 of Kershaw’s 14 companies were living on forward outposts 
within the brigade’s sector.141 Establishing the outposts was not easy, and the BCT faced 
its toughest combat during its initial months as it implemented Kershaw’s approach. 
In its first 90 days in the Triangle of Death, the BCT lost 25 vehicles to roadside bombs, 
a trend that Kershaw intended to arrest by continuing to place his units forward in the 
sector and thereby reducing the distance the troops had to travel to operate. The forward 
presence would also allow for more frequent engagement with the population.142 The 
BCT also conducted frequent air assaults to compensate for the difficulty of moving by 
ground through the segmented terrain of irrigated farmland and canals.143
The area most lacking in coalition presence was an inhospitable 20-square-mile patch 
of ground along a stretch of the Euphrates River near Yusifiyah where Kershaw was 
determined to expand his brigade’s control.144 In its first operation to enter the area, the 
brigade encountered a blocking obstacle of 14 IEDs along a section of road 1½ miles in 
length, indicating that the enemy had prepared a deliberate defense to prevent the pene-
tration of its safe haven.145 In October, however, the brigade seized the nearby abandoned 
Yusifiyah power plant and converted the massive concrete structure from an AQI base 
into a U.S. patrol base. Once gaining access to the enemy safe haven, the brigade captured 
what amounted to an insurgent arms depot: Kershaw’s troops discovered 138 55-gallon 
drums of ammunition and other materiel buried along previously inaccessible canals 
within the Shakhariyah Triangle, some of them a mere 500 meters from coalition out-
posts. The discovery bolstered Kershaw’s arguments to his higher headquarters that the 
area needed more U.S. patrol bases, not fewer. Adding other hubs soon after in a gradu-
ally constricting web of positions, the brigade robbed the insurgents of a fortified staging 
area on the banks of the Euphrates and constricted their ability to maneuver freely.146
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Source: Photo courtesy of and by Major Adam Scher.
The Yusufiyah Power Plant.147
As the surge got underway in early 2007, Kershaw considered the new guidance he 
received from Petraeus and Odierno to push troops forward into populated areas as vali-
dation of a course on which he already had embarked.148 In April 2007, Kershaw’s brigade 
kept the same battle space but became part of the newly created MND-C area of opera-
tions. The arrival of Major General Rick Lynch’s 3d Infantry Division as MND-C lent unity 
of effort to the campaign in the southern belts and to the interdiction of accelerants to 
Baghdad’s sectarian violence, but the principal way that Kershaw pursued his mission—
namely by establishing security through forward presence—remained unchanged.149
AQI and its allies responded with a wave of attacks against the brigade’s new occu-
pied outposts and increased IEDs along the supply routes that linked its hub-and-spoke 
system of patrol bases.150 This insurgent counterattack culminated on May 12 with an 
abduction of U.S. Soldiers by Sunni fighters at almost exactly the location where U.S. 
Soldiers had been taken the previous year. In a predawn ambush, about a dozen enemy 
fighters surprised an American patrol watching over a section of road frequently planted 
with IEDs.151 The insurgents quickly overwhelmed the crews of the two High Mobil-
ity Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) there, killing four U.S. Soldiers and an 
Iraqi soldier during the assault. The attackers snatched three wounded Americans and 
dragged them east away from the river, disappearing before quick reaction forces from 
two nearby patrol bases could arrive.152 It would emerge later that a leader from the local 
Qarghuli tribe had organized the operation, but AQI claimed responsibility and declared 
the attack as another retaliation for the rape and murder of a Sunni teenage girl by Sol-
diers from the 101st Airborne Division in the same area more than a year earlier.153
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The coalition response to the abduction of Kershaw’s three Soldiers was swift and 
intense. The BCT isolated the area and controlled access to the Euphrates River bridges. 
Kershaw’s battalions began a nonstop series of operations to collect intelligence in sup-
port of the search. Within 3 days, the brigade launched 12 air assaults, made possible by 
the provision of additional UH-60 helicopters. Two Stryker companies from Baghdad 
also joined the search. These forces ramped up the hunt for insurgent leaders on their 
target lists, conducting multiple raids each night, and maintaining an exhausting pace for 
6 weeks.154 Colonel Michael X. Garrett, commander of 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 
to the south, joined the effort by temporarily pushing troops into the northwestern tip of 
his sector along an often-neglected tactical seam where he shared a unit boundary with 
Kershaw on the Euphrates River.155 Meanwhile, Kershaw’s troops descended on Qar-
ghuli village, where a sullen population maintained close ties with AQI. They questioned 
every military-aged male and acquired biometric data—including fingerprints and other 
identifying characteristics—on more than 800 people. Similar sweeps occurred elsewhere 
in the area.156
A week after the attack, the BCT had amassed numerous tips from locals, including 
the tribal elders of Qarghuli village, but neither these nor other intelligence reports could 
definitively answer questions about the captives’ physical condition or location. On May 
23, Iraqi police discovered the body of one of the Americans captured on May 12 drift-
ing in the Euphrates River more than 10 miles downstream from the ambush site. The 
search continued into June as hopes of finding the other two of Kershaw’s missing Sol-
diers alive faded, with a series of brutal battles occurring as a byproduct of the increased 
operational tempo. While attempting to detain and search an insurgent on June 1, Staff 
Sergeant Travis W. Atkins from 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, became involved 
in hand-to-hand combat. Noticing the insurgent was about to detonate a suicide vest, 
Atkins threw himself on his opponent, shielding the other members of his patrol from the 
blast. For his selfless actions, Atkins was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Ser-
vice Cross.157 On June 10, U.S. Soldiers at the scene of a firefight 75 miles away in Samarra 
recovered personal items belonging to the missing men. Given the expected seriousness 
of their wounds, it was determined unlikely that the two could have survived a trip that 
far north.158 Their remains finally were found more than a year later near Jurf as-Sakhr 
after a man detained by U.S. special operations forces claimed to have knowledge of the 
burial place.159
Although the search for the missing American Soldiers ended tragically, the oper-
ations during the weeks following the Soldiers’ May 12 abduction led to dramatic and 
unexpected changes in the Triangle of Death. The intensity of the coalition’s response 
shocked local Sunni leaders and local insurgent groups, who had witnessed a much 
milder coalition reaction when insurgents abducted and killed U.S. Soldiers from the 
same spot a year before.160 The 6 weeks of pressure against insurgents in the Mahmudi-
yah District had come just as a violent battle among Sunnis in the area peaked. For nearly 
a year, tensions between AQI and some local tribal groups had worsened as the terrorist 
group had murdered and intimidated Sunni opponents and encroached on economic 
activities that were some tribes’ livelihoods. As tribes in eastern Anbar had taken up 
arms against AQI in early 2007, some tribal groups in the Triangle of Death had begun 
to do the same.161 Two of Kershaw’s battalions had a front-row seat to this “war within 
a war,” as one commander called it.162 Down the western slice of the BCT sector, where 
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the Zaidon and Radwaniyah areas straddled the unit boundary with the Marines south 
of Highway 1, the coalition had little to no military presence. Focused on eliminating the 
AQI sanctuary in his area of operation (AO) and on helping the Iraqi Army stabilize Mah-
mudiyah, Kershaw lacked the forces to venture often into Radwaniyah, let alone enough 
to muster the combat power to stay. Nonetheless, as early as January 2007, U.S. Soldiers 
observed from their patrol bases the sights and sounds of frequent nighttime skirmishes 
as AQI and the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades seemed to be fighting.163
Throughout the spring, locals began to provide tips to Kershaw’s unit and formed 
neighborhood watch groups in some villages. Kershaw’s cavalry squadron commander, 
who had made inroads with the Khartani tribe on the southern outskirts of Baghdad, 
conferred with the Marine battalion to his west in Anbar and arranged to meet a leading 
Zobaie sheikh whose tribal area stretched across division boundaries. The tribe’s leader-
ship, he reported to Kershaw afterward, appeared interested in contributing by providing 
tribal auxiliaries.164 The brigade commander sensed that this was a positive development 
but remained circumspect. The Iraqi Army still had to be persuaded.165
This approach toward accommodation with formerly hostile or ambivalent tribes 
accelerated in June. The swarming of U.S. troops in and around the search area after 
the May 12 abduction, coupled with the spike in raids against insurgent leaders, had an 
intimidating yet somewhat liberating effect on the population. Special operations forces 
working closely with Kershaw lent their lethal precision to the fight and, by removing a 
few key AQI operatives from the battlefield, opened the door to better intelligence-gather-
ing as more civilians came forward with information on the enemy.166 On June 10, Amer-
ican guards stopped a dump truck laden with 14,000 pounds of explosives as it careened 
down the market-lined main road of Sadr al-Yusifiyah toward the gate of a patrol base.167 
To local sheikhs caught in the middle but favoring more tight-knit security arrangements 
with Kershaw’s troops, the failed suicide truck bomb attack offered the latest evidence 
that AQI constituted a threat while the Americans did not.168
Sensing that the Americans might be willing to help in their intra-Sunni battle with 
AQI, local tribal fighters in Kershaw’s sector decided to solicit coalition assistance and 
thus gain some respite in a multi-front war. In mid-June, armed men waving a makeshift 
flag of truce approached a U.S. patrol in the west of the brigade’s sector.169 This encoun-
ter led to a meeting a few days later between two U.S. battalion commanders and one 
of the group’s leaders, a soft-spoken but charismatic man whom U.S. officers described 
as having a “dastardly” air about him.170 Intrigued by the man’s proposal to join forces 
against AQI, the U.S. commanders tentatively agreed because they found little to lose 
from the venture. One gave the insurgent leader a cell phone and a by-name list of the 
high-value targets his battalion was hunting. In a week’s time, the man reported kill-
ing two on the list. As proof, the brutal demise of one had been captured on cell-phone 
video. A third had been brought in alive for the Americans to arrest and interrogate. Told 
about the outcome of this second meeting, Kershaw instructed his subordinates to exploit 
what seemed to be a promising development but to proceed cautiously.171 For the BCT 
commander, this was uncharted territory, but the killing and capturing of elusive AQI 
operatives justified the associated risks in his mind.172 Within 3 weeks, the armed tribes-
men delivered an enemy fighter for whom 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had been 
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searching since September: the infamous Abu Rus, the insurgent who had abducted, tor-
tured, and killed two 101st Airborne Division Soldiers in 2006.173
The man behind these meetings was Karim Ismail Hussein, a Zobaie tribesman also 
known as Abu Maruf who was, almost incredibly, the brother of Colonel Faisal Ismail 
Hussein, the insurgent-linked Fallujah police chief. Abu Maruf’s own shifting allegiances 
embodied the complexity of the intra-Sunni struggle, as well as the murky origins of the 
Awakening beyond Anbar. Although he described himself as “an independent,” MNF-W 
in mid-2006 had characterized him as a Zaidon-based AQI leader, and at one time, he 
had kidnapped two senior members of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades in order to derail 
that organization’s cease-fire talks with the coalition. By the time Jaish al-Islami and the 
1920 Revolutionary Brigades declared themselves against AQI in May 2007, Abu Maruf 
himself had defected and joined “the 1920,” but al-Qaeda retaliated by slitting the throat 
of his brother Ahmed.174 As the battle for control in Fallujah swirled into outlying areas 
like Zaidon, opportunists like Abu Maruf saw a chance to expand the Awakening across 
the provincial border and gain some relief in their simultaneous struggle against Sunni 
extremists, the coalition, the Iraqi security forces, and Iranian-backed Shi’a militias.175
 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Kerensa Hardy (Released).
Lieutenant Colonel Brian Coppersmith Talks to Abu Maruf, an Awakening Leader in 
South Baghdad.176
Kershaw, for his part, welcomed cooperation with Abu Maruf and the tribesmen he 
led, but this agreement with local insurgents, though the most dramatic in the colonel’s 
sector, was just one of several initiatives there. In Sadr Yusifiyah, a sheikh belonging to 
the Albu Issa tribe had broached the subject of an armed neighborhood watch group with 
the U.S. company commander running the nearby patrol base. In another case, the care-
fully coordinated release of a sheikh’s detained son bought enough goodwill to entice 
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local elements of the previously pro-insurgent Khartani tribe into Kershaw’s fold.177 The 
collective impact of these cooperative security arrangements would be decisive in the 
Mahmudiyah District, though at the brigade level they appeared disparate and frag-
mented, slowly gaining traction as battalions built relationships and proceeded through 
trial and error.178 Kershaw also noted that reconciliation with erstwhile enemies actually 
simplified very little. “We are working with a multitude of competing tribes who will 
consistently seek to gain advantages against the other, and who will lie, cheat, and steal 
to get a piece of the action that is emerging,” he advised subordinates in the summer 
of 2007. “We are on the cusp of putting these people squarely in our court,” Kershaw 
pressed, “Stay after it.”179
The final element of Kershaw’s approach was to broker peace between the local Sunni 
fighters and the Iraqi security forces, especially Freiji’s Iraqi Army brigade, which had 
taken heavy casualties against these same insurgents. Once he was satisfied that working 
with the Sunni locals was a viable approach, Kershaw turned his attention to persuad-
ing Freiji and Iraqi 6th Division Commander Major General Abdul Ameer al-Lami of its 
merits. Freiji was difficult to convince, at one point angrily calling one of Kershaw’s battal-
ion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Mark Suich, a “traitor” for making deals with local 
insurgents. To involve Freiji closely in the Sunni volunteer initiative, Kershaw assigned 
his field artillery battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Morschauser, to spend 
most of his time with the Iraqi commander, while Kershaw himself met with Freiji sev-
eral times a week. As the months passed and Freiji grew more comfortable with the local 
“volunteers” and with the coalition and ISF oversight of them, he eventually became an 
advocate for the arrangement in appearances before Iraqi Government committees in 
Baghdad, with Kershaw accompanying him to those meetings.180
Colonel Kershaw (second from left) with Colonel Ali Freiji (center).  
Source: DoD photo by 2d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division Public Affairs (Released).
Colonel Michael Kershaw, Commander of the 2d BCT, 10th Mountain Division, 
Walks With Colonel Ali Freiji, Commander of the 4th Brigade, 6th Iraqi  
Army Division, in the Mahmudiyah Marketplace.181
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By the time of its departure from Iraq during November 2007, 2d Brigade, 10th Moun-
tain Division, had 8,800 local Iraqi tribesmen incorporated into day-to-day security oper-
ations in the brigade’s sector, usually paid under security contracts funded by CERP, with 
Petraeus’s and Odierno’s blessing.182 This Sunni tribal cooperation with Kershaw’s troops 
and Freiji’s Iraqi Army brigade resulted in a staggering reduction of violence in what had 
been a solid insurgent stronghold. Kershaw’s agreement with tribal irregulars led to the 
apprehension of 85 insurgents on the brigade’s target lists.183 Where tribal fighters began 
to cooperate in security operations, IED attacks on Kershaw’s troops plunged to nearly 
zero, while successful raids against AQI operatives skyrocketed. In an area that had seen 
only a thin security presence in 2006, Kershaw found himself in control of almost 20,000 
counterinsurgents, including his 3,300 U.S. troops, Ali Freiji’s 5,500-strong Iraqi brigade, 
1,500 Iraqi police, and the 8,800 local Awakening members—the equivalent of more than 
a division’s worth of ground troops.184 After July 2007, the brigade did not suffer another 
combat death.185
The Triangle of Death had experienced a total turnaround. Asked in fall 2007 what 
percentage of the tribal irregulars in his area had been insurgents, Kershaw paused for a 
moment and replied, “Probably all of them.”186
The Awakening in Babil Province
South and east of Kershaw, Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, experienced 
similar summertime breakthroughs with the tribes across the BCT’s enormous sector of 
Karbala, Najaf, and Babil Provinces. The brigade’s area, which had long been an economy 
of force effort for MND-B, was strained by diverse threats at opposite ends of the battle 
space. In its Shi’a-majority population centers, Shi’a militias such as the Badr Corps and 
JAM vied for control, occasionally violently. The January battle against the Soldiers of 
Heaven had occurred in Garrett’s sector, as had the AAH raid against U.S. police advis-
ers in Karbala the previous week. These events had pulled the brigade’s attention to the 
south. In the rural areas along the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, however, Sunni militants 
held sway, drawing the brigade’s attention north.187 With one of its three maneuver bat-
talions detached to reinforce the Marines northeast of Fallujah, the brigade struggled to 
control its portion of the southern belts and was forced to focus on the northern half of 
Babil Province while Iraqi forces assumed responsibility for the rest.188 Like Kershaw, 
Garrett maintained a generally favorable view of the Iraqi Army units with which he 
worked, but could expect little from the police, though Babil police chief Major General 
Qais Hamaz al-Mamouri proved both popular and dependable. The relative strength 
of the 8th Iraqi Army Division, under the command of the highly regarded Major Gen-
eral Othman Ali Farhood al-Ghanimi, did not necessarily translate into a lighter burden 
for Garrett.189 He still carried the responsibility of supplying and overseeing the military 
transition teams stationed at the southern reaches of the expansive territory under his 
purview in Karbala, Hillah, and even Diwaniyah, although Diwaniyah technically lay 
inside the Polish-led MND-CS area of operations.190
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Colonel Garrett (left) and Brigadier General Sadiq Jafar Ali (right).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st Class Steven Childers (Released).
Colonel Michael Garrett, Commander of the 4th BCT (Airborne), 25th Infantry Divi-
sion, and Brigadier General Sadiq Jafar Ali, Commander of the Diwaniya Provincial 
Iraqi Police.191
In the north, closer to Baghdad, Garrett parceled out his available forces to manage 
the risk of the vast sector. Jurf as-Sakhr, an insurgent hotbed on the Euphrates and a 
stronghold of the Janabi tribe, was, according to the BCT commander, a “nasty little 
place” where “every day was a movement to contact.”192 Without adequate U.S. or Iraqi 
forces to occupy it, the town remained an enemy safe haven. To the north and east, Lieu-
tenant Colonel Mark Odom’s cavalry squadron faced a similar situation in the Arab 
Jabour region along the Tigris. Headquartered on the southern edge of the capital and 
somewhat disconnected from Garrett’s other battalions, the squadron encountered dif-
ficulty expanding its forward presence because of its own limited size and a shortage 
of capable Iraqi forces.193 One of Odom’s patrol bases astride a prime infiltration route 
4 miles outside Baghdad came under attack almost daily. On April 12, AQI struck the 
company-sized outpost with a truck bomb loaded with 600 pounds of homemade explo-
sives, killing four U.S. Soldiers and wounding nine.194 Reporting on the attack, Petraeus 
highlighted the “frontline nature” of such bases, stating that a strategy featuring a “visi-
ble, constant presence” was “not without risk.”195 Still, even the right approach required 
sufficient resources. Without mutually supporting positions and enough U.S. and Iraqi 
troops to patrol their surroundings, forward bases were exposed and, at times, besieged. 
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The cavalry squadron abandoned the vulnerable patrol base in mid-June in conjunction 
with a realignment of battle space as the final surge brigade arrived.196
Although Garrett’s thinly stretched brigade struggled with its vast battle space, 
tribal security initiatives accelerated through the spring and began to succeed as Sunni 
sheikhs who had been fighting a losing battle against both Shi’a enemies and Sunni ter-
rorists approached coalition commanders to offer their cooperation. In early February 
2007, Emad Mohammed Talel, a sheikh of the Khartani tribe, met with American lead-
ers at Garrett’s headquarters at forward operating base Kalsu in Iskandariyah and pro-
posed raising a force of 5,000 Sunni irregulars to fight AQI and drive JAM from the area. 
Focused at the time on propping up formal governance and the Iraqi security forces, the 
brigade discounted his offer as outlandish and risky, not least because Sheikh Emad was 
reputed to be an AQI leader himself and was known to have carried out attacks on the 
Iraqi police.197 However, as other tribal groups continued to approach Garrett’s troops 
to ask for security assistance in exchange for information on insurgent activity, the bri-
gade’s judgement changed.198 Sheikh Emad went on to organize the North Babil Tribal 
Council, which convened with much fanfare at a May 15 ceremony hosted by Garrett 
in which council members pledged to support the Iraqi Government, oppose sectarian 
behavior, and stop intertribal violence.199 The raising of a tribal security force followed 
quickly afterward.
Garrett and his brigade threw their weight behind this tribal initiative in part because 
U.S. leaders had become disillusioned with the abysmal performance of the local Iraqi 
Government. After several months of frustration, commanders in Garrett’s area finally 
concluded that the official bureaucracy was akin to a sponge, “soaking up assets with no 
appreciable movement.”200 Finding that such entities “just seemed to swell and ask for 
more” without benefiting the people, the brigade sought to promote good governance 
through less formal venues.201 U.S. Army units elsewhere had arrived at a similar conclu-
sion.202 So, too, had Petraeus, who had begun to hope that the Sunni movement mobiliz-
ing against AQI might lead to the emergence of a more effective alternative to the Iraqi 
Islamic Party.203
The kind of expansion Petraeus envisioned was not far from what the Sunni sheikhs 
and former insurgent leaders of the Baghdad belts had in mind. As they watched the 
Zobaie tribe benefit from new security agreements with coalition troops in Anbar and the 
Triangle of Death, sheikhs from the Dulaimi and Janabi tribes farther down the Euphra-
tes River sought to replicate the Zobaie tribe’s accommodation with local coalition forces. 
Emboldened by Sattar’s success in Anbar and sensing their own opportunity, these one-
time supporters of the Sunni insurgency turned on AQI rather suddenly. Once the scales 
tipped—often over the course of tribal infighting—factions choosing not to reconcile with 
the coalition were betrayed and rooted out quickly.204 In Jurf as-Sakhr and across the 
southern swath of Garrett’s sector, U.S. forces and tribal leaders soon recruited more than 
1,400 irregulars, including Shi’a farmers who signed on to combat the unwelcome militia 
influence.205 To the north, in Hawr Rajab on the outskirts of Baghdad, Sheikh Ali Majid 
al-Dulaimi cut his ties with the insurgency after AQI murdered his father, abducted his 
cousin, and burned down his house.206 With coalition support, he would mobilize nearly 
200 tribal fighters to secure the town by mid-fall 2007.207
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Across MND-C’s area of operations, agreements like these between sheikhs and 
former Sunni insurgent leaders on one side and U.S. commanders on the other eventu-
ally would generate a massive indigenous force of tens of thousands of Sunni fighters. 
Most were eventually paid as security contractors, costing the coalition an average of 
$8 per fighter per day—a price that coalition commanders considered a bargain for the 
improved security it helped to buy.208
THE AWAKENING REACHES BAGHDAD
The Insurgents of Baghdad
The Awakening movement that began in Anbar and spread to the regions south of 
Baghdad had a profound impact on the various insurgent groups and leaders operating 
in the Iraqi capital. By early 2007, the Sunni insurgency in the city and its close suburbs 
had settled into distinct areas where Baghdadis and Iraqi military commanders recog-
nized what groups tended to dominate, and often recognized which insurgent com-
manders dominated certain neighborhoods. In addition to the presence of AQI in the 
city and its environs, Iraqi military commanders saw the insurgent enemy organized in 
seven main geographical areas. East of the Tigris River in Adhamiyah, a contingent of 
Jaish al-Islami operated under the command of Sheikh Wathiq al-Ubaidi, a Sunni cleric. 
Also in Adhamiyah, a group of former Iraqi military officers constituted another insur-
gent network, calling itself the “Free Officers.” Iraqi military officials believed the Free 
Officers were linked to the Iraqi Islamic Party, Iraqi Vice President Tariq Hashimi, and 
Hashimi’s assassinated brother, General Amer Hashimi. Meanwhile, in the farming areas 
just beyond Adhamiyah, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades maintained a presence. These 
three groups were engaged in a violent struggle with the adjacent Shi’a-majority areas of 
Sadr City, Sha’ab, and Ur. Also east of the Tigris, a group of local Sunni insurgents domi-
nated the Fadhel neighborhood under the command of Adel al-Mashadani, a community 
strongman whose fighters had purged Fadhel of its minority Shi’a population by early 
2007.209
West of the Tigris, a contingent of the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades operated in the 
Hayy al Adel neighborhood under the command of the sons of senior Iraqi Parliamen-
tarian Adnan Dulaimi, himself a former leader of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood and one 
of the leaders of the Sunni Parliamentary bloc. To the south of the Dulaimis’ turf, AQI 
maintained a stronghold in the large Dora neighborhood. To the west, just outside the 
walls of Camp Victory, a Jaish al-Islami contingent operated in the Ameriyah area under 
commanders associated with Ameriyah’s Firdas Mosque.210
On the city’s outskirts, major insurgent bases were found in Abu Ghraib and in the 
Taji area. In Taji and Tarmiyah, in addition to Abu Ghazwan’s AQI network, a potent 
insurgent organization operated under Sunni cleric Sheikh Ahmed al-Dabash. Dabash 
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and his family originally were based in the Shi’a-majority neighborhood of Hurriyah, but 
when Shi’a militias expelled Sunnis from Hurriyah in the early days of the war, he had 
relocated to the area near Taji and Tarmiyah and organized his insurgent force under 
the auspices of both the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and Jaish al-Islami. Dabash had 
dispatched fighters and terrorists into west Baghdad to attack the Shi’a population there, 
especially in his old neighborhood of Hurriyah. Over time, Dabash would pledge his 
allegiance to al-Qaeda and become a senior AQI commander.211
Finally, in Abu Ghraib three major insurgent groups all had a large following. The 
1920 Revolutionary Brigades had a sizable organization there under the command of the 
family of Harith al-Dhari in nearby Zaidon. AQI had a strong presence as well, under the 
command of a former Iraqi Army officer named Lieutenant Colonel Mohammed, who 
had been an Iraqi staff college graduate before 2003. Mohammed was captured and held 
in Camp Cropper in 2006, but his network survived. Finally, Jaish al-Islami had a large 
contingent under the command of Abu Azzam, who served as Jaish al-Islami’s security 
chief for Anbar Province.212
This Iraqi understanding of the geography and leaders of the Sunni insurgency was 
often more nuanced than the coalition’s appreciation of the enemy situation, which 
tended to focus on the more shadowy, cell-like al-Qaeda in Iraq networks such as the 
Rusafa car-bomb ring headed by AQI commander Abu Nur. The AQI cells in Baghdad 
tended to preserve their anonymity, but other insurgent groups were often well known 
to Baghdadis. It was among these more prominent non-AQI groups that the Awakening 
would have the greatest impact, as one insurgent commander after another would face a 
choice between submission to AQI or accommodation with the coalition.
Breakthrough at Abu Ghraib
As the Awakening spread from eastern Anbar into the region south of Baghdad, it 
also spread to the western outskirts of the capital city. The town of Abu Ghraib, the west-
ern gateway into Baghdad, had been a stronghold of the insurgent group Jaish al-Islami 
for 3 years, but in late 2006, the group’s local leader Abu Azzam faced a crisis. He had 
watched his organization dwindle in relation to AQI, and with Jaish al-Islami’s national 
leadership shifting its emphasis to other parts of Iraq, the cells under Abu Azzam’s direc-
tion found it difficult to find funding and retain their independence in AQI’s shadow. In 
an insurgency characterized by rapidly shifting alliances and easy individual migration 
from one group to another, the threat of mass defections to AQI loomed. Meanwhile, 
Jaish al-Islami ranks thinned as continuous coalition operations took their toll, and the 
growth of the Awakening took more potential recruits off the board, making combat 
losses harder to replace. Like other Sunni insurgent groups in the Baghdad belts, the 
Abu Ghraib insurgents also found themselves increasingly pressured by the Iraqi Gov-
ernment forces and by Shi’a militias, and the idea of a truce with one of their multiple 
enemies made increasing sense over time.
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Unlike Jaysh al-Islami’s national leaders, Abu Azzam favored a cease-fire with the 
coalition in order to improve Jaish al-Islami’s position vis-à-vis the Sunni extremists 
operating in Anbar and, ultimately, as a hedge against Shi’a militias. The insurgent leader 
met with Iraqi Vice President Hashimi to discuss the terms of a cease-fire several times in 
late October and shared the idea with other resistance groups, but senior Jaysh al-Islami 
leader Mahmud Janabi disapproved. Abu Azzam shared his cease-fire idea with other 
insurgent groups as well, but Ansar al Sunna, for its part, stood opposed to a truce with 
“unbelievers” on ideological grounds. When AQI began moving against Abu Azzam and 
his last remaining fighters in December 2006, he turned to Baghdad and the coalition for 
help.213 He found a receptive audience at MNF-I, where Abu Azzam appeared to Lamb to 
be one of those Sunni leaders who “saw the writing on the wall” and realized the Sunni 
insurgents could not carry on a four-way war against the coalition, the ISF, the Shi’a mili-
tias, and AQI all at once.214
The local U.S. commander in Abu Ghraib had come to the same conclusion. Arriving 
in town in November 2006 at the head of 2d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Regiment, Lieutenant 
Colonel Kurt J. Pinkerton had heard about tentative talks with local insurgents and hoped 
to use this connection to reduce violence in the restive town.215 Assigned to Colonel Paul 
E. Funk’s 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Pinkerton’s squadron shared the two standing 
tasks of its parent unit: maintaining freedom of movement on the supply routes running 
out of the city and protecting the flank of MND-B as it secured the population in Bagh-
dad’s neighborhoods. Occupying the upper-left quadrant of the belts, Funk’s BCT sat 
astride a major line of communications traversing Tarmiyah and Taji to connect Baqubah 
with the insurgent stronghold above Fallujah near Lake Tharthar. Its boundaries aligned 
roughly with the territory of Abu Ghazwan, the al-Qaeda emir whose activity effectively 
linked Baghdad to foreign fighter facilitation networks in the north.216 Significant in its 
own right, Pinkerton’s sector on the brigade’s southern edge was the gateway to the cap-
ital. The squadron’s sector included the area where insurgents had destroyed a coalition 
supply convoy and abducted and killed Army Specialist Keith M. Maupin during the 
April 2004 uprisings. The local insurgents Pinkerton would engage were likely those who 
had carried out the attack, and perhaps Abu Azzam among them.
Nonetheless, in the interest of exploring any local engagement that might prevent 
attacks on his troops, the squadron commander attended a meeting arranged by Lamb’s 
reconciliation cell in late 2006 and began working with Abu Azzam. The Jaish al-Islami 
security chief told Pinkerton that his fighters could clamp down on AQI operations in 
and around Abu Ghraib, piquing the colonel’s interest but not alleviating his suspicion.217 
Pinkerton approached the relationship cautiously, “building the bridge as he walked 
across it,” as one colleague termed it.218 In the first months of 2007, Abu Azzam’s men 
helped U.S. troops mainly by providing intelligence tips, but under pressure from AQI 
and the local Iraqi Army unit, the Jaish al-Islami leader desired to put the agreement with 
the Americans on a firmer footing. As the Ramadi tribes had done, Abu Azzam eventu-
ally hoped to have his men recognized as their area’s official security forces and put on 
the Iraqi Government payroll, an idea Pinkerton endorsed.219
This vision put Pinkerton squarely at odds with Brigadier General Nasser Ghanam, 
commander of the 3d Brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, known as the Muthanna Brigade. 
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Lieutenant Colonel Pinkerton (left) Abu Azzam (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Specialist Shea Butler (Released).
Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Pinkerton Meets With Awakening Leader Abu Azzam.220
Although Ghanam presented himself as a profes-
sional, the general reportedly maintained ties with 
both Shi’a militia leaders and AQI, periodically releas-
ing prisoners or returning confiscated equipment in 
exchange for bribes. When Pinkerton approached 
Ghanam about the budding accommodation with 
Abu Azzam, the Iraqi commander feigned support—
even after receiving instructions from Baghdad 
to keep his distance. Soon, the Muthanna Brigade 
began raiding sites where Pinkerton held meetings 
with former insurgents; however, the U.S. colonel 
saw through the charade and shifted his meetings to 
places outside the Muthanna Brigade’s sector.221
Despite the Iraqi commander’s attempts to sab-
otage the effort, by April 2007, the engagements 
between U.S. forces and Abu Azzam had reached 
the point of mobilizing another large emergency 
response unit of Sunni fighters opposed to AQI and 
friendly to the coalition. On April 23, Pinkerton 
drove to a rural schoolhouse to meet again with Abu 
Azzam, who had pledged to raise a substantial force 
to assist with security in Abu Ghraib. The view that 
Source: U.S. Army photo by United 
States Forces-Iraq.
Staff Brigadier General Nasser 
Ghanam.222
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greeted the U.S. commander when he arrived astonished him. As promised, a few thou-
sand Iraqi men—most from the Zobaie tribe—had gathered to enroll in provisional units 
forming under Abu Azzam. Present at the gathering to help organize the throng of vol-
unteers was Abu Maruf, the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades commander from Zaidon who 
would soon after strike a cooperative agreement with Kershaw in the Triangle of Death. 
Abu Maruf’s active participation illustrated the interconnected nature of local insurgent 
groups as they tentatively cast their lot with the coalition in a broader communal strug-
gle for power. It also highlighted the often-neglected agility that tribal ties afforded the 
insurgency. The fact that Abu Maruf happened to be on Pinkerton’s high-value target list 
suggested something about the complex negotiations that lay ahead as bottom-up recon-
ciliation went mainstream.223
At MNC-I, Odierno considered the watershed event of that day and saw it as a chance 
to shut down AQI in Abu Ghraib and “close the gate to the west.” However, Odierno 
and other coalition leaders were alarmed when it appeared that the fleeing opportunity 
in Abu Ghraib might soon be lost.224 In the week after Abu Azzam’s recruiting drive, the 
Muthanna Brigade had gone looking for trouble at the site of the gathering and wound 
up inciting a mob that threatened to overwhelm an isolated Iraqi Army platoon. Called 
to the scene, Pinkerton restored order and rescued the platoon by requesting coalition 
fighter aircraft to buzz the crowd as a show of force. The squadron commander was in the 
middle of a dispute that would quickly escalate to a major point of contention between 
U.S. forces and the Maliki government.
Like Odierno, Petraeus was struck by the decline in attacks around Abu Ghraib fol-
lowing the organization of local opposition to AQI and grasped both the potential and 
urgency of the initiative. On May 12, he reported to Gates that the coalition had “a fairly 
tight window of opportunity to permanently drive a wedge between Sunnis and AQI.”225 
He also noted the challenge of persuading Maliki that the U.S. military’s relationship with 
Abu Azzam supported the fielding of a provisional police force, not the arming of a Sunni 
militia that would be a threat to the Iraqi Government.226 For his part, the Prime Minister 
saw little difference between the two. In his view, Abu Azzam was “tricky as a fox” and 
“a chameleon who changed his color” to suit the circumstances.227 Paranoid when it came 
to anything tinged with the possibility of Ba’athist resurgence, Maliki viewed the devel-
opments on Baghdad’s doorstep with “considerable angst,” as Petraeus put it.228
This difference in attitudes between the Iraqi leader and the coalition commanders 
meant that Maliki was not inclined to rein in Nasser and his troops in Abu Ghraib, where 
the Muthanna Brigade’s aggressiveness toward Abu Azzam’s men, and Sunnis in general, 
jeopardized the fragile accommodation the coalition had forged with insurgent leaders. 
By mid-May, Abu Azzam and other local Sunni leaders demanded Nasser’s reassignment 
or the removal of his brigade. Elevated to higher echelons, the issue became a matter of 
priority to MND-B as Odierno’s frustration spiked.229 The engagement, an important test 
case for the Anbar Awakening’s expansion, was “ready to fall apart,” Odierno believed.230 
The enmity between Nasser’s Muthanna Brigade and Sunni resistance groups at the local 
level pointed to a more serious obstacle. On June 2, Petraeus offered Gates a rundown of 
how the Prime Minister and his co-sectarians likely viewed the matter.
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If we were to ask the Maliki government if they support Sunni tribal engagement and reconciliation, 
they would answer “yes.” In Sunni provinces like Anbar and Salah ad Din, they would likely mean 
“yes.” Closer to Baghdad, they might say “yes,” but would act to slow roll any movement. In 
places like Diyala, they might say “yes,” but would be very unsure of how to proceed. The appetite 
of the Shi’a leadership for Sunni tribal engagement lessens significantly as the issue gets closer to 
Shi’a towns and neighborhoods.231
In retrospect, it also might have been the case in Abu Ghraib that Maliki was not 
simply declining to rein in an obstructive Iraqi commander, but was directing the com-
mander’s actions. In later years, the coalition would find that Nasser and Maliki had close 
personal ties that potentially meant Nasser was acting on Maliki’s instructions. As the 
coalition looked to expand the Awakening geographically and to solidify the resulting 
security gains by integrating Sunni tribesmen into the Iraqi Army and police, the central 
government’s hostility to the idea would prove increasingly problematic.
The Awakening Inside the Capital City
In Baghdad, as in Anbar and Abu Ghraib, the Awakening expanded in the wake 
of crisis. By 2007, Sunnis in west Baghdad’s Mansour District had been pressured for 
months by the Shi’a militias’ expansion across west Baghdad. Living adjacent to the mas-
sive coalition base at Camp Victory and at the convergence of two axes of Shi’a militia 
encroachment, residents in the Sunni enclave of Ameriyah felt especially besieged. Local 
community leaders with ties to the insurgency initially had regarded AQI as an ally, 
enough so that in 2004 Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had been able to convene an AQI lead-
ership summit in the neighborhood. However, Ameriyah’s residents came to regret this 
relationship once the terrorist group acquired enough power to dominate the neighbor-
hood.232 Fighters driven from Haifa Street following U.S.-Iraqi clearing operations in Jan-
uary 2007 gravitated to Ameriyah and reinforced AQI’s contingent there.233 As had been 
the case in Anbar, the AQI fighters soon alienated Ameriyah’s population by carrying out 
a campaign of murder and intimidation while continuing attacks that shut down the local 
economy and disrupted basic services. As a result, local leaders began to reconsider the 
logic that had led them to support the group.234
This change in popular attitudes came just as Colonel J. B. Burton and his 2d Brigade, 
1st Infantry Division, established a permanent presence among the population through 
new combat outposts and joint security stations in early 2007. Three additional battalions 
flowing into Burton’s sector between January and May as part of the surge reinforced 
this effort and allowed Burton to concentrate Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. Kuehl’s 1st Bat-
talion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, in Ameriyah as other units focused on curtailing JAM’s 
aggressive sectarian forays elsewhere.235 As events would soon show, Burton’s troops’ 
expanding presence in west Baghdad would enable local Sunnis to challenge AQI.
The first weeks in Ameriyah were difficult, however. Clearing operations in April 
spearheaded by 3d Stryker Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, seemed to accomplish little, 
apart from prompting more deadly attacks against coalition forces patrolling the AQI 
stronghold. Three deep-buried IEDs exploded the first week of May, killing five Soldiers 
and one interpreter. Kuehl and his battalion responded by ramping up the frequency of 
patrols and targeted raids while scouting for a suitable site for the battalion’s first forward 
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outpost in Ameriyah. When the outpost was emplaced on May 19, another deep-buried 
IED killed six Americans and one interpreter. The frustrated Kuehl upbraided Sheikh 
Waleed al-Asawi, an influential cleric at Ameriyah’s Firdas Mosque, demanding he do 
something to assist the coalition’s fight against an enemy that threatened both U.S. troops 
and the local population.236
The U.S. battalion commander did not know it at the time, but the backlash against 
AQI already had begun. Sa’ad Uraibi Ghafari, also known as Abu Abed, a Jaysh al-Is-
lami operative and Saddam-era army officer whose two brothers had been tortured and 
killed by Shi’a militiamen, had resolved to fight AQI after the group planted an IED 
near his house despite his objections. With the backing of local clerics, Abu Abed began 
targeting AQI fighters for assassination.237 As his military revolt against AQI kicked off, 
popular dissent against the terrorist group peaked. When AQI operatives tried to kidnap 
an elderly Christian and, amid the scuffle, humiliated his wife by yanking off her skirt, 
it struck a nerve among Ameriyah residents. Asawi witnessed the disgraceful scene and, 
considering the mounting beatings and beheadings AQI had carried out, determined that 
the time finally had come to take a stand.238
Abu Abed (left), Lieutenant Colonel Kuehl (second from left), and General Petraeus (center).  
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Awakening Leader Abu Abed Meets With Lieutenant Colonel Dale C. Kuehl,  
General David Petraeus, and Senior Iraqi Leaders in Ameriyah.239
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On May 29, Sheikh Asawi informed Kuehl that armed volunteers planned to attack 
AQI at noon the next day. The Americans simply needed to stay out of the way, the reli-
gious leader advised. Taken aback by the unexpected development, Kuehl countered 
by suggesting the U.S. battalion should handle it, but then relented after it became clear 
that Ameriyah locals intended to carry out the operation with or without his approval.240 
When several mosque loudspeakers broadcast the call to arms, Abu Abed and dozens of 
fighters attacked the AQI base at the Maluki Mosque, where a chaotic firefight went in 
the attackers’ favor.241 The euphoric Sheikh Asawi relayed to Kuehl that they had secured 
two-thirds of the neighborhood by sundown.242
However, when AQI launched a furious counterattack the next day, most of Abu 
Abed’s contingent melted away, while a remnant fell back several blocks to the Firdas 
Mosque and requested American assistance. In a scenario not unlike the late-2006 U.S. 
rescue of the Albu Soda tribe outside of Ramadi, Kuehl dispatched two Strykers that 
arrived to find Abu Abed and a half-dozen of his men fighting for their lives against the 
AQI assault.243 With the Strykers on site, the AQI attack dissipated. Over the next several 
days, a combined force of Americans, ISF, and Ameriyah locals reasserted control in the 
neighborhood, killing 10 enemy fighters and capturing 15 in the process.244
During the weeks that followed, Kuehl and Abu Abed forged an informal alliance 
that Burton sanctioned. The U.S. troops and Iraqis established a joint command and con-
trol center in southeast Ameriyah and began to plan operations against AQI. Unknown 
to Kuehl, Abu Azzam, champion of the April cease-fire in Abu Ghraib, had been sum-
moned to lend his experience to the organization of this latest manifestation of the Awak-
ening. In the meantime, Burton approached the commander of 5th Brigade, 6th Iraqi 
Army Division, with a request for support. Surprisingly amenable, the Iraqi commander 
arranged for the delivery of 30,000 rounds of AK-47 ammunition, as well as medical 
care for Abu Abed’s wounded.245 Formal integration into the security apparatus would 
take time, but, in principle, the volunteers filled a crucial gap in Ameriyah, where there 
virtually had been no police and the population distrusted the Iraqi Army.246 Combined 
patrols comprised of U.S. Soldiers, Iraqi troops, and Abu Abed’s fighters sought to nor-
malize relations between the locals and the ISF, but they also occasionally led to verbal 
clashes between Iraqi Army commanders and their former insurgent enemies.247
Adopting the name “Knights of the Land of Two Rivers,” Abu Abed’s group grew 
quickly to 300 fighters in summer 2007, with many of the men serving without pay in 
the initial months.248 Clad in tracksuits and toting AK-47s and RPGs, the Ameriyah vol-
unteers looked, to Kuehl’s troops, no different from AQI. In a bizarre scene that would 
become relatively common in 2007, some of the Sunni fighters donned black ski masks 
as they deployed for security operations atop the American Soldiers’ Bradley Fighting 
Vehicles. The Ameriyah fighters generally impressed American observers with their mil-
itary bearing and tactical skill. Later, Abu Abed outfitted his men with combat fatigues 
and gear that gave them the sharp, professional appearance of shade-wearing security 
contractors but made observers from the Iraqi Government nervous. “Who are these 
guys really?” one U.S. officer wondered.249 Indeed, many, like their leader, had prior 
military experience in addition to their affiliation with Jaysh al-Islami. In an unexpected 
twist, Kuehl provided this organization of former enemies and once hostile or ambivalent 
bystanders a dedicated advisory team manned from his own limited ranks.250 As the U.S. 
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commander saw it, the Ameriyah Knights provided him with an additional battalion of 
light infantry, and their impact on security was well worth the investment.251 After losing 
14 Soldiers in May, Kuehl’s unit suffered no major attacks from early August until its 
departure in January 2008. Murders and kidnappings, which had hovered around 30 per 
month in Ameriyah in the spring, plummeted to an average of 4 during the latter half of 
the year.252
For Petraeus, the events in Kuehl’s sector in May and June marked a crucial turning 
point. By committing their troops to fight alongside erstwhile insurgents and then supply-
ing them with ammunition, Burton and Kuehl both had pushed the limits of acceptable 
risk. But the spectacle of Baghdad Sunnis decisively cutting their ties to AQI and risking 
their lives to identify terrorist hideouts, point out IEDs, and locate weapons caches made 
the MNF-I commander determined to support the initiative in spite of the likelihood of 
infuriating the Maliki government.253 In any case, “nothing else worked in Ameriyah,” 
Kuehl observed.254 A trip to see 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, and observe Abu 
Abed’s men on patrol left Petraeus convinced that what the coalition had witnessed in 
Anbar could indeed be cultivated elsewhere.255 “Ameriyah stands as a promising example 
of the general concept of local people helping secure local neighborhoods,” he told Gates 
on June 9.256 However, to be sustained, the Awakening’s expansion had to be accompa-
nied by a parallel effort to integrate newly allied fighters into the security forces. “The 
key,” Petraeus wrote, “is to formalize the volunteers as quickly as possible by linking 
them with Iraqi and coalition forces, as we did in Anbar.”257 Each case would be different, 
he anticipated.258
Developments elsewhere in the city showed the MNF-I commander was right. Just 
north of Ameriyah, another local Sunni security arrangement grew out of stability rather 
than out of an all-out fight against AQI as Ameriyah had witnessed. In Ghazaliyah, Bur-
ton’s BCT had established a “safe neighborhood” protected from terrorist attacks by 
concrete barriers and nearby combat outposts and joint security stations.259 As they had 
done so, a former Iraqi Army lieutenant colonel approached locally based U.S. Soldiers to 
propose a neighborhood watch group that would staff checkpoints and conduct limited 
patrols. The well-organized Ghazaliyah “Guardians,” as they became known, initially 
performed their duties without weapons, content to leave the hunting of extremists to 
the Americans and the Iraqi security forces. Even inside a single BCT sector, two sets of 
volunteers with distinct motivations and characteristics emerged.260
East of the Tigris River, by contrast, tensions exacerbated by intra-Sunni violence 
led to further fracturing in the summer as long-time insurgent Sheikh Wathiq al-Ubaidi 
openly broke with AQI after extremists murdered two of his nephews in Adhamiya.261 
In nearby Fadhil, Sunni insurgent strongman Adel al-Mashhadani reached an agreement 
with a battalion commander assigned to 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, after a fero-
cious gunfight with the Americans and Iraqi troops on April 10, 2007, left about a dozen 
of his men dead. The arrangement effectively saved the insurgent leader from carrying 
on an exhausting two-front war, allowing him to focus on the JAM onslaught emanat-
ing from Sadr City. Even as U.S. reconstruction money flowed into Fadhil, Adel main-
tained loose ties to AQI—though he would cut them completely in the fall after a suicide 
bomber’s attempt on his life.262 Throughout the spring and summer of 2007, a growing 
number of “awakenings” like these would emerge in the Baghdad region, and coalition 
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commanders would increasingly choose to exploit these opportunities lest they wither 
on the vine.
***
By the late summer of 2007, the series of local cease-fires between coalition troops and 
Sunni insurgents accumulated into a broad movement that changed the security condi-
tions and political situation across large regions of western and central Iraq. With more 
than 20,000 Anbari tribesmen joining security initiatives against AQI, the once-violent 
Anbar Province was well on its way to becoming the safest region in Iraq less than a year 
after it had been the location of an al-Qaeda emirate. The region formerly known as the 
Triangle of Death sat pacified, with almost 9,000 former Sunni insurgents joining the coa-
lition and expelling AQI from one of its former strongholds. The AQI and Jaysh al-Islami 
bases of Abu Ghraib and Ameriyah had become the headquarters of anti-AQI move-
ments totaling more than 1,500 and 300 Sunni fighters, respectively. Thousands more 
Sunni fighters mobilized to join similar efforts throughout central Iraq as well.
The effect of these local security arrangements was clear. Though aggregate U.S. casu-
alties and aggregate insurgent attacks in Iraq remained high, in each area where Awak-
ening groups had begun to cooperate with U.S. troops in security operations, attacks 
dropped to near zero. The value of brokering cease-fires with insurgents and then joining 
forces with them in the shared fight against AQI went beyond statistics charting the drop 
in attacks and casualties or the steady rise in caches and IEDs found—as significant as 
those numbers were. Just as the surge in BCTs extended the operational reach of coalition 
forces and enabled the clearing of longtime enemy safe havens, so too did the Awakening 
and the concurrent growth of its members. Throughout central and western Iraq, Sunni 
fighters allied with the coalition complemented the escalation of U.S. troop levels, lim-
iting AQI’s freedom of movement as their presence expanded.263 After 4 years in which 
U.S. units had been thinly stretched across violent, vast Iraqi territories, some coalition 
brigade and division commanders in mid-2007 finally found themselves with enough 
U.S. troops due to the ongoing surge, enough ISF partners, and enough Sunni auxiliaries 
to control their areas of operations. In eastern Anbar, the southern belts, and west Bagh-
dad, the counterinsurgent lines had been strengthened enough to force AQI out of its 
operating and support zones for the first time.
The process of striking these agreements with recent enemies was neither easy nor 
without risk for many coalition units. After 4 years of warfare against many of these 
same Sunni fighters, U.S. commanders had to balance caution and trust. Given that many 
Awakening leaders had been senior insurgents responsible for American deaths, some 
commanders were reluctant to move too quickly in entering into any agreement with 
these former enemies. When leaders at the tactical level, such as Kershaw and his subor-
dinates, witnessed the dramatic reduction in violence locally, they measured the gains in 
terms of the number of American lives saved and found the risks associated with recon-
ciliation worth taking. This was particularly true once it became clear in early 2007 that 
senior commanders like Petraeus and Odierno stood ready to underwrite those risks—
and to make the creation of local cease-fires with Awakening groups a top priority for the 
coalition for the first time.
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For many of the Sunnis who chose to make peace with the coalition and turn against 
AQI, the impetus to make this fateful change was clear. Fighting a war on multiple fronts 
against the coalition; AQI and other extremists; the Shi’a-dominant Iraqi security forces; 
and, in mixed areas, Shi’a militias like JAM, desperate and besieged Sunnis reached out 
to the foe they deemed least menacing to their way of life. This proved to be the coalition.
However, the participation of the Iraqi Government remained the missing element 
in the initiative. Prime Minister Maliki and many other senior Iraqi officials looked with 
alarm on what appeared to them to be a U.S. military campaign to arm and organize 
Sunnis intent on overthrowing the government. To ease such fears and to solidify the 
security gains of the Awakening, MNF-I would need to formalize the processes linking 
local reconciliation efforts with the Iraqi Government, as the Joint Strategic Assessment 
Team had recommended. Whether the short-term gains in the Awakening areas could 
be converted into a sustainable long-term arrangement remained to be seen. Tensions 
between MNF-I and the Iraqi Government over the initiative would take months to settle.
In the meantime, Petraeus and Odierno remained determined to build on the momen-
tum that the surge of U.S. troops and the Awakening had generated. As the final surge 
brigade arrived in June 2007, they prepared to launch one of the war’s largest operations 
to retake the operational initiative in the Baghdad belts and Diyala, aiming to push AQI 
out of striking distance from the Iraqi capital for good.
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CHAPTER 5 
SUMMER 2007—THE SURGE OF OPERATIONS
The surge of additional forces into Baghdad and the gathering momentum of the 
Awakening movement in Anbar and the belts around the city changed the situation in the 
Iraqi capital significantly in the first 5 months of 2007. For more than a year, Sunni insur-
gent groups and Shi’a militias had controlled large swaths of territory inside Baghdad 
as the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) transition strategy played out. By June 2007, 
the U.S. and Iraqi surges of reinforcements had quieted the Shi’a militias and robbed 
the Sunni insurgents of most of their territory inside the city, but this progress had come 
at significant cost. May 2007 had been a harrowing month, with 120 American combat 
deaths, the worst monthly tally since 2005. “This is a period in which it gets harder before 
it gets easier,” General David H. Petraeus told one journalist at the time.1 Lieutenant Gen-
eral Raymond T. Odierno had also foreseen this steady increase in violence and was not 
inclined to abandon his deliberate approach.2 In a certain sense, the fight had just begun. 
As the last surge units arrived in May and June 2007, Petraeus and Odierno looked to use 
their additional forces to extend Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s (MNC-I) forward presence 
deeper into the belts surrounding the city, with the aim of pushing al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
and its allies farther away from their former operating zones in Baghdad.
The first step, however, was settling the deployment cycle of the 5 surge brigades and 
the 15 other brigade-sized U.S. units in Iraq to ensure that the “surge of operations” could 
extend far enough into 2008 to complete MNF-I and MNC-I’s new campaign plan. If 
these brigades served the usual 12-month rotation period in Iraq, the surge would begin 
winding down at the end of 2007, little more than 6 months away. To give the campaign 
plan sufficient time to unfold, the units deployed to Iraq would have to stay longer than 
the normal year-long combat tour. Petraeus and Odierno recognized this and lobbied 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert M. Gates to extend the length of unit deploy-
ments so as to provide, in Petraeus’s words, “the flexibility to continue with the new 
strategy into early 2008 if needed.”3 Convinced, in April Gates announced that he would 
be extending the deployments of most active-duty Army units stationed in Iraq from 12 
to 15 months. Even so, the announcement caught some units off guard. One deploying 
brigade commander learned of the extension by reading a Department of Defense (DoD) 
press release on his BlackBerry on his way through Kuwait.4 The 25th Infantry Division’s 
commander, Major General Benjamin R. Mixon, whose headquarters was responsible for 
Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), was stunned to see the announcement on an 
airport television monitor on his way back from mid-tour leave.5 All the same, the exten-
sion seemed the only way to keep force levels in Iraq elevated without shortchanging 
other Army commitments.6
In mid-June, with the future of the surge forces settled, MNC-I would kick off the 
first of three major operations in 2007-2008 to push AQI out of its support zones and 
sanctuaries beyond the city and then pursue the group as it displaced in search of new 
safe havens—a process that Petraeus described as a “surge of operations.”7 After more 
than 2 years in which MNF-I’s insurgent enemies had enjoyed the initiative, the coalition 
commanders were determined to seize it once again.
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REGAINING THE INITIATIVE: OPERATION PHANTOM THUNDER
The first phase of the “surge of operations” was Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, a 
set of division operations across central Iraq and portions of Anbar and Diyala Provinces 
in which Odierno and MNC-I intended to stop the “accelerants” that flowed into Bagh-
dad to perpetuate the cycle of sectarian violence. Having created the new Multi- National 
Division-Center (MND-C) area of operations and redirected MND-N’s focus to the lower 
Diyala River Valley, Odierno intended to send his late-arriving surge units and his oper-
ational reserve into those same areas to disrupt or destroy the support zones and sanc-
tuaries from which AQI and its allies had terrorized Baghdad since 2004.8 To accomplish 
this objective, Odierno tasked MND-N with conducting a new operation to clear AQI 
from the lower Diyala Valley, and particularly from the provincial capital of Baqubah. 
During Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, each of the other U.S. divisions—Multi-Na-
tional Division-Baghdad (MND-B), MND-C, and Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W)—
would mount supporting operations in their own areas of operations at the same time.
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 13. Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, June-August 2007.
After 5 months of operating as MNC-I, Odierno and his III Corps staff had zeroed in 
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and its allies, and in Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, MNC-I’s units would attack 
into these zones in central Iraq. Within the III Corps staff, Colonel James B. Hickey and 
his Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Operations Integration Cell (COIC) had 
noted particular “no-go” areas that coalition and Iraqi units had come to avoid over time 
because of the certainty of being attacked there, either by small arms or IEDs. The COIC 
was especially keen to locate areas where insurgents had had time to emplace belts of 
blocking obstacles in the form of deep-buried IEDs that could destroy any coalition vehi-
cle, including tanks. As Hickey saw it, those areas were likely the enemy’s most import-
ant bases, which is why the enemy had set up a deliberate defense of them. Rather than 
avoid these areas as coalition and Iraqi units had tended to do, Odierno, Hickey, and III 
Corps intended to attack into them and seize what they believed was key terrain to the 
enemy.
Hickey and the cell had also drawn from several years of significant activities 
(SIGACTs) and other data to predict where insurgent groups in each of these zones were 
likely to displace once they came under pressure. The COIC was able to do so because in 
almost every case, coalition troops had previously conducted raids into the Sunni insur-
gency’s support zones—sometimes on multiple occasions—and it was possible to exam-
ine SIGACT data, intelligence reports, and tribal ties to see where the insurgents had fled 
on those previous occasions. It had been rare in previous years for the coalition to pursue 
AQI and other groups into their secondary locations, but in late spring 2007, III Corps 
aimed to break that pattern and maintain the pressure as the insurgents sought new 
bases. Using Hickey’s analysis, Odierno would plan follow-on operations to disrupt the 
terrorists before they could establish new support zones elsewhere.
This concept determined where MNC-I deployed the surge units arriving from April 
onward. Shortly after Gates’s announcement of the extended combat tours, the third 
surge brigade, Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Divi-
sion, deployed to MND-C, commanded by Major General Rick Lynch’s 3d Infantry Divi-
sion. Odierno detached Grigsby’s tank battalion to MND-B and his artillery battalion 
to the Camp Bucca guard force, but he sent the remainder of the brigade to a sector 
where only a handful of Iraqi units guarded the eastern desert approaches to the capital.9 
Though it was difficult to support this remote location in logistical terms, Grigsby’s posi-
tion at a new operating base nearly 32 kilometers east of Baghdad (Forward Operating 
Base Hammer) placed him astride a troublesome route used by Shi’a weapons smugglers 
while allowing him to support operations against well-defended Sunni insurgent strong-
holds south and west of the capital.10
When the fourth surge brigade, Colonel Jon S. Lehr’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 2d 
Infantry Division, arrived in April, Odierno assigned it to Mixon’s MND-N and deployed 
it to Baghdad’s northern belt stretching from the Tigris River east toward Diyala Province. 
By giving Lehr and his brigade responsibility for Tarmiyah, a critical node in AQI and 
other Sunni insurgents’ northern line of communications, Odierno enabled Colonel Paul 
Funk’s MND-B’s 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, to shift its focus west 
toward Sunni insurgent sanctuaries near Lake Tharthar.11 A few weeks later, the 13th 
Marine Expeditionary Unit, U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) theater reserve, also 
deployed to the Tharthar region northeast of Fallujah to operate in the “seams” among 
the MNF-W, MND-B, and MND-N boundaries. Finally, when the last surge brigade, 
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Colonel Terry R. Ferrell’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, arrived in May, 
Odierno deployed it into MND-C’s area of responsibility to occupy the thin wedge of 
farmland along the meandering Tigris River south of Baghdad that included the longtime 
AQI stronghold of Arab Jabour.12 With the addition of four American brigades’ combat 
power between April and June, III Corps and four American divisions were positioned to 
apply pressure simultaneously along sectarian fault lines in Baghdad and along the lines 
of communications essential to controlling the city. It would be the largest operation in 
the Baghdad region since April 2003.
Clearing Baqubah
Within MND-N, the main task for Operation PHANTOM THUNDER was to retake 
the city of Baqubah from AQI. Diyala had been the scene of ethno-sectarian violence since 
the early months of the war. With its volatile mix of Sunni and Shi’a tribes and tensions 
stemming from Kurdish encroachment, the rural province had often been described as 
“little Iraq,” a microcosm of the broader ethno-sectarian divisions that spanned the coun-
try. It was also a key al-Qaeda stronghold. In spring 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had 
declared Baqubah the capital of his new “caliphate,” and the AQI leader had been killed 
only a few kilometers west of the city in June 2006.13 In the first months of 2007, many of 
the AQI operatives who fled Anbar and Baghdad under the twin pressures of the Awak-
ening and the surge had reestablished themselves in Baqubah, after which the city’s secu-
rity eroded rapidly.14 By late spring 2007, the city’s population was nearly under AQI’s 
control, with the group in control of the city’s services, including water and electricity, 
and the local mosques taken over by AQI imams who began enforcing Sharia law.15 Coa-
lition analysts estimated there were between 300 and 500 AQI fighters terrorizing the 
population and preparing a deliberate defense in the city. The situation was exacerbated 
by the behavior of the Diyala-based 5th Iraqi Army division and the local police, both of 
whom were led by sectarian commanders who allowed Shi’a death squads to operate in 
the province.16
The extent of AQI’s grip on Baqubah stunned Odierno, who described the entire city 
as a “war zone” after returning from a visit.17 The sectarian struggle among rival militant 
groups to control the lines of communication running between Baghdad and Baqubah, 
along with the Iraqi Government’s almost willful neglect of Sunnis in the contested areas 
of the province, made the dire situation far more than the single U.S. brigade in the prov-
ince could handle. With responsibility for all of Diyala, Colonel David W. Sutherland’s 3d 
Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, was already stretched thin by its mission to 
screen the Iranian frontier. Sutherland’s remaining units struggled to hold their own both 
in the city and throughout the highly contested villages along the shifting sectarian fault 
line near the convergence of the Diyala and Tigris River valleys. As violence in Baqubah 
rose in early 2007, Mixon and MND-N asked MNC-I for an additional brigade to oper-
ate in the lower Diyala River Valley while Sutherland’s brigade focused on the upper 
valley. However, with most of the surge brigades still en route, Odierno had been able to 
send only an additional battalion from his operational reserve, Colonel Steven Towsend’s 
3d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, in March. The additional troops, from 
Lieutenant Colonel Bruce Antonia’s 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry, enabled Sutherland’s 
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brigade to secure a foothold in eastern Baqubah, but coalition intelligence estimated that 
AQI had mined the western half of the city with about 175 deep-buried IEDs and had 
booby-trapped an unknown number of houses to prevent U.S. troops from clearing the 
area.18 The group had also dug defensive positions throughout the dense palm groves 
around the city.
Source: DoD photo by Specialist Benjamin Fox (Released).
Colonel David Sutherland With General David Petraeus in Baqubah.19
For U.S. units, the fighting in Diyala in the late spring and summer of 2007 would be 
some of the most intense of the entire war. Antonia’s troops encountered heavy resistance 
as they attempted to clear the areas surrounding the city, especially in the form of IEDs 
that destroyed U.S. vehicles on an almost daily basis, sometimes accompanied by insur-
gent small arms fire. In one instance on April 5, 2007, after an IED destroyed a Bradley 
fighting vehicle in Baqubah, Specialist Christopher Waiters ignored commands to stay in 
his nearby Stryker vehicle and braved heavy insurgent fire to pull two wounded Soldiers 
from the Bradley to safety, returning to remove a third dead Soldier from the vehicle as 
well. For this act, Waiters received the Distinguished Service Cross. In another incident 
on April 23, two suicide car bombs rammed a U.S. outpost in the village of Sadah near 
Baqubah, after which insurgents mounted an unsuccessful ground assault on the troops. 
The car bombs collapsed a building on the compound, killing 9 Soldiers and wounding 
20 more.
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Source: DoD photo courtesy 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment (Released).
Soldiers Move Through the Outskirts of Palm Groves in Baqubah  
During the Night of March 25.20
As Antonia’s battalion fought AQI around Baqubah in April and May, the fourth 
surge brigade—Lehr’s 4th Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division—flowed into the 
northern belt, strengthening the coalition position along the western boundary of Diyala 
and providing another Stryker battalion to operate in the highly violent area between 
Baqubah and Baghdad. As the Stryker units isolated AQI in Baqubah by clearing the 
roads and villages surrounding the city, they found that the deep-buried IEDs AQI 
emplaced on Diyala’s roads were often powerful enough to destroy the heaviest Amer-
ican armored vehicles. In early May, deep-buried IEDs destroyed three Stryker vehicles 
and killed eight U.S. troops in 1 week in the Baqubah area alone. “[W]e’re in for some 
tough challenges in Diyala,” Petraeus observed when he reported the incident to Gates.21 
Illustrating his point, later in the month, a deep-buried IED in the city destroyed an M1 
tank. The area was dangerous for U.S. aviators as well. In the last week of May, insur-
gents shot down two U.S. helicopters using truck-mounted heavy machine guns, one of 
them just northeast of Baqubah.22
In the same week, on May 25, U.S. troops attempting to push AQI from the villages 
south of the city captured a house that AQI had used as an ad hoc prison and liberated 
42 Iraqis that AQI fighters had imprisoned and tortured there. The site was just one of 
multiple “torture houses” that AQI had set up in the area to terrorize the population into 
submission.23 The group also took aim at local Iraqi officials for much the same purpose. 
In a high-profile case, AQI attacked the home of the Baqubah police chief on June 8, kill-
ing his wife and 13 others, but missing the police leader himself.24
The arrival of the final surge brigades in May and June 2007 finally generated enough 
combat power for MNC-I to allow Odierno to send an additional brigade to Diyala. In 
late May, he pulled the rest of the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division, from 
its duties as MND-B’s mobile strike force and made them available to MND-N for a deci-
sive operation to retake the whole of the Baqubah area from AQI. It was an operation for 
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which Townsend himself had lobbied for Odierno’s support. After dispatching Anto-
nia’s 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment, from his own brigade in March, Townsend 
had followed the battalion’s progress from his headquarters in Baghdad and had seen 
what he believed was an opportunity to help Sutherland seize most of Diyala from the 
enemy. Although Major General Joseph F. Fil, Jr., protested the proposed redirection of 
his strike force, Odierno agreed with Townsend that the coalition now had the oppor-
tunity to apply simultaneous pressure on AQI across central Iraq. He also believed that 
the ongoing surge mitigated the risk of reducing the Strykers in Baghdad, where incom-
ing battalions would offset the departure of Townsend’s units. Accordingly, Odierno 
directed Townsend to take his brigade headquarters and two more Stryker battalions to 
Diyala to fight alongside Sutherland’s 3d Brigade, under MND-N’s control.25
The Stryker brigade’s move to Baqubah marked the beginning of Operation PHAN-
TOM THUNDER for MND-N (and the beginning of Townsend’s brigade-level por-
tion called Operation ARROWHEAD RIPPER). On the night of June 18, 2007, one of 
Townsend’s battalions, the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry Regiment, road marched 90 kilo-
meters from Baghdad to Baqubah while U.S. air strikes pounded AQI positions in the 
city. The two U.S. battalions already outside the city conducted air assaults into blocking 
positions to cut off any AQI fighters’ escape.
Pausing only briefly outside the city to let the air strikes and air assaults take place, 
Townsend’s troops attacked on June 19 at 1 a.m., assaulting AQI positions in the western 
side of the city. Within hours, the Strykers and their dismounted infantry squads were 
moving through the town and pushing back AQI fighters. With the help of tribal irreg-
ulars who pointed out about 30 deep-buried IEDs on the main road through the city, 
Townsend’s units lost only 1 Bradley fighting vehicle destroyed on the operation’s first 
day, while killing 36 enemy combatants.26
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Armando Monroig (Released).
Soldiers from the 5th Iraqi Army Division and 3d Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry Division, 
During Operation ARROWHEAD RIPPER.27
MNC-I’s operational maneuver appeared to have achieved its aim of surprising 
the large AQI contingent in Baqubah, which was clearly unprepared for the sudden 
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appearance of a brigade’s worth of additional U.S. combat power. Townsend’s move 
to Baqubah doubled the number of coalition forces in the provincial capital and freed 
up Sutherland’s troops to shift their focus northeast toward Muqdadiyah, interdicting 
enemy fighters as they withdrew north and east up the Diyala River Valley in search of 
new sanctuaries.28 Clearing west Baqubah was not easy, even after most AQI fighters 
had fled. The terrorist group had rigged dozens of houses to explode as U.S. or Iraqi 
troops entered them, in one case booby-trapping two entire city blocks of houses. Even 
so, by June 25, Townsend’s troops had finished clearing west Baqubah and had enabled 
local Iraqi security forces, Iraqi officials, and the Diyala provincial reconstruction team to 
return to the cleared areas. Operations in and around Baqubah continued through July, 
with elements of the two brigade combat teams (BCTs) implementing tactics similar to 
those introduced in Baghdad: deliberate house-by-house clearing, followed by the estab-
lishment of company-sized combat outposts and the use of concrete barriers to control 
access to neighborhoods.29
In the first month of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, MND-N’s troops in Baqubah 
killed more than 60 AQI fighters and captured another 215, while eliminating more than 
130 IEDs.30 By July 26, Baqubah was firmly enough in coalition and Iraqi security forces 
(ISF) control to enable Odierno to take Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to the city to meet 
with local officials and tribal leaders.31 Iraqi officials responded to urgent coalition appeals 
to cultivate good will among the populace by arranging for the delivery of food and 
other supplies in the wake of U.S. clearing operations.32 Earlier engagement efforts with 
Sunni tribes in Diyala also bore fruit, maturing more slowly than they had in Anbar, and 
nascent Awakening groups began to consolidate security gains, while the newly formed 
Diyala Support Committee worked to improve the fractious political environment.33
The province was far from pacified, however. By early July, almost all the surviving 
AQI fighters and commanders from Baqubah had fled to the Diyala towns of Muqdadi-
yah, Balad Ruz, Khalis, and Khan Bani Sa’ad and had begun to attack ISF and Shi’a mili-
tias in those areas to secure new safe havens.34 In most of these areas, existing sectarian 
tensions made the situation ripe for AQI to exploit, as did the corruption and sectarian 
behavior of the Shi’a-dominated ISF units in the province. By the time Operation PHAN-
TOM THUNDER ended in mid-August, Diyala’s provincial capital was back under coali-
tion and Iraqi Government control, but further operations would be needed to roust AQI 
and its allies from the rest of the province.
Closing the Lake Tharthar Seam
As MND-N battled AQI around Baqubah, other units from MNF-W and MND-N 
moved to push AQI fighters out of another Sunni insurgent safe haven in the badlands 
south and east of Lake Tharthar. The sparsely populated area lay at the edge of the divi-
sion boundaries of MND- N, MND-B, and MNF-W, meaning that no single coalition unit 
had ever assumed responsibility for securing it. Consequently, the Tharthar area had 
long served as a base of support for AQI, from which jihadi leaders and fighters could 
easily transit Anbar, Salahadin, and Diyala without significant coalition interference. The 
ability to move freely through the Tharthar area enabled Sunni insurgents to attack or 
control the western and northern belts of Baghdad with relative ease.
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As a result of these factors, the AQI fighters driven out of Ramadi, Abu Ghraib, Fallu-
jah, and Baghdad in spring 2007 were able to hold on to support bases in towns such as 
Karmah, Taji, and Tarmiyah and to mount significant attacks against both the local pop-
ulace and the thinly stretched coalition units responsible for those areas. In February, for 
example, Sunni insurgents north of Taji had been able to gather enough combat power 
to conduct a rare company-sized attack on a U.S. unit in the area. A platoon of Funk’s 
brigade that erected a new combat outpost near Tarmiyah on February 16 found itself 
attacked 3 days later by a succession of three suicide car bombs that rammed the out-
post’s entry point and collapsed part of the building where the U.S. element was sleeping. 
An insurgent infantry assault followed and lasted for several hours before close air sup-
port and ground reinforcements helped drive the attackers off. Funk’s platoon suffered 
2 killed and 17 wounded, rendering it combat ineffective. Meanwhile, Sunni insurgents 
south of Taji were carrying out attacks against the residents of the Shi’a-majority town 
of Sab al-Bour, forcing 50,000 of them—90 percent of the population—to flee by March, 
leaving AQI in charge of the town.
The arrival of Lehr’s brigade in April enabled MNC-I to deploy an additional Stryker 
battalion to the Taji area, but it was not enough to stop insurgents from attacking the 
lines of communications in the area with large IEDs on an almost daily basis. In one inci-
dent on May 22, an IED made of 20 strung-together artillery shells destroyed a Stryker 
from Lehr’s brigade north of Taji, killing or wounding 5 of its 6-man crew. Miraculously 
unhurt in the blast, the vehicle’s driver, Specialist Erik Oropeza, quickly treated a fellow 
Soldier’s mangled leg with a tourniquet and then ran through enemy small arms fire to 
summon help. For this act, Oropeza would receive the Distinguished Service Cross.35
Source: DoD photo by Corporal Neill Sevelius (Released).
U.S. Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit During  
Operations in Karmah.36
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With these developments and similar attacks in eastern Anbar in mind, Petraeus and 
Odierno requested that CENTCOM dispatch its theater reserve, the 13th Marine Expe-
ditionary Unit (MEU), to reinforce MNF-W in the Karmah area south of Lake Tharthar. 
Arriving in June 2007, the Marine unit was on the ground in time to press the fight near 
Lake Tharthar without requiring Odierno to draw from U.S. units committed elsewhere.37 
Under the leadership of Colonel Carl E. Mundy III, son of a former Marine Corps com-
mandant, the 13th MEU began a large-scale sweep around the crossroads of Karmah on 
June 24 to disrupt AQI weapons distribution and supply routes. The clearing operation 
quickly revealed that the area served as a large-scale IED arsenal for AQI and its allies. 
In their first few days of clearing, the Marines and their partnered Iraqi units discovered 
car bomb factories, large stocks of nitric acid and explosives, and hundreds of already-
built IEDs. One of the caches was large enough that the Marines called in an F-18 Hornet 
strike to destroy it with a 500-pound bomb.38 These discoveries reinforced the assessment 
that the Sunni insurgents who carried out attacks in Baghdad and eastern Anbar had 
long enjoyed sanctuary in the rural areas northeast of Fallujah. The MEU would remain 
in the region through the summer to search for and destroy AQI’s caches and disrupt the 
group’s ability to produce and employ its weapon of choice.
Interdiction in the Southern Belts
As MND-N cleared AQI from Baqubah, Lynch’s MND-C undertook its portion of 
Operation PHANTOM THUNDER in Baghdad’s southern belts by conducting opera-
tions to interdict the “accelerants” of sectarian violence that trickled from that area into 
the capital in the form of car bombs and Sunni insurgents.39 The division’s main effort 
would come in the areas of Arab Jabour, Mada’in, and Salman Pak, all of which had 
served as Sunni insurgent support zones and the scenes of sectarian cleansing for several 
years. The town of Mada’in had been the site of an alleged massacre of dozens of Shi’a 
townspeople in April 2005 that had sparked a political crisis during the formation of the 
Ja’afari government. Adjacent to Mada’in, the picturesque river town of Salman Pak, site 
of an ancient arch marking the one-time Persian imperial capital of Ctesiphon, had been 
the area where hundreds of corpses dumped into the Tigris in Baghdad had washed 
ashore in 2005-2006. Between Mada’in and southeast Baghdad, the town of Jisr Diyala 
had been an Iraqi military housing community and the site of the Iraqi regime’s Osirak 
nuclear reactor destroyed by Israeli planes in 1981. Opposite Jisr Diyala on the west bank 
of the Tigris, Arab Jabour was home to a Sunni population of 120,000, just 6 kilometers 
south of Baghdad, close enough to the capital to have served in Saddam Hussein’s day 
as a convenient getaway for prominent Ba’athists, many of whom had built villas there.40 
In short, the area had been a Ba’athist regime stronghold and was fertile ground for the 
Sunni insurgency.
SUMMER 2007—THE SURGE OF OPERATIONS
205
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
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Source: DoD photo courtesy Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (Released).
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen With Major General 
Rick Lynch, Commander 3d Infantry Division.41
When Colonel Terry Ferrell’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, reached 
Iraq in May as the fifth and final surge brigade, Odierno and MNC-I gave Ferrell respon-
sibility for the Arab Jabour area just ahead of the start of Operation PHANTOM THUN-
DER. With two of his battalions already detached to other areas, Ferrell would have 
two battalions to use for the task. Although coalition special operators had carried out 
frequent raids in Arab Jabour, the brigade’s arrival broke a 3-year streak in which U.S. 
ground troops had largely steered clear of the stretch of canal-notched farms and palm 
groves that bordered the Tigris River to the west as it snaked south out of Baghdad. 
Taking stock of his new area of operations, Ferrell estimated that the safe haven contained 
about 1,500 AQI operatives, including close to 200 foreigners, with those numbers swell-
ing as the group shifted fighters south from Diyala Province to bolster the Arab Jabour 
defenses in anticipation of a coalition offensive.42 The area was a “critical hub for traffick-
ing weapons, bombs, and fighters into Baghdad,” Ferrell concluded, with a sophisticated 
enemy command-and-control structure “on the scale of a conventional military force.” 
In their first month on the ground, the brigade withstood an average of over 40 attacks 
per week, including the same kind of deep-buried IEDs and explosive-rigged houses that 
U.S. troops in Diyala were encountering.43 Like their fellow Soldiers in Diyala and the 
Tharthar region, Ferrell’s troops were dealing with the difficulty of seizing long-uncon-
tested enemy-held territory.
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Just across the Tigris near Salman Pak, Grigsby’s 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, 
geared up to move against another AQI transit point that had long fed the violence in 
Baghdad. Like Arab Jabour, the town of Salman Pak had close historical ties with the 
Ba’athist regime. Saddam’s special intelligence service operated a headquarters there 
before the coalition invasion, and the dictator had purportedly authorized secretive bio-
logical weapons testing at a nearby facility.44 More recently, Salman Pak had been the 
scene of a cycle of intimidation, violence, and retribution between Sunnis and a restive 
Shi’a minority, with the latter backed by National Police units notorious for sectarian 
abuses. Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) had also participated in the fight for control of the critical 
crossroads—and for good reason.45 Exploiting Sunni resentment toward the Shi’a-domi-
nated security forces and in an environment characterized by minimal U.S. presence, AQI 
used the highways running along the Tigris through Salman Pak to attack into eastern 
Baghdad, particularly Rusafa and Sadr City. The extremist group also funneled men and 
supplies by boat across the river into Arab Jabour and then north toward staging areas 
in the Rashid District such as the Dora neighborhood.46 In June, Grigsby estimated that 
20 percent of the attacks occurring in the capital were “facilitated by accelerants moving 
through AO [area of operation] Hammer,” the BCT’s sector southeast of Baghdad.47
Eager to set the division offensive—labeled Operation MARNE TORCH—in motion, 
Lynch ordered Ferrell’s brigade, along with Iraqis from the 6th Iraqi Army Division, to 
clear the Arab Jabour region southward from the outskirts of Baghdad and construct 
combat outposts in the AQI sanctuary. As a supporting effort, Grigsby would advance 
concurrently along the opposite bank of the Tigris southeast of Salman Pak to block the 
escape of enemy fighters if they should attempt to cross the river.48 On June 15, the divi-
sion carried out ferocious preparatory fires on suspected AQI sites in Arab Jabour, during 
which 40,000 pounds of ordnance fell in a 10-second span.49
Lynch’s use of massive demonstrations of firepower in MND-C stood out among the 
coalition operations in central Iraq in 2007, most of which were characterized by clearing 
operations, patrolling among the local population, and the kind of restraint that the Army 
and Marine Corps’ new counterinsurgency field manual tended to encourage. “This is all 
about killing and capturing bad guys,” Lynch told his subordinates. “Later, we can do 
area security. So use anything you can to hit him in the nose. Once he is back on his heels, 
then we can worry about the population.”50 In this case, the MND-C commander sought 
to dislocate AQI cells by destroying weapons caches and rendering unusable roads and 
river crossings that could serve as enemy exfiltration routes. Lynch also acted on the 
claims by local Iraqis that boats moored along the Tigris or plying its waters belonged 
exclusively to insurgents or smugglers. Suspicious of the absence of commercial docks 
along this stretch of the river and the fact that most boats appeared to sail only at night, 
Lynch concluded that all vessels afloat were likely hostile and ordered them destroyed in 
support of the operation.51
With the American attack driving expectantly into what Ferrell described as a “hor-
net’s nest,” progress came slowly.52 The brigade’s calculated advance cleared less than 6 
kilometers of Arab Jabour’s IED-laden main road over the course of 2 grueling weeks.53 
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Nevertheless, after 1 month, the division operation yielded a number of new patrol bases 
in rural areas long under AQI’s sway. In the process of wresting control of key terrain 
on either side of the Tigris River, MND-C killed 83 insurgents and captured another 
280. Forty of those captured were on coalition high-value target lists. The division also 
destroyed dozens of boats on the Tigris, many of which when struck produced secondary 
blasts that suggested they were carrying explosive material, seeming to confirm Lynch’s 
suspicions about their use.54
Lynch extended his interdiction efforts to the western half of his sector in July, focus-
ing on enemy lines of communications up the Euphrates River, as well as Highway 8. 
Spearheaded by Colonel Michael X. Garrett’s 4th Brigade Combat Team (Airborne), 25th 
Infantry Division, and supported by elements of the 6th and 8th Iraqi Army Divisions, 
operations centered on the mixed-sect Iskandariyah, a small city of 120,000 mostly Shi’a 
civilians, and on the Sunni town of Jurf al-Sakhr, situated as a gateway on the Euphra-
tes between Anbar and the southern belts.55 As in Arab Jabour, MND-C began the new 
operation, called MARNE AVALANCHE, with a striking display of airpower as a single 
B-1B bomber dropped nearly 10,000 pounds of munitions on selected bridges across the 
Euphrates to isolate enemy fighters and restrict their maneuver.56 In a month-long series 
of platoon- and company-sized attacks and air assaults against militants of both sects, the 
division killed 16 enemy fighters and captured 110, including local top-level AQI leaders 
and operatives from JAM mortar-and-rocket teams.
IED attacks in the Euphrates Valley area south of Baghdad fell from 111 in June to 55 
the following month, signifying to Lynch that MND-C’s approach of highly mobile and 
firepower-intensive operations was succeeding in disrupting insurgent activity there.57 
Still, by Lynch’s own admission, the summertime operations into AQI’s sanctuaries had 
not defeated the terrorist group. As an indication of the enemy’s persistent strength in 
Arab Jabour, for example, four of Ferrell’s Soldiers were killed and another four wounded 
while clearing a booby-trapped house on August 11, and troops elsewhere continued 
to face roadside IEDs, small-arms fire, and rocket attacks aimed at recently established 
combat outposts. To be sure, the coalition had seized the initiative and had gained “tacti-
cal momentum” in the southern belts, but it had not proceeded as smoothly as Lynch had 
hoped.58 The MND-C commander chafed at his division’s dearth of engineer support, 
which meant that he lacked the construction capability required to build patrol bases at 
a pace aligned with his push into enemy-controlled territory.59 Regardless of the security 
gains made, in Lynch’s view they could not be confidently sustained without more and 
better-trained Iraqi forces, which, he believed, needed to triple or quadruple in size for 
his area of responsibility.60 Even the notable turnaround in places witnessing a reinvig-
orated American presence seemed tempered by what some Iraqis viewed as the heavy-
handed and unnecessary destruction of local bridges and fording sites upon which so 
many depended for their livelihood. Once seized, the initiative would still have to be 
exploited and the security of key terrain solidified by efforts to secure the goodwill of the 
population through improved governance and economic development.61
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 15. Disposition of U.S. Forces in Baghdad, June 2007.
The Continuing Fight for Baghdad
For Fil and MND-B, Operation PHANTOM THUNDER inside Baghdad would be 
a continuation of Operation FARDH AL-QANOON, the U.S.-Iraqi effort to clear the 
remaining Sunni insurgent strongholds in the city and to solidify the renewed security 
presence in the city’s neighborhoods. The introduction of the surge units into the city 
beginning in early 2007 had put AQI and other insurgent groups off-balance, but the first 
4 months of the surge in Baghdad had been difficult and violent. The AQI car bomb rings 
on both sides of the Tigris had continued to do their grisly work, though on a decreasing 
scale as Fil’s troops pressured them and expanded the coalition and ISF footprint. Shi’a 
death squads had continued to operate as well, though with a greatly reduced freedom 
of movement. During March through May, Sunni insurgents had attempted to separate 
the two halves of the city by repeatedly bombing the bridges that spanned the Tigris. One 
massive truck bombing on April 12 entirely collapsed the spans of the Sarafiyah Bridge 
between Karkh and Adhamiyah, probably an attempt by Sunni insurgents to stop their 
Shi’a militant enemies from crossing between the two sides of the city. The following 
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Sarafiyah Bridge, After Its Destruction by al-Qaeda in Iraq on April 12, 2007.63
MND-B’s share of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER was not just a matter of hunting 
down AQI and other Sunni insurgent cells, however. As the summer months approached, 
Colonel J. B. Burton’s brigade sector in northwest Baghdad remained one of the most 
problematic areas in the country because of the activities of both Sunni insurgents and 
Shi’a militias and death squads. As had been the case in Burton’s sector for the better part 
of a year, U.S. units were bedeviled continually by the sectarian behavior and corruption 
of the local ISF. The most egregious example was in Baghdad’s Kadhimiyah District, 
where Burton and his subordinates discovered numerous illicit connections between the 
Sadrists and local security forces and developed Operation SEVENTH VEIL to find guilty 
Iraqi officials and hold them accountable.64 Begun as a response to the battery of civil-
ian complaints against units infiltrated by Shi’a militants, this systematic effort eventu-
ally led to a violent confrontation at the Kadhimiyah shrine, one of the four holiest sites 
of Shi’a Islam. Family ties clouded army loyalties and bolstered the Sadrists’ position. 
Sadrist cleric Hazem al-Araji controlled the shrine—a moneymaker during pilgrimage 
seasons—while his brother Baha al-Araji served in Iraq’s Parliament and a cousin, Lieu-
tenant General Faruq al-Araji, directed Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief, a 
special action arm that reported directly to Maliki and frequently bypassed the military 
chain of command in order to pressure Iraqi commanders.65
When Burton’s troops closed in on the Araji-controlled shrine on April 29, 2007, to 
detain JAM leaders they knew to be present, they came under rocket-propelled grenade 
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(RPG) and small-arms fire. The Americans had called on a battalion from the 1st Brigade, 
6th Iraqi Army Division, for assistance, but rather than helping them, the Iraqi soldiers 
came to the aid of JAM militants in the shrine. The ensuing 2-day standoff resulted in 
the deaths of at least nine Iraqi soldiers who had allied themselves with the militia and 
ended with a Parliamentary decree barring U.S. troops from a 1-square-kilometer zone 
around the shrine. In the aftermath of this incident, Petraeus noted that General Abud 
Qanbar’s attitude toward JAM seemed to be hardening—along with that of Maliki’s—
since the Baghdad commander pressed for fewer restrictions on coalition operations near 
the militia’s strongholds.66 This, nonetheless, provided little comfort, given the extent of 
JAM’s infiltration of the army in Kadhimiyah. Throughout the summer and the duration 
of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, Burton’s troops would maintain a tense standoff 
with both Shi’a militants and pro-militia ISF units in the shrine neighborhood, a factor 
that complicated the effort to complete the expulsion of Sunni insurgents from other parts 
of west Baghdad.
Meanwhile, MND-B’s main effort was in the AQI-dominated neighborhood of Dora. 
In the heart of the Rashid District—which Petraeus had labeled as “the most challenging 
in Baghdad”—the streets bounding the once-vibrant Dora market proved key terrain 
in a hard-fought sectarian struggle.67 The neighborhood sat astride an expressway that 
crossed the nearby Tigris River and fed into Shi’a-dominated eastern Baghdad. Likewise, 
a well-traveled north-south route provided access to the belt areas of Hawr Rajab and 
Mahmudiyah. Thus, the Dora neighborhood proved to be an important transit point for 
insurgents inside the city. Al- Qaeda in Iraq intended to defend the stronghold with a lay-
ered network of deep-buried IEDs, sniper positions, and jury-rigged passageways that 
facilitated maneuver between buildings.68
The 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, under the command of Colonel 
Ricky D. Gibbs, had spent the spring closing in on the Sunni extremist fighters ensconced 
in Dora. After establishing 12 combat outposts and joint security stations across the Rashid 
District, Gibbs launched a series of clearing operations with support from attached Stryker 
units and Iraqis from the 2d National Police Division.69 Perceiving that AQI “wanted to 
plant their flag and hold” Dora as a launching point to wreak havoc across Baghdad, 
the colonel marshaled his forces to root out the extremist cells and “send the message to 
the enemy that we weren’t leaving anytime soon.”70 The brigade concentrated on three 
specific mahallas (neighborhoods) where resistance proved most stubborn and began 
house-by-house clearing operations on July 1. Gibbs’s units netted over 100 suspected 
AQI fighters and discovered some 200 weapons caches within 2 weeks. Operations in 
Dora continued through late September when the brigade commander announced the 
reduction of the Sunni extremist stronghold, along with a general decline in violence. 
Murders in Rashid, for example, had fallen by 65 percent since the brigade’s arrival in 
mid-March.71
The erecting of combat outposts and a sustained presence in neighborhoods, cou-
pled with attacks into erstwhile safe havens, had comparable effects on other Baghdad 
hotspots. Burton’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, observed a steep drop 
in violence in Kadhimiyah and Mansour in the 3 months following the kickoff of Oper-
ation PHANTOM THUNDER.72 Burton attributed this improvement to a combination 
of clearing operations that targeted extremist leaders, the formation of local Awakening 
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groups, and the further development of “safe neighborhoods” and “safe markets,” all 
of which were byproducts of surging additional American troops into his sector.73 Prog-
ress—mixed across Baghdad—had come more quickly in Karkh District, where Colonel 
Bryan T. Roberts’s 2d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, presided over a dra-
matic turnaround on Haifa Street. By the summer of 2007, attacks on coalition forces had 
fallen by 60 percent, with reported civilian murders plummeting at an even faster rate. 
With violence waning, Roberts focused increasingly on essential services, reviving the 
local economy, and area beautification.74 A comprehensive approach that paired security 
operations with initiatives to improve governance and economic development also bore 
fruit in eastern Baghdad. There, the 2d Brigade Combat Team, 82d Airborne Division, 
juggled the AQI threat based in Old Adhamiyah along with the persistent problem of Ira-
nian-supported JAM Special Groups operating out of Sadr City. While attacks against the 
airborne brigade initially rose with the establishment of forward positions in February, 
they had declined markedly by August, persuading American leaders to finance local 
reconstruction projects totaling some $2.5 million—with another bevy of projects costing 
$8 million scheduled to follow.75
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Michael Pryor (Released).
Soldiers From 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry Regiment, During a Firefight in Baghdad’s 
Adhamiyah Neighborhood on June 16.76
Looking at the whole of Iraq’s capital as Operation PHANTOM THUNDER wound 
down in mid-August, Petraeus assessed the results of the operation with a characteristic 
blend of caution and optimism. “Security has improved in almost every area of Bagh-
dad,” he reported to Gates on August 11, adding that, nonetheless, “improvement has 
been very uneven and remains tenuous” in places.77
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From Operation PHANTOM THUNDER to Operation PHANTOM STRIKE:  
Pursuit Operations Against al-Qaeda in Iraq
Operation PHANTOM THUNDER ended on August 15, 2007. In the 60 days of the 
operation, the coalition divisions had driven AQI out of Dora, Baqubah, and the Fallujah 
area and had greatly damaged the militant group and its allies in their former safe havens 
throughout the Baghdad belts. Coalition troops had killed 1,196 enemy fighters, wounded 
419, and captured another 6,702, with 382 of the captured considered high-value tar-
gets. U.S. and Iraqi troops together had captured more than 1,100 weapons caches, found 
almost 2,300 IEDs, and disabled 52 car bombs.78 During the same period, U.S. units lost 
150 troops killed by hostile fire, the vast majority of them to IEDs.
The change in the security situation in Baghdad and its environs was significant. In the 
5 months before Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, an average of 298 Baghdadi civilians 
were killed in acts of violence each week. By the end of the operation, the weekly civilian 
death toll in the capital had fallen to about half of that figure, and from that point to the 
end of 2007, the weekly average of violent civilian deaths fell to 91, a level not seen in 
Baghdad since early 2005.
Encouraged by these improved security trends and an overall reduction in violence in 
and around the Iraqi capital, MNC-I sought to capitalize on those hard-won gains and to 
continue the pressure against AQI as it attempted to regroup. On August 15, Operation 
PHANTOM THUNDER gave way to another corps-level operation, Operation PHAN-
TOM STRIKE, designed to serve as a framework for the aggressive pursuit of AQI in the 
immediate aftermath of operations that had worn down the extremist group’s ranks and 
had rendered longtime sanctuaries increasingly untenable. Like its predecessor, Opera-
tion PHANTOM STRIKE consisted of a set of operations oriented on a common purpose 
but planned and executed by lower echelons of command. Nonetheless, it differed in 
emphasis, with the clearing of enemy strongholds and the seizure of key terrain that had 
characterized Operation PHANTOM THUNDER yielding to a focus on solidifying prog-
ress. Although U.S. troops maintained a forward presence among the population, they 
generally refrained from explicit efforts to extend their control into new areas.
This shift did not entail a scaling back in activity, however. Nor was the situation any 
less dynamic. Sensing that coalition forces had retaken the initiative at the operational 
level, Petraeus, Odierno, and other coalition commanders looked to keep AQI’s leaders 
off-balance and on the run by orchestrating targeted raids across the country to exploit 
the enemy’s dislocation, drive its center of activity farther from Baghdad, and prevent 
its consolidation.79 In MND-B, U.S. troops concentrated on reducing the AQI strong-
hold in the Hadar neighborhood just south of the Dora expressway running through 
Rashid. Arriving to replace Townsend’s Stryker brigade in late summer, Colonel John S. 
RisCassi’s 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment became the corps operational reserve and, like 
its predecessor, served as MND-B’s “above-ground” strike force—a role that freed the 
Stryker unit from responsibility for the security of a particular sector and leveraged the 
formation’s mobility and comparably large infantry troop strength. Supporting Gibbs in 
Rashid, RisCassi’s regiment cleared Hadar while BCTs elsewhere in Baghdad constricted 
AQI with the help of partnered Iraqi security forces and increasing numbers of Sunni 
irregulars.80 The “pursuit” in MNF-W took the form of continued operations northeast 
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of Fallujah, with Marines striking into the hinterlands around Lake Tharthar as the Iraqi 
police tightened its grip on the city.81 In Baghdad’s southern belts, Lynch faced man-
power constraints that discouraged MND-C from expanding its area of control, but, in 
accordance with Operation PHANTOM STRIKE’s intent, the division managed to launch 
operations designed to keep AQI off-balance. Colonel Daniel L. Ball, commander of the 
3d Infantry Division’s combat aviation brigade, for example, organized a flurry of raids 
and air assaults that drew on U.S. conventional and special operations forces to disrupt 
insurgent staging areas around Mahmudiyah and the Euphrates River Valley.82 In Arab 
Jabour, Ferrell’s BCT conducted strikes against AQI death squads reportedly formed to 
assassinate Awakening fighters. Lynch again employed tremendous firepower, and in 
1 day alone in September, four B-1B aircraft dropped eight 500-pound and two 2,000-
pound laser-guided bombs on enemy targets in Arab Jabour, while the division’s artillery 
fired 45 missions.83
For Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, MNC-I intended to pursue AQI fighters who had 
fled Baqubah farther up the Diyala River Valley to the town of Muqdadiyah and into 
the remote Hamrin Ridge area, an important insurgent line of communications between 
Diyala and the Za’ab Triangle south of Mosul. By August, MND-N’s task was more dif-
ficult than those of the other divisions. As Anbar, the Baghdad belts, and Diyala became 
dangerous territory for AQI leaders and fighters, they increasingly chose to displace to 
far northern Iraq, where the coalition and ISF presence was thin. Mixon’s main effort, 
designated Operation LIGHTNING HAMMER, would focus on the upper Diyala Valley 
beyond Baqubah. Sutherland’s 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, would 
lead the fight for Muqdadiyah and other towns in upper Diyala.
At the same time, however, rising attacks elsewhere in MND-N’s area of operations 
signified that AQI and other insurgents were flowing toward areas where the coalition 
was weak, as they had done so many times in the past.84 In Salahadin Province, IEDs and 
insurgent ground attacks grew in frequency in late summer, with Samarra as particu-
larly contested ground for the 2d Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment. In one 
incident on August 26, more than 40 AQI fighters attacked one of the battalion’s observa-
tion posts, seeking to abduct the 4 American Soldiers posted there. Two of the American 
infantrymen were killed in the ensuing firefight, but Specialists Christopher Corriveau 
and Eric Moser mounted a fierce defense and held off dozens of attackers until a U.S. 
quick-reaction force arrived. These actions earned the two Soldiers the Distinguished 
Service Cross.85
In another incident in Samarra just 2 weeks later, a team of U.S. special operators 
and their partnered Iraqi special operations forces conducted a nighttime attack against 
an AQI hideout that was the suspected location of the city’s AQI emir. Blinded by sand 
kicked up by their own helicopters and cut off from their Iraqi partners, three special 
operators assaulted the AQI emir’s building and found themselves in a close-quarters 
gunfight with more than a dozen AQI fighters. When his two fellow Green Berets were 
wounded, Staff Sergeant Jarion Halbisengibbs continued to clear the building by himself 
in complete darkness, not stopping even when shot in the hand and abdomen. Despite 
his wounds, he made contact with the Iraqi special operators and reorganized them to 
continue the attack. During the engagement, Halbisengibbs killed six of the AQI men, 
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including the AQI emir himself. For his actions, the Green Beret sergeant received the 
Distinguished Service Cross.86
The situation was even more dangerous in Ninawa Province, where in late summer 
and early September Colonel Stephen Twitty’s Mosul-based 4th Brigade Combat Team, 
1st Cavalry Division, detected a migration of AQI fighters north from Baghdad. The first 
sign had come when Twitty’s troops began capturing enemy fighters who possessed 
Baghdad area identification cards.87 As the terrorists arrived, Twitty recorded a cor-
responding uptick in enemy activity.88 This migration of AQI fighters to the north led 
to the Iraq War’s most deadly terrorist incident. On August 14, the day before Opera-
tion PHANTOM STRIKE began, AQI attacked 2 Yazidi towns near Sinjar with massive 
truck bombs that killed about 300 civilians and wounded at least 700 more, according to 
MNF-I’s reports.89 Iraqi reports put the toll even higher, at almost 800 killed and 1,500 
wounded. Either way, the attack on the Yazidis resulted in the highest death toll of any 
single terrorist attack of the entire war, and it indicated AQI’s resilience as well as its 
determination to hold onto Mosul and Ninawa Province despite its loss of almost all of 
its territory in central Iraq. While the coalition necessarily focused on ending the sectarian 
civil war in Baghdad, the civil war among ethnic groups and sects in Ninawa had con-
tinued, offering a political opening for AQI and other hard-line Sunni insurgent groups. 
The civil war in the north would flare again as AQI members made their way north and 
as the group attempted to switch its cross-border infiltration routes from the increasingly 
difficult Anbar Province to the more AQI-accessible Sinjar-Tel Afar-Mosul corridor.
By intensifying the pressure on Sunni militants and sustaining the surge of operations 
through Operation PHANTOM STRIKE, Odierno hoped to prevent AQI from carrying 
out its usual spike in attacks and killings of civilians during the holy month of Ramadan. 
If the coalition could constrain AQI’s normal level of activity once the holy month began 
on September 12, it would demonstrate the group’s waning power and neutralize its psy-
chological effect on Iraqis.90 For Petraeus, the pursuit of the enemy in August occurred 
in the context of his impending congressional testimony with Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
in Washington, where the next month the two men would be expected to report on the 
first 7 months of the surge. Petraeus would have to assess publicly the interim results 
of the surge of operations while Operation PHANTOM STRIKE was still underway, a 
task that would be fraught with political implications. The summer 2007 operations were 
succeeding in pushing AQI away from Baghdad and the Awakening was turning tens 
of thousands of local Iraqis against AQI, but it was not yet clear that reconciliation with 
the Iraqi Government would follow. Ever mindful of the steadily ticking Washington 
“clock,” Petraeus knew that time was running short.
SUMMER OF THE AWAKENING
The Coalition and the Iraqi Government Organize for Reconciliation
In addition to the offensive operations of the four U.S. divisions in central Iraq, the 
surge of operations of summer 2007 had a significant tribal outreach component. Though 
senior coalition commanders had been somewhat divided and cautious about the Awak-
ening’s potential in early 2007, by late May the unexpected spread of the tribal movement 
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had shown them that they were witnessing a golden opportunity not to be squandered. 
The MNF-I and MNC-I commanders became determined to continue building the Awak-
ening’s momentum and to make the tribal movement a force multiplier in the coalition’s 
major operations, including Operation PHANTOM THUNDER. Petraeus had already 
told Gates and his coalition subordinates that the tribal movement’s continued growth 
would depend to a great degree on the Iraqi Government’s acceptance of it. Accordingly, 
and as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team had recommended, Petraeus took steps to 
institutionalize the coalition’s oversight of the Awakening and to broker an accommoda-
tion between the multiplying Awakening groups and the Maliki government. At MNF-I, 
the small cell created under British Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb responsible for 
tribal engagement carried on but expanded in size and scope. In the spring, it received 
its own co-directors in British Major General Paul R. Newton and Donald A. Blome, a 
senior aide to the U.S. ambassador. The Force Strategic Engagement Cell, as it came to 
be called, would have the job of prodding the Iraqi Government as it shuffled down 
the path toward national reconciliation and attempt to convince Maliki that integrating 
Sunni tribal irregulars into the security forces lay in his best long-term interests.91
One of the cell’s initial quandaries was what name should be assigned to the disparate 
groups that made up the broader Awakening movement. Before creating a standardized 
name, coalition staff officers referred to the tribal irregulars by a variety of terms includ-
ing “potential reconcilables,” “Sunni groups,” “local security forces,” and “police sup-
port units” before settling on the term “Concerned Local Citizens” in June 2007. Even that 
term proved unworkable, as coalition leaders soon discovered that “Concerned Local 
Citizens” was more accurately understood in Arabic as “People who worry a lot.” After 
several more months of searching for an appropriate name, MNF-I staffers settled on the 
term “Sons of Iraq” in February 2008.92
Naming conventions aside, at MNC-I, Odierno, who had been initially cautious 
regarding outreach to former insurgents, changed course and made the facilitation of 
bottom-up reconciliation a top-tier priority for his headquarters and subordinate units. 
By late spring 2007, the MNC-I commander concluded that the short-term security gains 
realized through bottom-up reconciliation could not be sustained without top-down 
efforts to integrate armed tribesmen or former insurgents with the Government of Iraq. 
But he also realized that the Maliki government, for the time being, was at best ambiva-
lent and at worst downright hostile to the Sunni groups with whom MNC-I’s units had 
begun to work. Rather than wait for the Maliki government to move ahead with a formal 
reconciliation process of its own, Odierno encouraged his subordinate commanders to 
engage anyone who was willing to talk. In new written guidance to his units in June 2007, 
Odierno instructed commanders to use dialogue with local groups to stop attacks against 
the coalition and to broker cease-fires among warring parties. The MNC-I commander’s 
goal was not for his subordinate commanders to pressure extra governmental armed 
groups to lay down their weapons, but rather that they should convince those groups to 
turn their weapons against AQI and other irreconcilable terrorists.93 In writing to MNC-
I’s units, Odierno conceded that “some may be skeptical” of facilitating bottom-up rec-
onciliation—as he, too, had initially been—but like Petraeus, he believed the initiative to 
work with Sunnis who had at one time fought against the coalition reflected a new real-
ity.94 On the streets and in the rural districts of Iraq, insurgent groups and their affiliated 
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tribes were breaking from AQI and seeking local accommodations with the coalition that 
promised to reduce violence sharply in the near term.
Odierno’s June 2007 directives laid out broad guidelines on the use of the tribal irreg-
ulars and authorized a wide array of “tools” to reach accommodations, including tar-
geted detainee releases, Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP)-funded 
infrastructure security contracts, and employment in positions that would lead to a more 
permanent job with the Iraqi police.95 To help synchronize local engagements throughout 
the country and implement MNC-I’s new guidelines, Odierno created a new reconcili-
ation directorate within MNC-I and encouraged each of his divisions to set up similar 
“reconciliation cells.”96 Given the rather unconventional directive to facilitate reconcili-
ation, Odierno saw his primary contribution as underwriting the risk subordinate com-
manders assumed as they engaged with insurgent groups.97 For the colonels in charge 
of BCTs and battalions, this top cover afforded by Odierno, as well as Petraeus, allowed 
for aggressive engagement in an unavoidably decentralized environment in which they 
often found themselves making “handshake agreements” with recent enemies.98
When it came to negotiations with Sunni insurgents, the Maliki administration was 
less inclined to take such risks. Petraeus found this somewhat understandable, given 
Iraq’s recent history of Ba’athist rule and conspiracy-fueled fears of the party’s resur-
gence, but he believed the time had come to stop the bureaucratic foot-dragging on 
national reconciliation.99 Provincial elections would perhaps be the most straightforward 
way to draw Sunnis into the political process, but in the summer of 2007, prospects for 
convincing the Iraqi Government to hold new elections were dim. Instead, in June, Prime 
Minister Maliki formed the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for National Rec-
onciliation (IFCNR) to manage the Iraqi Government’s part in brokering agreements with 
the many local Sunni groups coming forward.100 One 
crucial task for the Iraqi Government, as coalition 
commanders saw it, involved vetting the names of 
Awakening members—many of whom were con-
tractors compensated through CERP funds—and 
then expediting their induction into the Iraqi police 
and thus onto official government payrolls.
Petraeus considered the IFCNR a good idea in 
theory but doubted its members would perform 
their duties in an evenhanded way, especially after 
Maliki staffed the committee with personnel from 
the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC), 
the special arm that allowed the Prime Minister to 
bypass the military chain of command.101 Moreover, 
the dominant voice on the IFCNR was Bassima Luay 
Hasun al-Jaidri, a military technology specialist who 
had served in Saddam’s rocket and missile program 
before 2003 and since then had become a senior gov-
ernment administrator and a Maliki confidant.102 In 
February, Odierno had noted Jaidri’s Shi’a sectar-
ian bent and judged that her interference in security 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant 1st 
Class Kerensa Hardy (Released). 
Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidri.103
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affairs was discrediting Baghdad commander General Abud Qanbar.104 American officers 
regarded her appointment to be the IFCNR’s gatekeeper for the entry of Sunnis into the 
Iraqi police with disappointment. “The fact that [the IFCNR] is led by Jaidri and other 
sectarian OCINC personalities makes us a bit cautious as to whether it exists to rapidly 
assist local accommodation efforts or to protect Shi’a equities while dealing with these 
tribes or groups,” Petraeus wrote to Gates in late June.105
The first major task for Jaidri and the IFCNR was dealing with Abu Azzam’s large 
Awakening group in Abu Ghraib. By midsummer 2007, the coalition had registered more 
than 1,700 of the Abu Ghraib volunteers for potential induction into the Iraqi police and 
onto government payrolls, a step that coalition commanders believed needed to take 
place quickly in order to ensure that the volunteers did not become discouraged and 
drift back into the insurgency.106 Odierno saw Abu Ghraib as a test case.107 If the Iraqi 
Government balked at absorbing Abu Azzam’s men into the government security forces, 
it could undercut the only measurable progress made toward reconciliation and doom 
the whole venture. To press Jaidri and other IFCNR leaders to see beyond their sectarian 
perspectives, Odierno dispatched his political adviser Emma Sky to lobby the IFCNR 
about the benefits of bottom-up reconciliation and specifically to persuade them to issue 
hiring orders for the Abu Ghraib volunteers. Sky worked to win Jaidri’s trust, gradu-
ally chipping away at the common perception among the Shi’a ruling class that U.S. 
cooperation with Sunni groups was part of some American scheme to fuel civil war and 
hasten Maliki’s overthrow. Nonetheless, the Iraqi official still felt strongly that integrat-
ing former insurgents into the security forces was equivalent to arming AQI. As Jaidri 
saw it, American commanders like Odierno seemed obsessed with the Sunni irregulars in 
nearby Abu Ghraib, and senior American officials’ occasional public antagonism toward 
her only raised her suspicions.108 Under her leadership, the new IFCNR moved slowly 
on vetting the Abu Ghraib volunteers, letting the process drag on well into the summer. 
When coalition commanders learned in late July that the IFCNR was prepared to consider 
fewer than half the names submitted from Abu Ghraib and, of those, none who had ever 
been affiliated with Jaysh al-Islami, they braced themselves for a serious confrontation 
with the Prime Minister. However, at the 11th hour Sky persuaded Jaidri to relent and 
approve the list in its entirety.109 The following week, the MNF-I commander conveyed 
the encouraging news to Gates and hoped the development indicated Maliki’s “increased 
commitment to moving forward on reconciliation—not just in word, but also in deed.”110 
However, the action foretold no guarantee of future success.
Control Measures and Tensions Over the Awakening
At the tactical level, the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders’ encouragement and guid-
ance about the Awakening came as brigade and battalion commanders were experiment-
ing with ways to work with Sunnis who were mainly former enemies, balancing the need 
for caution with the need to keep local cease-fires from stalling so that Sunni groups did 
not drift back into the anti-coalition camp. As U.S. units monitored the activity of Awak-
ening groups in their area, they demanded full transparency of the group’s members 
and required the Sunni fighters to coordinate their operations and movements. Many 
commanders also devised arrangements that encouraged or even compelled the Sunni 
groups’ cooperation with local Iraqi security forces. In Ameriyah, for example, Lieutenant 
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Colonel Dale C. Kuehl instituted combined patrols and expected Abu Abed, the local 
Awakening leader, to post representatives in joint security stations at all times for liaison 
purposes.111 To the south around Mahmudiyah, Colonel Michael M. Kershaw’s 2d Bri-
gade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, “partnered” a U.S. unit with each armed 
tribal group while ensuring that the local Iraqi Army brigade commander, Brigadier Gen-
eral Ali Freiji, met regularly with Awakening members in his sector.112 One of Kershaw’s 
battalion commanders even organized his local Sunni irregulars into “platoons” to secure 
areas that would have stretched the capabilities of available U.S. forces.113
To supplement the standard practice of cataloging biometric data and weapon serial 
numbers, Kershaw required sheikhs to vouch formally for the loyalty of each fighter.114 
He found that this obligation not only yielded insights into the insurgency and its lead-
ers, but it also provided a great deal of leverage over those who had cast their lot with 
the coalition against AQI.115 Similarly, in his dealings with Awakening members in north-
west Baghdad, Burton employed the contract as a mechanism to apply leverage, investi-
gating alleged violations of the agreed-upon terms and holding offenders accountable.116 
Of course, the fact that the tribal irregulars benefited from stores of U.S. or Iraqi ammu-
nition gave coalition forces considerable leverage.117 American units also had to deal with 
the ethically tricky matter of how Awakening groups handled the detainees they cap-
tured. Most commanders prohibited unsupervised interrogations by irregular forces and 
limited the time they were allowed to hold prisoners before transferring them to U.S. or 
Iraqi units.118
Yet in spite of these control measures, enlisting new partners in a multifaceted strug-
gle for stability created its own problems, reminding commanders that accommodations 
with one-time insurgents stemmed primarily from momentary alignments of interest and 
thus were delicate in nature and, at times, volatile. Kershaw’s involvement with former 
1920 Revolutionary Brigades leader Abu Maruf was a prime example. On occasion, 
Kershaw’s brigade employed Abu Maruf and his men in raids, exploiting their general 
knowledge of enemy tactics as well as their precise intelligence of the locations of extrem-
ist leaders. One operation coordinated with Kershaw’s troops lasted an entire night as 
Sunni fighters cleared from Radwaniyah south to the Euphrates River, raiding AQI safe 
houses and opening an IED-choked road along the brigade’s sparsely manned western 
boundary.119 Abu Maruf embraced his role as informal ambassador for the Americans 
among nearby tribes, spurring further local accommodations, but was nonetheless an 
opportunist at heart.120 Funk, the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, com-
mander whose unit was responsible for Taji, also had dealings with Abu Maruf. Since the 
former insurgent’s idea of which Sunnis belonged to AQI seemed contrived and inconsis-
tent, Funk found Maruf capricious.121 The Awakening leader also magnified the already 
hostile relations between Sunni volunteers and General Nasser Ghanam’s Muthanna Bri-
gade in the Abu Ghraib area. In late summer, Abu Maruf’s men launched an indepen-
dent attack on some of the Muthanna Brigade’s checkpoints, having previously warned 
local U.S. officers that they might do so if tensions with Ghanam’s troops continued. 
When Kershaw learned that the armed tribal group had staged the raid from his sector, 
the U.S. commander clamped down and directed one of his battalions to act as a buffer 
between the hostile forces.122 Though a key figure in rallying the Zobaie tribe in the Rad-
waniyah-Zaidon area against AQI, Abu Maruf never completely severed his ties with the 
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insurgency and occasionally antagonized even his new American friends by continuing 
to speak, as he described it, the “language of the resistance.”123
Like Abu Maruf, Abu Abed also had shown courage in taking on Sunni insurgent 
cells in Ameriyah in May 2007, as well as a ruthless knack for rooting out their neighbor-
hood sanctuaries. Indeed, U.S.-backed fighters organizing across Baghdad demonstrated 
this unique expertise—not least because they knew where AQI operatives lived, recog-
nized their faces, and could pinpoint the locations of their weapons caches. The cumula-
tive effect was akin to squeezing the irreconcilable extremists out of Baghdad.124 Yet, like 
Abu Maruf, Abu Abed was a controversial partner for U.S. units. A charismatic figure, 
the self-styled “Robin Hood” made enemies in the Iraqi Islamic Party, whose Sunni 
power brokers saw his rapid rise in popularity politically threatening, while the Special 
Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)-like efficiency of his men elicited uneasy scrutiny from the 
conspiracy-minded Shi’a running the national government. That Abu Abed seemed to 
embrace the high-profile persona of a temperamental mafia boss did not help. On top of 
the infighting in his own organization, he occasionally had heated arguments with local 
Iraqi Army commanders, requiring the Americans to mediate.125 These factors created 
challenges in solidifying the security gains in Ameriyah. Recognizing Abu Abed as a 
leader of influence, the IFCNR engaged him in dialogue but delayed the police enroll-
ment of the Ameriyah “Knights” on the basis of accusations that the armed men carried 
on like thugs, charges that Kuehl, the U.S. commander of 1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry Reg-
iment, in Ameriyah, investigated but largely dismissed as a disinformation campaign 
intended to undermine the Awakening.126
Despite Petraeus and Odierno’s enthusiasm for U.S. units’ outreach to local Sunni 
groups, not all of the higher coalition headquarters’ involvement in reconciliation efforts 
was welcomed at lower unit levels. MNF-I’s strategic engagement cell, for example, was 
established mainly to track and coordinate the dozens of local reconciliation initiatives to 
prevent divisions from working at cross-purposes, or to identify additional opportunities 
for reconciliation and pass on the information to subordinate echelons. Lower-level units 
resented instances when the strategic engagement cell interacted directly with insurgent 
leaders and appeared to intervene in tactical activities. Marine Brigadier General John 
R. Allen, deputy commander of MNF-W, considered MNF-I’s involvement with tribal 
engagement disruptive and even harmful, since it potentially undermined the MEF as the 
coalition’s primary interlocutor with the Anbari sheikhs. “We bristle when higher head-
quarters wants to help us,” he told historians in late June 2007, disparaging the strategic 
engagement cell’s efforts to establish a unilateral relationship with the tribes in MNF-W’s 
area of operations.127 MNF-I’s supposed presumption that the delicate nature of reconcil-
iation inside Anbar was best left to “the next group of British officers in the front office” 
incensed him. “We love them coming down here, and we’re happy to brief them . . . and 
introduce them to people,” he offered, but “we don’t need their help.”128 Venting just 
days after a suicide bomber at Baghdad’s Mansour Hotel killed several Awakening lead-
ers who had been summoned for talks with the Maliki government, an angry Allen pro-
posed that, rather than try to control negotiations with the sheikhs, higher headquarters 
should contribute resources instead: “If you want to help me . . . give me $20 million. I’ll 
spend it where I know it’ll make some good.”129
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Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Paul Bishop (Released).
Major General John Allen With a Sheikh of the Albu Issa Tribe at Camp Fallujah.130
In the MND-C area of operations, another serious disagreement over reconciliation 
matters arose when MND-C commander Lynch developed guidance at odds with ways 
in which Kershaw’s brigade had begun to employ the newly minted Concerned Local 
Citizens (CLCs). Focused on major combat operations to clear Arab Jabour and Salman 
Pak as part of Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, Lynch considered MNC-I’s guidance 
to broker cease-fires with local tribes as contradictory with his operations, and a lower 
priority in any case.131 When it came to reconciliation, the division would “start small,” 
Lynch determined.132 Expecting a cool reception from the populace as U.S. forces pressed 
deeper into AQI sanctuaries, Brigadier General James L. Huggins, one of Lynch’s depu-
ties, believed, as late as mid-July, that reconciliation in the area of operations would come 
primarily “out of the barrel of an M4.”133 By contrast, Kershaw, whose 2d Brigade Combat 
Team, 10th Mountain Division, had been fighting vigorously in the “Triangle of Death” 
for 8 months, was pushing ahead of his boss to embrace tribal engagement and incor-
porate the CLCs into his brigade’s security scheme. As the summer progressed, the dif-
ference between the two commanders’ views grew wider, especially as Lynch, who had 
ordered 40,000 pounds of munitions dropped in the opening 10 seconds of clearing oper-
ations in Arab Jabour, emphasized overwhelming firepower. In the Triangle of Death, 
Kershaw wanted a more restrained use of firepower and clashed with Lynch on this issue 
and on the employment of the division’s combat aviation brigade. Kershaw frequently 
used helicopters to enhance his unit’s mobility, but he considered the division’s AH-64 
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Apaches too aggressive for a complex battlefield where U.S. and Iraqi troops maneuvered 
in conjunction with Sunni irregular forces. When MND-C’s attack helicopters mistook an 
armed group of tribesmen in Kershaw’s sector for AQI and fired on them, the brigade 
commander began to rely on OH-58 reconnaissance helicopters for support instead.134
Kershaw’s decision to employ the CLCs as “shock companies,” rather than merely 
informants or guards at fixed sites, also ran afoul of Lynch’s more conservative guidance. 
Concluding that an auxiliary force of armed tribesmen only would lead to more blood-
shed, the MND-C commander initially prohibited the practice. Forbidding his units to 
issue weapons and ammunition to the CLCs, Lynch also banned the act of fighting along-
side them. “They can give us the intel and we will fight al-Qaeda,” he directed.135 Having 
already gone through months of trial and error with Awakening forces, Kershaw consid-
ered Lynch’s restriction unnecessary and self-limiting, especially if U.S. units could mon-
itor the armed groups closely and oversee them in operations.136 Kershaw also disagreed 
with Lynch’s view that the coalition should avoid working with Sunni fighters who had 
American blood on their hands and dismissed his commander’s concern that AQI could 
infiltrate the armed groups cooperating with the brigade. In a midsummer memorandum 
to his subordinates, Kershaw emphasized the utility of prudent control measures, but 
implicitly criticized MND-C’s directives by warning against the impracticality of overly 
prescriptive guidance. “As I look at the daily disposition of the groups, it occurs to me 
that they exactly mirror the same cells that we were fighting against 2 months ago,” Ker-
shaw explained to his units. “We are now working with many of the same people we 
were fighting against. . . . So, the groups are already ‘infiltrated.’ Get over it.”137
THE WAR AGAINST IRAN’S MILITANT PROXIES
EFP Networks and the Iranian Border Problem
As the MNC-I operations against AQI intensified in the Baghdad belts and beyond, 
the coalition’s Shi’a militant problem grew, requiring more attention from U.S. com-
manders. Taking advantage of MNF-I’s renewed focus against Sunni militants elsewhere, 
Shi’a militants increased their attacks in the first half of 2007, conducting 65 explosively 
formed penetrator (EFP) attacks against coalition troops in April alone.138 As in 2006, a 
well-established network of Iranian-sponsored militants were smuggling EFP devices 
and other weapons across the Iran-Iraq border in the south and in the Diyala Valley. The 
most active EFP smugglers were the operatives headed by Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani and 
his brother Abu Yaser al-Sheibani, who moved the Iranian weapons through Maysan 
and Wasit Provinces to deliver them to JAM and other militant groups. In addition to 
the border crossings near Amarah and Kut, coalition analysts suspected the Sheibani 
brothers and other smugglers were using routes through the vast marshes that spanned 
the border south of Amara, just as they had done in their shadowy war against Saddam’s 
regime during and after the Iran-Iraq War. Though coalition special operators were able 
to capture Abu Yaser al-Sheibani on April 20, the incidence of EFP attacks nevertheless 
increased as the summer approached, eventually rising to 99 attacks during July.139
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Russell Bassett (Released).
Fully Constructed EFPs.140
The nature of the EFP smuggling operation and the employment of EFPs left U.S. 
commanders with no doubt that the weapons were part of an Iranian regime proxy war 
against the United States and parts of the Iraqi Government, a judgment that Petraeus 
and Crocker relayed to the visiting Nebraska Senator Charles T. Hagel on April 15.141 At 
that time, U.S. analysts believed that 100 percent of EFPs were meant to target coalition 
troops, though they often killed or wounded Iraqis as collateral damage.142 The EFPs also 
never proliferated into the hands of Sunni militants, indicating that the Iranians kept 
tight control of their distribution.
For coalition commanders, the operational problem was the difficulty of controlling 
the porous southeastern border—the same problem Lieutenant General Peter W. Chi-
arelli had reported to Casey almost exactly a year before. Reporting to Gates in mid-
May 2007, Petraeus noted that the Iranian regime appeared to be directly involved in 
the cross-border smuggling, with the coalition detecting at least 10 Iranian helicopter 
incursions into Iraq in the marsh-covered border area of southeastern Iraq since January. 
“Most of the observed flight paths followed smuggling routes,” Petraeus noted, “which 
may mean those routes are being reconnoitered to allow smugglers to avoid detection by 
border patrols and also assess deployed Coalition Forces.”143
To improve the coalition’s monitoring of the troublesome border area, Petraeus and 
Odierno expected MND-C to deploy coalition combat power to Wasit Province, in addi-
tion to its continuing efforts to support the Sunni Awakening and interdict AQI in Bagh-
dad’s southern belts. Situated between the Iranian border and Baghdad, Wasit Province 
contained key routes between Iran and various Shi’a militias and Special Groups, and 
in the past efforts to disrupt these supply lines suffered from a distinct lack of coalition 
troops and resources. The closest permanent coalition presence to the main border cross-
ing of Zurbatiyah was a hazardous 80-kilometer drive away from Forward Operating 
Base Delta, near the city of Kut, and coalition border security teams were able to search 
only a handful of the approximately 300 trucks that crossed into Iraq daily.144 The arrival 
of the 2,000 soldiers of the 3d Infantry Brigade from the Republic of Georgia in July 2007 
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enabled MNC-I to “thicken” the space between Kut and the border with a coalition troop 
presence and checkpoints designed to disrupt smuggling of weapons and explosives. In 
addition to the Georgian checkpoints, coalition commanders made plans to secure the 
primary border crossings with six new outposts constructed as a secondary screen to 
the existing Iraqi outposts. These new facilities would be outfitted with X-ray machines 
that would permit more effective vehicle searches as well as biometric systems to allow 
guards to identify known terrorists or militants.145 In September, construction began on 
Combat Outpost Shocker, which would allow MNC-I to station U.S. troops just 8 kilo-
meters from the Zurbatiyah crossing and allow a permanent coalition contingent on the 
border.146 Although smugglers would no doubt still find alternative routes along smaller 
roads or across the open desert, they would be vulnerable to detection by satellites or 
aerial surveillance.147
South of MND-C’s area of operations in Wasit Province, Maysan Province and its 
unruly capital of Amarah represented another, more complicated problem. In keeping 
with the transition campaign plan of 2006, the province had been passed to Provincial 
Iraqi Control in mid-April 2007, making the coalition’s ability to operate there unilater-
ally more difficult.148 Unlike the border crossing area in Wasit, Maysan’s marshy border 
was largely unwatched by either Iraqi or coalition forces, and coalition commanders sus-
pected Amarah to be a major Shi’a militant logistics hub. The province was riddled with 
Shi’a militant activity. On June 18, for example, coalition troops conducting a series of 
raids against the Special Groups (a term referring to highly trained, Iranian-sponsored 
Shi’a militants such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq) in Amarah and the border town of Majar al 
Kabir came under heavy small arms and RPG fire. In the ensuing firefight, they killed at 
least 20 militants before leaving the area with a captured member of an EFP smuggling 
network.149 Throughout June and July, coalition troops made similar raids throughout 
the province to try to stem the flow of EFPs into central Iraq, but with no real coalition 
presence in Amara or on Maysan’s border, U.S. commanders would have difficulty pre-
venting the Sheibani Network or other Shi’a militants from moving lethal materials into 
Iraq at will.
The Trilateral Talks and Iranian Involvement
In addition to the clear forensic evidence of Iranian-sponsored lethal assistance across 
the Iran-Iraq border, coalition commanders were learning more about Iranian involve-
ment with Shi’a militant groups from top Shi’a militant leaders themselves. On March 20 
in Basrah, coalition troops had captured Qais al-Khazali and his brother Laith al-Khazali 
based on evidence that the two men and their Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq group had been behind 
the January 2007 killing of U.S. military advisers at the police compound in Karbala. They 
had also captured a third man whose identity was unknown but who had pretended to 
be mute. On May 1, the third detainee, whom coalition officers referred to as “Hamid the 
mute,” began speaking to his captors in a coalition detention center, revealing himself to 
be Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior leader of Lebanese Hizballah’s external operations group. 
Daqduq admitted that he had deployed to Iraq to advise Qais al-Khazali and Asa’ib Ahl 
al-Haqq in their campaign against the coalition. Once talking, he and Khazali revealed 
extensive details about their Iranian-sponsored operations. “The evidence is impressive,” 
Petraeus wrote to Gates in late May:
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The five-page Qais Khazali sworn statement, made last week and marked with his inked 
fingerprints, is an unequivocal indictment of Iranian interference. His statement, along with those 
of his brother and other detainees, provides incontrovertible evidence that Iran is arming, funding, 
training, equipping, and advising Shi’a extremists operating in Iraq. Iranian interference began 
shortly after the Coalition began operations, but advanced significantly after the Najaf operation 
in 2004. The statements of those interrogated are buttressed by dozens of documents taken from 
the captured laptops. As Qais asserted, without Iranian funding, JAM special groups would not be 
able to function.150
Petraeus had spoken publicly about the implications of this evidence just a few days 
before, telling an American reporter that Iranian regime activities in Iraq were “abso-
lutely nefarious” and “hugely damaging to Iraq.” The Iranian regime had provided mil-
lions of dollars to different Shi’a militias since the 2003 invasion, Petraeus noted, and the 
scale of support was such that it had to denote Iranian regime policy. Asked whether the 
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei might not know about these Quds Force activi-
ties, Petraeus was emphatic. “He can’t not know,” the MNF-I commander said, noting 
that Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani reported directly to Khamenei. “It’s a 
massive operation. . . . If he doesn’t know about it, it’s the most out-of-control operation 
in the world.”151
Source: DoD briefing slides (Released).
Brothers Qais and Laith Khazali, Commanders of the  
Militia Group Asa’ib Ahl al Haqq.152
Within 2 weeks, Petraeus began briefing senior Iraqi officials on what MNF-I was 
learning from Khazali and others. Deputy Prime Minister Barham Saleh and National 
Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie were “properly taken aback and left for Iran on 
Sunday determined to take a strong message to Tehran” after they were informed, Pet-
raeus reported to Gates. Interior Minister Jawad Bolani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar 
Zebari urged Petraeus to broadcast Khazali’s and Daqduq’s taped confessions on Iraqi 
television—something Petraeus had to inform them the Geneva Convention would not 
allow.153 MNF-I leaders had their own plans to explain to the world the scale of Iranian 
involvement in any case. On July 2, Petraeus’s MNF-I spokesman, Brigadier General 
Kevin Bergner, held a press conference in Baghdad to lay out the evidence of the Iranian 
regime’s lethal involvement in Iraq, particularly its training and operational direction 
of the Special Groups. While capturing Qais al-Khazali, the coalition had discovered a 
22-page “in-depth planning and lessons learned document” about the January 20 attack 
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Khazali’s operatives had carried out against the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination 
Center, Bergner explained, and in the course of their questioning by coalition officials:
Ali Mussa Daqduq and Qais Khazali state that senior leadership within the Qods Force knew of 
and supported planning for the eventual Karbala attack that killed five coalition soldiers. Ali Musa 
Daqduq contends that the Iraqi Special Groups could not have conducted the complex operations 
without the support and direction of the Qods Forces. Daqduq and Khazali both confirm that Qais 
Khazali authorized the operation, and Azhar al Dulaimi, who we killed in an operation earlier this 
year, executed the operation.154
Although Petraeus and other coalition officials had previously mentioned their suspi-
cions of Iranian involvement in Iraq, the July 2 press briefing was the most comprehen-
sive public exposure of the evidence of Iran’s destabilizing role and Lebanese Hizballah’s 
involvement. As Petraeus described to Gates, the rollout was meant to “put Iran on 
notice that we know of their activities and that those activities are unacceptable.”155 As 
if to punctuate MNF-I’s point, on the morning of Bergner’s press conference Shi’a mil-
itants shelled Forward Operating Base Echo in Diwaniya, attacking the Multi-National 
Division-Central South (MND-CS) base with 80 mortar rounds.
Later the same month, against the backdrop of the public exposition on July 2, Crocker 
met with Iranian ambassador Hassan Kazemi-Ghomi in the second round of trilateral 
talks among the United States, Iraq, and Iran, where the American and Iranian represen-
tatives agreed on July 24 to form a security subcommittee that would conduct further 
talks. “On one hand, we’ll seek cooperation on an anti-AQI agenda,” Petraeus reported to 
the Pentagon, but “on the other hand, we’ll remain firm in showing the Iranians we have 
extensive knowledge of their activities and will confront them as they support Shi’a mili-
tias inside Iraq.”156 With Operation PHANTOM THUNDER pushing AQI away from the 
capital, MNF-I’s statistics showed that Shi’a militias were likely responsible for approx-
imately two-thirds of attacks against U.S. troops in Baghdad, and Petraeus and Crocker 
intended the coming security talks to be a venue for senior Iraqi and U.S. officials to pres-
ent a united front against Iranian lethal aid to the militias.157 On August 6, Bergner and 
Crocker’s political-military counselor, Ambassador Marcie Ries, met with Iranian coun-
terparts again in a meeting hosted by the hard-nosed Iraqi Interior Ministry intelligence 
chief Hussein Ali Kamal. The “surprisingly good” Kamal “kept [the meeting] focused on 
AQI and the militias,” Petraeus recounted, while the U.S. officials “stressed the need for 
tangible improvement in reducing EFPs, indirect-fire, and support to special groups.” 
As U.S. officials had noted in the earlier meetings, “the Iranians seemed off-balance in 
comparison to their Iraqi counterparts’ determined leadership of the meeting,” Petraeus 
added in his weekly letter to Gates.158
In fact, U.S. officials noted that the Iranian delegates had appeared nervous and 
unsure of themselves in each of the trilateral meetings, seemingly afraid of being held 
to account for going beyond a very limited set of talking points. An incident the same 
week as the August 6 meeting might have explained why. On August 11, Iraqi Minister 
of State for National Security Affairs Shirwan al-Waeli brought to Petraeus a message 
from Qassem Soleimani, who told Waeli to relay word that he, Soleimani, was “the sole 
decision-maker on Iranian activities in Iraq” and that he was willing to decrease the Spe-
cial Groups activities in exchange for the release of Qais al-Khazali.159 “I told Waeli to 
relay back to Soleimani that we believe that Iran has overreached and is on the brink of 
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attracting international isolation,” Petraeus reported back to Gates. “I noted that I am not 
a policy maker,” he continued, but:
as the commander on the ground, I am starting to think that Iran is attacking Iraqi and coalition 
soldiers through proxies - the JAM they have trained, funded, armed, and in some cases even 
directed. To provide a bit more jolt, I said that I am considering telling the President that I believe 
Iran is, in fact, waging war on the US in Iraq, with all of the US public and governmental responses 
that could come from that revelation. For what it’s worth, I do believe that Iran has gone beyond 
merely striving for influence in Iraq and could be creating proxies to actively fight us, thinking 
that they can keep us distracted while they try to build WMD and set up JAM to act like Lebanese 
Hezbollah in Iraq.160
Soleimani’s message sent two signals. First, it reinforced how important the Special 
Groups were to the Iranian regime, particularly Qais al-Khazali and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, 
which Soleimani and the regime clearly considered a vital Iranian instrument inside 
Iraq. Second, it seemed timed to neutralize the trilateral talks going on in Baghdad and 
ensure that no other channel might emerge to challenge Soleimani’s control of the Iranian 
regime’s operations in Iraq. The Iranian delegates at the trilateral meetings were “on a 
short string,” clearly not empowered to deal substantively with the United States, and 
“had to take breaks and make frequent calls back” to their superiors for guidance during 
the talks, one U.S. diplomat recalled.161 Soleimani, by contrast, demonstrated through 
his continuing sponsorship of Shi’a militants, and by the toll they took on U.S. troops in 
summer 2007, that he had a virtually free hand in his Iraq operations.
For American officials in Iraq, expectations for the talks were low at the outset and 
sank even lower after three rounds of talks that produced nothing. As one senior diplo-
mat put it, “as a practical matter, it was hard to see how you get to a stable arrangement 
on anything that Iran and its many clients actively opposed, so it was important to make 
the effort.”162 Crocker and the U.S. Embassy prepared for a planned fourth round of talks 
in the fall of 2007, bringing some of the State Department’s top Iran experts to Baghdad 
in anticipation of the talks, but as the weeks and then months passed, the Iranians failed 
to set a return date and let the engagement lapse.163 In retrospect, the three sessions of 
the trilateral talks of 2007 may have represented a debate between two camps within 
the Iranian regime: one that saw some utility in talks with the United States if it would 
ultimately remove the U.S. military presence in Iraq, and another that believed the talks 
were, at best, premature. If there was in fact an intra-Iranian policy debate, the latter view 
apparently prevailed.
The JAM War Against ISCI and the Maliki Government
Despite his assertion that he controlled Iran’s Iraq policy and his offer to rein in his 
Iraqi proxies if the United States was willing to deal with him, in August 2007 Soleimani 
was in the midst of an intra-Iraqi Shi’a conflict that threatened the viability of his Iraq 
strategy. Since striking his deal to support the Special Groups and JAM in 2004, Solei-
mani had sought to maintain a unified Iraqi Shi’a militant front against the U.S.-led coa-
lition, with the aim of forcing the U.S. military out of Iraq. For 3 years, he and his Quds 
Force generals had been highly active in arming, training, and funding any of the major 
Shi’a militant factions that were willing to fight against the coalition. By the summer of 
2007, it was clear that his militant proxies were fighting each other as much as they were 
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fighting coalition troops, and his continued support to Shi’a militant factions had begun 
to amount to an arming of Shi’a groups that were in rebellion against a Shi’a government 
ostensibly aligned with the Iranian regime. In short, by trying to arm all Iraqi Shi’a oppo-
nents of the United States, Soleimani and the Quds Force had helped incite a civil war 
among their top Iraqi clients, and it was unclear whether Soleimani or anyone else was 
actually in full control of the most active Shi’a militant elements.
A series of high-profile attacks drew attention to the broader intra-Shi’a conflict puls-
ing ominously throughout the southern provinces. On June 5, the chief Sadrist official in 
Babil was killed, followed by the murder of a Najafi cleric associated with Sistani. The 
Shi’a-on-Shi’a violence surged as the summer progressed, with operatives from JAM and 
Badr engaging in a deadly tit-for-tat as Sadrists and Sistani representatives were killed 
in rapid succession through July and early August. The tensions between the two sides 
escalated into larger-scale violence as well. On June 19 and 20, the Nasiriyah Tactical Sup-
port Unit, a well-regarded ISF unit headed by Colonel Naji Rostum Sahra (also known 
as Abu Liqa), came under attack by as many as 200 JAM fighters north of the Euphra-
tes River. Through 2 days of fighting, MNC-I provided close air support and coalition 
reinforcements as Abu Liqa and his SWAT operators held off their JAM enemies. Prime 
Minister Maliki and Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi (himself a Nasiriyah native) gave 
coalition commanders a green light to attack “any and all JAM elements” in the city, even 
though the province was already under Iraqi control.164 At least 20 JAM fighters died in 
the clashes before calm was restored.165
 
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
General David Petraeus With Iraqi Police Colonel Naji Rostum Sahra,  
Also Known as Abu Liqa.166
The fighting in Nasiriyah was followed 2 weeks later by another large engagement in 
still-restive Diwaniya, initiated by a JAM indirect-fire attack against Camp Echo on the 
same day as Bergner’s press conference. Accurate enough to suggest that JAM elements 
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had benefited from “inside help” in their targeting, the barrage of more than 75 rockets 
and mortars only wounded 1 coalition soldier, but it damaged equipment and came close 
to igniting critical ammunition stores. F-16 fighters streaked over Diwaniyah in response, 
destroying three buildings identified as enemy firing points. A raid by U.S. special oper-
ations forces against a JAM cell later that week brought a large number of fighters into 
the streets, where they seemed poised for a march on Camp Echo until an AC-130 strike 
mowed down scores of fighters, decisively ending the attack.167 With close air support 
readily available, the coalition retained ample firepower, but that advantage itself could 
not prevent JAM from returning to Diwaniya’s neighborhoods in strength once again. 
However, Petraeus noted in his report on the battle that Diwaniya residents—and Prime 
Minister Maliki as well—had responded favorably to the coalition’s actions, while Sadrist 
leaders had chastised JAM members for firing from inside the city.168
The Nasiriyah and Diwaniya clashes were part of an escalating confrontation between 
JAM and the Special Groups on one side and the Shi’a parties inside the government 
on the other, with the coalition increasingly active in support of the government and 
JAM ever more active against the coalition, especially in Baghdad. The same week as the 
Diwaniyah fighting, coalition troops conducting a raid to arrest a police officer connected 
to JAM in Sadr City found themselves under heavy fire from other presumably JAM-
linked Sadr City policemen as they withdrew from the neighborhood. Four days later, 
Shi’a militants attacked the International Zone with 35 mortar rounds launched from 
multiple locations in Sadr City during a 90-second synchronized attack, a sharp change 
from the Shi’a militants’ previous tactics of firing only 1 or 2 rounds at a time. The militia 
attack on the Green Zone had “a psychological effect” and had even “shaken the Prime 
Minister a bit,” Petraeus reported.169 The Shi’a militants were shelling the seat of their 
own government, where the Sadrists still had members in the Parliament.
Meanwhile, the Shi’a militants’ assassination campaign in southern Iraq culminated 
with the killing of two Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) governors in mid-August. 
On August 11, Qadisiyah Governor Khalil Jalil Hamza and the provincial police chief 
died amid a hail of small-arms fire and an EFP explosion in Diwaniya. MNF-I quickly 
concluded that the attack had been carried out by JAM operatives in retaliation for Ham-
za’s support for the ongoing coalition-ISF operations against local JAM groups.170 Nine 
days later, Muhammad al-Hassina, a former Badr Corps member who was governor of 
Muthanna Province, fell victim to a string of EFPs that tore through his convoy. Reeling 
from these high-profile losses, ISCI politicians blamed the Iranian-backed Special Groups 
immediately, and by summer’s end the new ISCI governor of Qadisiyah was calling for 
another offensive against the militias in Diwaniya.171
Commenting on the two assassinations, Petraeus noted “Tensions between ISCI/Badr 
and JAM are high now in the southern provinces. This also may heighten tensions with 
Iran, as there is considerable belief that Iran may have been connected to these events.” 
The events also underscored for Prime Minister Maliki the threat that the Iranian-backed 
militias posed, Petraeus continued, observing, “Iranian influence appears to be more 
damaging over time.”172
It was a judgment that Petraeus had been forming for several months, as the Shi’a 
militant threat gradually came into greater relief and al-Qaeda in Iraq receded from the 
Baghdad region. “I tend to agree with the assessment of Ray Odierno and see that JAM 
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is more of a hindrance to long-term security in Iraq than is AQI,” he had written to Gates 
on June 30, adding that, “JAM is a much tougher nut and will require kinetics against the 
rogue leaders and active engagements to make the mainstream more constructive.”173 In 
terms of the militias’ lethality, Petraeus was right—about two-thirds of U.S. casualties 
in the following month of July came at the hands of Shi’a militants. The events of the 
summer also showed a Sadrist militant front that was in disarray as it faced pressure 
from both the coalition and its rivals in the Iraqi Government. The Sadrists’ top problem 
was that their leader, Moqtada Sadr, appeared not to be in full control of his numerous 
militant commanders and fighters. In early July, he had suddenly returned to Iran, leav-
ing Sheikh Ahmed al-Sheibani in charge of JAM activities and issuing little guidance to 
his organization.174 As Sheibani took command back in Iraq, MNF-I detected that JAM 
leaders were purging their ranks, and as JAM groups mounted large-scale indirect fire 
attacks in Baghdad, coalition commanders could not tell how many of the Sadrist militant 
groups actually followed Sadr’s commands.175 Sheibani left for Iran in mid-July, part of 
an exodus of JAM commanders who were spending more time in Iran as Maliki con-
sented to more coalition operations against longtime JAM sanctuaries in Baghdad and 
elsewhere.176 By mid-August, Petraeus judged that “Sadr is at least a bit marginalized; 
even the Iranians think he is a weak leader.”177
The most significant factor working against the Sadrists, however, was that they had 
worn out their welcome with Nuri al-Maliki, and the Prime Minister was increasingly 
willing to fight them. After the Sadrists had withdrawn from his cabinet in April, Maliki 
had spent 3 months working toward fashioning a new governing coalition among Iraq’s 
four major parties that excluded the Sadrists. Petraeus anticipated that Maliki was “set-
ting the stage for a more direct confrontation with the radical elements of JAM.”178 Both 
Petraeus and the Iraqi Prime Minister detected an erosion of JAM’s popular support as 
well. A late July coalition clash against JAM in Karbala had revealed local disaffection 
with the militia when JAM fighters commandeered a hospital and demanded that the 
doctors treat their wounded, instigating a “ruckus” when the doctors refused. “This atti-
tude seems to match that of many Karbala residents, who believe JAM’s presence will 
bring on AQI attacks,” Petraeus reported.179 When an August 8 coalition operation in 
Sadr City resulted in 32 JAM militiamen killed, Petraeus observed, “while such an opera-
tion would have received great opposition only a few months ago, today Iraqis are happy 
to have these rogue militias cleaned off of their streets.”180
The Karbala Fiasco and the JAM Freeze
The week following the assassination of Governor Hamza in Diwaniya, Maliki told 
Petraeus that “many Shi’a communities are getting fed up with JAM,” and discussed the 
Sadrists’ prospects among a Shi’a population that was growing resentful of them. Reflect-
ing on the discussions, Petraeus reported to Gates on August 18:
my take on JAM is that they, like AQI, have overplayed their hand in some areas. . . . JAM continues 
to demonstrate the destructive nature of their organization, and we are seeing a growing rejection by 
Iraqi citizens of JAM. JAM protected Shi’a communities when AQI and Sunni insurgents threatened 
them, but with that threat dissipating in some areas, JAM is being viewed more as criminal gangs 
and thugs than protectors. Many Iraqi leaders talk about the danger of the Hezbollization of Iraq by 
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JAM, as well, but both the Prime Minister and I sense that JAM lacks the capability and widespread 
acceptance among the Shi’a to take on such a role. When the Shi’a communities turn against JAM, 
as many of the Sunni communities have done against AQI, this effort will turn more to the good.181
The turning of the Shi’a population against JAM was not long in coming. The low-
level conflict among the Shi’a factions finally boiled over in late August in the shrine city 
of Karbala. On August 27, Sadrist gunmen attacked Badr-associated government security 
guards at the Imam Ali shrine, the destination of more than one million pilgrims who 
had made their way to the city that month to celebrate the birth of the twelfth imam. For 
weeks, Iraqi security forces and the coalition had made careful plans to guard the pil-
grimage against AQI attacks, but had not anticipated that the actual threat would come 
from the Sadrists. Horrified Iraqis watched footage of the fighting as 52 people were 
killed and another 279 wounded, many of them pilgrims caught in the crossfire.
The clashes in Karbala quickly set off fighting between JAM and Badr elsewhere, 
including in Baghdad, where gun battles broke out between the groups for 2 days before 
finally calming down. The day after the Karbala violence, an enraged Prime Minister 
Maliki led a 52-vehicle convoy to Karbala to confront JAM fighters and leaders, arrest 
local officials who had been complicit or incompetent in the JAM attacks, and shut down 
the pilgrimage, ordering the hundreds of thousands of remaining pilgrims to leave the 
city for their own safety. The Prime Minister, cheered by crowds along the route from 
Baghdad, brandished a pistol upon arriving in Karbala and arrested scores of Sadrists 
implicated in the violence as quick reaction forces from the Interior and Defense minis-
tries deployed to lock down the city, including Major General Othman al-Ghanimi and 
his 8th Iraqi Army Division.182
The Karbala fiasco forced Moqtada Sadr to act quickly to deflect the criticism descend-
ing upon his party and repair the embarrassing impression that his movement had become 
dominated by out-of-control, murderous gangs. The carnage near one of the Shi’a world’s 
holiest sites was a clear sign of the depths to which JAM had sunk: a militant organization 
formed in 2003 expressly to protect Shi’a pilgrims from violence was now seen on televi-
sion slaughtering them. Three days after the incident, Sadr’s top representatives read out 
a public statement in which he announced a freeze of all JAM operations for 6 months, 
during which he encouraged militia members to cooperate with the ISF and refrain from 
attacking the coalition.183 Inside the JAM leadership, Sadr went further and ordered his 
subordinates to overhaul the militia with an educational program for the rank and file, 
while reportedly clashing with his deputy Ahmed al-Sheibani over Sheibani’s handling 
of the Karbala incident.184
The Sadrist fiasco and JAM freeze delivered MNF-I an unexpected respite from the 
main body of the Sadrist militia organization and also handed Petraeus and coalition 
leaders a useful tool with which to attack those militias that continued to fight. Coalition 
leaders could now argue that any Shi’a militants that attacked coalition forces were not a 
part of Sadr’s “honorable” followers, but rather criminal groups who were subject to coa-
lition and ISF targeting. The halt to “mainstream JAM” activities helped coalition com-
manders identify and target Special Groups, breakaway groups, and rogue militants who 
distinguished themselves from mainstream JAM by continuing their activities despite 
Sadr’s call for a freeze on activities. Coalition commanders also judged that Sadr, though 
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weakened, had not decided to drop militant resistance against the coalition for good. 
“They were embarrassed over the Karbala events,” Odierno concluded. “I think they 
called the ceasefire not because they want to stop violent action, but because they want to 
regroup, reorganize, [and] see if they can get control of their forces so they can continue 
to influence the future of Iraq.”185
Some analysts later concluded that the coalition benefited from a strategic windfall as 
Sadr supposedly unilaterally ordered his militia to stand down from attacks against the 
coalition. In truth, the JAM freeze was Sadr’s desperate attempt to rescue his movement 
from a severe political backlash inside the Iraqi Shi’a community. The Sadrist stand-down 
was also, at least in part, a defensive reaction to several months of intensifying pressure 
on JAM and the Special Groups from both the coalition and the ISF. On a macro scale, it 
represented the beginning of a reversal of fortunes for Maliki and Sadr. Just as the Kar-
bala incident caused a dramatic change in the Sadrists’ near-term political position, it did 
the same for Maliki. The Prime Minister’s decisive action had increased both his stature 
and his confidence, Petraeus noted a few days later, as well as Maliki’s confidence in the 
ISF units that had responded quickly to secure Karbala.186 The confrontation with JAM 
in Karbala marked the beginning of a high-stakes Maliki-Sadrist showdown that would 
culminate in Basrah and Baghdad the following spring.
MNF-I AND THE OPPOSITION TO THE SURGE
CENTCOM Has Its Doubts, Again
As the operational situation in Iraq began to change in the summer of 2007, the views 
of the MNF-I and CENTCOM commanders diverged again. Less than 3 months into 
Admiral William J. Fallon’s command, his initial skepticism about the prospects of the 
surge had developed into virtual opposition to Petraeus’s approach. By late May 2007, 
before the last of the surge units had arrived in Iraq, Fallon concluded that the surge was 
doomed to strategic failure. He set out to develop an alternative campaign plan for Iraq 
that would, in his view, allow the United States to regain its strategic flexibility by reduc-
ing what he believed was an over-commitment of U.S. military resources to the Middle 
East. In June, as Petraeus and Crocker’s subordinates fleshed out the new joint campaign 
plan, Fallon dispatched Rear Admiral James “Sandy” Winnefeld to Iraq to assess the 
situation and formulate a plan to significantly drawdown U.S. troops by year’s end, far 
ahead of the scheduled end of the surge. The Navy men shared the belief that Army lead-
ers had become invested emotionally in Iraq and could no longer clearly judge Iraq’s stra-
tegic importance and the coalition’s chances of success. Journeying to Baghdad to attend 
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) change of command 
in early June, Fallon took it as a bad sign when incoming commander Lieutenant General 
James M. Dubik delivered his assumption of command speech in phonetic Arabic. Dubik 
had meant it as a gesture of respect to the assembled crowd of hundreds of Iraqi officers, 
but Fallon saw it as evidence that Army leaders had become too deeply ensconced in 
Baghdad.187 Visiting the vast post exchange at Camp Liberty later, Winnefeld walked 
through rows of flat-screen televisions for sale to American troops, a sight that seemed to 
him emblematic of an Army that had settled into a permanent mission in Iraq—though 
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Petraeus coincidentally had tasked MNF-I 
Command Sergeant Major Marvin Hill to qui-
etly end such sales.188 The CENTCOM com-
mander and Winnefeld were determined to 
help extricate the U.S. military from the Iraq 
morass. Fallon and Winnefeld’s alternative 
Iraq strategy involved ending the U.S. combat 
mission in the country and accelerating the 
transition to Iraqi control, virtually the same 
concept U.S. forces would adopt during Oper-
ation NEW DAWN more than 3 years later.189
To assist Fallon in refining this approach, 
Brigadier General Daniel P. Bolger, having 
recently served as the commander of the Coa-
lition Military Assistance Training Team, trav-
eled to Tampa to help Winnefeld set down the 
particulars of how to end combat activities and 
convert U.S. units into transition teams. As the 
plan took shape with Bolger’s input, Winn-
feld shared its details with U.S. commanders 
in Iraq and the Gulf region. In Kuwait, he met 
with Army Central commander Lieutenant 
General R. Steven Whitcomb to discuss ways 
in which the command could more quickly 
withdraw the Army from Iraq.191 In Bahrain, he 
met Marine Corps Central commander Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, but when 
Winnefeld offered the observation that the surge had failed in its objectives and that 
U.S. forces should begin to withdraw, an astounded Mattis protested that the Marines 
in MNF-W were close to winning their war against AQI. Enemy activity had dropped 
to just a few incidents per week, and the Marines had partnered with the Awakening to 
mobilize tens of thousands of new Anbari counterinsurgents. However, in his exchange 
with Winnefeld, it seemed to Mattis that these strategically significant developments in 
Anbar had somehow escaped CENTCOM’s notice. “We’ve got our boots on their wind-
pipe and you’re telling me to lift my foot and let them live,” the Marine general declared, 
incredulously.192
In Iraq, Winnefeld met with each of the division commanders and Odierno. The 
MNC-I commander was not receptive to the CENTCOM commander’s withdrawal plans. 
Odierno believed that Winnefeld’s planning was conceptually sound and represented 
what the United States would eventually have to do in Iraq, but he was alarmed that 
Winnefeld and Fallon were promoting the idea at such an early stage, when the loss of 
badly needed combat power would probably ensure the failure of the U.S. campaign.193 
Near the end of the admiral’s fact-finding tour, Winnefeld and Petraeus met and calmly 
debated the competing strategies. In the end, Petraeus noted that he believed the Presi-
dent had given him the task of formulating the mission and campaign plan for U.S. forces 
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Monica A. King 
(Released).
Rear Admiral James Winnefeld.190
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in Iraq, and offered, “if someone else is going to present an alternative plan to my boss, 
then I’m going to have a problem with that.”194
At a 2-day commanders’ conference at CENTCOM’s forward headquarters in Qatar 
the following month, Fallon pressed subtly for a change of mission in Iraq. The admi-
ral told his subordinates that the commands across the CENTCOM area of responsibil-
ity were “too operationally and tactically focused” and were failing to be “cognizant of 
strategic realities that are changing.”195 He also contended that the political dynamics 
in Washington militated against the continuation of the surge. “We are not going to be 
able to make any of the domestic political constraints go away,” Fallon warned his sub-
ordinates. “Dave [Petraeus] is going to have to deal with alternatives . . . that may be 
pushed on us,” the admiral said, and, as a result, MNF-I should, “prepare for a change of 
mission, the downgrading of population security to secondary concern in favor of tran-
sition.”196 Signaling the depth of the divergence in worldviews, as the conference turned 
to regional security matters beyond Iraq, Petraeus weighed in, offering counterpoints to 
Fallon’s perspectives.197
In keeping with his warning, 3 days later Fallon dispatched Winnefeld to Baghdad 
again to present the conclusions of his campaign assessment to Petraeus. Winnefeld and 
the CENTCOM commander proposed a gradual troop drawdown to 10 brigades starting 
in November 2007, with three-quarters of U.S. combat forces departing Iraq by the end 
of 2009.198 Just as Casey had recommended in 2006, Winnefeld proposed that U.S. troops 
should focus on transitioning security responsibility to the Iraqis, while special opera-
tions forces continued to hunt AQI and Special Group leaders. Only with this mission 
change, Winnefeld argued, could the U.S. military restore the strategic flexibility needed 
to respond to crises in other parts of the world.199 A puzzled Petraeus replied that, while 
MNF-I would examine some of Winnefeld’s ideas, no one could be expected to come up 
with a credible Iraq strategy after spending only a few days on the ground as Winnefeld 
had done.200 The general pointed out that the last elements of the fifth surge brigade 
had only arrived in June, and time was needed to gauge the surge’s impact. Fallon and 
Winnefeld’s proposal to withdraw troops was also disconnected from major upcoming 
Iraqi political events, he observed, such as the provincial elections expected in late 2008. 
What was more, Petraeus argued, their plan was essentially the same one U.S. troops had 
employed from 2003 to 2006, which had already failed. Petraeus also reiterated that he 
would protest strongly—even to the point of offering the President his resignation—if 
someone attempted to present an alternative Iraq strategy to the President or SECDEF.201
Comparing notes after the discussion, Fallon and Winnefeld shared the belief that 
Petraeus was manipulating the President into sticking with a failing surge strategy, and 
that an intervention by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the SECDEF was needed.202 Among 
the senior Army officers in Baghdad, the Winnefeld-Fallon plan caused confusion and 
frustration. “[Winnefeld] came here with a conclusion and was looking for evidence,” 
one U.S. commander charged.203 Instead of attempting to undermine the strategy set by 
Bush and MNF-I, Petraeus believed that Fallon and CENTCOM should be working to 
gain support and aid from other Middle Eastern countries and focusing on resolving 
regional issues, especially by stemming the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq.204 Senior 
MNF-I officials also were frustrated at Fallon’s seeming obstruction of MNF-I’s requests 
for forces and other resources needed to support the surge. There was a suspicion at the 
Baghdad headquarters that Fallon’s focus on developing an alternative to the surge was 
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distracting him from his other duties.205 Petraeus followed up his July 17 meeting with 
Winnefeld by calling Fallon in order to reemphasize his opposition to a what he saw 
as CENTCOM’s “simplistic and strategically unsound proposal.” He also registered his 
disappointment that his immediate boss in the chain of command was undermining—
rather than supporting—a surge plan that was only 4 months into execution, with the 
final surge forces barely established and operating. Commanders in Iraq were beginning 
to see significant gains from the surge operations, Petraeus said, and further progress 
appeared likely in the months ahead. He also noted his concern about the amount of 
time that requests for forces were taking to get through CENTCOM. “I can take ‘No’ for 
an answer, admiral,” Petraeus said, “but I can’t take no answer.” Yet if the answer was 
no, the MNF-I commander said, the admiral should be prepared for Petraeus to raise 
the issue with the President and SECDEF, given the assurance of support the President 
had made before Petraeus took command and had reiterated in weekly videoconferences 
ever since.206
Back in Washington, however, an increasing number of U.S. leaders seemed to agree 
with Fallon’s view that the surge was doomed to fail. By midsummer, the odds had grown 
that the U.S. Congress might pass legislation for an early end to the surge.207 Eventually, 
these dynamics influenced Fallon’s military advice to his superiors. During a videocon-
ference with Bush on August 30, Fallon questioned whether a continuation of the surge 
could garner enough congressional support, to which Bush replied that politics and Con-
gress were his concern, not the admiral’s. Five days later, the President, accompanied 
by the other National Security Council (NSC) principals, met with both Fallon and Pet-
raeus at Al Asad air base, where Bush received updates on the situation in Baghdad and 
also met Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, the leader of the Awakening in Ramadi. In the 
presence of his war cabinet at Al Asad, the President reaffirmed his support for Petrae-
us’s campaign plan, finally and firmly resolving the 5-month-long dispute between the 
CENTCOM and MNF-I commanders in Petraeus’s favor.208
The September Congressional Testimony
The President’s and NSC principals’ visit to Anbar on September 3 took place 1 week 
before Petraeus and Crocker were scheduled to appear before the U.S. Congress to give 
their assessment of the surge and its progress. The direction of the Iraq War had become 
one of the most divisive political issues in the United States since the Vietnam war and the 
two men’s scheduled congressional testimony was a highly anticipated and high-stakes 
event. Although the summer had passed without a congressional effort to terminate the 
surge, the idea of a legislative intervention was still a possibility, and much would hinge 
on whether Petraeus and Crocker could point to an improving situation on the ground. A 
few late-summer events had greased the rails for the MNF-I commander and U.S. ambas-
sador, most notably a visit to Iraq by influential American think-tank scholars. After tour-
ing conflict zones around central Iraq with MNF-I escorts, Kenneth Pollack and Michael 
O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution co-wrote a New York Times op-ed entitled, “A War 
We Just Might Win,” in which the scholars argued that “we are finally getting somewhere 
in Iraq,” with “sustainable stability” potentially within reach of the U.S.-led coalition due 
to the significant security gains and the growing competence of the ISF.209 The article was 
so effective at slowing the congressional move toward anti-surge legislation that Petraeus 
236
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
referred to it as a new phenomenon, the “strategic op-ed,” and thereafter opened Iraq to 
a series of similar visiting delegations of U.S. scholars and other intellectuals. In addition 
to these delegations, Petraeus, Crocker, and Odierno had also hosted dozens of members 
of Congress in Baghdad by the end of the summer, considering the visiting delegations 
not as a distraction, but rather as opportunities to clarify the situation on the ground to 
U.S. policymakers.210
In his prepared statements to the Foreign 
Relations and Armed Services committees 
in both the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives on September 10-11, Petraeus gave 
a data-based assessment of the campaign. 
“The military objectives of the surge are, in 
large measure, being met,” Petraeus judged, 
before walking the committee members 
through a series of detailed statistical reports 
and charts displayed on easels in the hearing 
room. Overall, Petraeus noted that security 
incidents had declined in 8 of the previous 12 
weeks, to levels not seen since spring 2006. 
The decline was mostly because of U.S. and 
Iraqi troops’ success in driving AQI out of 
its sanctuaries and disrupting the Shi’a mili-
tant groups. “The fundamental source of the 
conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic 
and sectarian communities for power and 
resources,” Petraeus testified, and in this 
regard, it was encouraging that ethno-sectar-
ian deaths had dropped by 55 percent since 
December 2006 across Iraq, and 80 percent in Baghdad. Iraq as a whole was becoming 
less volatile, with violent civilian deaths declining by 45 percent since December, and by 
70 percent in Baghdad itself.212
Petraeus reported that the nascent Awakening among Sunni tribes had had a signifi-
cant impact on these figures and was spreading quickly from Anbar to other areas, in the 
process damaging AQI’s ability to operate. In 8 months, MNF-I and its Iraqi allies had 
killed or captured nearly 100 AQI leaders and about 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. They 
had also robbed AQI of its war-making machinery. “As we have gone on the offensive in 
former al-Qaeda in Iraq and insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly sup-
ported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased number of arms, ammuni-
tion, and explosives caches,” Petraeus noted. U.S. troops had already seized 4,400 caches 
in 2007, about 1,700 more than MNF-I had discovered in all of 2006. Partly because of 
this massive loss of materiel, insurgent IED attacks had dropped by one-third during the 
summer of 2007, and car bombs had declined from a high of 175 in March to about 90 in 
August. In Anbar, monthly attacks had dropped sharply from 1,350 in October 2006 to 
just over 200 in August 2007, a decline of more than 80 percent.213
Source: DoD photo (Released).
General David Petraeus Testifies  
Before Congress, September 2007.211
SUMMER 2007—THE SURGE OF OPERATIONS
237
At the same time, more than 20,000 Awakening members had come forward to join 
the Iraqi police and thousands more had hopes of joining the army. The ISF was set to 
expand from 445,000 to as many as 485,000, and the Iraqi Government was committed 
to spend $1.6 billion in foreign military sales with the United States. In other words, Pet-
raeus reassured Congress that the Iraqis would soon be paying their own way for their 
security forces. The general also noted that about 95 of Iraq’s 140 combat battalions were 
now capable of taking the lead, with coalition support.214
Alongside these positive signs, Petraeus identified a number of serious obstacles that 
needed to be dealt with before Iraq could be stabilized. “Foreign and home-grown terror-
ists, insurgents, militia extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian competition 
toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and, especially, by Iran fuel that violence,” he 
reported. He added that “lack of adequate government capacity, lingering sectarian mis-
trust, and various forms of corruption add to Iraq’s challenges.” Not all of Iraq’s prov-
inces were progressing at the same rate: Ninawa and Salahadin, in particular, remained 
violent and had not yet experienced the same stabilizing trend that had come to Anbar 
and Baghdad. The IRGC Quds Force and its Iraqi Shi’a militant proxies were a persistent 
problem as well. “It is increasingly apparent to both coalition and Iraqi leaders that Iran, 
through the use of the Quds Force, seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbol-
lah-like force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the Iraqi state and coali-
tion forces in Iraq,” Petraeus noted.215
Though MNF-I had increased its targeting of Shi’a militia leaders in the previous 6 
months, the Quds Force proxies had still “assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi Governmen-
tal leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with advanced explosive devices provided by 
Iran, and indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone and elsewhere.”216 
Nevertheless, Petraeus concluded that, based on the prevailing trends, he and Odierno 
agreed that the surge brigades could be withdrawn from Iraq by summer 2008 without 
endangering Iraq’s security. He added that he would allow the 13th MEU to depart Iraq 
later in the month without requesting another unit to replace it, followed by the with-
drawal of a BCT in December, also without a replacement. Four additional brigades and 
two Marine battalions would depart without being replaced in the first 7 months of 2008, 
bringing MNF-I to its pre-surge level of 15 brigade-sized units in mid-July.217
From that point, however, Petraeus argued that the drawdown should slow, and that 
the United States should not yet try to prescribe the troop levels or pace of withdrawal 
after mid-2008. “In my professional judgment, it would be premature to make recommen-
dations on the pace of such reductions at this time,” he offered. “In fact, our experience 
in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it 
can be misleading and even hazardous.” In this line of argument, Petraeus pushed back 
directly on Fallon and others who wanted to institute a scheduled drawdown, rather than 
the conditions-based approach Petraeus favored. Petraeus also argued against Fallon’s 
months-long pressure for a change of mission:
One may argue that the best way to speed the process in Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission 
from one that emphasizes population security, counter-terrorism, and transition, to one that is 
strictly focused on transition and counter-terrorism. Making that change now would, in our view, 
be premature. We have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over tasks to the Iraqi 
Security Forces before their capacity and local conditions warrant.218
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Alongside Petraeus’s presentation on Iraq’s security, Crocker delivered a sober 
assessment of the state of Iraqi politics and national reconciliation. Crocker emphasized 
the enormity of the challenges facing Iraq, a “traumatized society” exiting 35 years of 
Ba’athist rule. “A new Iraq had to be built almost literally from scratch,” he observed, 
adding that Iraq was “experiencing a revolution, not just regime change.” The surge had 
provided Iraqis with “time and space” to pursue national reconciliation, but “some of 
the more promising political developments at the national level are neither measured in 
benchmarks nor visible to those far from Baghdad.” The process of stabilizing Iraq “will 
not be quick, it will be uneven,” Crocker judged, meaning that the United States would 
need to display “strategic patience,” especially since, in the ambassador’s view, the alter-
natives—such as withdrawal—would be “far worse” for U.S. vital interests.219
Petraeus’s testimony that the surge was working and Crocker’s judgment that the 
United States should exercise strategic patience in Iraq prompted endorsements from 
members of Congress who favored the surge and criticism from those who did not. The 
two men’s hearings before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Ser-
vices were highly charged, particularly since five Presidential candidates from both par-
ties served on those committees, and the hearing room thus became an extension of the 
Presidential campaign.220 Illinois Senator Barack H. Obama was skeptical of Petraeus’s 
reports of progress, arguing “I think that some of the frustration you hear from some of 
the questioners is that we have now set the bar so low that modest improvement in what 
was a completely chaotic situation, to the point where now we just have the levels of 
intolerable violence that existed in June 2006, is considered success. And it’s not.” Obama 
judged that the effect of the surge, “has been relatively modest,” and added that, “it is 
not clear to me that the primary success that you’ve shown in Anbar has anything to do 
with the surge.” Concerning Crocker’s plea for strategic patience, Obama offered that 
the country was already out of patience, and that “the question I think that everybody is 
asking is: How long will this take, and at what point do we say, ‘Enough’?”221
For her part, New York Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton expressed deep skepticism 
of Petraeus and Crocker’s reports, telling the MNF-I commander and ambassador that 
“You have been made the de facto spokesmen for what many of us believe to be a failed 
policy,” and that, despite the two men’s efforts, “the reports that you provide to us really 
require a willing suspension of disbelief.” Continuing in Iraq would be counterproduc-
tive, she judged, since, “any fair reading of the advantages and disadvantages accruing 
post-surge, in my view, end up on the downside.”222 Connecticut Senator Christopher J. 
Dodd, another Presidential candidate, argued, “People are getting tired of hearing that 
things are better. I don’t know anybody who believes that,” while Delaware Senator 
Joseph R. Biden, also a Presidential candidate, told Petraeus, as one reporter put it, that 
“he had not heard anything that persuaded him that the military was pursuing a new 
strategy as opposed to new tactics in Iraq.”223
Despite the vehement response from some senior members of Congress, the Petraeus 
and Crocker reports offered enough evidence of progress in the surge campaign to begin 
to relieve some of the pressure to end that campaign early. “Those hearings gained us 
critical additional time and support, without which it is likely that the mission in Iraq 
would have failed,” Petraeus later wrote.224 Yet, at the same time the hearings had placed 
a senior military leader in the awkward role of defending strategy in the political realm. 
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Two days after Petraeus and Crocker concluded their testimony, Bush gave a televised 
speech reiterating the evidence the two had given Congress, emphasizing the security 
gains that had been made in Baghdad, Anbar, and Diyala and highlighting the spread of 
the Awakening. Now was the time to secure a “return on success,” Bush declared, and 
consequently he had chosen not to replace the 2,200 Marines from the 13th MEU due to 
redeploy at the end of September and would also consider bringing home an Army BCT 
before Christmas. These moves would result in a total reduction of 5,700 troops by the 
end of the year. The President also informed the nation that Petraeus expected to be able 
to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq from 20 to 15 brigades by July 2008.225 The end point of 
the surge was now a formal U.S. policy.
***
The surge of operations in summer 2007 had enabled the coalition to retake the initia-
tive for arguably the first time since MNF-I’s offensive in fall 2004 to clear insurgent sanc-
tuaries before the elections. MNC-I’s Operation PHANTOM THUNDER had coordinated 
the activities of four U.S. divisions to push AQI away from Baghdad and out of support 
zones and sanctuaries the militant group and its allies had dominated in some cases for 
more than 3 years. At the same time, MNC-I and MNF-I had taken steps to institution-
alize the Awakening by brokering formal agreements between vetted groups of armed 
Sunnis and the Maliki government, though it was not clear Maliki and his officials could 
be convinced of the Awakening’s merits. Nevertheless, Operation PHANTOM THUN-
DER had allowed the Awakening to spread even further in the Baghdad belts, Diyala, 
and southern Salahadin Province and had sent AQI reeling.
By early September, this strategic turn of events and the corresponding drop in vio-
lence in Baghdad helped limit the effects of criticism from opponents of the surge in 
Washington. The Sadrists had inadvertently assisted the coalition, too, by overreaching 
and creating a backlash among the Iraqi public. Worsening tensions between the Iraqi 
Government and the Iranian regime’s Shi’a militant proxies would occupy more of the 
coalition’s attention as the months passed.
Petraeus and Crocker would return to Baghdad to see the onset of Ramadan amidst 
the continuing Operation PHANTOM STRIKE. With the main battlefields of the anti-
AQI fight shifting to northern Iraq, the coalition commanders were poised to pursue the 
remaining hardcore Sunni insurgents further from Baghdad than ever and to plan deci-
sive operations to finish them off in early 2008.
However, a single event cast a pall over the September testimony and the security gains 
the coalition and the Awakening had made. Hours before Bush’s nationwide address on 
September 13, AQI operatives killed Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha in a car bombing in 
Ramadi, robbing the Awakening of its most prominent founding leader just 10 days after 
he had met with Bush at Al Asad and showing that AQI remained a potent threat to the 
Sunni Iraqi leaders that had begun to turn against it. The war was far from over.
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“THE DARKNESS HAS BECOME PITCH BLACK”
By early fall 2007, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) had endured more than 3 months of inten-
sifying pressure from coalition operations as well as from Sunni tribes and former insur-
gents that had turned against the extremist group. For the first time since 2004, AQI lost 
its support zones inside the capital city and was on the verge of suffering a defeat in the 
Baghdad belts. At the same time, the Iraqi security forces were growing rapidly, adding 
to the counterinsurgent forces in the field, although they still suffered from significant 
shortcomings and sectarian behavior.
These factors alarmed al-Qaeda’s senior leaders in Pakistan who had declared the 
battle for Iraq as central to their global jihadist efforts. As AQI’s fighters were forced 
farther from Baghdad in search of new safe havens, the organization’s leaders refocused 
their forces on slowing the growth of the Awakening, which they had deemed an exis-
tential threat to AQI. At the same time, Moqtada Sadr’s decision to “freeze” his militia’s 
activities created an opportunity for the coalition to fracture the Shi’a insurgency and 
hopefully to neutralize the Shi’a groups that had helped plunge the country into civil 
war. Political reconciliation—the overall goal of the surge—lagged behind the improving 
security situation because of both tensions among the competing Iraqi political factions 
and destabilizing interventions by Iraq’s neighbors. Coalition leaders would find it diffi-
cult to translate the military gains of the surge into political ones.
AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ LOSES THE INITIATIVE
Operation PHANTOM STRIKE Continues
By the time of General David Petraeus’s much-anticipated testimony before Con-
gress in early September 2007, coalition operations were “taking out [AQI] networks at a 
faster rate than they can replicate themselves,” Petraeus reported to Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Robert M. Gates. The coalition had killed or captured more than 2,500 AQI 
members between February and September, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) com-
mander wrote, including 94 key AQI leaders.1 One reason for this damage to AQI had 
been the increasing number of successful intelligence-driven raids by coalition special 
operators, whose operational tempo in July and August often totaled more than 60 raids 
per week.2
Despite the successes of the special operators, the key to robbing AQI of its vast terri-
tory in central Iraq had been the continued, large-scale ground operations led by Multi-Na-
tional Corps-Iraq (MNC-I). The corps-level Operation PHANTOM STRIKE that jumped 
off on August 13 was a month old by the time Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
completed their congressional testimony in Washington. As with the midsummer Oper-
ation PHANTOM THUNDER, General Raymond Odierno and MNC-I used Operation 
PHANTOM STRIKE to synchronize the four U.S. divisions in central and northern Iraq 
as they conducted division-level operations. These operations caused a visible reversal of 
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AQI’s fortunes in Baghdad, where, by mid-September, insurgent attacks had declined by 
70 percent from their peak in 2006 and by 50 percent since the start of Operation FARDH 
AL-QANOON in January. Car bombs and suicide attacks fell to their lowest levels in a 
year.3
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Shawn M. Cassatt (Released).
Soldiers From 3d BCT, 2d Infantry Division, During Operations in Muqdadiyah.4
Also as in Operation PHANTOM THUNDER, MNC-I’s main effort in Operation 
PHANTOM STRIKE was General Benjamin R. Mixon’s Multi-National Division-North 
(MND-N). In June and July, Mixon and MND-N had used Colonel Steven Townsend’s 
3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, to retake Diyala’s provincial capital of Baqubah from 
AQI and reestablish the Iraqi security forces (ISF) and Iraqi Government in the city. In 
August and September, Mixon followed up by using Colonel David Sutherland’s bri-
gade to pursue AQI farther up the Diyala Valley to Muqdadiyah, where many of the 
surviving insurgent defenders of Baqubah had displaced. In the ensuing MND-N opera-
tion, Sutherland’s troops forced AQI fighters to withdraw yet again from towns around 
Muqdadiyah where the extremist group had attempted to regroup, on some occasions 
fighting pitched battles against company-sized AQI groups. Over the course of 2 weeks, 
MND-N killed or captured 78 AQI fighters, with the remainder fleeing farther from the 
Diyala cities to remote areas such as the hills surrounding Hamrin Lake.5
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Source: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lieutenant Richard Ybarra (Released).
A Soldier From 4th Stryker BCT, 2d Infantry Division, Fires an AT-4 during  
Operations South of Baqubah.6
On September 5, Mixon redirected MND-N’s focus to the areas to which the Diyala- 
based enemy groups were likely to move. In MND-N’s Operation LIGHTNING HAMMER 
II, Mixon shifted the division’s main effort from Sutherland to Colonel Stephen M. 
“Steph” Twitty’s 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, as the latter launched an operation 
into the long-time insurgent sanctuary in the Za’ab Triangle south of Mosul. Two other 
brigades supported Twitty’s operation to the south, with 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Divi-
sion, moving into the Hamrin Mountains between Diyala and Salahadin Provinces and 
3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, launching operations into enemy strongholds near 
Bayji and Tikrit. By mid-September, MND-N had killed another 72 enemy fighters and 
captured more than 600, and Twitty’s troops had established several new combat out-
posts in the Sharqat area and were in a position to control the lines of communications 
between Mosul and Tikrit.7 In late September, MND-N shifted its main effort again, this 
time to Colonel Jon Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, in Tarmiyah as the brigade 
carried out raids against AQI and created new Sunni irregular groups to hold the area 
that Abu Ghazwan and Ahmed Dabash had controlled with their insurgent armies just 
months before.8 This would be the last operation Mixon and his 25th Infantry Division 
would conduct before being replaced by the 1st Armored Division in October.
Each of the three other U.S. divisions—Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), 
Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), and Multi-National Division-Center 
(MND-C)—conducted supporting operations in their respective areas as Mixon’s bri-
gades operated in August and September. Among these, Major General Rick Lynch’s 
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MND-C conducted the largest-scale supporting operations to continue to push AQI and 
its allies out of their sanctuaries in the Tigris River towns southeast of Baghdad, forcing 
the extremist group farther south. MND-C’s midsummer operations had disrupted AQI 
and its allies in Arab Jabour and the Triangle of Death, but it also had stretched Lynch’s 
four maneuver brigades dangerously thin. Only Colonel Peter Baker’s field artillery bri-
gade, reassigned from Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) to MND-C in 
July, remained as a maneuver unit in the Kut sector. With little combat power left to spare 
for new operations, Lynch used an ad hoc brigade combat team (BCT) under his division 
aviation brigade commander, Colonel Daniel Ball, to conduct MND-C’s portion of Oper-
ation PHANTOM STRIKE, called Operation MARNE HUSKY. With one infantry battal-
ion at his disposal, Ball carried out air strikes and raids against suspected AQI hideouts 
in the Tigris River area between Salman Pak and Suwayrah, the latter of which was the 
last Sunni-majority town before reaching the overwhelmingly Shi’a area stretching from 
Kut to the Persian Gulf. As he had done before, Lynch emphasized the use of firepower 
in Operation MARNE HUSKY and targeted dozens of Tigris River boats. From mid-Au-
gust to mid-September, the operation yielded 256 enemy fighters killed and captured and 
pushed AQI to the edges of predominantly Shi’a controlled territory.9
To follow up on his operation on the east bank of the Tigris, Lynch shifted his main 
effort in mid-September to Colonel Terry Ferrell’s 2d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, in 
Arab Jabour. The midsummer operations had begun to take the riverside town from AQI, 
but the extremist group had reduced Arab Jabour to one-sixth its normal population 
and rigged many houses to explode when coalition and Iraqi troops entered. Having 
established a foothold in Arab Jabour, Ferrell pushed farther west into enemy territory 
in September and October, creating additional outposts and building new roads to reach 
them. By mid-October, MND-C had killed or captured another 252 enemy fighters and 
had planted a large patrol base in the heart of a previously inaccessible canal-crossed 
agricultural area that had served as an enemy sanctuary.10
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Kevin Stabinsky (Released).
Colonel Terry Ferrell, Commander of 2d BCT, 3d Infantry Division,  
With Sheik Ali Majid, a Concerned Local Citizens (CLC) Leader.11
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As Odierno intended, the operations to push AQI farther from Baghdad limited the 
damage the terrorist group could do during the holy month of Ramadan, which for 4 years 
had been a period of heightened violence since Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had launched the 
first “Ramadan Offensive” in 2003. AQI announced its plan to carry out a similar offen-
sive through October 22, 2007, but when the holy month began on September 13, the 
group and its Sunni allies managed only a 3-day spike in car bombs and suicide attacks 
against mainly ISF and Awakening targets. Casualties from the worst of these attacks 
numbered “in the dozens . . . not the hundreds we saw in previous signature [Ramadan] 
attacks,” Petraeus reported to Washington in late September.12 Odierno observed on Sep-
tember 20 that Iraq was experiencing its lowest levels of violence in the 19 months since 
the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing.13 The overall Iraqi civilian and police death 
toll for the month-long period was less than half that for the Ramadan period of 2006, and 
the level of violence for the month was 40 percent lower than in 2006.14 The reduction in 
the Sunni insurgents’ activities also translated into a reduced level of indirect fire against 
coalition bases and Iraqi towns, down by nearly 40 percent from the previous month and 
at its lowest level since 2005.15
AQI’s decreased ineffectiveness in the capital was partly due to the coalition’s con-
tinuous clearing of Baghdad’s worst neighborhoods. Three days into Ramadan, on Sep-
tember 16, MND-B launched an operation to clear east Rashid, where AQI operatives 
had long maintained a foothold. After 5 days, MND-B Commander Major General Joseph 
F. Fil, Jr., reported that the ISF and coalition forces were in control of approximately 56 
percent of Baghdad and in the process of clearing another 28 percent. Enemy fighters 
dominated the remaining 16 percent of the city.16
Continued Pressure From the Awakening
The rolls of the Awakening continued to expand through the fall of 2007. Even the 
AQI assassination of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha on September 13, the first day of 
Ramadan, could not slow the movement’s growth. Abu Risha’s younger brother Ahmed 
assumed leadership of the Ramadi Awakening Council the following day, undeterred 
by AQI’s revenge campaign targeting Awakening leaders. Two weeks after Abu Risha’s 
assassination, Petraeus reported that the Awakening’s numbers had doubled in a month. 
In total, more than 52,000 had joined the program throughout Iraq with more than 
30,000 being paid wages through Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) 
contracts.17
As the Awakening expanded geographically, it put pressure on AQI in regions where 
the extremist group had previously faced nominal opposition. In Baqubah, scores of 1920 
Revolutionary Brigades members joined the Awakening group dubbed the “Baqubah 
Guardians” in the wake of Multi-National Division-North’s (MND-N) clearing opera-
tions in July and August and began assisting Townsend’s brigade in attacking AQI cells 
in the area. The group’s emergence prompted AQI to counter with suicide bombings 
against Baqubah’s Awakening leaders, such as the September 24 suicide car bomb at a 
city mosque that killed 24 attendees of a reconciliation meeting hosted by the Diyala gov-
ernor. That attack also killed the Baqubah police chief, Ali Dilayan, who had escaped the 
AQI attack against his home in June. Nevertheless, the Baqubah Guardians continued to 
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grow, reaching more than 1,000 members who patrolled and conducted raids alongside 
the U.S. troops they formerly had fought.18
Similar scenarios emerged elsewhere. After AQI operatives murdered 3 Sunni imams 
in Mosul on September 27, local volunteers killed 11 AQI members in retaliation the 
following day.19 Five days later, a Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) group led Iraqi Army 
and police units to a foreign fighter base at the abandoned Muthanna chemical complex 
northwest of Baghdad, where the ISF units and Sunni irregulars jointly attacked militants 
holding hostages there. The ISF and CLCs rescued 27 hostages while killing 6 militants 
and capturing 37 more, though 7 ISF members and 1 of the CLC sheikhs were killed in 
the action.20
Meanwhile, in Arab Jabour and adjacent towns, two of Colonel Terry Ferrell’s bat-
talion commanders, Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth Adgie and Lieutenant Colonel Mark 
Odom, were fostering a large Awakening group whose members—many of them admit-
tedly former insurgents—provided detailed intelligence against local AQI members. In 
Odom’s sector, Sheikh Maher Sarhan al-Muini, a Sunni sheikh who had been imprisoned 
in Camp Bucca earlier in the war, led local fighters who helped hunt down AQI members 
and pointed out improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to U.S. troops. In Adgie’s sector, 
a former military officer known locally as General Mustafa Jabouri helped establish a 
group of local scouts that Adgie’s men called the “Bird Dogs,” whose intelligence tips 
led to a long string of captures of AQI men. “Where local citizen groups are actively 
participating in security, violence levels have plummeted,” Petraeus noted on October 
13.21 As if to illustrate his point, on October 23, Anbar Province experienced no attacks 
at all, and 2 days later Baghdad experienced just three attacks, all of which were ineffec-
tive.22 Walking through Arab Jabour on October 26, Petraeus saw the effects of the local 
Sunni mobilization and Odom’s and Adgie’s handiwork. “Nearly 700 concerned local 
citizens have joined with our forces and taken back their villages,” he wrote on October 
26. “There were no Iraqi police or army forces in the area, and these locals are now under 
contract to secure their communities.”23
At the same time, an AQI commander south of Balad made a similar observation that 
validated Petraeus’s assessment. Writing on October 15 in a journal captured by coalition 
troops a few days later, AQI emir Abu Tariq lamented:
There were almost 600 fighters in our sector before the tribes changed course 360 [sic] degrees 
under the influence of the so-called Islamic Army (Deserter of Jihad) and other believer groups. 
Many of our fighters quit and some of them joined the deserters . . . things started getting worse 
ever since, and as a result of that the number of [our] fighters dropped down to 20 or less.24
On October 28, an embittered Abu Tariq stated that he and his group had been betrayed 
by the local tribes as they joined the Awakening:
We were mistreated, cheated, and betrayed by some of our brothers who used to be part of the 
Jihadi movement . . . [They] were very good faithful Jihadi Fighters, but later on we found out 
that those people were nothing but hypocrites, liars, and traitors and were waiting for the right 
moment to switch sides with whoever pays them most and at the end they fought against us and 
they tried to prevent us from attacking the al-Sahwah [Awakening] groups in [the] area.25
It was a stark reversal of fortune for AQI in a district that had been a safe haven for Zarqa-
wi in 2006 and the site of the founding of the Islamic State of Iraq.
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The Blackwater-Nisour Square Incident
Despite MNF-I headway against AQI, an incident in an unrelated area showed that 
the coalition’s campaign in Iraq remained in a fragile state. The action also highlighted 
a troublesome aspect of security operations in a counterinsurgency setting. On Septem-
ber 16, U.S.-Iraqi relations suffered a significant setback when a U.S. Embassy security 
detail staffed by Blackwater security contractors opened fire on traffic in the busy Nisour 
Square in west Baghdad, killing 14 civilians and wounding 17 others. Although the Black-
water guards alleged they had taken fire from hostile elements, the incident immediately 
sparked outrage among Iraqis and a crisis in U.S.-Iraqi Government relations. Prime Min-
ister Nuri al-Maliki charged that Blackwater’s actions challenged Iraqi sovereignty, and 
the Iraqi Government froze the company’s operations while government officials moved 
to ban it from the country.26
In the face of the public outcry and “tremendous angst among the Iraqi leadership,” 
as Petraeus put it, the U.S. Government opened several investigations into the incident.27 
Even so, U.S. Embassy leaders had few alternatives to the Blackwater contractors to fulfill 
the American mission’s extensive diplomatic security requirements. Just 5 days before 
the shootings, Crocker testified to Congress that there was “no way” to provide security 
in Iraq without contractors. In the wake of the shootings, embassy officials judged that 
the company’s sudden departure would create a security vacuum.28 As a result, less than 
a week after the Nisour Square killings, the State Department authorized Blackwater to 
resume its security escort missions.29
The incident highlighted what had been an under-examined aspect of the Iraq cam-
paign: the coalition’s heavy dependence on private security contractors (PSC) to perform 
what in the past had been military missions. These included a broad range of security 
tasks such as convoy escort, base security, and personal security, as well as intelligence 
analysis, security training, and operations and movement coordination. As of September 
2007, the Department of Defense (DoD) employed an estimated 6,000 PSCs in Iraq, a frac-
tion of the estimated 25,000 to 30,000 contractors employed throughout the country by 
federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and private firms.30 
On average, only 7 to 10 percent of DoD’s security contractors were U.S. citizens, with the 
remainder coming from more than 30 countries, including Iraq.31
The majority of these contractors appeared to perform their duties professionally, but 
actions by a portion of the foreign security contractors had bred resentment among Iraqis 
for several years before the Nisour Square incident. Numerous instances occurred of 
PSCs running Iraqi cars off the road, disabling vehicles by shooting into the engine block, 
throwing objects at civilians, and in extreme cases, actually shooting civilians—most 
often in the course of escalation of force incidents. As the 3d Infantry Division’s assistant 
commander in September 2005, Brigadier General Karl R. Horst investigated complaints 
against security contractors and found that, during a 2-month period, 12 shootings by 
contractors had resulted in 6 Iraqi civilian deaths in the MND-B area of operations.32 At 
the time, Horst—who also discovered the infamous Jadriyah bunker torture chamber in 
the same period—had said to a reporter that security contractors “run loose in this coun-
try and do stupid stuff. There’s no authority over them, so you can’t come down on them 
hard when they escalate force. They shoot people, and someone else has to deal with the
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Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Marshall Thompson (Released).
Ugandan Contractors From a Private Security Company Named SOC,  
at a Gate at Al Asad Air Base.33
aftermath.”34 In some cases, the contractor shootings had been part of darker incidents 
than escalations of force. A few months after Horst’s comments, security contractors for 
the United Kingdom-based Aegis Defence Services allegedly assembled a “trophy video” 
set to Elvis Presley music that showed themselves shooting civilian cars on Iraqi roads. 
At the same time, contractors working for U.S. security company Triple Canopy alleged 
their coworkers were firing on Iraqi cars for sport. In December 2006, a Blackwater guard 
allegedly shot and killed a bodyguard of Iraqi Vice President Adel Abdel Mahdi during 
an argument in the Green Zone.35
The coalition often had difficulty maintaining awareness of the security contractors’ 
activities. A 2007 Washington Post investigation found that weapons discharges by PSCs 
rarely were reported to U.S. or Iraqi authorities, and that the 2007 contractor shooting 
incidents reported between May 2006 and May 2007 may have represented as little as 
15 percent of the actual number.36 The popular backlash against the contractors after the 
2007 Nisour shootings affected the U.S. military campaign, because Iraqis tended not 
to distinguish between American Soldiers and American-hired security guards. As one 
Iraqi Interior Ministry official noted, the contractors “are part of the reason for all the 
hatred that is directed at Americans, because people don’t know them as Blackwater, 
they know them only as Americans.”37 The observation was true even when the contrac-
tors were not U.S. employees. In October 2007, MNF-I found itself managing the conse-
quences of an incident in which Australian PSCs killed two Iraqi Christian women. The 
Iraqi Government “accepted it reasonably well,” Petraeus noted, because the Australian 
company promptly took full responsibility, “acknowledged the event, expressed regret 
that it happened, made immediate reparations, and pledged full cooperation with the 
investigation into the incident.”38 Commenting on the episode to Gates, Petraeus judged 
that “we cannot accomplish our mission in Iraq without Private Security Contractors, but 
we need to reduce the friction they sometimes cause before the Government of Iraq uses 
the sovereignty card to try to shut them down completely.”39 When PSCs were involved 
in 3 escalation of force incidents in a single week a month later, Petraeus decided to gain 
control of the situation by requiring a meeting between MNF-I’s J-3 and 54 leaders of the 
PSC elements in Iraq to address procedures and the critical nature of their actions.40
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The shootings in Nisour Square were deeply troubling for a U.S. military force whose 
commanders had begun to adopt population-centric counterinsurgency tactics through-
out the country. One military official opined that the consequences of the Nisour Square 
shootings “may be worse than Abu Ghraib.” From Washington, Gates concluded that 
security contractors’ activities were often “at cross-purposes to our larger mission in 
Iraq.”41 Petraeus saw the problem as one of fundamentally differing philosophies and 
roles on the battlefield:
At the heart of the matter is a subtle, but critical, difference in how [private security contractors] 
and military elements view their mission. Mission success for [private security contractors] is safe 
delivery of the “package,” and this makes them very risk averse in the battlespace. Our soldiers, 
focusing on improving security for the population, accept a bit more personal risk and are likely 
more cognizant of the impact of their actions on civilians.42
This difference in missions had the potential to derail even the most carefully conducted 
military campaign. In the months following the Nisour incident, MNF-I continued to 
tighten its monitoring of contractor activities, requiring security contractors to clear their 
operations and locations with coalition units—a policy with which contractors complied 
unevenly.
The Sinjar Documents
As AQI’s situation in central Iraq worsened under the combined pressure of the coa-
lition, the Awakening, and the Iraqi security forces, the terrorist group received another 
blow in early fall 2007 as its machinery for sending foreign fighters into Iraq came under 
more intense pressure than ever before. Since 2003, Zarqawi and other insurgents had 
created networks inside Syria that facilitated the movement of fighters from around the 
Arab world to be suicide bombers or fighters in Iraq. From the Damascus airport, mili-
tant fixers helped foreign fighters move into Iraq’s Euphrates River Valley or the Jazeera 
desert of Ninawa Province. Some of these networks using Ninawa Province had belonged 
to former Ba’athist regime leaders, such as Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad. Another sig-
nificant network belonged to the former Iraqi military officer Suhail Hammo, a Sunni 
Turkoman from Tel Afar who sent insurgent fighters into Iraq from the Syrian border 
town of Qamishli and would later be a senior leader in the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant.43
The most prolific network belonged to AQI’s top Syria-based facilitator, a young Iraqi 
named Badran Turki al-Mazidih—also known by the nom de guerre Abu Ghadiyah. 
From 2003 forward, Abu Ghadiyah split his time between the eastern Syrian cities of 
Deir ez Zour and Albu Kamal, helping probably thousands of foreign fighters move into 
Iraq to join AQI’s ranks there. Just across the border from the Iraqi city of Al Qa’im in 
the Western Euphrates River Valley, Albu Kamal was a perfect launching point into Iraq. 
However, as the anti-AQI Awakening movement took hold in Anbar in fall 2006, AQI’s 
foreign-fighter pipeline through the Euphrates River Valley became increasingly tenu-
ous, and Abu Ghadiyah apparently moved the group’s primary facilitation route north 
to Ninawa. From there, AQI recruits made their way to the town of Sinjar, 30 miles west 
of Tel Afar, before moving to Mosul or central Iraq.44
The flow of foreign fighters through Sinjar was heavy enough that in the fall of 2006 
AQI stationed a “border emir” known as Abu Muthanna near the town to receive the 
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fighters Abu Ghadiyah sent into Iraq and send them to their specific assignments.45 
Around the same time, senior AQI leader Abu Usama al-Tunisi assumed overall com-
mand of AQI’s foreign fighter networks. Considered a likely successor to Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri, Tunisi had been AQI’s military emir in Baghdad’s southern belts and had been 
behind the June 2006 abduction and killing of two American Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 
502d Infantry Regiment, near Mahmudiyah, south of Baghdad.46 His assignment to the 
management of the foreign fighter influx indicated its importance to AQI’s leaders.
According to later coalition estimates, by early 2007 the Abu Ghadiyah-Abu Muth-
anna northern network was pushing 80 to 110 foreign fighters into Iraq each month. The 
influx of these foreign fighters coincided with the spring 2007 spike in suicide bombings 
in Iraq, which peaked at 59 in the month of March 2007.47 With the onset of summer, the 
coalition’s surge of operations and ramping up of special operations took its toll on the 
northern facilitation network. As AQI’s cells dispersed and its leadership cadre thinned 
out, coalition leaders determined that the group was suffering a decline in funding, 
including money from outside donors, and was having difficulty paying its facilitators.48 
By the end of the summer, U.S. officials began to see signs of reticence by outsiders to 
send their fighters into Iraq, and the flow of foreign fighters dropped to an estimated 60 
per month across the country.49
In September 2007, the coalition dealt the northern facilitation network two severe 
blows with raids that killed its most senior leaders. On September 11, coalition special 
operators located and killed AQI border emir Abu Muthanna near Sinjar.50 Coalition 
troops followed that raid a week later with the destruction of 15,000 pounds of explo-
sives in a remote nearby site.51 The coup de grace for the northern network came a few 
days later on September 25, when a U.S. air strike killed Tunisi near Musayyib, in Babil 
Province.52
Source: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (Released).
An AQI Foreign Fighter Registration Form Captured in the Sinjar Documents.53
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The most significant long-term impact from these operations came not from the kill-
ings of the senior AQI men, but from the data yielded from the raid near Sinjar. According 
to journalists, Abu Muthanna had detonated a suicide vest to evade capture, but the U.S. 
special operators recovered five terabytes of data and hundreds of personnel files he had 
maintained onsite, a collection that provided extensive insight into AQI’s operations.54 A 
subsequent report by the U.S. Military Academy’s Combating Terrorism Center, based 
on access to these “Sinjar Documents” as they became known, painted a detailed picture 
of AQI’s networks of foreign supporters and volunteers. The documents contained per-
sonnel files of 606 foreign fighters who entered Iraq between August 2006 and August 
2007 by crossing the Syrian border. Many had passed through the important AQI hub of 
Deir ez Zour in Syria.55 Among the foreign fighters, 40 percent were from Saudi Arabia, 
with the largest portion coming from the Saudi capital of Riyadh. Another 8 percent each 
had come from Yemen and Syria. A surprising 31 percent had come from North Africa, 
a region that U.S. officials previously had believed provided only a small fraction of for-
eign fighters.56 Even more surprising was that about one of every five foreign fighters 
was Libyan, making that country the highest contributor of foreign fighters per capita. 
Most of the Libyans came from the cities of Derna and Benghazi and appeared to have a 
well-established route to Damascus via Egypt. Libyan recruits had surged in spring 2007, 
apparently coinciding with a new relationship between al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic 
Fighting Group, an organization that would later cooperate with the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) against the Gadhafi regime in 2011.57
As a whole, the foreign fighters depicted in the Sinjar Documents had a median age 
of 22- to 23-years-old, suggesting that most of them were first-time volunteers. Of those 
who listed a profession, two-thirds described themselves as students. In Abu Muthan-
na’s files, almost 400 of the foreign recruits had been sorted into specific roles, the most 
common of which were “suicide bomber” (56 percent) and “fighter” (42 percent).58 Many 
of the fighters arrived at Abu Muthanna’s processing point on the same day, suggest-
ing they had traveled together in groups. The records listed no fighters entering Iraq in 
March or April 2007, indicating that the facilitation network may have been disrupted 
during those months.59
As the coalition began to release information about the Sinjar Documents to the media 
in late 2007, the knowledge that AQI had relied on a large number of foreign suicide 
bombers and fighters created a public relations problem for the group, which had tried 
to cultivate the impression within Iraq and the Arab world that it was an Iraqi organi-
zation.60 The disruption of the northern facilitation network also seemed to have had a 
significant impact on AQI’s operations. After the September 2007 raids, MNF-I estimated 
the number of foreign fighters coming into Iraq each month fell to fewer than 40, and 
the number of suicide bombings in the country fell to just 16, half the monthly average 
during the summer.61 These coincided with a weekly attack average in October that was 
64 percent lower than the all-time high of late June 2007, and a U.S. battle death toll of 29, 
the lowest monthly figure since before the Samarra mosque bombing.62
Though he attributed these changes partly to the disruption of AQI’s foreign facilita-
tion networks, Petraeus judged that “the trends are the result of many factors,” including 
the rapid coalition-ISF operational tempo against AQI, the emergence of the Awakening, 
and “the restraint being exercised by some Jaysh al Mahdi elements.”63 He also might 
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have added the fact that the coalition’s total strength on the ground had swelled to over 
178,000 troops, close to the highest level of the entire war. Even so, the MNF-I commander 
was guarded in his pronouncements. “We continue to stress the point that success in Iraq 
will not be like flipping a light switch,” he wrote to Gates. “It will emerge slowly and 
fitfully.”64 It was a prudently optimistic point he already had made to Prime Minister 
Maliki a few weeks earlier. “The PM [Prime Minister] said he believes he is seeing the 
beginning of ‘victory,’ in a psychological sense, given the damage done to AQI and the 
militias, combined with the people’s rejection of them as well,” Petraeus reported on 
September 22. “I cautioned him that we still have much work to do and that achieving 
political progress is what is needed to move toward that ‘victory’.”65
Osama Bin Laden’s Response
On October 21, in response to the situation in Iraq, Osama bin Laden released his third 
audio recording in 2 months, which aired on al-Jazeera television. Entitled “Message to 
the People of Iraq,” the recording presented a dire assessment of the situation in Iraq, dif-
fering greatly from Ayman al-Zawahiri’s January 2007 pronouncement that America was 
“weaker than before” and that the mujahideen in Iraq had already “broke[n] its back.”66 
Bin Laden began his October message by extolling his Iraqi audience, declaring that they 
had been “steadfast in the war against President George W. Bush and his riffraff” while 
the world had stood “stunned, amazed, delighted and wonder-struck watching America 
the tyrannical [have] its brigades being wiped out in front of your raids and its battalions 
being obliterated.” He had particular praise for “the champions of the Fedayee [martyr] 
operations . . . rushing with their car bombs into the midst of the armored vehicles.”67
The al-Qaeda leader then turned to the grave matter facing him and his followers: 
the failure of AQI leaders to attract recruits to the Islamic State of Iraq and to prevent 
the defection of former AQI allies such as the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades, Jaysh Muja-
hideen, and Jaysh al-Islami, all negotiating truces with the coalition. Addressing “my 
brothers, the amirs of the Mujahid groups,” bin Laden warned that “some of you have 
been tardy in performing another duty, which is also among the greatest of duties: com-
bining your ranks to make them one rank. . . . the Muslims are waiting for you to gather 
under one banner.” Apparently acknowledging the overbearing AQI behavior and vio-
lence that had fractured the Sunni insurgency, he spoke of “the mistakes that take place 
between the brothers,” noting that, “when they happen, differences break out [among] 
the people.” However, he was quick to ascribe some of the Sunni insurgency’s infighting 
to “those in whose hearts there is a disease [who] look for the faults and lapses of the 
Mujahideen and exaggerate them, and perhaps allege that they are a consequence of the 
devotion of Jihad, which they label violence and terror.”68
Turning to the phenomenon of the Awakening that had begun to damage his Iraqi 
franchise, bin Laden argued that AQI commanders and tribal leaders alike had a duty to 
resolve the disputes among them. “It is incumbent on the men of knowledge, amirs of 
the Mujahideen, and Shaykhs of the clans to make every effort to engender reconciliation 
between every two parties in dispute,” he implored. He added an allegation that Saudi 
Arabia partly was behind the Awakening, asserting that “those in the land of the Two 
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Sanctuaries [Saudi Arabia] . . . forbid the Mujahideen from fighting the army and police 
of the traitors—like al-Alawi, al-Jafari and al-Maliki—although they know that they are 
tools of the American occupation helping it to kill the people of Islam.”69
Delving into operational matters, bin Laden commented on AQI’s diminishing effec-
tiveness on the battlefield, which he partially attributed to a breakdown in operational 
security. He warned AQI commanders to beware “the hypocrites who infiltrate your 
ranks to stir up strife among the Mujahid groups,” and to:
protect your secrets and excel in your actions, for among the things which sadden the Muslims and 
delight the unbelievers is the hindering of some combat operations against the enemy because of 
negligence in any of the stages of preparation for the operation, whether it be reconnaissance of 
the target, training, integrity and suitability of weapons and ammunition, quality of the explosive 
device or other such arrangements. And when you lay a mine, do it right, and don’t leave so much 
as one wounded American soldier or spy.70
Bin Laden reserved his most emphatic criticism for Iraqis who had split from AQI’s jihad 
and abandoned the establishment of an Islamic emirate out of sentiment for Iraqi nation-
alism or tribal affiliation:
[B]eware of fanatical partiality to men, groups and homelands. . . . The brotherhood of faith is what 
ties the Muslims together, not belonging to the tribe, homeland or organization. And the interests 
of the group take priority over the interest of the individual, and the interests of the Muslim state 
take priority over the interests of the group, and the interest of the Ummah take priority over the 
interests of the state.71
In closing, bin Laden defiantly exhorted “our people in Iraq” to redouble their efforts 
despite the fact that with the coalition’s growing advantage over the insurgency, “the 
malice has increased, and the darkness has become pitch black.”
The Ummah had reserved you for the darkest of nights, because you are their lions who don’t  
care. . . . You refused to abandon the homeland to the unbelievers, or allow their tanks to roar 
between the Tigris and Euphrates. . . . You massacred the enemy and applied yourself to fighting 
them, until they became prisoners of their bases and the Green Zone, fearing danger. So continue 
to make the soldiers of unbelief drink from the bitter cup of death, and leave not one of them on 
the soil of Iraq.72
For coalition commanders, the al-Qaeda leader’s admission of mistakes by his orga-
nization’s Iraqi branch validated that the Awakening had created major fractures within 
the insurgency and that surge operations were having a significant impact. Bin Laden’s 
speech also was a windfall for MNF-I’s information operations organizations, which acted 
quickly to turn the al-Qaeda leader’s remarks to the coalition’s advantage and amplify 
the message that bin Laden believed his followers were losing in Iraq. “Strategically, we 
were heartened this past week by Usama bin Laden’s admission of mistakes by AQI in 
their brutal methods and by Al Jazeera’s relatively truthful coverage of his admission,” 
Petraeus wrote to Gates 6 days after bin Laden’s message. “This crack in Al Qaeda mes-
saging sheds light on the enormous amount of hard work done by our troops and our 
Iraqi partners over the course of this year.”73
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Operation PHANTOM STRIKE in Salahadin, Nahrwan, and the  
Euphrates River Valley
The day after bin Laden’s message was released, Mixon and the 25th Infantry Division 
handed command of MND-N to Major General Mark Hertling and the 1st Armored Divi-
sion. The 1st Armored Division became the first U.S. division headquarters to deploy to 
Iraq with none of its subordinate brigades, and the division continued MND-N’s portion 
of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE by quickly executing an operation that Mixon already 
had prepared its brigades to conduct. On November 5, Operation IRON HAMMER 
shifted MND-N’s main effort from the Za’ab Triangle farther south to the Tikrit-Bay-
ji-Hawijah area of Salahadin Province, where Colonel Michael S. McBride and the 1st 
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, recently had arrived. Over the next 2 weeks, McBride’s 
Soldiers moved into insurgent-dominated neighborhoods in Bayji and nearby Siniyah, 
detaining dozens of suspected enemy fighters and raising 230 new recruits for the CLC 
program. Throughout the division’s area of operations, MND-N units captured about 400 
suspected insurgents during the same period and established new outposts that encour-
aged large numbers of locals to join the Awakening. Three weeks after Operation IRON 
HAMMER began, Colonel David Paschal’s 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, coordi-
nated with local tribal leaders in Hawijah to enroll 6,000 security volunteers to work with 
coalition troops against the militant presence.74 It was the first major Awakening group 
to appear in the upper Tigris region and was striking in that it came in Hawijah, a city 
that was a support base for the Naqshbandi Army, a Ba’athist insurgent group loyal to 
Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri. The area was also the home territory for the Obaid tribe, some of 
whose members had been fighting the Kurdish parties since their takeover of Kirkuk in 
2003. The Sunni tribal forces would be useful against AQI, but stood to pose a challenge 
to the Kurds if not watched closely.
The success of coalition operations, coupled with the expansion of the Awakening, 
drove AQI leaders as well as fighters toward Mosul. Hertling, concerned with the trend, 
took stock of the broader picture in northern Iraq. Violence in Mosul rose as this relocation 
took place. From March to September 2007, the city, home to more than 2 million Arabs, 
Kurds, Turkomans, and other minorities had witnessed about 60 attacks per week, but 
by late October, the average had risen to 80.75 At the same time, Tel Afar Mayor Najim 
Jabouri reported to coalition officers that, although Tel Afar remained in friendly hands, 
AQI fighters moved freely through Mosul, especially at night, and senior AQI command-
ers such as Masri had relocated to the area.76 Coalition officials later noted that Masri trav-
eled through Mosul at least twice during the late fall, validating Jabouri’s information.77 
The city felt AQI’s impact in neighborhoods west of the Tigris, across the river from the 
Kurdish-populated areas on which the Kurdish-led local security forces tended to focus. 
As it had done since late 2004, the terrorist group aimed many of its attacks at the Mosul 
police, such as the October 17 suicide truck bombing of a west side police station that 
killed 16 people and wounded another 50, an unusually large attack for the city.78
Petraeus echoed Hertling’s concern over the worsening situation in Mosul, writing to 
Gates that the city was “an area of concern that never had an adequate force presence.” 
With all U.S. brigades committed in central Iraq and Diyala, Petraeus and Odierno hoped 
that the 2d and 3d Iraqi divisions and two U.S. battalions under Twitty’s 4th Brigade, 1st 
Cavalry Division, could keep Ninawa Province under control for the time being.79 As the 
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1st Armored Division arrived, Hertling posted one of his assistant division commanders, 
Brigadier General Raymond A. “Tony” Thomas, in Mosul to keep an eye on the restive 
city, but the single U.S. battalion stationed there to support the Iraqi 2d Division was 
insufficient to prevent AQI from ramping up its activity. 
There were few Awakening groups in the Mosul area, where rivalry between Kurds 
and Sunni Arabs and Turkomans meant the local ISF and political leaders discouraged 
the mobilization of Sunni security volunteers. For Ninawa-based leaders of Massoud Bar-
zani’s Kurdish Democratic Party and their local allies, the idea of Ninawa’s Sunni Arabs 
and Sunni Turkomans banding together in armed groups under U.S. sponsorship threat-
ened Kurdish control of the province. MND-N leaders, too, were skeptical of sponsoring 
Sunni tribal groups that might challenge Ninawa’s Kurdish-dominated provincial gov-
ernment, judging that an Awakening there could shatter the fragile political détente and 
plunge the province into sectarian conflict. The dearth of coalition forces also meant that 
a critical catalyst for the gestation of such groups was missing.
The security situation in Ninawa reflected this absence of a large-scale local Sunni 
resistance to AQI. By the end of November, the weekly attack average for the Mosul area 
rose again to more than 100 incidents, including several major attacks.80 On November 
23, AQI carried out 2 coordinated suicide car bombings against Iraqi police targets, kill-
ing 21 Iraqis and wounding 35 more. On the same afternoon, a truck bomb destroyed one 
span of the Qayyarah Bridge, a major Tigris River crossing about 50 miles south of Mosul, 
in an apparent attempt to isolate the city.81
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant Samuel Bendet (Released).
Soldiers From 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, Search Remote Terrain  
in Salahadin Province.82
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Despite the danger AQI posed to Ninawa, Hertling decided to defend the province by 
first blocking AQI fighters’ escape routes elsewhere. On November 27, he shifted MND-
N’s main effort farther south again, this time to the area spanning southern Salahadin and 
western Diyala Provinces where fighters from the Diyala River Valley had been escaping 
MND-N’s operations in the upper Diyala by transiting to the Tigris River Valley. In the 
towns of Khalis, Hadid, and Hibhib, Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, teamed 
with local units of the 5th Iraqi Army Division to conduct 3 weeks of searches for sus-
pected terrorist safe houses and weapons caches in the area where Zarqawi had located 
his own hideout and had been killed in June 2006. The operation netted about 60 sus-
pected insurgents and about 80 weapons caches, a reduction in tallies from Diyala opera-
tions in previous months, suggesting that most of the remaining AQI cells had probably 
escaped the trap.83
As MND-N conducted its operations in Diyala and Salahadin, Lynch and MND- C 
continued to seize territory south of Baghdad that militant groups had used as support 
zones and sanctuaries from which to threaten the capital, including areas dominated by 
Shi’a militias. As MND-C’s main effort from mid-October to mid-November, Colonel 
Wayne Grigsby and his 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, tightened their control over the 
Diyala River bridges leading to east Baghdad, making it more difficult for Jaysh al-Mahdi 
(JAM) and other Shi’a militants to move weapons and fighters into the city. Grigsby also 
established a new outpost in the town of Nahrwan east of Baghdad, a town of 120,000 
that had become a Shi’a militant stronghold. The town’s market was adjacent to a large 
vacant area that local Shi’a and Sunni militants used as a dumping ground for the bodies 
of their victims. When Grigsby located his new outpost in the middle of the vacant lot, 
murders in the town nearly ceased overnight and locals began tipping off U.S. troops, 
who then cracked down on what Grigsby assessed to be a JAM battalion.84
 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Natalie Loucks (Released).
Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr., Commander of 3d BCT, 3d Infantry Division,  
With a Senior Iraqi Officer.85
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THE AWAKENING, THE MALIKI GOVERNMENT, AND AQI
One week after Osama bin Laden released his October audio message, AQI already 
was responding to the increased pressure from the coalition and the Awakening. Signs 
quickly emerged that AQI’s main effort in the weeks following bin Laden’s message was 
to strike back against the CLCs, as well as against the Iraqi police in Sunni areas. The day 
after Hertling’s division took control of the north, a suicide bomber killed 27 policemen 
in Baqubah by detonating a bomb hidden on a bicycle. In the same week, insurgents 
killed 11 ISF members in Mosul in 3 separate attacks.86 The following week, a small war 
played out between AQI and local Awakening fighters in the area between Baqubah 
and Samarra. On November 8 in that area, coalition troops killed a senior AQI leader, 
Mohammed Sulayman Shunaythir al-Zubai. The following day, an AQI suicide bomber 
killed a coleader of the Diyala Salvation Council, an Awakening umbrella group associ-
ated with the Baqubah Guardians, in his home in Khalis. On the same day, November 9, 
a group of Jaysh al-Islami fighters who had joined the Awakening attacked AQI positions 
near Samarra and claimed killing 18 AQI members, while losing 15 of their own.87 In a 
bigger operation the following day, Awakening fighters and local ISF members attacked 
an AQI force near Baqubah, reportedly capturing 60 AQI men.88 On the same day as the 
Baqubah attack, Petraeus noted to Gates, “while the [Iraqi] Government might under-
estimate the importance of the CLC movements, AQI certainly does not. AQI’s recent 
targeting of Concerned Local Citizen leaders highlights its awareness that Concerned 
Local Citizen efforts pose the greatest threat to AQI’s freedom of movement and ability 
to conduct activities.”89
Events south of Baghdad 2 days later underscored the general’s point. On November 
12, at least 30 AQI fighters attacked 2 of Odom’s and Adgie’s partnered CLC detachments 
in the Arab Jabour area, leading to a long engagement that killed 5 of the CLCs and 18 
AQI fighters.90 Two days later, in the town of Haswa a short distance to the west, a sui-
cide bomber killed Sheikh Emad al-Ghurtani, the Awakening leader who had worked 
with both Kershaw’s and Garrett’s brigades to organize 700 Awakening volunteers in 
the formerly violent area between Haswa and Yusufiyah. Sheikh Ghurtani had met with 
3d Infantry Division Commander General Lynch a few days before his death, telling 
the American general, “Honestly, I’m not going to hide this from you . . . There is some 
al-Qaeda here in this area. But, God willing, we will get rid of them . . . The citizens are 
coming out. They’re not afraid anymore.”91
Despite setbacks like the loss of Sheikh Ghurtani, by November 2007 coalition com-
manders could see their partnership with the Awakening as a potentially decisive change 
in the war. By mid-November, coalition units had registered 77,000 CLCs, representing 
an increase of 25,000 in 6 weeks. Of that number, 49,000 CLCs were paid by CERP, and 
south of Baghdad, MND-C had registered about 20,000 CLCs in only 4 months.92
U.S. commanders often described the monetary expense of Sunni irregulars in rela-
tive terms, pointing out, as Petraeus did, that “the savings in vehicles not lost because 
of reduced violence—not to mention the priceless lives saved—have far outweighed the 
cost of their monthly contracts.”93 Fil, commanding MND-B, noted in late 2007 that the 
division had spent $17 million to enroll and pay about 67,000 fighters—a sum less than 
the cost of a single Apache helicopter.94 In Salahadin Province, Colonel Brian R. Owens 
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and his 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, saw CLCs as a similarly prudent investment. 
During a visit to Iraq, Senator John S. McCain challenged Owens, “Aren’t you just paying 
them not to emplace IEDs?” Owens responded, “No, I’m giving them an alternative to 
planting an IED . . . some way to feed their families.”95 Aside from saving CLC soldiers 
and equipment, the investment pumped money into the local economy, where their 
enrolled soldiers spent their $300 monthly salary.96
Despite the steep decline in violence in large part due to the Awakening, Prime Min-
ister Maliki’s and other senior Shi’a leaders’ paranoia toward the Awakening increased, 
further frustrating senior U.S. officials. Concerned that the CLCs would turn their guns 
toward the Iraqi Government, Maliki pressed his coalition counterparts to slow down 
the program and announced a freeze on the hiring of CLC members into the Iraqi secu-
rity forces. This move, if not reversed, would thwart the coalition’s plans to transition 
the CLCs into local police forces in Sunni areas. It validated Petraeus’s and Odierno’s 
suspicions that Maliki had created the Implementation and Follow-Up Committee for 
National Reconciliation under Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidari to slow the Awakening 
rather than to institutionalize it. Petraeus did not hide his concern, “As you would imag-
ine, this has been a frustration for us, as we try to take advantage of what likely is a nar-
rowing window of opportunity to reconcile with Sunni former resistance elements that 
now oppose AQI,” Petraeus reported to Gates on November 17. “Taken together with the 
halting progress on legislation and the slow movement on provision of services to Sunni 
communities, the freeze on CLC hiring for the ISF has us concerned that Maliki is not 
taking the necessary steps to capitalize on a fleeting opportunity to cement fragile gains 
in the security arena.”97 The Prime Minister, Petraeus observed, was “naturally suspi-
cious and inclined to believe rumors that he hears from his Shi’a advisors, to include the 
Commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command [General Ali Ghaidan].”98
At the same time, Maliki repeatedly told his coalition counterparts of his plans to 
declare an amnesty for those who had been “deceived” into joining the insurgency, a 
policy that seemed at odds with his suspicions about the CLCs. Maliki described his plan 
as a general amnesty for those who had been detained for taking up arms against the 
Iraqi Government—a criterion that seemed to require the freeing of many thousands of 
detainees being held by the coalition. Alarmed by the prospect of such an arbitrary pro-
cess, coalition leaders quietly engaged Maliki’s national security staff to clarify the policy 
and apply it only to vetted detainees whose behavior could be guaranteed by local Iraqi 
leaders.99
Maliki’s paranoia toward the CLCs manifested itself in the Iraqi capital in Novem-
ber, when General Faruq al-Araji, director of Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief, 
came to Maliki with “intelligence” that MNF-I was about to implement a plan under 
which the CLCs would seize the entry points into Baghdad and then remove Maliki in a 
coup. The Prime Minister responded to Araji’s fantastic rumor by deploying trusted ISF 
units for a day to checkpoints on the major roads leading into Baghdad, prepared for a 
supposed U.S.-led coup attempt that did not come. As coalition commanders realized the 
meaning of the strange ISF movements, astonished coalition officials met with Maliki’s 
Iraqi advisers to assure them that the U.S. military did not intend to lead a coup against 
him, with the CLCs or with anyone else.100
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Not all of Maliki’s suspicions toward the CLCs were unfounded, however. In mid- 
November, coalition special operators fought Sunni militants north of Baghdad who had 
obtained heavy antiaircraft guns. The special operations forces (SOF) operators killed 
20 of the militants and destroyed 14 of their machine guns before finding out they were 
a new CLC group. The incident prompted Petraeus to observe that MNF-I needed “to 
remain vigilant to the possibilities that some insurgent groups could be using CLC ele-
ments as a cover to regroup, rid their areas of al-Qaeda, and retain combat power for the 
future.”101
To resolve the CLC impasse with the Iraqi Government, Odierno went before the Iraqi 
National Security Council on December 2. With the recent history of ISF “ghost soldiers” 
in mind, Maliki and his advisers had scoffed at reports that the coalition had registered 
103,000 CLCs, more than 80,000 of which were Sunnis. The Iraqi leader’s skepticism had 
turned to alarm as Odierno revealed that coalition units had collected individual data, 
some of it biometric, for each CLC, establishing the accuracy of the figure. Nevertheless, 
when confronted with the scale of what the coalition already had done, and assured by 
Odierno that MNC-I would continue to monitor the CLCs’ activities to pick out “bad 
apples,” Maliki finally relented. The Iraqi Prime Minister ostensibly accepted the coali-
tion proposal that 20 percent of the CLCs should be absorbed into the ISF and the remain-
der given public sector jobs with the Iraqi ministries, declaring, “I agree with everything 
that General Odierno laid out!”102
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Curt Cashour (Released).
General Raymond Odierno, Commander of MNC-I, With Local Sheiks.103
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The day after Prime Minister Maliki lent his approval to the coalition’s partnership 
with the CLCs—at least for the time being—Abu Umar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the 
AQI-founded Islamic State of Iraq, called for a campaign of terror attacks against those 
same Sunni irregulars. “The individual mission of each mujahid,” Baghdadi declared, 
“is to conduct three IED attacks or three attacks with explosives, especially martyrdom 
attacks, or at least to kill three apostates and traitors” by a deadline of January 29, 2008.104 
Baghdadi also announced the creation of a special “Al Siddiq Corps,” that specifically 
targeted those he considered apostates and heretics—namely Sunnis who had joined the 
Awakening.105 AQI kicked off its anti-Awakening campaign with eight attacks during 
its first five days. Fighting between the Awakening movements and AQI spiked during 
mid-December as clashes erupted in Baghdad, Anbar, Ninawa, and Diyala Provinces.106
At a political level, though, the Awakening showed it had gathered a level of momen-
tum that AQI could not impede. Ten days after AQI’s call for terror attacks against the 
Awakening, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani assembled 750 Sunni and Shi’a tribal leaders in 
an “Awakening Council” meeting in Baghdad. Attended by Petraeus, who addressed the 
crowd, and other senior officials, the large gathering showed that in central Iraq at least, 
the reconciliation movement had begun to gain political traction.107 The following day, 
the Sunni insurgency took another blow. Iraq’s Government-run Sunni religious endow-
ment evicted Harith al-Dhari’s Association of Muslim Scholars from the west Baghdad 
Umm al-Qura Mosque, the vast complex from which Dhari’s colleagues had cheered the 
attacks against the coalition as well as the Iraqi Government since 2004. The action repre-
sented how far in public standing the Sunni insurgency’s supporters had fallen.
Despite the Maliki government’s lukewarm reception to the Awakening, as well as 
AQI’s vicious hostility toward it, by December 2007, the CLC initiative had grown to an 
extent that no coalition commander would have thought possible in early 2007. The deci-
sion by Petraeus, Odierno, and others to support the mobilization of tens of thousands of 
former Sunni insurgents had been a serious gamble, and many reasonable coalition offi-
cials in spring 2007 had argued against taking the risk—or at least in favor of mitigating 
the risk by moving more slowly than the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders had decided. 
The risk had been a political one as well. The coalition commanders had granted their 
tactical leaders autonomy as well as the latitude to use CERP funds to create a force of 
more than 100,000 Iraqi security volunteers where none had existed, all with the reluctant 
agreement of the Maliki government. It would remain to be seen in 2008 whether they 
could solidify that buy-in to make the Sunnis’ rejection of AQI permanent.
The End of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE
The last phase of Operation PHANTOM STRIKE found MND-C as the corps’ main 
effort. The operations south of Baghdad since June had established coalition and ISF con-
trol of the Triangle of Death and had forced AQI to move southwest into remote areas 
across the Euphrates River. In mid-November, MND-C launched an operation to estab-
lish a foothold on the south bank of the river using Colonel Dominic Caracillo’s newly 
arrived 3d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, which had replaced Kershaw and 2d Bri-
gade, 10th Mountain Division. In the final weeks of 2007, Caracillo’s troops built a pon-
toon bridge across the Euphrates at the town of Owesat, the same spot where U.S. troops 
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twice had been abducted and killed by Sunni insurgents in June 2006 and May 2007. On 
the southern bank, Caracillo’s brigade established a new combat outpost and branched 
out to patrol the local area, raise security volunteers, and drive AQI out of its last large 
sanctuary in the MND-C area of operations.108
Caracillo and his troops inherited a Triangle of Death that bore little resemblance to 
the violent area that Kershaw’s brigade had found on its arrival in fall 2006. Once the 
heartland of AQI and a major base for the terror attacks that nearly brought the collapse 
of the Iraqi state in 2006, by late 2007 the area was one of the most peaceful in Iraq. 
With the manpower raised during the Awakening, Kershaw had created a local army of 
almost 9,000 former Sunni insurgents, enabling the Awakening to spread beyond Anbar 
and change the strategic situation in central Iraq in ways that coalition leaders had not 
thought possible at the beginning of the year. Kershaw himself, however, would reap no 
professional reward. His clashes with Lynch over the use of firepower and the practice of 
operating with former insurgents meant that he would finish his career as a colonel. Of 
the four maneuver brigade commanders in MND-C during summer 2007 who drove AQI 
from the southern belts, Garrett, Ferrell, and Grigsby later commanded at the division 
level. Only Kershaw would not be promoted to general officer.
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Ben Brody (Released).
Soldiers From the 101st Airborne Division Conduct Air Assault Operations  
in Ubaydi, December 29, 2007.109
Across Iraq, Operation PHANTOM STRIKE had maintained the pressure begun by 
Operation PHANTOM THUNDER and, as the coalition commanders had intended, had 
disrupted the flow of “accelerants” into the Iraqi capital. The result was a significant 
drop in violence in central Iraq. Before Operation PHANTOM THUNDER began in June, 
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insurgent attacks had averaged 58 per day, but for the period of July to November, the 
daily attack average fell to just 27. By the end of 2007, days with no attacks became a 
common occurrence in Anbar Province. Change also swept Baghdad as well, where surge 
operations cut violence levels in half. On November 3, Baghdad experienced its first day 
of no reported violent incidents. On December 7, there were only 13 effective attacks in the 
country, and overall violence had fallen to levels not seen since 2004.110 Diyala, Salahadin, 
Kirkuk, and Babil also experienced steep drops. The surge of operations had resulted in a 
massive capture of the enemy’s munitions as well.111 By October, U.S. and Iraqi troops in 
Anbar had found twice as many weapons caches as in 2006.112 In Baghdad, coalition and 
Iraqi troops discovered more than 1,000 caches by the end of 2007, compared with 213 in 
2006.113 These captures diminished insurgent means to employ IEDs and other bombs.
Only Ninawa Province did not experience these trends. Violence in Ninawa had risen 
during the surge of operations to more than 15 attacks per day, making it Iraq’s most 
violent province. “We have seen a general movement of AQI to the north,” Petraeus 
reported during the week following Baghdadi’s call for a terror campaign. “Kurdish 
expansionism and the real/perceived disenfranchisement of the Sunni majority play a 
role here,” the MNF-I commander explained to Gates, “as AQI is able to find some refuge 
in Sunni communities that feel under pressure.”114 In some cases, AQI also benefited from 
drought conditions that had devastated the Sunni farmers of Ninawa, with conditions 
made worse at times in areas where Kurdish parties controlled the water supply, such as 
the western Ninawa town of Biaj.115
The outburst of AQI activity, especially in the far north, made clear that the coalition’s 
hold on Ninawa Province was tenuous and would require reinforcement. The rotation 
of Colonel Michael A. Bills’s 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment and two of its squadrons 
into Ninawa Province in relief of Twitty’s 4th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, in early 
December meant a modest increase in U.S. troop strength in the province, but Odierno 
and MNC-I doubled the U.S. strength in Mosul by moving the 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 
from Baghdad. With the addition of the battalion, the 3d ACR could split the city between 
two U.S. battalions, one on each side of the Tigris River. U.S. and Iraqi commanders also 
recalled two Iraqi battalions that had deployed from the 2d Iraqi Division to Baghdad as 
part of Operation FARDH AL-QANOON, increasing the number of Iraqi battalions in the 
city from seven to nine.116
To manage the situation in Mosul and the surrounding region better, in Decem-
ber Prime Minister Maliki took a step further and created a Ninawa Operations Com-
mand and assigned Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq, a Sunni officer who had 
commanded the 9th Division in Baghdad, to head the new command. For Maliki, the 
new command was a way of balancing “the Kurd dominance of political and military 
elements in Mosul,” a dynamic that he had complained about to Petraeus and Crocker 
since September. For coalition commanders, the new operations command was a badly 
needed structure for unifying the effort of the two Iraqi divisions and various police 
forces spread across Ninawa. Petraeus also noted that the move would “help reassure 
Arabs in Mosul that Kurds are not running the province,” though with the governorship, 
deputy governorship, provincial council, and police chief posts in the hands of the Kurd-
ish Democratic Party (KDP) and its allies, the Mosul Arabs’ perception of Kurdish control 
was not wrong.117 As 2007 ended, coalition leaders unanimously judged that with a heavy 
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AQI presence and a smoldering Arab-Kurd conflict, Ninawa Province would require a 
full-scale offensive of its own.
THE WAR AGAINST THE SHI’A MILITANTS
Monitoring the Sadrist “Freeze”
As the coalition commanders pressed their operations against AQI, they monitored 
Shi’a militant activities to gauge the effect that Moqtada Sadr’s “freeze” on JAM opera-
tions would have on the security situation. Before the late-August Karbala violence and 
Sadr’s damage-controlling response, MNF-I had estimated that Shi’a militant groups 
were responsible for two-thirds of all attacks on coalition troops in Baghdad, and in the 
month of July alone, explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks had killed 23 coalition 
troops and wounded another 89.118 The weeks following the “freeze” declaration seemed 
to offer hope that political efforts could make Sadr and his organization cease all or most 
of their attacks. On September 16, senior Sadrist Parliamentarian Baha al-Araji told Pet-
raeus that Sadr was “now open to dialogue with the Coalition.”119 For his part, Prime 
Minister Maliki told Petraeus that low-level U.S. outreach to Sadrists in Baghdad seemed 
to be gaining traction and asked that MNF-I “calm down” its raids against targets in Sadr 
City in order to encourage political reconciliation. Petraeus answered that he would be 
glad to do so “if there is a reciprocal calming down of EFPs and [indirect fire.]”120
The fall 2007 period following Sadr’s JAM freeze announcement was marked by the 
same disconnect between the coalition and the Maliki government that had characterized 
each side’s approach to the Shi’a militant problem since late 2006. While Maliki contin-
ued to reach out to Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) and other Special Groups in hopes of using 
them as a political counterweight against Sadr and “mainstream JAM,” whom Maliki 
considered more threatening than the Special Groups, MNF-I pursued the exact opposite 
course. Petraeus and other U.S. commanders intended to use Sadr’s freeze as a means of 
splitting the Sadr movement and driving a wedge between those who were “mainstream 
JAM” followers of Sadr and those in the Special Groups that continued attacks against 
the coalition and the ISF in defiance of Sadr’s instructions. Throughout fall 2007, Petraeus 
and other coalition spokesmen made frequent public statements clarifying that the coali-
tion did not consider Sadr and his obedient followers to be enemies, while Petraeus con-
tinued to order intense targeted operations against the Special Groups that Maliki was 
trying to entice into politics under the auspices of his Da’wa Party.
As Maliki and his advisers saw it, the Special Groups, especially the imprisoned Qais 
al- Khazali, were potentially reliable partners for the Maliki government, while the erratic 
Sadr was immature and troublesome. In mid-October, Maliki’s office requested that 
MNF-I release 40 “reconcilable” Shi’a militants from coalition detention centers. Petraeus 
responded by authorizing the release of nine that coalition officials deemed safe.121 Maliki 
and his advisers also wanted MNF-I to remove a number of prominent Special Groups’ 
leaders from coalition target lists, but reluctant coalition commanders hesitated, given 
the Special Groups’ continued attacks on coalition troops. On October 21, the coalition’s 
operations against the Special Groups collided with Maliki’s outreach efforts when U.S. 
troops conducting a raid against a Special Groups target in Sadr City became engaged in 
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a large-scale firefight. U.S. forces killed an estimated 49 Special Groups fighters in a battle 
that required air strikes before the raiding party could be extricated. Pro-militia media 
outlets immediately claimed the coalition troops had killed only 15 people—all civil-
ians, and some of them children. An infuriated Maliki and other Shi’a politicians publicly 
denounced the raid and MNF-I’s “lack of regard for Iraqi sovereignty,” showing that the 
coalition’s operations against the Special Groups remained politically sensitive.122
Even more politically sensitive were the coalition’s activities against the Islamic Rev-
olutionary Guard Corps of Iran (IRGC) Quds Force, which had continued its lethal assis-
tance to the Special Groups and other Shi’a militant proxies. On September 20 in the 
Kurdish city of Sulaymaniyah, coalition troops captured an undercover Quds Force offi-
cer, and the Iranian regime protested by closing several border crossing points with Kurd-
istan.123 The following month, more evidence of the Quds Force’s activities in Iraq came 
to light when U.S. troops in Diyala uncovered a cache of 280 fully or partially assembled 
EFPs and at least 300 pounds of plastic explosives with January 2007 Iranian manufactur-
ing labels, all transported from Iran by a JAM member.124
The Quds Force activity presented a problem for the U.S. diplomatic initiative to 
engage in trilateral security talks with the Iraqis and Iranians in Baghdad. As a result, 
Petraeus noted to Iraqi leaders, “We believe the caches were established prior to the Ira-
nian leaders pledging that they would stop the arming, training, and funding of Iraqi 
militia extremists.” He added that he and other coalition officials “hope[d] that the Ira-
nian leadership is adhering to the commitment they made to PM Maliki in July and that 
we welcome the next round of sub-ambassadorial talks with Iranian representatives.”125 
On November 9, in a goodwill gesture meant to support the trilateral talks, Petraeus and 
Crocker released nine Iranian detainees, deemed as no security risk by coalition officials, 
to Iraqi Government custody so they could be returned to the Iranian Government.126 
Eleven days later, five of the Iranian men were captured attempting to cross back into 
Iraq, for which they gave the unlikely explanation that Iranian officials had refused to 
take them back into Iran and had transported them back to the Iraqi border.127
Diwaniya, Poland, and the Special Groups
The Special Groups’ activities were intensifying as well, partly in response to a new 
and unexpected assertiveness from the Polish coalition contingent. On September 25, 
the MND-CS commander, Polish Major General Tadeusz Buk, reversed his command’s 
long-standing caution in Diwaniya and launched Operation OIL DROP to emplace a 
second joint security station inside the city and extend the Polish and ISF presence there. 
In this operation, Buk partnered with 8th Iraqi Army Division Commander Major Gen-
eral Othman al-Ghanimi. Both generals were assisted by a small team of U.S. Marines 
whom Petraeus had assigned to Diwaniya to create a local force of anti-JAM Shi’a tribal 
auxiliaries, including Captain Seth Moulton, a future U.S. congressman; Captain Ann 
Gildroy; and Staff Sergeant Alex Lemon. Together, the Polish general, the Iraqi general, 
and the young Marines put into motion an operation to clear the city of its JAM cells, 
already under pressure following al-Ghanimi’s operations of spring and summer 2007.
In an assault that seemed an apparent response to Operation OIL DROP, on Octo-
ber 2, an Iranian-sponsored Special Groups’ cell attacked the Polish ambassador in the 
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Baghdad neighborhood of Karada, hitting his convoy with several EFPs. The wounded 
ambassador was evacuated to a U.S. military hospital in Germany. The assassination 
attempt was clearly meant to intimidate the Poles into ceasing their Diwaniya opera-
tions.128 Two weeks later, Special Groups fighters attacked Buk’s troops in Diwaniya, 
wounding seven American and Polish soldiers and killing four Iraqi civilians in several 
days of rocket and mortar attacks that JAM-friendly media outlets attempted to attribute 
to coalition air strikes.129 During the same week, Special Groups fighters bombarded the 
U.S. Embassy’s regional office in Hillah but caused no casualties.130
Back in the Baghdad area, on October 28, a Special Groups cell abducted eight Sunni 
sheikhs from a nearby area of Diyala, but General Tawfiq—soon to be assigned as the 
Ninawa operations commander—and troops from his 9th Iraqi Division rescued the 
sheikhs the following day, though not before one of the hostages was killed.131 On the 
same day as the rescue, Brigadier General Jeffrey Dorko, commander of the Gulf Region 
Division of the Army Corps of Engineers and responsible for most of the coalition’s con-
struction projects, was seriously wounded by an IED that hit his convoy as it passed 
through northern Baghdad. In what was likely a Special Groups EFP attack, Dorko 
became the highest-ranking U.S. officer wounded in the Iraq War.
Much of the increased Special Groups’ activity like this in central and southern Iraq 
was the handiwork of Akram Kabi and AAH, the militant group commanded by the 
imprisoned Qais al-Khazali. At the time, MNF-I incorrectly associated the group with a 
new Special Groups-affiliated political party in Nasiriyah, the Iraqi National Gathering. 
MNF-I officials did correctly guess that Kabi and AAH were splinter groups that “seem 
to be rejecting Muqtada al Sadr and reaching out to Hezbollah and Syria along the lines 
of Arab identity,” though they again misjudged that the Iranian-allied AAH were “dis-
tancing themselves from overt Iranian connections.”132
General Buk believed the Special Groups attacks against the Polish ambassador and 
against his base camp in Diwaniya also were meant to influence the Polish elections to be 
held in October in much the same way the March 2004 Madrid terrorist attack had influ-
enced the Spanish elections, and had led to the withdrawal of the Spanish military con-
tingent from Iraq. Unfolding events supported Buk’s theory. Elections in Poland resulted 
in a change of government to the anti-Iraq War party of Donald Tusk. On November 14, 
General Othman launched the ISF-led Operation LIONS’ POUNCE to continue pressure 
against JAM elements in Diwaniya. Two days later, Poland had a new government and 
a new defense minister who promptly announced on November 17 that Poland would 
withdraw from its combat mission within months.133
Evidence continued to emerge of active Iranian regime sponsorship of AAH and other 
militant groups. On November 17, coalition troops captured a cell of militants, possibly 
from AAH, that had returned from Iran in late October after undergoing Quds Force 
training in explosives, sniper, and other militant activities. Under questioning, the men 
admitted to crossing the border east of Amarah and being escorted by Quds Force offi-
cers to a training camp near Tehran.134
The following day, November 18, Special Groups members simultaneously attacked 
several U.S. bases in the Baghdad area by firing large oxygen cylinders mounted on 107-
mm. rocket motors and filled with bulk explosives and ball bearings. It was the first use 
of an Iranian-designed weapon that coalition troops eventually named the improvised 
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rocket-assisted munition (IRAM) and whose design indicated that it was intended to 
cause mass casualties. The IRAM’s bulkiness meant that it had to be fired from a range of 
no more than 200 meters, indicating that the Special Groups who fired no fewer than 31 
of them on November 18 had been able to come extremely close to the perimeter of U.S. 
bases. The IRAMs wounded 12 U.S. Soldiers and damaged or destroyed 24 vehicles.135
The Special Groups’ attacks were not always against coalition troops or political ene-
mies. On November 23, Special Groups’ members bombed east Baghdad’s Shorja Market, 
killing eight fellow Shi’a in an attack. The Shi’a militants perversely intended to blame 
AQI to justify the Special Groups’ presence in Shi’a neighborhoods. When four Special 
Groups’ members were arrested shortly after the bombing, they tested positive for han-
dling the type of explosives used in the attack and confessed to having carried out the 
attack under orders from a Special Groups’ leader. “We believe the Special Groups are 
finding their criminal activities under ever more scrutiny and are trying to justify the 
need for militia security, and we think they thought they could get away with blaming 
AQI for the attack,” Petraeus explained to Gates on November 25.136
Fragmentation of the Shi’a Militants
Despite the continued Special Groups’ activity, the Sadrist freeze on JAM activities 
resulted in fewer than 40 EFP attacks in November, roughly half the number carried out 
in June.137 “The Sadrist interlocutors we are engaging [claim] that the decrease in violence 
toward the Coalition Forces (CF) and ISF reflects good intentions in following Sadr’s 
ceasefire; that the Sadrist trend is a nationalist party with wide support at the grassroots; 
and that they are committed to fighting Iranian influence over Iraq,” Petraeus reported 
on November 9. It was an opening that the MNF- I commander was eager to exploit. “As 
I have repeatedly observed, we cannot kill our way out of the JAM problem,” he wrote to 
Gates, “and I don’t think we need to, given the increasing sense of extremist rejection.”138 
By late November, the Special Groups’ disregard for Sadr’s freeze order led Petraeus to 
conclude that:
JAM no longer exists as a relatively unified entity, and we are working hard to keep it fragmented 
while peeling away reconcilable elements, similar to what we have done with AQI and the Sunni 
insurgency. The military arm of the Sadrists is fractured and relatively incoherent, and Sadr himself 
is being intimidated by his affiliates. . . . Exposing and stopping Iranian influence and destroying 
the Special Groups without reunifying JAM will require a nuanced approach—reaching out to 
reconcilables and hammering irreconcilables (quietly), all the while keeping the government of 
Iraq (GOI) on [our] side and the larger strategic context involving Iran in mind.139
In part, the disarray inside the Sadrist militant movement resulted from Sadr’s 
absence and his failure to manage his own organization. He returned to Iraq through the 
Maysan marshes in early October to try to impose some order over his followers, but by 
early November, he left for Iran again, claiming he would enter a program of additional 
religious training, presumably so he could claim ayatollah status at some future point.140 
However, the Sadrist issues also were the culmination of the fissures between Sadr and 
his senior lieutenants, such as Khazali, in the wake of their defeat in Najaf in 2004. One 
senior Shi’a militant leader in coalition detention, a former Sadr lieutenant who had been 
involved in the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center (PJCC) attack, described to 
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coalition officials in late 2007 the reason that so many Special Groups leaders, like Khazali 
and Kabi, had chosen to break from Sadr:
[H]e [Moqtada] himself is not stable but he is constantly changing his mind and that reflects on 
his followers. One day he will tell you that the American forces or CF are an occupying force 
and he will tell you that we should resist by political means. Then he will draw back from that 
conclusion and tell you that we must resist by military means. This mind changing creates too 
much waste, obstacles, and hardships because you do not understand his right clear thinking in 
order to dialogue or converse with him. We believe that this problem is much greater than if he 
had a negative assumption or understanding of things. . . . He has demonstrated through time that 
he is not focused, organized, or competent. He does not take advice from others and often acts 
unilaterally and makes decisions on his own on matters which he is not knowledgeable on. As a 
result, two distinct sides have formed within the Sadrist movement. There is [Moqtada] and those 
who are loyal to him as the leader of the movement and representative of their political interests. 
Then there is the collection of former associates and supporters of [Moqtada], who still subscribe to 
the teachings and philosophy of the late Muhammad al-Sadr, but have determined that [Moqtada] 
is not an appropriate leader or the proper successor to his father.141
In a number of ways, Moqtada Sadr had failed to continue his father’s practices and 
ideas, becoming “more dictatorial and controlling in his approach,” the detained militant 
leader said, adding that Sadr was a self-centered leader unconcerned with the welfare of 
his many followers. He had seen this side of Sadr’s character firsthand while hiding Sadr 
in Baghdad after the August 2004 Battle of Najaf and had “decided to part ways with 
[Moqtada Sadr] strategically.”142 The militant leader also charged that Sadr had failed to 
support the Najaf hawza, Shi’a religious colleges, in their competition with the Iranian 
regime’s religious center in Qom, thereby creating a “strategic danger” of deep Iranian 
influence over Shi’a Iraq.143
In December, coalition leaders thought Sadr appeared to be preparing for a violent 
power struggle with those Sadrist militant leaders who had challenged his leadership. In 
early December, Interior Minister Jawad Bolani reported to Petraeus that “mainstream 
JAM members are beginning to bring in information about JAM Special Groups activ-
ity.”144 A few days later, Sadrist representatives in Baghdad told journalists that Sadr was 
“happy with the results of his ceasefire and may even seek to make it permanent, while 
emphasizing his organization’s social role over its armed wing.” A JAM commander in 
southern Iraq added, “we listen to his orders, even if he were to decide to abolish [JAM]. 
He understands our interests more than ourselves.”145
As Sadr’s militant followers awaited his instructions, the Special Groups struck a seri-
ous blow against the ISF in the mid-Euphrates region on December 9 when they assas-
sinated Babil Province police chief Qais al-Mamouri, a nationalist Shi’a officer who had 
used his highly capable special weapons and tactics (SWAT) battalion against both AQI 
and Shi’a militant targets for several years. A Special Groups’ cell from Sadr City orches-
trated the attack, which was carried out with an array of five Iranian-provided EFPs.146 
Within days, coalition special operators struck back by capturing several Special Groups 
leaders who had received advanced Quds Force training in Iran. By December 23, the 
coalition had detained 8 of the 16 Special Groups leaders and had begun interrogating 
them to gain information that could be used in the pending trilateral talks with the Ira-
nians and Iraqi Government.147 Four days later, coalition special operators carried out 
another raid near Kut. Eleven Shi’a militants died in the firefight that followed.148
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Sadr’s apparent response to this flurry of Special Groups and special operations activ-
ity encouraged coalition leaders. The week after the Kut firefight, Petraeus reported to 
Gates, “Sadr is upset with the Iranian-supported Special Groups that continue to defy his 
ceasefire order. . . . He may be on the verge of authorizing their targeting by his own ele-
ments.”149 The same week, Sadrist representatives met with Islamic Supreme Council of 
Iraq (ISCI) leaders in Nasiriyah to solidify an October cease-fire between Sadr and Abdul 
Aziz al-Hakim’s ISCI, after which clerics loyal to Sadr during Friday sermons on January 
4 called on his followers to “respect the ceasefire” and make peace with rival factions.150
However, on the diplomatic level, the situation was less encouraging. Any hope for 
the talks faded as it became apparent the Iranians did not intend to continue them. The 
talks, originally scheduled for August, had been postponed repeatedly, and after setting 
dates of December 18 and then December 28, the Iranians backed out of the meetings 
again with no indication they would return.151
Some Iraqi leaders believed the December 3 public release of the U.S. national intelli-
gence estimate, which concluded that the Iranian regime had halted its nuclear weapons 
program, had relieved international pressure on the Iranians, who had consequently seen 
no reason to return to the negotiations in Baghdad. Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari 
also believed the intelligence estimate’s publication had emboldened the Iranian regime 
and would lead to increased assertiveness by both the Iranians and Syrians.152 The Iranian 
regime’s posture in early 2008 indicated no interest in diplomatic engagement with the 
United States in Iraq, as Petraeus noted on January 13: “The tri-partite talks between the 
United States, Iran, and Iraq are again on hold. No date has been negotiated, and the Ira-
nians have spent the week criticizing President Bush’s Middle East trip.”153 The expected 
next round of trilateral talks would never take place.
THE IRAQI SURGE
General Dubik at Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)
By fall 2007, the increasing pressure on AQI and other militants came not just from coa-
lition troops and the Awakening, but also from a large-scale expansion of the Iraqi security 
forces and an improvement in their capabilities. The dramatic expansion coincided with 
a significant change in the coalition’s effort to develop Iraqi forces. Although Lieutenant 
General James Dubik’s MNSTC-I was a peer headquarters to Odierno’s MNC-I, Dubik 
arrived in Iraq in June 2007 with the view that the MNC-I mission should have primacy 
over that of his own command. Under Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I 
had followed its own campaign plan, setting priorities for resources and areas of Iraq that 
were not strictly connected to MNC-I’s ongoing war against AQI and the Shi’a militant 
groups. As Dubik saw it, there could be no transition to the ISF unless MNC-I could suc-
ceed in improving the overall security situation, and his command should therefore be 
in a supporting role to MNC-I’s campaign plan rather than following a campaign plan of 
its own.
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Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Corporal Ira B. Goldfrank (Released).
Lieutenant General James M. Dubik, MNSTC-I Commander,  
Greeting Iraqi Representatives From Anbar Province.154
Beginning in the summer of 2007, Dubik and MNSTC-I let MNC-I’s plan for offensive 
operations drive the creation and replenishment of ISF units. By specifically targeting 
those ISF units who would play a role in upcoming MNC-I operations, MNSTC-I would 
work to provide the Iraqi forces required to maintain momentum in areas of Iraq where 
MNC-I’s decisive operations were taking place.155 MNSTC-I would no longer focus on 
transitioning to an Iraqi lead in security affairs, but would focus with MNC-I on repairing 
the security situation itself.
Dubik rejected what he regarded as a “false dilemma” of quality versus quantity. A 
focus on quantity would result in an ISF composed of “a whole bunch of people that were 
worthless on the battlefield,” he judged, while an overemphasis on quality would result 
in a campaign timeline “so long that we would not be able to contribute to the counter-
offensive and achieve the effects that we knew we needed to achieve on the timeline 
that General Petraeus had set for us.” Instead, Dubik focused on sufficiency: “what is 
good enough to create the combat power necessary, relative to the enemy? If it was good 
enough, we fielded it and we augmented ‘good enough’ with iterative quality improve-
ments.”156 Determining what constituted sufficiency was a subjective matter and Dubik’s 
perspective faced challenges created by Iraqi priorities, the bureaucratic foreign military 
sales program, and Washington’s desire to reduce spending. Dubik also believed the 
coalition’s separate efforts to generate tactical forces and to mentor the security ministries 
needed to be combined into one effort to build an entire defense and police “enterprise,” 
in which the tactical forces on Iraqi streets reflected a coherent national strategy, with 
ministries that could plan and sustain a security campaign.157
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Dubik’s tenure led to a dramatic increase in the size of the Iraqi security forces. After 
taking command, he commissioned several studies to determine the proper size of the ISF 
for securing the country, and polled his superiors and the Ministers of Defense and Inte-
rior on the question. The figure that emerged was an ISF with an end strength between 
600,000 and 650,000, very different from the 380,000, evenly split between military and 
police, which MNF-I and MNSTC-I had previously set as the goal for the ISF.158
Dubik’s raising of the Iraqi forces’ end strength coincided with an “Iraqi surge” that 
resulted in a net increase of more than 106,000 Iraqi soldiers and police over the course of 
2007. “That is a substantial growth for any country, let alone one in the middle of a tough 
war, lacking mature institutional structures, and hampered by an inefficient, marginally 
capable government,” Petraeus observed on December 23, adding that “quantity has a 
quality all its own in a COIN fight.”159
Under MNSTC-I’s plans, the rapid increase of 2007 would continue into 2008, when 
the Iraqi Army would grow by another 41,000 men. The additional troops would enable 
the Iraqis to staff their 13 existing divisions at close to Petraeus’s and Dubik’s goal of 120 
percent, with some select units at 130 percent. The increase in 2008 would also allow for 
the creation of 24 new battalions and 5 new brigade headquarters.160 The vast expansion 
of Iraqi troops came partly from a significant increase in Iraqi training capacity. In addi-
tion to the large combat training center at Besmayah, east of Baghdad, MNSTC-I began 
creating training centers for each Iraqi division, with a mix of Iraqi and coalition trainers, 
including a small but important contingent from NATO.161 Between March and Novem-
ber 2007, 53,000 soldiers were trained at these and other locations, increasing the assigned 
strength of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the Iraqi Army from 33 percent to 43 per-
cent and that of officers from 43 percent to 57 percent. The average daily strength of the 
Iraqi divisions also rose to 77 percent, a 10 percent increase since June.162 One important 
change was that, under Dubik’s guidance, MNSTC-I focused not just on generating new 
Iraqi units, but also on replenishing existing ones that had been much reduced through 
combat and other attrition. By establishing the “second production line” of replacements 
for existing units, Dubik aimed to raise the effectiveness and confidence of Iraqi units 
that in some cases had been worn down by constant combat, losing much of their man-
power and their tactical skills as a result. This change also enabled MNSTC-I to accelerate 
toward its goal of 120 percent staffing of existing Iraqi units even as new formations were 
being built.163
The Awakening helped contribute to the overall ISF expansion as well by provid-
ing Sunni recruits, mainly police, in Sunni-majority areas where ISF recruiting had been 
slow and unpopular before 2007. The integration of Sunnis into the Iraqi Police allowed 
MNSTC-I to reopen the Habbaniyah police academy and graduate a class of 537 in August 
2007, a reversal from 2 years earlier when the academy had been closed for lack of volun-
teers.164 The influx of Sunnis spread to Baghdad as well, where they constituted most of 
the 9,000 new police recruits in the city in January 2008.165
The new ISF troops and units were expensive, requiring an outlay of $5.7 billion by 
the Iraqi Government in 2007, but even this barely kept pace with the ISF expansion. The 
Ministry of Defense spent a full $1.1 billion through the U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) 
program to equip its units in 2007, but the Interior Ministry spent nothing through its 
own FMS accounts for the year, as it had to divert large sums of money to pay salaries for 
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new police officers.166 MNSTC-I considered the Interior Ministry too inefficient to spend 
FMS funds for the time being, in any case. “Our priority was the Army initially, then the 
police,” Dubik recalled later. “With the police we had to get the ministry working better 
and [place] the National Police on a reform agenda. Otherwise any money spent would 
have been wasted.”167
This approach collided with differing priorities in the United States. As U.S. leaders 
in Baghdad planned for the training and equipping of the expanded ISF in 2008, they 
found themselves in a debate with officials in Washington and at U.S. Central Command 
(CENTCOM) who favored reducing or postponing the $3 billion the United States had 
planned to contribute to the Iraqi defense budget in 2008 that would be in addition to the 
$8 billion the Iraqi Government was able to muster. Gates eventually decided this dispute 
in MNF-I’s favor, but as violence ebbed in Iraq, U.S. agencies were beginning to question 
U.S. expenditures in the country precisely when Petraeus, Odierno, and Dubik aimed 
to bolster the ISF to take over territory from departing U.S. units.168 In the longer term, 
the Iraqi Government’s rising oil revenue and defense expenditures would theoretically 
make U.S. spending for the ISF unnecessary, but in 2007-2008, there was a funding gap 
to be bridged, and the U.S. generals in Baghdad believed their Iraqi counterparts were 
increasingly unwilling to bridge it, regardless of the strategic consequences.
As pressure built to equip the growing Iraqi Army, Iraqi leaders were frustrated by 
the slowness of the U.S. foreign military sales system to deliver weapon systems, vehi-
cles, and other equipment Iraqi commanders required immediately for the ongoing war 
against AQI and other insurgent groups. In mid-2007, DoD took an average of 5 months 
just to approve Iraqi purchase requests, with the actual delivery of equipment taking 
months longer. “FMS is a peacetime mechanism and not really suited for wartime speed,” 
Crocker noted to a visiting congressional delegation.169 Through considerable personal 
attention to the problem inside the Pentagon, Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen were able to cut the FMS request timeline from 5 months to 
2½ months, but even so, delays in awarding contracts and in production eroded Iraqi 
confidence in the system. In one high-profile case, the FMS contract for new Harris radios 
for the ISF stalled due to DoD’s contracting regulations. The radios, which the MNF-I 
commander deemed critical to ISF capabilities, were scheduled for delivery to Iraq in 
November 2007, but another vendor protested the award of the contract and initiated a 
bureaucratic process that delayed delivery for more than 3 months. Over time, MNSTC-I 
came to rely on FMS for less urgent equipment needs that could be programed over a 
greater length of time and to use the Iraqi Security Force Fund to direct purchase items 
that the ISF needed in a more timely manner.170
In addition to the bureaucratic demands of the FMS process, there were self-imposed 
U.S. constraints, such as the U.S. failure to grant Iraq “dependable undertaking status,” 
a category that allowed countries to pay for their equipment purchases in installments. 
Leaving Iraq out of this category meant that the Iraqi security ministries were forced to 
pay in full for any equipment before the U.S. Government would deliver it. At MNSTC-I, 
Dubik warned that the failure to grant the Iraqi Government dependable undertaking 
status was a “strategic hindrance” that encouraged the Iraqis to purchase arms from other 
countries that would let them pay over time.171 In the view of Petraeus and other senior 
leaders in Baghdad, the U.S. handling of the FMS problem was especially shortsighted 
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because equipment was one of the two main limiting factors in building new Iraqi units, 
along with the development of Iraqi military leaders.172 Iraqi Minister of Defense Abdel 
Qader al-Mufreiji expressed a preference for U.S. military hardware such as the M1 tank, 
which he believed would raise the prestige of the Iraqi Army and mark a break with 
Soviet-era equipment. By late 2007, Mufreiji was “shopping for other weapons suppli-
ers due to the time required for FMS deliveries,” Petraeus reported. In arms deals with 
Serbia, Ukraine, and China, the Iraqis ordered 380,000 assault rifles, 110,000 pistols, and 
over 27,000 machine guns. They sought secondhand helicopters and heavy mortars from 
Serbia as well. While buying from these countries allowed the Iraqis to get equipment 
and weapons into their hands more quickly, the result was a mix of different models 
of hardware that made maintenance and logistics more difficult.173 Petraeus encouraged 
Mufreiji and other Iraqi leaders to “[buy] for the long term” and build the Iraqi Army 
around American-made weapons, vehicles, and aircraft rather than “[get] deflected by 
apparent bargains from Central Europe.”174
One idea Dubik, Odierno, and Petraeus formulated to equip the Iraqi Army and 
police with U.S. hardware was to accelerate greatly the delivery of American up-armored 
High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to the ISF by transferring 
the vehicles as U.S. units in Iraq began to receive deliveries of mine resistant ambush 
protected (MRAP) vehicles. Handing the displaced up-armored HMMWVs to Iraqi units 
would be a welcome change for Iraqi troops that had generally faced the IED threat with 
soft-skinned vehicles with little protection, and the transfer accordingly promised to 
increase ISF units’ confidence, capability, and operational tempo.
Petraeus hoped to transfer 8,500 of the HMMWVs to the Iraqis in 2008, with the Iraqi 
Government paying a nominal fee of $1,000 per vehicle. When defense officials in the 
United States insisted on charging the Iraqis $11,000 per vehicle, however, the Iraqis 
could only afford to buy about half the 8,500 vehicles in 2008, leaving the rest to be pur-
chased in 2009. In ways that frustrated Petraeus and other U.S. commanders in Baghdad, 
the policy change slowed the effort to increase the Iraqi troops’ mobility and survivabil-
ity, and further undermined senior Iraqi leaders’ confidence in the U.S. Government’s 
commitment to equip the ISF.175 It also slowed Dubik’s plans to use the unwanted U.S. 
HMMWVs to give the Iraqi Army and police a coherent maintenance program in which 
drivers, mechanics, and maintenance supervisors throughout the ISF could be trained on 
the same standard system, with the security ministries using a common vehicle system in 
their budgeting and staffing.176
Aside from the equipping of the ISF, there were problems within the Iraqi security 
structure. The sectarian power struggle that had manifested itself in incidents such as the 
assassination of Lieutenant General Amer Hashimi in late 2006 had partially receded by 
late 2007, but assassinations still occasionally took place. In one high-profile case, the Shi’a 
deputy commandant of the Iraqi military academy in Baghdad kidnapped and murdered 
his own commandant, then later kidnapped but did not kill the murdered commandant’s 
successor. When the deputy commandant’s role was uncovered, the Ministry of Defense 
dispatched Iraqi special operations forces to detain him on September 25.177
Another problem that bore watching was Prime Minister Maliki’s attempt to exert 
control over the Iraqi Army and police by proliferating regional operations commands. 
Using the Baghdad Operations Command as his precedent, Maliki created other regional 
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commands in Basrah, Diyala, the mid-Euphrates region, and Ninawa, and others would 
follow. Initially coalition leaders welcomed the idea of regional commands that could 
create unity of Iraqi effort, but their enthusiasm faded as Maliki began to use the new 
headquarters to bypass the formal chain of command. Over time, coalition commanders 
bristled as Maliki began issuing orders to tactical units through the politically connected 
General Faruq al-Araji and the Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC) rather than 
through the Iraqi Joint Forces Command. Coalition officials noted it was a practice resem-
bling the operating mode of the Saddam Hussein regime and a signal that Maliki might 
be creating a structure to politicize the Iraqi military as the Ba’ath Party had done. Pet-
raeus shared these concerns but was reluctant to wrestle Maliki over control of the Iraqi 
military in the midst of a difficult campaign. The MNF-I commander preferred to embed 
coalition officers as advisers within the OCINC and the regional commands to keep a 
watchful eye on their behavior instead.178 MNF-I would then try to undo Maliki’s consol-
idation of control once the crisis of the insurgency had passed.
The Jones Commission and the National Police
During the “Iraqi surge” year, the Interior Ministry remained a problem, with a sig-
nificant portion of its police forces either ineffective or divided by sectarian behavior. 
Partly in reaction to coalition reports about the ministry’s destructive sectarian role in late 
2006, the U.S. Congress in 2007 formed an independent commission of former military 
officers and senior defense and security officials led by retired Marine General James L. 
Jones, the former NATO commander and future national security adviser. After months 
of examination, the Jones Commission released a detailed report on the state of the ISF 
on September 6, 2007, just 5 days before the Petraeus-Crocker congressional hearings. 
Among its general findings, the report found that the Iraqi Army was gradually improv-
ing, but not ready to operate independently. The commission also noted several major 
areas in which the Interior Ministry required urgent reforms in order to produce effective 
police. Its most striking finding stated that the National Police were hopelessly sectarian 
and should be disbanded:
The National Police have proven operationally ineffective. Sectarianism in its units undermines its 
ability to provide security; the force is not viable in its current form. The National Police should be 
disbanded and reorganized. . . . It should become a much smaller organization under a different 
name with responsibility for highly specialized police tasks.179
The Jones Commission’s recommendation to do away with the National Police, which 
at that time numbered more than 30,000, received a great deal of attention in the United 
States, but it was an idea with which Petraeus strongly disagreed. Speaking to his senior 
advisers in Baghdad, the MNF-I commander argued that the United States already should 
have learned the folly of disbanding large security organizations in Iraq. As bad as the 
National Police might be, Petraeus judged, it would be better to reform it than to put tens 
of thousands of armed men out of work as had been done in 2003.180
To formulate an alternative to the Jones Commission’s recommendations, Petraeus 
and Dubik pressed Interior Minister Jawad Bolani to present his own plan for reforming 
his ministry and the National Police, with extensive coalition input. Dubik used the Jones 
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Commission report as leverage to push Bolani and other Iraqis to accept politically diffi-
cult reforms, showing that if the reforms did not come, the U.S. Government in Washing-
ton was certain to cut off funding and assistance to the Interior Ministry. This pressure 
forced Bolani and the Maliki government to institute some of the coalition’s recommen-
dations, but progress was slow and inconsistent.
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant James Selesnick (Released).
Jawad Bolani, Iraqi Minister of the Interior (2006-2010).181
As Dubik pressed Bolani to make these changes, Petraeus tapped Colonel H. R. 
McMaster to conduct a 2-month countrywide inspection of the Interior Ministry and rec-
ommend additional ways to reform it. Going far deeper into the ministry’s operations 
than the Jones Commission had done, McMaster found that corruption and sectarian-
ism thrived inside the ministry mainly because of the political pressure that Iraq’s major 
parties placed on it. The ministry and its police forces had become a battlefield among 
the warring parties, a fact that the coalition’s capacity building efforts had naively failed 
to recognize. The sectarian takeover of the ministry had taken place under the eyes of 
hundreds of coalition advisers who had done little to stop it, McMaster noted. The worst 
actors took advantage of the absence of written policies for most of the ministry’s activ-
ities, creating a gray area in which there were few explicit prohibitions against corrupt, 
sectarian, and nepotistic behaviors—an underestimated factor in the legalistic Iraqi Gov-
ernment system. The ministry’s outdated bureaucracy created room for large-scale cor-
ruption within its vast budget that could not be easily traced. Against this backdrop, the 
influence of the Badr Corps was particularly negative, because the Badr Corps officers 
who had infiltrated senior ministry positions under Bayan Jabr continued to use the min-
istry’s troops and resources to implement a sectarian agenda.182
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McMaster also found that there already were a small cadre of reform-minded officials 
inside the ministry, and if they could be insulated from political pressure, they might 
have a chance to institute reforms. As Dubik also noted, McMaster discovered that Inte-
rior Minister Bolani quietly had begun to purge sectarian officials such as Bashir Nasser 
al-Wandi, the infamous Engineer Ahmed, shifting some of them to powerless jobs or 
firing them altogether. In addition, many Interior Ministry officers had served in the Iraqi 
Army during the Iran-Iraq War and resented the ministry’s Badr Corps appointees, most 
of whom had fought on the Iranian side. These officers were glad to see some of the Badr 
Corps men sidelined within the ministry and quietly told McMaster so. The McMas-
ter Report concluded that the coalition needed to make dramatic changes, exerting its 
advantage over the ministry, making its security assistance conditional on appropriate 
behavior, and strongly supporting the ministry’s reformers, if the Iraqi police were to be 
salvaged.183
As McMaster delivered his findings, Dubik saw additional ways the coalition might 
change its approach and improve the National Police, working closely with National 
Police commander Lieutenant General Hussein al-Awadi as he did so. In early November, 
the final National Police unit completed its “rebluing” training and returned to operations 
in the Baghdad area, where the National Police no longer played as destabilizing a role 
as they had done in 2006. “Rebluing” was a process where each National Police unit was 
pulled from security duties and put through a 3- to 4-week program that involved vetting 
its personnel and retraining in democratic policing and respect for human rights. Many of 
the units were renamed, and officers were issued new digital camouflage in yet another 
effort to rebrand the troubled organization. Also in early November, a newly arrived 
contingent of Italian Carabinieri, operating under Dubik’s NATO element at MNSTC-I, 
began retraining National Police units to operate as a paramilitary gendarme-type force, 
a process that Dubik and other coalition commanders hoped would help curb the organi-
zation’s sectarian activities when deployed as reinforcements for local police.184
At the same time, General Awadi removed the commander of the notorious “Wolf 
Brigade,” making him the 10th National Police brigade commander to be replaced in 
2007, and meaning that all nine of the organization’s brigades had seen their commanders 
replaced—one of them twice.185 That the diminutive Awadi was bold enough to fire polit-
ically well-connected sectarian commanders surprised coalition leaders. At one point in 
early 2007, coalition commanders misjudged Awadi as a Shi’a sectarian responsible for 
some of the National Police’s destructive behavior—and had even briefly put him on 
Petraeus’s notorious “top 20 sectarian actors” list. Not until working more closely with 
Awadi to institute reforms in fall 2007 did the general’s coalition partners fully realize 
that he and many other senior Shi’a officers with an Iraqi Army background were nation-
alists who had been constrained by sectarian political pressure from 2004 onward. Once 
the coalition helped provide Awadi political top cover, he had been quick to purge many 
of the sectarian commanders who had caused such trouble in Baghdad in 2006.186
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PLANNING FOR DRAWDOWN
As the Iraqi security forces continued their expansion in late 2007, coalition com-
manders already were planning for the reduction of their own troops. The surge was a 
temporary initiative, and whatever the exact numbers or timeline, MNF-I would need to 
prepare for its orderly conclusion—though Petraeus and Odierno were loath to signal 
publicly that the coalition troops who were pressuring AQI and the Shi’a militias would 
soon begin to leave. The Joint Campaign Plan of June 2007 had assumed that the United 
States would maintain 20 BCTs in Iraq only through March 2008, though with the Army’s 
extension of unit deployments and individual augmentees from 12 to 15 months, the end-
point of the surge could stretch to June 2008.187
As early as June 2007, Odierno judged that conditions likely would allow for a reduc-
tion of U.S. troops beginning in December 2007, while Petraeus believed a reduction of 
approximately 30,000 U.S. troops would be warranted by mid-2008.188 Together, MNF-I 
and MNC-I planned for a gradual reduction of U.S. brigades beginning in December 
2007, reaching the pre-surge level of 15 in July 2008. Upon reaching 15 brigades, the force 
level would remain steady for a period of several months as commanders judged whether 
the security progress of the surge could be sustained with a smaller force. U.S. forces in 
Iraq at that point would number 137,000, higher than the pre-surge troop total due to 
the addition of a division headquarters, combat aviation brigade, and a larger number of 
combat support troops than before the surge.189 There were also two nonstandard brigade 
headquarters that controlled almost no subordinate forces but assisted with governance 
and ISF development in select areas where security had improved.
MNC-I’s concept was for U.S. forces to thin out across the country rather than disap-
pear from any particular area in order to maintain situational awareness and to continue 
the partnering of U.S. units with ISF counterparts at lower echelons. Drawing down by 
30,000 troops would be a complex undertaking that depended on a variety of physical 
factors and policy considerations. Some were straightforward, such as the U.S. Army 
component of CENTCOM’s (U.S. Army Central [ARCENT]) capacity to process only two 
and half brigades per month through Kuwait. Others were more complicated, such as 
unanswered questions about which equipment should be turned over to the Iraqi secu-
rity forces to enhance their capability and interoperability.190 MNC-I would also have to 
plan how to administer not just the 15 BCTs but also individual battalions, provincial 
reconstruction teams, combat support and combat service support units, and ISF for-
mations to cover the country. Instead of closing bases as part of its drawdown scheme, 
MNC-I would “transition parts of each base by reducing the Coalition ‘fence line’ within 
the base simultaneous with conducting a partial handover to the ISF.”191
In a larger sense, the end of the surge would mean a coalition return to the concept 
of transition to Iraqi control, the same process that had fallen apart in 2006. As Petraeus 
described it to British Defence Secretary Desmond Browne, the coalition would move 
over time from “leading to partnering to over watching” as the Iraqi forces continued to 
develop.192 Unlike the premature drawdown of 2006, the coalition hoped that transition 
to Iraqi control in 2008 would take place “in a deliberate fashion and . . . based on local 
conditions,” according to an MNC-I operations order of December 20, 2007.193
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The MNC-I order presented two different operational concepts for transitioning 
security responsibility to the Iraqis and shifting U.S. forces to an overwatch role. In the 
first approach, military transition teams (MiTTs) in a given area would double or even 
quadruple in size, as preserving security gains would fall on the shoulders of the ISF, 
U.S. advisers, and embedded provincial reconstruction teams.194 A prime example of this 
approach was in Ramadi where Colonel John Charlton’s 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Divi-
sion, would not be backfilled after it departed Iraq in April 2008, and MNF-West would 
lose two additional Marine infantry battalions elsewhere in Anbar the following month.
The second overwatch concept was one of “scalable strike packages,” in which Iraqi 
units would pair with embedded coalition advisers from the Combined Joint Special 
Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) who would receive priority of fires; intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance; and lift assets, while local conventional units would provide a 
quick reaction force.195 MNC-I considered Nasiriyah the prime example after Abu Liqaa’s 
specialized police unit and its supporting CJSOTF advisers suppressed a JAM attempt to 
take over the city in June 2007.196 In December 2007, MNC-I directed its subordinate units 
to develop scalable strike packages of their own using Iraqi special operations forces and 
their CJSOTF advisers.
No matter the approach, it was difficult to mitigate the impending rapid loss of 30,000 
U.S. troops. By late 2007, one of Petraeus’s biggest challenges was persuading coalition 
allies to maintain or even expand their troop presence as the United States reduced its 
own. Like the 2,000-strong Georgian brigade that arrived as MND-C in late summer 2007 
making the nation the third-largest contributor of troops to the coalition, Petraeus sought 
to convince others to increase their participation in the “Coalition of the Willing.”197 In 
October, MNF-I hosted a conference of 35 partner countries in Bahrain, but it produced 
no new major troop commitments.
Some countries’ commitments to MNF-I were contingent on domestic political devel-
opments. In mid-December, Kevin Rudd, Australia’s newly elected Labor Prime Minis-
ter, informed Petraeus and Crocker that he would withdraw the Australian battle group 
in August 2008, though Australia would consider providing advisers to build Iraq logis-
tics capacity after that time.198 Similarly, on November 17, the Polish Defense Minister 
announced that his country would withdraw its 900-man contingent in MND-CS in 2008, 
a development Petraeus believed might endanger the gains against JAM in Diwaniya and 
put Camp Echo outside the city at risk.199 The Poles also sought an accelerated relief of 
their responsibilities through the early transfer of Qadisiyah Province to provincial Iraqi 
control (PIC), but Petraeus replied to the Polish ambassador that Qadisiyah would “PIC 
when the conditions are right to do so and not when it is politically convenient for the 
Polish Government.”200 The promise of logistical assistance from MNC-I for the Polish 
redeployment, coupled with a reminder of the agreement between Bush and the Polish 
Government, helped convince Polish leaders to maintain responsibility for MND-CS until 
October 1, 2008.201 Gains with partner nations proved insufficient, and by the end of 2007, 
U.S. commanders could see that within months U.S. units would have to expand farther 
into southern Iraq to cover areas left open by vacating allies. A diminishing number of 
U.S. troops would be required to hold more territory than ever before.
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IRAQI POLITICAL TENSIONS AND PROGRESS
The strategic purpose of the surge had been not just to defeat AQI and other major 
insurgent groups, but also to create conditions in which the Iraqi political factions would 
reconcile and use politics rather than violence to pursue their political goals. As the secu-
rity goals of the surge appeared to come closer to fruition in summer and fall 2007, the 
political goals remained elusive. Kurdish-Arab tensions simmered, with the governing 
parties deeply divided over the question of Kirkuk and the future relationship between 
the Kurdistan Regional Government and the government in Baghdad. The Awaken-
ing offered a political opening against the Sunni insurgency, but Maliki and other Shi’a 
leaders were reluctant to partner with a movement that they considered infiltrated by 
Ba’athists and sectarian enemies. The Sunni Parliamentary bloc remained outside the 
government altogether, leaving most of Iraq’s Sunni electorate without representatives 
in the Iraqi cabinet. The large Sadrist bloc remained in opposition to the government as 
well. As these major political groupings jostled for political power in the Green Zone and 
in provincial councils, their disputes often fueled violent clashes among their various 
militias or security forces on the street, and they often seemed more concerned with fight-
ing one another than fighting the worst of the terrorist groups.
A few major political disputes stood out. The fate of Saddam’s former senior deputies 
became a Sunni-Shi’a political divide when Maliki and other Shi’a leaders pressed MNF-I 
to allow the execution of the men sentenced to death by an Iraqi court for the 1988 chemi-
cal weapons attacks against Kurds in Halabjah. The coalition had agreed to the execution 
of Ali Hassan al-Majid (also known as Chemical Ali) after Jalal Talabani and his Vice 
Presidents had agreed to sign the execution warrant. A dispute arose, however, when 
Maliki pressed to execute former Minister of Defense General Sultan Hashem, the Mosul 
native who had signed the 1991 cease-fire agreement with General Norman Schwarzkopf, 
and who had surrendered to Petraeus in Mosul in 2003. Many Iraqi Sunnis considered 
Hashem blameless in the 1988 war crime and looked on him as a potential Sunni polit-
ical leader. Sunni opposition to his execution was broad; as a result, President Talabani 
and others had declined to sign his execution order rather than anger the Sunni political 
parties with what they would consider a sectarian killing. Nevertheless, Maliki pressed 
MNF-I to release Hashem from coalition detention so that the death sentence could be 
carried out, something Petraeus and Crocker refused to do without the full approval of 
Talabani and his Vice Presidents.202
The coalition had hoped to encourage the Sunni bloc’s return to Maliki’s government 
in fall 2007, but Maliki’s ongoing dispute with Vice President Tariq Hashimi and other 
senior Sunni politicians thwarted this idea. Maliki considered Hashimi a recalcitrant 
sectarian linked to terrorist groups, and Hashimi had reciprocal feelings about Maliki. 
Some of Maliki’s distrust of the top Sunni Parliamentary leaders seemed warranted when 
coalition troops raided Sunni leader Adnan Dulaimi’s residence in the Green Zone the 
following month to arrest one of his aides for murder and found Dulaimi’s bodyguards 
with a car bomb at the house. “The incident has created political problems and is likely 
to heighten sectarian tensions and farther increase the divide between the government of 
Prime Minister Maliki and the Sunni Tawafuq alliance,” Petraeus noted dryly.203
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Source: DoD photo courtesy of Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Public Affairs (Released).
Iraqi Vice President Tariq Hashimi Greets Major General Joseph Fil, MND-B,  
Commander.204
For its part, the coalition occasionally considered Hashimi difficult to deal with as 
well, and Petraeus sometimes withheld coalition airlift support for Hashimi in response 
to his public criticism of the coalition and of Maliki.205 As Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha and 
the Anbar Awakening grew in prominence in fall 2007, both U.S. officials and Maliki 
considered giving the Awakening the power to name Sunni ministers to fill the cabi-
net positions Hashimi and the Sunni Parliamentary bloc had abandoned earlier in the 
year. “We are going to reduce our support for Vice-President (VP) Hashimi and see how 
Sheik Ahmed performs in a more high profile role for a while,” Petraeus reported in 
early October. “We need to find some Sunni leaders able to bring the Sunni commu-
nity along the road to reconciliation, and our early impressions are that Sheik Ahmed 
may fill such a role.”206 Petraeus was reacting partially to a budding intra-Sunni power 
struggle between the Awakening and Hashimi’s Iraqi Islamic Party, the latter of which 
dominated the Sunni bloc in Parliament. In early 2008, 300 sheikhs in the Awakening met 
in Ramadi to elect a central committee and announce they would form a political party, 
called Sahawa al-Iraq. The new political challenge had the potential to create intra-Sunni 
political violence. “Our message is that both parties have a right to exist, and threats or 
acts of violence are unacceptable,” Petraeus noted.207
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The intense rivalry among the major parties spilled over into the coalition’s detainee 
releases, as the major political leaders vied to preside over the frequent detainee release 
ceremonies in order to claim credit for extricating Iraqis from coalition custody. After 
Vice Presidents Tariq Hashimi and Adel Abdel Mahdi presided over release ceremonies 
in October, MNF-I held one on November 8 at which Maliki presided. “Hopefully this 
ceremony (larger than the one at which VP Tariq Hashimi presided) will help compen-
sate the PM’s distress over the good will received by the Iraqi vice Presidents when they 
hosted previous detainee release ceremonies,” Petraeus commented.208 Perhaps carried 
away by the emotion of the event, Maliki mentioned to Odierno the following day that 
he was considering declaring a general amnesty for those in detention, an ill-formed idea 
that alarmed coalition leaders who knew their detention centers still held thousands of 
hard-core fighters.209
The Turkey-Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) Crisis
Signs of political discord between Shi’a and Sunni parties in Baghdad were eclipsed 
by the flaring of ethnic warfare in northern Iraq. The coalition found itself in fall 2007 
with yet another conflict on its hands when the decades-long war between Turkey and 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) broke out again. From its bases inside Iraqi Kurdis-
tan, the PKK had launched intermittent attacks against Turkey even before 2003, but the 
conflict had slackened until several high-profile violent events occurred in 2007. On May 
22, a suspected PKK suicide bomber killed eight people in Ankara, after which Turkish 
leaders threatened to invade Iraqi Kurdistan to root out the PKK, and even to attack 
Massoud Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), whom Turkey blamed for 
harboring the PKK. Barzani responded by declaring that the peshmerga would resist 
any Turkish incursion. Turkish troops shelled PKK positions inside Iraq and even briefly 
crossed into Iraq in “hot pursuit” of PKK fighters.210
After an October battle left dozens of Turkish soldiers and PKK fighters dead, the 
Turkish Parliament authorized its military to use “every kind of measure” against the 
PKK, including ground operations inside Iraq. Under threat of Turkish attack, Barzani 
wrote to Petraeus, warning that he would recall Kurdish troops from Iraq to defend 
the Kurdistan region if necessary.211 Since Kurdish troops were a key part of Operation 
FARDH AL-QANOON and the ongoing operations in Ninawa and Salahadin, their with-
drawal would put the security of those provinces and Baghdad at risk.
After further bloodshed, Petraeus and Crocker found themselves “in a difficult posi-
tion with our Iraqi partners and our Turkish NATO allies,” as the general put it.212 Iraqi 
leaders in Baghdad and Erbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, protested to U.S. counter-
parts that Turkey was illegally invading their country, while Turkish leaders in Ankara 
protested that MNF-I had done nothing to prevent the PKK from using Iraq as a base 
from which to attack Turkey. The situation worsened when Kurdish peshmerga took 
several Turkish soldiers who had crossed into Iraq hostage, a crisis that Petraeus defused 
by taking custody of the Turks and personally returning them to the Turkish Army on 
November 3.213
The Turkish attacks had a significant political impact both in Iraqi Kurdistan and in 
Baghdad. The Turkish bombing campaign angered the Kurdish public and made it dif-
ficult for Kurdish leaders to back down. It also forced Barzani to declare that Turkey’s 
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actions violated Iraqi sovereignty, a surprising claim for a Kurdish separatist to make. 
In Baghdad, the Kurdish parties began to indicate to Maliki and other Iraqi leaders that 
if the Iraqi Government did not resist future Turkish incursions into Iraq, the Kurdish 
Alliance would withdraw from the Maliki government, causing its collapse. The crisis 
thus threatened to leave Iraq without a prime minister and a government—and leave 
MNF-I without Iraqi Government partners—in the midst of the fragile security gains of 
the surge.
Petraeus’s preferred solution to the crisis was for U.S. leaders to force Turkish repre-
sentatives to negotiate with the KDP, which had fought a civil war against the PKK in 
the 1990s and had no fondness for the party.214 Before diplomacy could be given a chance 
to work, however, the Turks expanded their operations into a full-scale air campaign 
against the PKK on December 16. Turkish military leaders, eager to signal that they had 
American support, announced that the United States had opened Iraqi airspace to Turk-
ish attack aircraft and had provided Turkey with targeting intelligence against the PKK.215
In fact, the U.S. European Command and MNF-I had indeed coordinated with the 
Turkish general staff on the operation in order to restrict its potential damage, but when 
the bombing actually began, Turkish leaders gave U.S. counterparts a mere 30 minutes 
notice. The Turkish air strikes also extended far beyond the area MNF-I had agreed could 
be struck, and angry Kurdish leaders reported to MNF-I that the first air strikes had 
killed some Iraqi Kurdish civilians.216 The following day, PKK spokesmen warned, “if 
colonialist powers in Kurdistan are continued to be supported, it should be known that 
the Kurdish people have the power to spoil the balances in the Middle East and hurt the 
interests of Western powers.”217 A letter from the PKK to Petraeus 3 days earlier had been 
far more conciliatory, asking Petraeus and U.S. leaders to broker a political resolution to 
the conflict, but lacking policy guidance from Washington, Petraeus did not reply.218 “It 
would be most helpful if the Turks would employ some ‘constructive ambiguity’ and 
at the least remain quiet about any strikes they conduct,” Petraeus wrote to Gates on 
December 23. He added, “Given the minimal amount of damage we assess they have 
afflicted on the PKK to date, the better solution is to pressure the Turks to stand down 
altogether and refocus on a broad, politically-led strategy against the PKK.”219 For the 
time being, however, the Turks and the PKK remained on a war footing, and the coalition 
remained braced to deal with the political repercussions.
Political Crisis and Prime Minister Maliki
The crisis in the north came at a time when political tensions between Prime Minister 
Maliki and the other parties in his government were near the breaking point. A signif-
icant factor in the infighting among the major parties was the tendency for Maliki and 
his personal advisers to make decisions in a secretive, insular fashion without consulting 
the other parties in the government. The Prime Minister, a deeply distrustful man who 
had come of age as an exiled Da’wa Party member under constant threat from Saddam’s 
intelligence apparatus, tended to interpret political events as conspiracies and viewed 
the other parties in his national unity government as potential enemies rather than part-
ners. Before the Turkish campaign against the PKK began, he had begun to take steps in 
October to curb the KDP’s political dominance of Ninawa Province.220 At the same time, 
an early October Sadr-Hakim truce that the coalition welcomed as a way of suppressing 
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intra-Shi’a violence seemed to strike Maliki as a potential Sadrist-ISCI alliance against 
Maliki and Da’wa. By late October, Petraeus noted, “unfortunately, we are beginning 
to see some suspicion of ISCI and VP Adil Mahdi akin to the suspicion once reserved 
for VP Hashimi.”221 For their part, the other parties complained to coalition leaders that 
Maliki had cut them out of the decision-making process and had refused to abide by an 
agreement among the parties to use a “3+1” arrangement, in which major policy choices 
would come from consensus among the Prime Minister, President Talabani, and Iraq’s 
two Vice Presidents.222
Matters started to come to a head in mid-December as ISCI and the Kurdish par-
ties began to raise the idea that the Iraqi Parliament should vote Maliki out of office. 
On December 16, the same day that Turkey launched its air campaign against the PKK 
in Iraqi Kurdistan, Petraeus reported to Gates that Kurdish leaders had “presented a 
long array of grievances and frustrations with the exclusive and conspiratorial Maliki 
inner-circle.”223 Three days later, on December 19, several of the same leaders met with 
visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Baghdad and asked for U.S. support for 
a Parliamentary vote to remove Maliki as Prime Minister. Rice threw cold water on the 
idea, however, and told the Iraqi leaders that they should look instead to “implementa-
tion of the 3+1 concept and true leadership of the [Iraqi Government] to capitalize on the 
improvements in security that the surge has brought.”224 The matter did not end there. 
On December 23, Petraeus reported to Washington that almost all of Iraq’s major political 
groups continued to move toward Maliki’s ouster. The Kurdish parties were “increas-
ingly frustrated with what its members perceived as Maliki’s ineffective leadership and 
isolated decision-making” and considered withdrawing from the government. Ayatollah 
Ali Husayni Sistani and other religious leaders in Najaf were “worried about their repu-
tation being tarnished by the GOI’s ineffectiveness,” while Kurdish leaders and the Iraqi 
Islamic Party were on the verge of forming an alliance.225
The political pressure took its toll on Maliki, who physically collapsed on December 
29 and was evacuated to London by the coalition to seek medical treatment for exhaus-
tion and dehydration. “At this point, we don’t have any additional evidence that plan-
ning for a putsch has progressed,” Petraeus noted on December 30, though he reported 
the following week that Vice President Mahdi was traveling to Tehran seeking Iranian 
support for Maliki’s ouster, while Abdul Aziz al-Hakim visited Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf 
probably asking for the same.226
The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) Rollover
In actuality, coalition leaders had mixed feelings about the prospect of Maliki’s 
replacement. Rice and others were wary of recreating the government vacuum of early 
2006, when, for 5 months, Iraq had gone without political leadership and the government 
machinery ground to a halt. U.S. officials in Baghdad also had seen worrying signs that 
Maliki and his Da’wa allies were becoming authoritarian and difficult to deal with, espe-
cially on issues related to the U.S.-Iraqi security and political relationship.
When the time came in late 2007 to renew the UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) that authorized MNF-I’s presence in Iraq, U.S. officials in Baghdad found 
themselves negotiating not with Iraqi ministers, but with Maliki’s Da’wa Party advisers, 
who appeared to discount the U.S. military’s role in tamping down the Iraqi insurgency 
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and displayed an ill-informed distrust of common international legal language. Across 
several weeks of negotiations, the Da’wa men started by “dredging up language from the 
Amman letter of October 2006” and declaring that they expected the terms under which 
MNF-I operated to be significantly restricted to reflect “the progress that has been made 
over the past year.”227 As the talks proceeded, Maliki’s advisers insisted that the Iraqi 
Government be given “all functions and authorities concerning detention, arrest, and 
imprisonment,” which would have prevented coalition units from detaining anyone in 
Iraq.228 Only after some dramatic confrontations that Petraeus described as “contentious” 
did the Maliki government agree to allow the UNSCR to go forward for approval on 
December 19. The UNSCR “was in question until a few hours before the vote, with Iraqi 
officials rejecting language in the resolution that suggested their security forces be sub-
jected to international law,” Petraeus reported. The general added that the resolution was 
adopted only after Rice assured Maliki that the resolution’s language did not undermine 
Iraqi control of its security forces. The process left U.S. officials concerned that American 
plans to negotiate a strategic partnership and bilateral security agreement with the Maliki 
government in 2008 could run into similar problems.229 The vast improvement in security 
during the course of 2007 had not yet made relations among the Iraqi political parties or 
between the United States and the Iraqi Government much easier.
***
The First Year of the Surge: General Petraeus’s Analysis
As 2007 ended, Petraeus took stock of the changed situation in Iraq since the surge had 
begun almost 11 months earlier. By December 2007, the average number of violent inci-
dents per week in Iraq dropped to less than 40 percent of the peak violence of June 2007 
and was on par with the level of violence of early 2005. High-profile bombings had fallen 
to less than one-third of the June 2007 peak. The number of civilian deaths had fallen to 
one-sixth the peak total of November 2006, when more than 3,000 civilian deaths had been 
recorded. In their internal reporting, the coalition commands estimated that over 7,400 
enemy fighters had been killed in 2007, compared to about 5,000 in 2006.230 Conversely, 
2007 had been the deadliest year of the war for U.S. troops, with 864 killed, compared to 
770 in 2006, but losses had been dropping steadily since the summer. Twenty-two U.S. 
troops had been lost in December 2007 (seven of them nonbattle deaths), the second-low-
est monthly total since the beginning of the war.231 Among ISF units, 2,452 Iraqi troops 
and police were killed in 2007, a slight decrease from the 2,590 killed in 2006.232 “In many 
ways we spent 2007 creating a new situation—one of reduced violence—that replaced 
the horrific existence most Iraqis bore for the past 12 to 18 months. Now we obviously 
need to make the most of the new situation,” Petraeus noted as December ended.233
On January 6, 2008, the MNF-I commander wrote to Gates to report these figures and 
to reflect on the dynamics that caused such significant improvements in the security sit-
uation. He began by writing, “the past 12 months were made possible by the courageous 
decision in early December 2006 by General Casey and Ambassador Khalilzad to state 
that the strategy at the time was not working. This acknowledgement paved the way for 
the surge—ours and the Iraqis—and for the change in strategy that made securing the 
population the central tenet.”234 It was a backhanded compliment, considering that Pet-
raeus understood Casey had not agreed that the transition plan needed to be abandoned. 
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Moving to security arrangements, Petraeus noted that by living in Iraqi communities 
alongside the ISF, “we not only improved security, we also fostered and supported 
movements in local communities to reject AQI.” As Iraqi tribal leaders had come forward 
willing to turn against AQI, coalition units had been flexible enough to exploit the oppor-
tunity that the Awakening presented. “With experienced leaders like Ray Odierno at the 
helms of our units, our elements made the most of the situations that developed (validat-
ing Seneca’s observation that ‘Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportu-
nity.’),” Petraeus observed. The coalition had also been able to bring local political and 
economic initiatives to bear along while clearing and holding AQI sanctuaries on a large 
scale. “[S]uccessful counter-terrorist/counterinsurgency operations on the scale of those 
in Iraq require conventional forces [and] special forces . . . all working together and aug-
mented by host nation forces and supportive local communities,” Petraeus wrote.235
A few other factors had contributed to the improvement in security. AQI had exhibited 
“genuine tone deafness” about the Iraqi population’s disapproval of their brutal tactics 
and ideology, Petraeus noted, making it easier for the coalition and the Iraqi Government 
to sway public opinion against the terrorist group. The Sadrist cease-fire had been an 
important development as well, though Petraeus noted that “we remain very wary of the 
assistance the Quds Force continues to provide” and that MNF-I would not be “handing 
out any badges for good behavior to Teheran any time soon.”236
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Map 16. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, 2007.
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Looking ahead in 2008, Petraeus judged that, although coalition forces had done con-
siderable damage to AQI, more remained to be done because the group was “far from 
finished” and remained “the most serious near-term threat to Iraq.” Where the Shi’a mil-
itant groups were concerned, MNF-I would “continue to quietly target members of the 
JAM Special Groups, to contribute to additional fissures in the Sadr organization, and 
to cultivate the seeds of a Shi’a Awakening by increasing that community’s recognition 
that Special Group extremists are the long-term threat to security and the rule of law in 
Iraq.” In 2008, Petraeus and MNF-I would seek to replicate the effect of the Sunni Awak-
ening among the Shi’a militant groups’ constituencies, based on his judgment that “the 
same power of the people that made such a profound change in the Sunni communities 
is present and waiting to be activated, and we have some reason to believe that the basic 
sensibility of the Iraqi people will lead them to a broader rejection of bad behavior.”237
Also in 2008, Petraeus reported coalition leaders and units would aim to increase the 
capacity of the Iraqi Government to try to consolidate the year’s security gains. “Given 
that much of 2007’s progress was based on the Iraqi people rejecting extremism, we’ll 
have to work with the GOI [Federal Government of Iraq] and use all of our available 
means to help the government deliver basic services, job training, and employment to 
those same people to cement the security gains we’ve made together,” he noted. For that 
reason, “there will be a need in 2008 for additional aid, advisors, and capacity building 
efforts in the coming year.”238
Petraeus’s report indicated the growing sense inside the coalition headquarters that 
the coalition’s position was growing stronger week by week. Conversely, for AQI and its 
allied insurgent groups, the situation bin Laden had described as “pitch black” darkness 
in October 2007 had become even bleaker by year’s end. AQI had lost thousands more 
fighters killed and captured. The Awakening had become the dominant force in former 
insurgent strongholds such as the Hawijah and Arab Jabour, and the insurgency’s over-
all prospects looked dim. Across central and northern Iraq, AQI remained strong only in 
Mosul and its environs, and coalition commanders already were planning a large-scale 
offensive led by U.S. forces to drive AQI out of Mosul before the departure of the surge 
brigades. However, as events transpired, it was an offensive that would never take place.
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ENABLING THE SURGE, 2007-2008
The increase in U.S. forces’ operational tempo and effectiveness that General David 
Petraeus noted in his January 2008 retrospective on the first year of the surge could not 
have taken place without the addition of thousands of support forces and significant 
changes in the way the United States prosecuted its campaign in Iraq. The surge in Iraq 
was substantially more than just the deployment of 21,000 additional combat troops and 
roughly 8,000 support troops that accompanied them. Several major supporting factors 
enabled the coalition’s combat forces to conduct the security operations of the surge 
campaign and to pivot into large-scale stabilization activities that helped tamp down 
Iraq’s sectarian civil war. The campaign of 2007-2008 was enabled by an unusual level 
of U.S. civil-military unity of effort and focus from the strategic to the tactical levels. The 
fielding and maturation of a series of technological enablers and innovative practices 
greatly enhanced coalition and Iraqi units’ ability to engage in close fights with enemy 
groups and to survive the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that had become the most 
common enemy weapon.
The coalition’s intelligence capabilities had matured as well, with thousands of intel-
ligence professionals gaining the experience and knowledge base needed to support 
counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. Coalition units also enjoyed access to 
sophisticated intelligence resources at lower echelons than ever before, giving tactical 
U.S. units an unprecedented advantage in their local operations. The idea of “money as 
a weapon system” took root at all levels of the coalition’s operations, enabling both the 
spread of the Awakening and the dismantling of important portions of the insurgen-
cy’s finances. Finally, the coalition was able largely to regain control of its own deten-
tion centers, though the results of its rehabilitation programs were mixed. By early 2008, 
Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) and its units were operating with new capabilities 
and new ways of integrating them that gave the operations of the surge campaign a dif-
ferent look and feel than those that had preceded them.
GENERATING UNITY OF EFFORT
The Civil-Military Campaign Plan
Beyond additional troops, implementing the new strategy in 2007-2008 required stra-
tegic coherence, active leadership, and an uncommon degree of U.S. civil-military coop-
eration. President George W. Bush’s level of direct involvement in the Iraq campaign had 
grown over time, as had his direct interaction with senior U.S. officials in Baghdad. By 
the onset of the surge, the President had instituted regular, typically bi-weekly, meetings 
of the National Security Council (NSC) Principals Committee on the situation in Iraq that 
featured the MNF-I commander and the U.S. ambassador reporting via video teleconfer-
ence from Baghdad, and often included the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) com-
mander as well. Throughout the surge, Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker were 
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able to offer their unfiltered updates on the situation directly to the NSC principals and 
often received immediate guidance. This arrangement, which had begun when General 
George Casey, Jr., was in command in Baghdad, was a significant change to the tradi-
tional procedure in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represented the views 
of field commanders in NSC meetings.
 
Source: DoD photo by Cherie Thurlby (Released).
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates With U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan Crocker 
and General David Petraeus.1
Having the top U.S. military commander and diplomat in Iraq report to the NSC 
principals as a team also enabled Petraeus and Crocker to keep their respective home 
agencies’ military and diplomatic activities aligned in a way that had been impossible 
to do in the early years of the war. With the support of Bush and Gates, Petraeus aimed 
to ensure that MNF-I’s security operations supported the larger political goals of the 
President’s New Way Forward. The Joint Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) launched 
by Petraeus and Crocker in March 2007 provided the basis for a joint embassy and force 
campaign plan with a common mission statement and the political line of effort, rather 
than security, as the main effort.2
Petraeus and Crocker oversaw the execution and integration of the joint civil-military 
campaign plan from offices in Baghdad’s Republican Palace that were separated only 
by a waiting room. The two men met daily to coordinate their activities. About every 
6 weeks, they jointly chaired the Campaign Assessment and Synchronization Board, in 
which senior leaders from the military commands and the U.S. Embassy teamed up to 
examine each line of effort in the Joint Campaign Plan, with coalition ambassadors and 
United Nations (UN) representatives usually present. Petraeus and Crocker also met 
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with Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki together several times a week, usually choreograph-
ing what each would say to the Iraqi leader beforehand—sometimes in a “good cop, bad 
cop” approach.
Within the theater headquarters, Petraeus created or gave new emphasis to several 
staff elements to execute the surge. Three, in particular, were noteworthy for their con-
tribution to the conduct of a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign. Headed by a 
British major general and a senior State Department officer, the Force Strategic Engage-
ment Cell met with Sunni and Shi’a insurgents in an attempt to identify “reconcilables” 
and bring them into some kind of accommodation with the Iraqi Government. Petraeus 
had ordered the formation of this cell after he returned to Iraq in 2007, reflecting a tenet 
in his counterinsurgency guidance: “We must strive to make the reconcilables part of the 
solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.”3 
Next, to help sort the reconcilables from irreconcilables, the Strategic Debriefing Element 
that interrogated high-level detainees took on renewed importance, enabling the com-
mand to have extensive conversations with senior detainees and, in the process, “map” 
enemy networks and better gauge their motivations.
Finally, the MNF-I Information Operations (IO) Task Force provided tailored media 
products as part of a psychological operations effort to influence attitudes in the Iraqi 
population and encourage rejection of violent extremists. These sophisticated informa-
tion operations served as an important force multiplier. Taking guidance from Petraeus, 
the IO Task Force sought to “turn our enemies’ bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, 
oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.”4
The joint campaign plan also served to align and synchronize all the U.S. military 
and coalition efforts in theater with the MNF-I strategic approach, as happened when 
the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) changed its objective 
in mid-2007 to partnering with and building Iraqi security force (ISF) capacity to better 
align with MNC-I, the main effort. At the same time, the shift in the theater strategy 
also served to synchronize the efforts of special operations forces into the overall theater 
campaign. These organizations all participated in MNF-I’s daily Battle Update Assess-
ment, but Petraeus also gathered his senior commanders at weekly meetings in which the 
commanders of Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
Gulf Regional Division, the CENTCOM Joint Contracting Command, and Task Force 134 
joined as well. These sessions complemented the senior commanders’ daily dialogue in 
the Battle Update Assessment and were typically followed by detailed updates and plan-
ning sessions with Petraeus and key subordinate commanders.5
The Civilian Surge
Alongside the deployment of additional U.S. troops, 2007 and 2008 witnessed the 
deployment of a smaller, but significant, contingent of U.S. civilians to help execute the 
civil-military campaign in Iraq. However, across the U.S. Government, coordination 
dilemmas, institutional cultures, and a lack of execution oversight or accountability 
meant that the civilian surge lagged behind the military deployment.
An important component of Bush’s New Way Forward strategy was to increase the 
number of civilians serving with provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq from about 
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100 civilians in early 2007 to over 450 by the end of the year.6 In addition to increasing the 
size of each team, the new PRT program, renamed embedded provincial reconstruction 
teams (EPRTs), added personnel that specifically focused on facilitating reconciliation 
initiatives, economic development, and delivery of essential public services at district 
level and below. By the end of 2008, the State Department had a total of 14 EPRTs in 
Baghdad, Anbar, north Babil, and southern Diyala.7
The civilian staffing for this expansion of the PRT program was a source of friction. The 
State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) struggled 
to provide the foreign service officers, administrative personnel, and Arabic language 
interpreters to fill the new requirements.8 Diplomats who specialized in the Arab world 
were already fully committed, and the resulting shortfall had to be filled by the Depart-
ment of Defense (DoD) or by private-sector experts hired as temporary State Department 
employees.9 By the time the second phase of the embedded PRTs came into theater, 99 
of the 133 personnel on those teams were DoD military and civilians.10 Both Gates and 
Army Chief of Staff General Casey believed the small number of foreign service officers 
serving on the PRTs represented the State Department’s lack of commitment to the Iraq 
campaign, a sentiment that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice resented.11
The missions of the EPRTs evolved over time. Although the EPRTs were conceived to 
focus on sustainable, longer-term reconciliation, governance and development projects, 
their priorities gradually shifted to more immediate stabilization activities that would 
tamp down attacks against coalition soldiers.12 Some EPRT leaders were uncomfortable 
answering directly to military commanders instead of the U.S. Embassy, though Rice 
recalled that “there was never any question that the PRTs would be run by the battle 
space owner,” and Crocker worked to enforce that arrangement.13 Additionally, the PRTs 
and EPRTs both had to rely on U.S. military forces for sustainment and security, particu-
larly those that were co-located with U.S. military units.
In general, shortfalls in the U.S. Government civilian ranks in Iraq in 2007 and 2008 
resulted in an increase in contractors providing services ranging from security to engi-
neering and technical support, construction, economic development, and humanitarian 
assistance.14 DoD had the lion’s share, with 149,000 DoD contract personnel in Iraq and 
another 30,300 elsewhere in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, though some of the 
latter supported operations in Afghanistan rather than Iraq. The State Department had 
approximately 6,700 contractors in Iraq, of which 2,300 were U.S. citizens, and about 
40 percent of the department’s total provided security. By mid-2007, USAID directly 
employed another 3,500 contractors, of which about 2,900 were Iraqis, and sponsored 
programs that employed another 75,000 Iraqis. The Departments of Justice, Homeland 
Security, Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Treasury employed about 500 
additional contractors among them.15 Throughout the surge, the number of U.S.-em-
ployed contractors in Iraq exceeded the strength of U.S. military forces in the country, 
demonstrating the degree to which MNF-I’s operations depended on civilian manpower 
and support.
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Improved Coordination With Special Operations Forces
One of the central components of Petraeus’s strategy was to use special operations 
forces (SOF) to strike at the generators of sectarian violence—namely al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI) and Shi’a militias—to help buy time and space for the political process to develop. 
By 2007, a combination of internal developments and improved relationships with con-
ventional forces had enabled special operations forces to fulfill their assigned mission 
to a degree that had not been possible previously. Better intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance assets, as well as revised tactics that sped up the organization’s targeting 
cycle, led the number of monthly raids conducted in Iraq to jump from 18 in August 
2004 to 300 in August 2006.16 The withering series of nightly attacks stunned its sectarian 
opponents, putting them into a reactive mode that helped tactical commanders regain the 
initiative on the battlefield as well as operational leaders to advance the political process 
in Baghdad.
Yet the commandos’ crushing pace could not have been implemented without dra-
matically improved relations with the Army and Marine forces responsible for battle 
space across Iraq. While some coordination challenges remained, by and large, relations 
between the two elements had improved considerably from 2005 to 2006—which itself 
was a period of marked improvement from the beginning of the war. Many leaders 
on both sides benefitted from trust established across multiple deployments to Iraq or 
Afghanistan, where the two elements learned how to best partner for synergistic effects. 
Officers who had been battalion commanders in 2003 and 2004 had returned in 2006 and 
2007 as brigade staff officers and commanders, with similar increases in responsibility 
for more junior officers. Reflecting on that period, one special operations task force com-
mander conceded, “We really didn’t mesh completely with the conventional war effort 
[in Iraq] until 2006 [and] 2007.”17 By 2007, the effects of SOF’s pace of intelligence-driven 
raids against high-value targets and the presence of conventional units often were mutu-
ally reinforcing, improving security while accruing additional intelligence to keep the 
enemy off-balance. A symbiotic relationship had developed in most locations where 
each element provided its strengths, compensating for the other force’s weaknesses. 
Conventional units provided quick reaction forces, logistics support, evacuation, and an 
understanding of the local battlefield, while SOF provided intelligence, precision strike 
capabilities, flexibility, and speed. In particular, when special operations elements shared 
their in-theater document exploitation capabilities and technical capabilities, conven-
tional forces benefited greatly.
Despite the progress, problems remained. There were still examples in 2007 of poorly 
coordinated SOF raids that produced collateral damage that set back conventional units’ 
counterinsurgency efforts. In addition, there were problems coordinating priorities 
between rotating SOF elements that caused a lack of continuity and difficulties synchro-
nizing the SOF effort with MNC-I’s priorities. While overall conventional-SOF coordina-
tion was indeed getting better, there was still room for improvement.18
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The Counter-IED Effort and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicles
From the outset of the surge, Gates placed heavy emphasis on efforts to counter the 
insurgents’ use of IEDs, the weapon that caused a majority of coalition casualties. By 
late 2006, there were over 1,200 attacks and attempted attacks per week and an average 
of over 50 IED explosions every day, despite more than 3 years of work by the U.S. mil-
itary on countermeasures.19 IEDs had been the insurgents’ weapon of choice because of 
their simple construction, the ready availability of the materials to make them, and their 
effectiveness against coalition forces’ superior military systems and vehicles.20 In June 
2003, Commander of CENTCOM General John Abizaid had declared the IED to be his 
“No. 1 threat.” Almost 3 years later, in March 2006, Bush announced that defeating the 
IED threat was a top priority.21 From 2005 until the spring of 2008, IEDs were responsible 
for well over half of U.S. fatalities in Iraq, and the IED challenge seized media and public 
attention.
In 2007, counter-IED efforts matured to such a degree, when complemented by the 
rapid fielding of vehicles with more effective armor protection, that they constituted an 
essential enabler for the surge of forces. What began as an ad-hoc 12-member Army count-
er-IED task force in 2003 evolved by 2006 into the Joint Improvised Explosive Device 
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), a large DoD sub-agency whose mission was to “defeat 
the device, attack the network, [and] train the force” by disseminating effective count-
er-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures to units in the field.22 By 2007, JIEDDO had a 
staff of 3,100 and an annual budget of over $4 billion. Under retired Army General Mont-
gomery Meigs, JIEDDO and its predecessor organizations pursued an approach dubbed 
“left of boom” that, consistent with the U.S. Army’s preference for initiative and offensive 
action, focused on attacking the networks of bomb builders and facilitators in order to 
find IEDs and prevent them from exploding.23
While JIEDDO’s early years involved many of the growing pains experienced by 
newly formed government organizations, by the surge period, the group was having an 
operational level effect. Between January 2007 and June 2009, from the time the surge 
was announced to the withdrawal of coalition forces from Iraq’s cities, JIEDDO launched 
29 different initiatives to counter IEDs, often pushing technical assets down to the bri-
gade level or below in order to enable ground commanders in the tactical fight.24 Tech-
nical advances in IED forensics were some of the most effective initiatives, linking those 
responsible for the deadly weapons to their progeny with enough confidence to be able 
to arrest and detain the builders in addition to the triggermen. During the surge, the 
original IED forensics cell, the Combined Explosives Cell (CEXC), grew into multiple 
cells that served as crime scene investigation-type teams for the counter-IED fight. CEXC 
teams consisted of intelligence, law enforcement, and explosives experts, as well as elec-
trical engineers, information technology experts, and intelligence analysts who investi-
gated IED incidents and surveyed post-blast sites for fingerprints, telltale signs of specific 
bomb makers, and unique aspects of how devices were employed. The counter-IED effort 
also brought new emphasis on Shi’a militants sponsored by the Iranian regime. JIEDDO 
funded additional personnel in Iraq from the Defense Intelligence Agency’s Joint Intel-
ligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism, to provide advanced analysis and actionable 
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intelligence about Iranian-sponsored militant groups employing IEDs that contained 
EFPs.
An important part of JIEDDO’s operations was the Counter-IED Operations and 
Integration Center (COIC), which reached full capability in 2007 as a supporting ele-
ment to General Raymond T. Odierno’s III Corps headquarters after the corps assumed 
duties as MNC-I. The COIC provided essential intelligence for attacking networks of IED 
makers, trainers, and financiers and maintaining awareness of IED developments world-
wide. Under its director, Colonel James B. Hickey, the COIC generated unique analyses 
of attack trends and helped shed important light on the operational posture and inten-
tions of the coalition’s enemies. The COIC played a major role in 2007-2008 by helping 
Odierno and an adaptive MNC-I make tough choices about how to employ forces and 
their relationship to key terrain and a thinking enemy. Even so, when XVIII Airborne 
Corps headquarters assumed the MNC-I mission from III Corps in early 2008, the COIC 
was dissolved and its functions migrated to other MNC-I staff sections or to JIEDDO.
The integration of U.S. and multinational counter-IED capabilities fell to Combined 
Joint Task Force (CJTF) TROY. Initially established in 2005, Task Force TROY was staffed 
by joint service explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technicians and a diverse group of 
subject matter experts, including some from the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia, 
who brought a depth of EOD and electronic warfare expertise to the task. With teams in 
direct support of multinational divisions and combat brigades, CJTF TROY conducted 
weapons technical intelligence collection and exploitation to defeat IED networks. It also 
disseminated actionable intelligence and kept coalition and Iraqi units informed about 
new counter-IED tactics, techniques, and procedures.25
Task Force Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize (ODIN) represented another 
counter-IED innovation during the surge. In 2006, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army General 
Richard Cody, who had overseen the creation of the Joint IED Defeat Organization, saw 
a critical requirement to “win back the roads” from IEDs and help improve the coalition 
and Iraqi units’ freedom of movement.26 The result was the creation of Task Force (TF) 
ODIN, an aviation battalion equipped and outfitted to “improve the detection of roadside 
bombs before they explode[d], and to strike more adversaries safely, from a distance.”27 
The TF ODIN battalion consisted of three companies, each with different platforms and 
equipment to detect and destroy IEDs before coalition troops encountered them. These 
included C-12 Cessnas refitted for aerial reconnaissance and real-time imagery transmis-
sion, the Warrior Alpha and Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the Con-
stant Hawk forensic back-tracking system capable of detecting the point of origin for IED 
attacks.28 After fielding at Fort Hood, TX, Task Force ODIN deployed to Camp Speicher 
near Tikrit in July 2007 to support of commanders at the brigade level and below.
The Push for MRAPs
Decreasing the vulnerability of the armored vehicles used by the coalition proved 
one of the most difficult challenges to the counter-IED effort. Through 2007, the United 
States and its allies relied heavily upon High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles 
(HMMWVs) for daily operations, but its basic chassis and frame offered limited ability 
to improve protection against IEDs. As the basic vehicle had been retrofitted as much 
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as possible with armored shields, improved doors, and better floor armor, any further 
improvements in protection would require the fielding of an entirely new vehicle. Soon 
after Gates became the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), he reviewed the programs that 
aimed to replace the HMMWV and was shocked by what he felt was a lack of progress. 
After Gates ordered the process accelerated, the search quickly settled on the MRAP vehi-
cle as the best alternative. MRAPs were armored trucks based on South African vehicles 
used in conflicts in Angola and Rhodesia that had a V-shaped hull designed to channel 
the blast from land mines or IEDs away from the crew compartment.
 
Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Paul Tuttle (Released).
An MRAP Vehicle Arrives in Kuwait.29
Gates believed the program to replace the HMMWV with a more survivable vehicle 
had languished in the Pentagon from 2004-2006 primarily due to what he called “next 
war-it is,” a focus on preparing for hypothetical future wars rather than winning the cur-
rent war in Iraq.30 To a degree, this resistance was a legacy of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols 
Defense Reform Act in which the uniformed services focused on organizing, training, and 
equipping forces for future conflicts while regional combatant commanders had respon-
sibility for conducting contingency operations. That divergence in purpose gave the ser-
vice headquarters’ bureaucracies little incentive to modify their programs for current 
operations. To complicate matters further, the framers of Goldwater-Nichols had envi-
sioned that future demands on the force would consist of discrete, short-duration con-
tingencies, rather than the extended conflict of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Faced with 
limited budgets, the institutional Army and Marines experienced considerable tension 
between the demand to field a vehicle such as the MRAP—which might only be useful 
for the conflict in Iraq—and developing future combat systems that might be needed to 
fight a peer competitor. The procurement and sustainment costs made funding both pri-
orities impossible, even with the supplemental appropriations received from Congress. 
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Indeed, the Army’s program to field a new reconnaissance helicopter, the Comanche, had 
already collapsed under the weight of budgetary pressures, and by 2009, the Army’s new 
armored vehicle program would also be canceled. Prior to the surge, this tension between 
current and future needs had been lessened somewhat by CJTF-7 and MNF-I’s campaign 
plans, which set concrete, even if shifting, dates for troop withdrawals and a transition 
of security to Iraqi authorities. Bush’s decision to surge forces to Iraq and his demand 
that the war had to be won effectively resolved the tension in favor of developing a new 
vehicle capable of surviving IEDs and ambushes in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Fielding MRAPs in Iraq quickly became a priority for both Gates and Petraeus because 
they provided a compounding effect on the battlefield. In addition to being much more 
effective against the IED threat than other combat vehicles, once fielded in Iraq the 
MRAPs would free up thousands of HMMWVs that MNF-I could transfer to the Iraqi 
security forces to replace the ISF’s ubiquitous light-skinned commercial pickup trucks.31 
Coalition and Iraqi commanders alike believed the introduction of armored HMMWVs 
to the ISF would improve Iraqi troops’ survivability, freedom of movement, and willing-
ness to patrol.
Once MRAPs began to arrive in Iraq, the advantage of the level of protection they pro-
vided became evident quickly. In January 2008, Petraeus notified Gates that “10 MRAPs 
have been struck by IEDs to date and every soldier has walked away” with only minor 
injuries.32 The MRAP was not invincible: on April 12, 2008, the first U.S. Soldier was 
killed in an MRAP when an EFP pierced his vehicle in Baghdad.33 Nevertheless, although 
EFP attacks increased by 40 percent between February and April 2008, deaths from IEDs 
decreased by 17 percent over the same period. When the first MRAPs arrived in Iraq 
in 2007, 60 percent of all U.S. casualties were a result of IEDs, but this rate plummeted 
to 5 percent by the end of 2008, when 10,000 of the vehicles had been fielded.34 Several 
U.S. Government studies estimated the impact MRAPs would have had in Iraq had they 
been fielded when the Defense Department first received an urgent needs request from 
CENTCOM and MNF-I in February 2005. At the lowest end, these studies estimated that 
speeding the fielding of MRAPs by 2 years likely would have reduced U.S. casualties by 
50 percent. Other estimates ranged as high as an 80 percent reduction in casualties.35
The Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Surge
In addition to MRAPs, Gates also played a decisive role in deploying additional intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to Iraq during the surge. Writing in Foreign 
Affairs in 2009, Gates noted that it had been “necessary to go outside the normal bureau-
cratic process” to counter-IEDs, build MRAPs, and quickly expand ISR capability.36 By 
April 2008, Gates had doubled the ISR capacity in the Iraq theater of operations, but 
expressed his frustration that “our services are still not moving aggressively in wartime 
to provide resources needed now on the battlefield.” Accordingly, Gates created a new 
ISR task force to focus on getting additional ISR support to deployed forces and explor-
ing “more innovation and bold new ways” to assist the war fighter.37 These included 
small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), blimps and aerostats, Predators, and Task Force 
ODIN’s C-12 aircraft. A program supplied by the National Security Agency (NSA) also 
helped by speeding up the processing of the information collected by the additional ISR 
platforms arriving in Iraq.38
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Source: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lieutenant Jason Sweeney (Released).
Contractors Load Hellfire Missiles onto an MQ-1C Gray Eagle in Iraq.39
During 2003-2004, the operational commands in Iraq could count on at most two UAV 
systems to meet all of their full-motion video (FMV) requirements, and most divisions 
and brigade combat teams (BCTs) had no capability at all. By 2007-2008, MNC-I had 
daily support from at least 12 FMV systems and was pushing them to the lowest possible 
echelon. This increase in ISR capability was most apparent at the BCT level. The BCTs 
of 2003 had little ISR or analytical capability of their own, but by 2007-2008, BCTs had 
three times the analytic capability and twice the human intelligence capability of a 2003 
brigade combat team. Additionally, each BCT had an organic tactical UAV platoon that 
could provide 18 hours of full-motion video surveillance coverage a day, and BCTs could 
often count on additional FMV support from corps’ assets allocated to support division 
operations. The U.S. brigades of 2007-2008 also had much greater bandwidth to handle 
internal communications needs and to link to higher echelon intelligence organizations.40 
The decentralization of ISR assets and the increased connectivity among brigades, bat-
talions, and companies enhanced commanders’ agility while giving corps and higher 
echelons immediate visibility and support. As Petraeus reported to Gates, by 2007 these 
factors enabled Army BCTs to execute missions once solely reserved for SOF, includ-
ing operations against high-value enemy targets. More robust ISR and other intelligence 
enablers pushed down to lower echelons also provided new support to nontraditional 
missions such as reconciliation, key leader engagements, border security, ISF develop-
ment, and detainee release decisions. The units who were carrying out these tasks were 
among the largest consumers of intelligence information during the surge.41
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Biometrics and Population Control
Like ISR, the fielding of biometric scanning capability to tactical units proved to be a 
valuable technological enabler for the coalition. In a campaign in which the enemy hid 
among the population, coalition units found the Iraqi insurgents’ anonymity a constant 
challenge. The basic task of identifying Iraqis was often a murky proposition. Iraqi per-
sonal identification documents were easily forged, while the coalition’s sporadic attempts 
to track the Iraqi population by conducting censuses had sectarian and political implica-
tions that made the surveys difficult to perform.42 Census figures potentially affected the 
major political parties’ claims to particular neighborhoods and could even jeopardize 
the parties’ shares of oil revenues. To identify persons of interest better, MNC-I fielded 
biometric scanners as the surge began that were portable and simple enough for Soldiers 
to use on the streets. These biometric tools allowed U.S. forces to scan fingerprints and 
irises during routine operations and then gradually build a personal identification data-
base.43 Eventually, the coalition had the means to trace fingerprints found on IEDs and 
match them to biometric data gathered elsewhere, an effect that was compounded when 
JIEDDO was able to field remotely operated robots to defuse IEDs and at the same time 
collect biometric data, rather than having the data disappear upon detonation.44 By the 
end of the surge, the coalition had matched over 1,700 sets of fingerprints to those who 
had placed the IED.45 The use of biometrics had a palpable effect at the tactical level, 
where some U.S. officers noted that once enemy fighters lost their anonymity, they were 
quick to flee for fear of capture.46
 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Robert DeDeaux (Released).
U.S. Troops Scan an Iraqi With Handheld Biometric Equipment.47
Tracking Iraqi identity also extended to the ISF and Awakening. As the coalition began 
to field M16 rifles to the Iraq military and police in 2007, each weapon was individually 
tagged to its Iraqi recipient’s fingerprint and iris scan.48 Similarly, the coalition collected 
biometric data for all concerned local citizens (CLCs), a policy which discouraged those 
irregular forces from returning to the insurgency. Additionally, as Prime Minister Maliki 
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became concerned toward the end of the surge about the size and potential influence of 
the CLCs, Petraeus and Odierno tried to mitigate these concerns by showing that rather 
than constituting a “hidden army” as Maliki feared, the CLCs were identifiable and con-
trollable because their biometric data had been cataloged.49
The cataloging of Sunni irregulars was a tool that cut two ways. The gathering of the 
members’ biometric data helped the coalition ensure their good behavior, and knowl-
edge that the database existed helped allay Maliki’s concerns about the Awakening in 
2007-2008. As U.S. forces began withdrawing from Iraq later in the war, the data would 
also make it possible for Maliki government officials to track and purge some of the very 
people who had been most responsible for tamping down the Sunni insurgency.
THE INTELLIGENCE WAR
Innovations among operational and tactical commanders from 2005 to 2007, who 
learned on the job how to conduct counterinsurgency operations, were equally matched 
by Army and Marine intelligence personnel who made creative adaptations to doctrine 
and policies in order to improve their contributions to the war effort. Specifically, orga-
nizations and leaders who had spent most of their professional lives training to fight 
massed armored formations of peer competitors retooled themselves to provide better 
understanding of the social fissures and political struggles that caused intercommunal 
violence and fueled Iraq’s insurgent groups. By 2007, coalition intelligence leaders and 
analysts at all levels had begun to accumulate the experience and knowledge needed to 
understand the motivations and relationships among Iraq’s various personalities, groups, 
and tribes. Four years into the war, the coalition could draw on a large pool of civilians, 
military service members, and contractors who had served in intelligence roles ranging 
from the tactical to strategic levels. These professionals were far better equipped than 
they had been in 2003-2004 to support the full range of missions and tasks demanded by 
a counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign that varied from combat operations to 
political-economic issues and security force development.50
As coalition intelligence leaders sought to optimize their organizational structure and 
resources, one approach that proved effective was the assignment of intelligence liaison 
officers (LNOs) to counterpart organizations. The range of entities that received intelli-
gence LNOs included the Kurdistan Regional Government; Iraqi National Intelligence 
Service (INIS); Iraqi Operational Centers (National Operations Center, and Baghdad 
Operations Command); Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE); Multi-National 
Division-Central South (MND-CS), and even some military transition teams (MiTTs) 
operating with ISF. MNSTC-I also assisted in the development of Iraqi intelligence capa-
bilities within the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, while helping to coor-
dinate the activities of the INIS and the Iraqi National Security Adviser.51
At the tactical level, recommendations made in early 2005 to push intelligence capa-
bilities to division and below bore fruit in 2007. Until that time, the corps and division 
analysis and control elements were the main hubs of coalition intelligence, in keeping 
with the Army’s traditional doctrinal perspective and reflective of the fact that the signal 
intelligence, imagery intelligence, and human intelligence capabilities and tools needed 
for targeting networked insurgent or terrorist organizations simply were not widely 
available before late 2006. Without those capabilities at division and brigade levels, it 
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was difficult to develop targets and pursue the enemy across different coalition units’ 
areas of operation, particularly because coalition unit boundaries did not match those of 
enemy networks.52 But as the coalition commands began to distribute integrated intelli-
gence capabilities more broadly across the force, intelligence cells were able to develop 
and share good targeting sets across unit boundaries, resulting in more constant pres-
sure on enemy groups.53 Even before the surge, the Army had recognized the need for 
dedicated military intelligence personnel at the lowest tactical level to support the coali-
tion campaign’s focus on enemy networks and population security. Tactical intelligence 
leaders often created ad hoc intelligence support teams to bring biometric, analytical, 
communications, mapping, and document exploitation systems to company and even 
platoon-level operations. By the time of the surge, these arrangements had become more 
formal. The BCTs of 2007 and later received national intelligence assets and capabilities to 
support tactical operations, and often even had national agency personnel such as cryp-
tologists embedded at the brigade level, with connectivity back to their home agencies 
enabling them to bring intelligence directly to frontline units.54
These changes represented a significant shift for the U.S. intelligence community, 
especially the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). The Iraq Study Group (ISG) reported 
in December 2006 that DIA had fewer than 10 analysts with more than 2 years of experi-
ence in studying the Iraqi insurgency and concluded that the U.S. intelligence community 
should implement “a better personnel system to keep analytic expertise focused on the 
insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand 
it on a national and provincial level.”55 DIA’s official response “clarified” that instead of 
10 DIA analysts who had studied the Iraq insurgency for more than 2 years, the number 
was closer to 20. In conjunction with the President’s New Way Forward, the ISG report 
served as a wake-up call that led DIA and other national agencies to change their posture 
in Iraq.
In early 2007, DIA Director Lieutenant General Michael Maples began committing 
additional DIA resources and personnel to Iraq, resulting in higher numbers of intel-
ligence operators and analysts forward deployed at lower echelons. Under Maples’s 
direction, DIA established a large forward presence of analytical support in Iraq, while 
nearly tripling the size of its Pentagon-based Iraq task force to provide enhanced reach-
back support and to build a cadre of experienced analysts who could rotate into the the-
ater. Other agencies such as National Geospatial Agency, National Ground Intelligence 
Center, and the NSA followed suit. As an important enabler, DIA coordinated a unified 
intelligence operation over multiple time zones, managing the flow of personnel, support 
requirements, and work among Iraq, CENTCOM, and the national level agencies.56As 
these national agencies became integrated into collection and analytical structures in 
Iraq, they facilitated greatly increased “reach forward” and “reach back” capabilities, 
integrating the Iraq campaign into the national intelligence structure in a way it had not 
been before.
MONEY AS A WEAPON SYSTEM
Petraeus’s campaign guidance to the force prominently featured the concept of money 
as an important enabler for commanders on the ground. “Money can be ‘ammunition’ 
as the security situation improves,” he noted, adding that commanders should “use a 
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targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each ‘round’ expended and to 
ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit’s 
overall objectives.”57 MNF-I and its units benefited from a number of important financial 
initiatives during the surge.
The Commanders’ Emergency Response Program
Before the surge, more than 90 percent of U.S. funds intended for Iraq’s reconstruction 
had already been obligated, meaning that commanders had decided on what reconstruc-
tion projects to fund, and contracts had been awarded to complete those projects. As a 
result, the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) took on greater impor-
tance for U.S. military units’ local stabilization and reconstruction projects.58 Initially 
funded from the seized assets of Saddam Hussein’s regime, CERP shifted to congres-
sional funding over time.59 By summer 2006, over $2.8 billion in U.S. Government funds 
were spent through CERP on a broad range of items, such as damage compensation, 
condolence payments for loss of life, medical expenses, infrastructure improvements, 
and local employment.60 As U.S. funding to 
rebuild Iraq dwindled, CERP funds filled 
the gap, evolving from small-scale disburse-
ment into sometimes massive reconstruc-
tion projects. The money dispersed by CERP 
ranged from $25 to replace a window to $33 
million for a hotel, office, and retail complex 
at Baghdad International Airport.61 In fiscal 
year 2007, U.S. units spent $915 million in 
CERP. “Every one of my commanders will 
tell you of the incredible vale that funding 
provided in their battlespace,” Petraeus 
reported to Gates in January 2008.62 CERP 
was also the vehicle that allowed the coali-
tion to pay monthly stipends for the CLCs 
while coalition leaders tried, ultimately 
unsuccessfully, to persuade the Maliki gov-
ernment to absorb them into the Iraqi secu-
rity forces or other government jobs.63 The 
U.S. Government spent approximately $300 
million funding the CLCs through 2008, 
an amount that Petraeus believed paid for 
itself in fewer American troops killed or 
wounded, fewer lost or damaged vehicles, 
and more secure communities.64
Even so, CERP received sharp criticism 
from some important quarters. U.S. Gov-
ernment development experts pointed out 
that, in some cases, short-term CERP projects undermined longer-term economic goals 
or skewed local economies. In addition, critics noted as CERP-funded projects became 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Natalie Loucks 
(Released).
Soldiers Talk to a Contractor and Local 
Villagers at a Windmill-Powered Ground 
Water Pump Reconstruction Project.65
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more costly and lengthy, problems with corruption and accountability also increased.66 
Some military leaders believed CERP exacerbated intercommunal strife by creating a 
new source of competition and corruption. In some cases, projects were funded but never 
completed, leaving only shells of buildings or utilities infrastructure. Reports occasion-
ally surfaced of U.S. military members misusing CERP funds, or of CERP funds making 
their way to Iraqi insurgents. These were difficult developments for the U.S. Congress to 
overlook as the Iraqi Government’s own revenues grew to surpass $60 billion.67
Yet, while CERP had many long-term challenges, there was little doubt that in the 
short term it helped tamp down violence, as unemployed Iraqis queued up to work on 
projects as simple as picking up garbage, which helped remove hiding places for IEDs, or 
laying gravel to make newly established combat outposts more livable. As congressional 
reluctance to continue funding CERP in the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act 
began to develop, Petraeus expressed concern that its absence could hinder the projected 
U.S. military drawdown.68 Worried that CERP would dry up while it was still relied on 
heavily in the field, Petraeus advised Gates that “we have often talked about the value 
of CERP in cementing the gains won through hard kinetic fighting. One of our battalion 
commanders said recently that ‘if money is ammunition, then we are ‘black’ on ammu-
nition’.”69 Congress eventually made provisions to keep CERP funds going through 
July 2008, but in light of the U.S. Government’s waning interest in spending money in 
Iraq, Petraeus encouraged the Iraqi Government to supplement CERP and to establish 
a matching Iraqi-funded “I-CERP” using the same U.S. procurement and disbursement 
policies already in existence.70
The Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
Along similar lines, DoD established the Task Force for Business and Stability Oper-
ations (TFBSO) under Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Paul Brinkley in 2006. Brin-
kley was a former Silicon Valley executive and proponent of establishing a free market 
system in Iraq. Much like CERP, DoD envisioned TFBSO as a tool for economic growth 
that could improve Iraq’s harsh economic conditions and create jobs for young Iraqis 
who might otherwise turn to militancy.71 In the post-World War II era, most of the U.S. 
Government’s major economic reconstruction programs in foreign countries were not 
orchestrated by DoD, but Brinkley argued that DoD’s involvement in the Iraqi economy 
was necessary because economic improvements went hand-in-hand with improved secu-
rity.72 In Brinkley’s view, DoD was best suited to handle the economic side of Iraqi recon-
struction because the lives of American Soldiers were at risk if security did not improve, 
and because DoD was the largest industrial enterprise in the world.73
Brinkley encouraged private investment in Iraq by inviting American and other for-
eign industrialists to tour Iraq with U.S. military escorts and survey economic opportuni-
ties in the country.74 Brinkley focused on revitalizing Iraq’s state-owned enterprises that 
had employed an estimated 200,000 Iraqis before 2003.75 Rather than attempt a “shock 
therapy” model of quickly privatizing former state-owned businesses—an approach the 
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) had advocated in 2003—Brinkley implemented 
a gradual privatization process so that the effects of reopening Iraqi companies might 
improve security in the long term.76 TFBSO received approximately $103 million dollars 
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to revitalize state-owned enterprises in Iraq between 2007 and 2008 and finalized its first 
private investment deal in January 2008, working with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense to 
privatize three state-owned Iraqi cement factories valued at $3 billion and capable of cre-
ating 5,000 jobs.77 Although most investors in the cement plants were foreigners, TFBSO 
required all state-owned enterprise investments to include at least one Iraqi so that a busi-
ness leadership base could be developed within Iraq.78 By late 2009, TFBSO reportedly 
had helped restart more than 60 Iraqi factories, creating approximately 250,000 jobs.79
The Energy Fusion Cell and Task Force Hydra
Iraq’s energy sector was problematic for the Iraqi Government and the coalition cam-
paign in two major ways. The Iraqi Government relied on oil production for more than 
90 percent of its revenues, but the country’s oil production infrastructure suffered from 
chronic mismanagement and security threats. At the same time, the Iraqi population 
relied on free state-provided electricity, but the supply constantly suffered from infra-
structure and security problems. To help alleviate these problems, MNF-I established an 
Energy Fusion Cell to “synchronize efforts of different ministries to provide energy to 
the people of Iraq and facilitate the export of oil.”80 Under the direction of British Brig-
adier Carew Wilks, the Energy Fusion Cell brought together representatives from the 
United States and pertinent ministries of the Iraqi Government to overcome departmen-
tal infighting and offer solutions to energy problems, such as increasing Iraq’s oil exports 
to generate higher revenues needed to stabilize the state. It was also Wilks’s job to help 
coordinate the various ministries of the Iraqi Government as they quarreled over energy 
priorities. On one hand, the priority of Prime Minister Maliki and Minister of Oil Hus-
sein al-Shahristani was to generate government revenues by exporting as much oil as 
possible, not holding it back for domestic use.81 On the other hand, popular demand for 
electricity was mounting while oil-fired generator plants throughout Iraq sat idle and 
produced only one-third of the country’s peak demand.82 Much of the oil used to fuel the 
generators was imported from Kuwait, while more than 10 percent of Iraq’s electricity 
was imported from Iran.83
In addition, there was significant disparity in access to the limited electricity the Iraqi 
Government grid produced. In 2008, the Energy Fusion Cell had to respond to the prob-
lem of outlying provinces (some of which had been starved of resources by Saddam) 
shutting down transmission lines to Baghdad in order to keep the electricity supply in 
their own areas rather than sharing it with the capital. Some provinces received an aver-
age of 23 hours of government-supplied electricity a day, while Baghdad often received 
fewer than 12 hours.84 During the surge campaign, Iraqi public demand for electricity 
only increased, constantly outstripping supply as Iraqis who felt more secure began pur-
chasing additional electrical appliances.85 The constant gap between demand and gov-
ernment supply bred resentment among a population accustomed to state-subsidized 
electricity.
A different coalition organization dealt with the other major problem plaguing Iraq’s 
energy sector: corruption. Corruption was widespread in Iraqi society, with many Iraqis 
considering a certain amount of bribery and kickbacks simply as the cost of doing busi-
ness. When international sanctions cut off much of the country’s oil revenues, corruption 
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became even worse. In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, corruption not only threatened 
to undermine economic recovery and development goals but also, in some cases, funded 
the insurgency, leading Maliki to declare corruption Iraq’s “second insurgency.”86 Cor-
ruption in Iraq’s oil sector, based on the scale of the money involved, was the major cause 
of concern. 
Before 2006, coalition officials had had trouble defining the problem and accepting 
the cultural differences associated with it. Often, MNC-I categorized the issue as one of 
supply and demand of fuel. In the months after the end of major combat operations and 
the fall of Baghdad in 2003, fuel demand surged, and by late 2005 much of the refined fuel 
used in Iraq, approximately 40 percent, was being imported from Turkey. After Iraq’s 
State Oil Ministry Office took control of domestic oil refinery operations in late 2004, the 
coalition lost control of the process, leading to a lack of oversight and rampant corrup-
tion. By early 2006, MND-N concluded that corruption at the sprawling Bayji Oil Refin-
ery, itself responsible for a third of Iraq’s output, had been financing insurgent activities 
since the start of the war. To combat this, in late 2007, MNF-I formed a small interagency 
group named Task Force Hydra, with representatives from the Department of State, 
Department of Treasury, and CENTCOM focused on AQI’s involvement in the flow of 
black market oil revenues from the refinery. Ultimately, Task Force Hydra uncovered a 
vast network of smuggling and extortion, about half of whose profits apparently went to 
AQI.87
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Bayji Oil Refinery in June 2007.88
Task Force Hydra pieced together a 5-year history of illicit activity at the Bayji refin-
ery. The technocrats at the refinery, who had run the facility during Saddam’s rule, had 
few local ties and continued operations regardless of the warfare that raged across the 
countryside. They made little protest as insurgents skimmed oil, refined product, and 
cash from the refinery’s activities. Local tribes were also involved in the rampant corrup-
tion, with three tribes controlling much of the distribution and sale of refined gasoline 
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and other by-products such as kerosene. Not to be left out, the Kurds to the north had a 
strong financial interest in the continued flow of Kurdish crude oil to the refinery, espe-
cially from the nearby Kirkuk oil fields. While any of these actors could have shut down 
Bayji by pulling out of the illicit arrangement, it was in the best interest of all parties to 
maintain the status quo.89 As Task Force Hydra unraveled the intricacies of corruption at 
Bayji, it concluded that nearly 70 percent of its $2 billion in fuel production in 2007 and 
at least a third of profits in 2008 were transferred to the black market. Estimates deemed 
that between $50 and $100,000 a day were being funneled from the refinery to AQI.90 
Uncovering these illicit links helped Task Force Hydra solve the mystery of the timing of 
recurring attacks on the crude oil lines running from Kirkuk to Bayji: insurgents appar-
ently worked in concert with tribal sheiks to systematically attack certain portions of the 
8-inch product line to control the output at Bayji. Task Force Hydra determined that the 
timing of these attacks was linked to a price fixing scheme rather than to outright insur-
gent activity.91
Revelations like these enabled coalition and Iraqi forces to plan sophisticated oper-
ations to take out critical nodes in the illicit northern oil enterprise from 2008 onward, 
seriously damaging one of AQI’s important funding streams. As the task force was suc-
cessful at diagnosing corruption at the Bayji refinery, the unit was not intended to redress 
the overall corruption problem in Iraq and its link to the insurgency. Therefore, in spring 
2008, MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy established the Iraq Threat Finance Cell (ITFC), a joint 
venture of the Department of Treasury, law enforcement agencies, and CENTCOM to 
conduct financial intelligence analysis of insurgent and terrorist elements in Iraq. The 
ITFC’s analysis of insurgent and terrorist finances, both inside and outside Iraq, became 
an important generator of targets against AQI and other groups as the kinetic aspect of 
the surge campaign began to wind down in 2008.
DETENTION AND RULE OF LAW
Overcrowding and Other Detention Facilities Problems
By spring 2007, the surge of U.S. BCTs and reinvigorated security operations in the 
Baghdad region led to a sharp rise in the number of captured insurgents, intensifying 
already overcrowded conditions in MNF-I’s detention facilities. Overwhelmed by the 
increasing number of prisoners, MNF-I’s TF 134 for detention operations lost control of 
its detention facilities, resulting in a near repeat of the riots and escape attempts of early 
2005. This crisis delayed Petraeus’s plan to have detention operations serve as an addi-
tional enabler for his larger campaign.
The overcrowding challenge had been a problem long in the making. As early as Jan-
uary 2006, Major General John Gardner, who had replaced Major General William Bran-
denburg as commander of TF 134, warned MNF-I of the danger developing in the camps:
Gains to the detainee population have outpaced releases almost 2 to 1 since Oct[ober] 2004. 
The new expansion compounds we are starting to build at [Camp] Bucca will help mitigate 
the overcrowding, but continued growth at this rate is not sustainable without an increased 
level of releases or a subsequent major expansion of Bucca and corresponding increase in  
U.S. personnel. . . . We are approaching an excessive level of crowding throughout the system.92
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At the same time, continuing pressure from 
SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld to transfer responsibil-
ity for detention to the Iraqis as soon as possible 
detracted from efforts to regain control of the rap-
idly expanding detainee population and to institute 
counterinsurgency measures in the detention facil-
ities.93 Gardner later recalled that he had been told 
before deploying to Iraq that he would be the last TF 
134 commander and was warned, “If you cannot get 
the U.S. out of detention, they will replace you with 
someone else that can.”94 Throughout 2006, Rums-
feld stymied the task forces’ operations by reducing 
its overall funding, and also blocked the task force’s 
new construction plans in order to compel TF 134 
to transition its activities to the Iraqi Government. 
As a result, Gardner was forced to rely on internal 
initiatives to reduce the mounting detainee popu-
lation pressure.96 First, aiming to trim the popula-
tion through increased releases, Gardner doubled the number of Combined Review and 
Release Boards held each week and created an expedited release program that freed low-
threat detainees within the first 30 days of their detention. These changes increased the 
number of average monthly releases from 650 to 1,100 by mid-2006.97
Gardner also aimed to reduce pressure by instituting a “counterinsurgency in the com-
pounds” program that sought to defuse detainee anger and hopelessness that stemmed 
from an inconsistent and confusing detention process as well as to attack the threat of 
jihadist radicalization and recruitment inside the camps.98 The core of this effort came 
from counterinsurgency teams that paired intelligence personnel with the guard force 
of each facility, a bold move considering the integration of intelligence personnel with 
detention guards was believed to have contributed to the detainee abuse scandal at Abu 
Ghraib in 2004.99 Brigadier General David Quantock, who would serve as TF 134 com-
mander in 2009, later recalled:
Abu Ghraib was still fresh in everyone’s mind and no one wanted intelligence specialists inside the 
wire working with the security forces. But General Gardner and his team were able to assemble 
counterinsurgency (COIN) teams that ran informants in the compounds to really sort out the 
population. Without the COIN teams figuring out the extremists from the moderates, none of the 
[later] rehabilitation efforts would have worked.100
As the teams slowly worked their way through each camp, they segregated detainees ac-
cording to the relative danger they posed and placed them in one of five categories: AQI, 
takfiris, moderate Sunnis, JAM, and moderate Shi’a.101 Takfiris were considered high-
er-threat Sunni militants not affiliated with AQI, while moderates were assessed to be 
less ideologically committed prisoners who might have joined the insurgency for money. 
Among the moderates, Gardner later opined that perhaps 1 in 10 probably should not 
have been detained in the first place.102
The counterinsurgency programs also included efforts to help reintegrate detainees 
into Iraqi society upon release: inmates could attend classes taught by fellow detainees 
Source: U.S. Army photo (Released).
Major General John D. Gardner, 
Commander TF 134.95
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who were teachers, outside agencies provided skills training to help newly released Iraqis 
find jobs, and moderate religious voices provided an alternative to the preaching of more 
extremist religious figures.103 With no doctrine to guide their effort, TF 134 applied les-
sons from the U.S. prison system and experimented with different tactics, techniques, 
and procedures of its own.
By February 2007, however, it was clear that the change in coalition strategy would 
dramatically increase the number of the coalition’s detainees, with TF 134 officials esti-
mating that the surge could create an additional influx of 2,000 prisoners per month.104 
With a total capacity of 18,000 across all coalition theater detention facilities and a 
detainee population standing at 15,840, little slack remained in the system to absorb such 
increases.105 The same month, TF 134 officials noted that the detainee population could 
double in 6 months’ time, prophetically warning that they were gravely concerned with 
“maintaining the required guard-detainee ratio to maintain order” as well as the “likeli-
hood of increased violence, escape attempts, and use of lethal force.”106 Gardner’s internal 
measures would not be able to compensate for the expected flood of detainees.
Informed by Gardner of the worsening situation, Petraeus initially hoped transferring 
detainees to Iraqi-run facilities could relieve some of the pressure. However, after dis-
cussing the issue with Maliki in April 2007, the MNF-I commander realized that the Iraqi 
corrections services would provide no relief to the coalition detention problem in the 
near term. The Iraqis themselves still struggled with prison capacity, arresting criminals 
and suspected insurgents in increasing numbers but committing few resources toward 
building new facilities in which to hold them. Pointing out the equally glaring problem 
that the Iraqi Government had no reliable judicial system to try prisoners, Petraeus noted 
that Maliki’s unsatisfactory plan for addressing the overcrowding problem was to “cut a 
political deal, declare amnesty, and release 90 percent of the detainees.”107
With no help from the Iraqi Government, Gardner moved to address the expected 
overcrowding by increasing the size of his guard force and by growing the capacity of 
his facilities. To counter Gardner’s insufficient guard-to-detainee ratio, MNF-I requested 
nine additional U.S. Army military police companies, nearly a brigade’s worth of one of 
the Army’s least-populated specialties. When these predominantly reserve component 
forces proved unable to deploy quickly, MNC-I diverted an artillery battalion from the 
surge brigades to augment TF 134’s guard force.108 To resolve the mismatch in the detainee 
population and capacity, Gardner ordered the construction of temporary facilities to meet 
immediate needs and requested military construction projects for enduring structures 
through the budgetary process, aiming for a total capacity of 30,000 prisoners.109 The 
majority of the new facilities were hastily built by Navy Seabees and consisted of groups 
of large plywood shacks or air-conditioned tents able to sleep 20 men. Although the new 
facilities were separated from each other by chain-link fences reinforced with earth-filled 
HESCO barriers, detainees within subdivided areas could roam freely under the observa-
tion of the guard force. By April, only one-third of the new temporary compounds were 
complete.110 The longer-term solution, which included additional permanent buildings, a 
supermax-style facility for hard-core terrorists, and a brick factory where prisoners could 
work, received funding from Congress in March, but construction did not begin until 
October 2007.111
These changes proved insufficient. As Gardner had predicted, the coalition’s detainee 
population climbed steadily, from 18,000 the week of April 14 to more than 20,000 just 2 
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weeks later.112 True capacity never caught up with the tidal wave of new detainees, and 
many of the crises that had shaken TF 134 in 2005 developed again. In spite of efforts to 
categorize inmates by sect and threat level, segregation in the relatively open compounds 
could not curtail intimidation and recruitment by dedicated jihadists.113 Hardened radi-
cals intimidated and recruited other inmates, with an estimated 1,350 dedicated members 
of AQI conscripting new members in Camp Bucca daily. Under the weight of overcrowd-
ing, many of Gardner’s promising “counterinsurgency inside the compounds” programs 
collapsed, and the coalition again lost control of its major detention facilities.114
“COIN Inside the Wire”
As Gardner and his replacement, Marine Corps Major General Douglas Stone, con-
ducted their transition in April 2007, the simmering problem of detention facility over-
crowding finally exploded. A riot that included nearly 10,000 detainees broke out at 
Camp Bucca, where mobs of inmates set fire to their tents and slung “chai balls”—hard-
ened projectiles molded from tea, sand, and milk—at the guard force as it attempted 
to restore order.115 As the riot dragged on and worsened, Stone became convinced that 
decisive action had to be taken to change the way the coalition conducted detention oper-
ations.116 A second riot of several thousand detainees again roiled Camp Bucca in May, 
and in June guards discovered a completed 80-foot long escape tunnel with an exit out-
side the wire.117 When the rioters came close to breaching the perimeter fence during the 
May riots, Stone called Petraeus in Baghdad to discuss whether to use deadly force to 
regain control. Such a measure had not been employed at Bucca since 2005, but the pros-
pect of inmates seizing American hostages troubled the new Task Force 134 commander. 
Not ready to pull the trigger, Petraeus arranged for Multi-National Division- Southeast 
to mobilize a mechanized quick-reaction force from nearby Basrah for shock effect if 
needed. In the end, Stone’s troops put down the riot with tear gas and nonlethal muni-
tions and corralled extremist ringleaders into the more isolated and recently completed 
compounds.118 As the riots overwhelmed TF 134’s day-to-day operations, the detainee 
population reached 22,400, and staff officers predicted the coalition could be holding as 
many as 53,940 detainees by September 2008.119
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Confiscated Weapons at Camp Bucca Similar to Those Used During  
the April 2007 Riots.120
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Armed with this dire assessment, and having seen firsthand the impact of overcrowd-
ing, Stone set about building upon Gardner’s efforts to transform detention operations 
into a crucial arm of the coalition’s efforts, viewing the handling of the coalition’s detain-
ees as an opportunity to enhance reconciliation within Iraqi society. Stone believed the 
detainees could be rehabilitated through reeducation and vocational training programs 
and changed from security threats into assets in the counterinsurgency campaign.121 As 
Stone saw it, TF 134’s mandate was an integral part of the surge, which aimed to:
. . . establish an alliance and empower the moderate Iraqis to effectively marginalize the violent 
extremists. That’s what victory means to me [ . . . ] I’m going to replace that destructive ideology 
and then, when [a detainee is] assessed to no longer be a threat, I’m going to release the detainee 
less likely to be a recidivist . . . they’re not going out of here unless I can feel comfortable about 
that.122
Stone outlined his plan for “COIN inside the wire” to MNF-I and MNC-I leaders in June 
2007. He intended to transform the detention facilities, which he described as “jihadi 
uni versities”—where AQI not only recruited new members but intentionally sent ex-
perienced cadres to recoup, network, and plan during their temporary incarceration—
into facilities that would facilitate ethnic and political reconciliation.123 Stone’s first step 
was to increase the capacity of the camps to facilitate the segregation of detainees and 
then, through a program of vetted and targeted releases and job training programs, to 
reeducate and reintegrate detainees with their local communities, tribes, and families.124 
Toward this end, Stone benefitted from the support of Petraeus, who also saw detention 
operations as a crucial component of counterinsurgency. Concerned that detention op-
erations were not properly resourced, the MNF- I commander reported to Gates in May 
that “we have a lot of work to do to provide higher-security detention facilities, more de-
tainee capacity, a carefully developed release program, and a way ahead in coordination 
with our Iraqi partners.”125 Petraeus conceded that the problem of overcrowding had cre-
ated a situation in which, “We essentially had maximum security detainees in minimum 
security facilities.”126
Source: DoD photo by Cherie Cullen (Released).
Major General Douglas Stone, Commander TF 134.127
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With support from MNF-I, Stone intended to distribute the detainee population more 
evenly across Iraq, putting more funding into regional facilities in order to take pressure 
off of Camp Bucca and better reintegrate detainees into local communities.128 Stone also 
proposed that MNF-I establish theater internment facility reconciliation centers at Taji 
and Ramadi to provide recently released detainees and unemployed adult Iraqi males 
with vocational and civil training, pay them a small stipend, and maintain a relationship 
with former prisoners to gain a better understanding of the insurgency.129
To reduce the pressure of overcrowding further, Stone proposed expanding the 
release program, estimating that up to 25 percent of inmates could be released with no 
issues, 30 percent could not be released under any circumstances based on the gravity 
of their offenses, and the remainder could go either way.130 Petraeus approved the pro-
posal, cautioning Stone to avoid any perception of “catch and release” while reducing 
the overall detainee population to 15,000 or fewer by the end of 2008.131 TF 134 would 
accomplish these releases by converting the review board process used by Gardner into 
a new Multi-National Force Review Committee Process. The revised system added non-
U.S. multinational personnel and ensured that the material in a detainee’s file could be 
shared with the detainee, thus demonstrating that a review process was ongoing, reas-
suring the often-bewildered detainees that their cases were being properly adjudicated.132 
Three coalition military officials reviewed the detainees’ files and assessed each prison-
er’s progress in detention. After hearing the detainees speak in their own defense, they 
made a recommendation for release or continued detention.133
Unfortunately, the new process suffered many of the same problems from the previ-
ous process. Neither the multinational members of the committee nor the detainees could 
review the classified information that might have led to their detention. TF 134 lacked 
the capacity to convert all of the authorized materials into Arabic for the detainees to 
read. Another problem pertained to the veracity of information provided by Iraqi infor-
mants, many of whom may have had motives for providing false information about the 
accused.134
Yet the revised release system proved effective at controlling the unrestrained growth 
of the detainee population, which peaked at 25,600 in October. It also drove down the 
average rates of detention to 333 days, with only 5 percent of the population having 
been interned over 3 years.135 At the same time, the changes proved to be controversial, 
reigniting many of the disputes that existed between the detention command and tactical 
commanders in 2005.
Detainees nominated for release first went through a screening process at TF 134, 
which then sent the multinational divisions a list of those nominated for release. In 
theory, detainees were released only when there was no longer any reason to believe 
they posed a security threat and only after pledging before an Iraqi judge not to partici-
pate in insurgent or criminal activity. Released detainees also required a guarantor who 
could be held responsible if the released detainee returned to violence.136 In practice, the 
process did not always run smoothly, as pressure to reduce the number of detainees was 
intense. MNF-W deputy commander Brigadier General John R. Allen recalled that, upon 
receiving a proposed list of detainee releases, MNF-W would circulate the names among 
local sheikhs and tactical commanders to ensure they were not “introducing cancerous 
cells back into the living organism of Anbar Province.” MNF-W’s refusal to take some of 
the detainees back into Anbar because of suspected insurgent ties created tension with 
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TF 134, particularly after some of the detainees that MNF-W wanted to remain in TF 134 
custody were released anyway. “We know who ought to come back and who shouldn’t,” 
Allen told an MNC-I counterpart in January 2008, adding:
Sometimes they get released anyway and that’s where the rub is. It’s causing hate and discontent 
for the Iraqis . . . we want to not create a situation where the Iraqis have become convinced that 
our rule of law has failed them and they’re going to have to take their own measures to protect 
themselves from detainees being cancerous cells being injected back into their neighborhoods and 
lives. We want a say in who comes back, and we want that say to be a veto, not a request.137
Like Allen, many tactical commanders believed that the release program not only allowed 
the enemy to reconstitute, but it also psychologically emboldened them as it communi-
cated a lack of will and determination on the part of the coalition. This psychological 
impact also affected the coalition’s soldiers and Iraqi allies—especially informants—who 
could be put at risk if hardened fighters were released mistakenly.
Large-scale political releases also continued, to the chagrin of some unit leaders who 
believed MNF-I pushed to release too many detainees too soon. In September 2007, 
MNF-I approved the release of 50 to 80 prisoners per day during the month-long Rama-
dan holiday to show goodwill and deter high-profile mass casualty attacks that could 
derail political support for the surge. MNF-I released 847 detainees in the first 3 weeks 
of Ramadan alone.138 By the end of 2007, MNF-I had released a total of 7,510 detainees 
for that calendar year.139 In October 2007, TF 134 reported only 70 recaptures of 4,865 
former prisoners, a 1.4 percent recidivism rate that was significantly lower than the 6 to 
8 percent recidivism rates reported in January 2007 by Gardner.140 Gardner’s estimation 
itself was far lower than the rate approximated by tactical commanders across the MNDs, 
and the issue of recidivism became a highly controversial topic that created a wedge of 
disagreement between tactical and operational commanders. Yet despite the controversy, 
Petraeus judged the reduction in reported recidivism rates allowed MNF-I to “take more 
risk in exchange for the payoff of putting Iraqi citizens back in their neighborhoods rather 
than holding them in detention.”141
 
General Petraeus (left). Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
General David Petraeus and Colonel James Brown at Camp Bucca.142
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The overall impact of TF 134’s “COIN inside the wire” initiatives on the insurgency 
was mixed. When coupled with increases in detainee capacity, they helped end the chaos 
that had prevailed in the detention centers before summer 2007. By the beginning of 
August 2007, theater detention facilities reported zero incidents among the 23,000 detain-
ees in coalition custody, a marked improvement from the period leading up to the Bucca 
riots several months earlier.143 Stone also reported an incident in October 2007, in which 
detainees in one of the Camp Bucca compounds presented the guards with a letter declar-
ing an internal Bucca “Awakening” during which a compound of reformed moderates 
overtook takfiri extremists. “It’s never happened before,” Stone noted. “Found them 
[extremists], identified them, threw them up against the fence, and shaved the frickin’ 
beards off of them.”144 Yet MNC-I was skeptical about TF 134’s reported rates of recid-
ivism for released detainees, which, Odierno and other senior officers judged, might 
simply be a recapture rate. In Odierno’s view, Stone also seemed to underestimate the 
possibility that radicalism was still going on inside the wire, however calm TF 134’s com-
pounds appeared.145
Rule of Law “Green Zones”
In April 2004, the CPA finalized Order 13 that established the Central Criminal Court 
of Iraq in an effort to create an independent Iraqi judiciary system. In the absence of a 
secure and stable environment, however, several years passed before the Central Court 
and the subsidiary provincial courts could operate effectively across the country. Stand-
ing up the judicial system in a post-dictatorial state was a significant task further compli-
cated by the murder and intimidation of judges, investigators, and witnesses. By 2007, 
the court system struggled to make a dent in the growing detention population and was 
a long way from administering routine civil and criminal case law. To try to reduce the 
vulnerability of judges and investigators, MNF-I established a secure Rule of Law “Green 
Zone” in the Rusafa District of east Baghdad that would contain a court, detention facil-
ity, and training academy as well as house judges and investigators along with their 
families.146
The Rule of Law Green Zone began to operate on April 2, 2007, after Prime Minister 
Maliki agreed to support its $50 million annual operating expenses.147 Petraeus informed 
Gates, “the investments we’ve made in it should help improve the institutional legiti-
macy and effectiveness of the Iraqi judiciary branch,” and that “provincial rule of law 
complexes are being built in Salah ad Din, Mosul, and Ramadi” in the hopes that the judi-
cial system could operate effectively beyond Baghdad as well. By mid-July, the Court had 
received over 1,900 cases, and its anticipated demand increased as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation continued to train more Iraqi investigators.148 Between April and Novem-
ber, the number of judges across Iraq increased from 570 to 1,160 as well. The infusion 
of attention and funds from the Iraqi Government along with the protection provided 
within the system seemed to be having a positive effect.
The Iraqi judicial system’s first real test came in February 2008 with the prosecution 
of former Deputy Minister of Health Hakim Zamili and former Ministry of Health Facil-
ities Protection Service Chief Hamid al-Shammari, two senior Sadrists accused of mas-
terminding sectarian killings across Baghdad in 2006-2007.149 During the men’s tenure at 
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the Health Ministry, officials and security guards had used their identification credentials 
and medical vehicles, including ambulances, to move freely across Baghdad and operate 
as death squads against Sunnis.150 They had also allegedly ordered the killing of Sunni 
patients in government hospitals in Baghdad.151 Finally, when their activities had been 
uncovered by Deputy Health Minister Ammar Saffar, a Da’wa Party official, they had 
abducted and murdered Saffar as well.
As Zamili and Shammari’s trial neared, the coalition took precautions to shield wit-
nesses and judges from intimidation to include having some witnesses temporarily 
moved out of the country. For some Iraqis, the trial was more important than Saddam’s, 
because it would signal whether or not Iraqi Government officials were above the law, 
and whether Shi’a militants could behave with impunity. As the trial approached, Pet-
raeus related to Gates:
This is the first trial in which high-ranking Iraqi officials of a post-Saddam government will be 
tried for offenses against the Iraqi people, and it promises to set an extremely important precedent. 
Unfortunately, the FBI has picked up intelligence that there may have been such severe intimidation 
(despite our detentions of some of the intimidators) that an acquittal may be the outcome. Ryan 
[Crocker] will meet with the Chief Judge [Medhat al-Mahmoud] to convey concerns that this might 
be the case. Nothing is easy.152
The following week, officials uncovered even more evidence that the trial appeared 
to be “fixed to assure acquittal” for Zamili and Shammari. Although Iraqi Chief Judge 
Medhat al-Mahmood initiated an investigation and replaced the judge, on March 3, 2008, 
both Zamili and Shammari were acquitted of all charges.153 Prime Minister Maliki, who 
had asked MNF-I to arrest Zamili in the first place the previous year, “expressed his per-
sonal conviction that witnesses had refused to testify or changed their testimony due to 
intimidation and death threats” and “lamented that the trial meant the entire Iraqi judi-
cial system was in danger.”154 The Rule of Law Green Zones had succeeded in securing 
Iraq’s judicial system and judges from the physical threat of terrorism, but they could 
not shield the Iraqi courts from political intimidation, casting doubt on Iraq’s long-term 
ability to administer the rule of law.
***
The operations of the surge campaign benefited from a number of enabling activities 
and capabilities that had matured or evolved since the beginning of the war. Many of 
these, such as the counter-IED effort, reflected advances made by trial and error as the 
U.S. military adapted to the character of the Iraq conflict over time. Others reflected the 
decisions by senior U.S. officials in Washington to commit their organizations more fully 
to supporting the coalition campaign, such as the forward deployment of the U.S. intel-
ligence community or the expansion of the provincial reconstruction team program. Still 
others were initiatives that arose in response to requirements that were unusual for a 
military campaign, such as the Energy Fusion Cell or the TFBSO. A few of these enabling 
activities had a clear, significantly positive impact on operations. The dramatic increase 
in ISR available for tactical units, the fielding of MRAPs, and the integration of special 
and conventional operations stand out in this respect. For some other initiatives, the 
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picture was mixed. For example, it is difficult to judge in retrospect whether the TFBSO 
contributed to economic stabilization or whether TF 134’s deradicalization programs had 
any effect on Sunni militancy. What can be said for certain is that the military commands 
in the Iraq campaign had to adapt to address problems that few U.S. leaders, including 
those who formulated the surge strategy, had foreseen. As they adapted, the military 
commands developed new capabilities, organizations, and ways of operating not antic-
ipated in U.S. doctrine before their employment or, in most cases, captured in U.S. doc-
trine after. By early 2008, these adaptations made coalition units and headquarters look 
and behave very differently than they had in 2005-2006. They would need every new 
capability at their disposal in order to get through the bloody spring of 2008, when the 
coalition unexpectedly would have to fight its largest battles since 2004.
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CRESCENDO: MALIKI AGAINST THE SADRISTS
On January 11, 2008, 3 days after the launch of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, 
snow fell on Baghdad for the first time in a century. Iraqis took it as a felicitous omen after 
the war’s most violent 2 years. The following day, President George W. Bush traveled to 
Kuwait for meetings with General David H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker. 
While there, the President announced publicly that he had decided to end the surge 
by midsummer, by which time 20,000 U.S. troops would have returned home without 
replacement. After a year of intensified operations mainly against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
and other Sunni insurgent groups, the surge was on its downward slope.
Yet, some of the most intense fighting of the Iraq War was in the offing. After 2 months 
of clearing operations in northern Iraq designed to push AQI ever farther from Baghdad 
and other Iraqi population centers, the coalition in spring 2008 would find its campaign 
plan against the Sunni insurgency thrown off course by a high-stakes war between the 
Nuri al-Maliki government and Iraq’s Shi’a militias. The long-simmering confronta-
tion between the Iraqi state and the Iranian regime’s Iraqi militant proxies was about to 
explode into a Shi’a civil war.
OPERATION PHANTOM PHOENIX
On January 8, 4 days before Bush’s announcement, Lieutenant General Raymond 
T. Odierno and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) launched Operation PHANTOM 
PHOENIX, the final corps-level operation employing all of the surge brigades before 
the first of them departed Iraq in February. In Operations PHANTOM THUNDER and 
PHANTOM STRIKE, MNC- I’s units had pushed AQI and other Sunni insurgent groups 
out of Baghdad and much of the surrounding belts. Odierno’s specific intent for PHAN-
TOM PHOENIX was to push AQI even farther from Baghdad and to pursue them up the 
Diyala and Tigris River Valleys, clearing the insurgent support zones in eastern Diyala, 
Mosul, and the area south of Baghdad known as Arab Jabour. He then intended that 
MNC-I’s units should hold those formerly insurgent-held areas by establishing new 
combat outposts and joint security stations “to ensure that AQI does not return . . . thereby 
further denying AQI from reestablishing staging areas throughout the Baghdad Belts.”1 
As with the preceding PHANTOM operations, PHANTOM PHOENIX involved all four 
U.S. division-level commands. Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) led the main 
effort, conducting large-scale clearing operations in the upper Diyala River Valley and 
the Mosul area. Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) conducted a supporting opera-
tion to clear AQI from the troublesome Tigris River areas of Arab Jabour and Salman Pak 
south of Baghdad. Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) focused on clearing the Jazeera 
desert and the vicinity of Lake Tharthar, the area that had for several years been a seam 
among MNF-W, MND-N, and Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B), where those 
units’ boundaries met. In the Baghdad area, MND-B continued operations to root out car-
bomb networks.2 Finally, the coalition launched a supporting effort, Operation HYDRA, 
in which a joint interagency task force made up of intelligence analysts, law enforcement 
experts, and even oil sector economists tracked down AQI’s financing networks at the 
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Bayji oil refinery in order to starve the group of the cash it normally generated from black 
market oil and gasoline.3
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 17. Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, January-March 2008.
Many of the U.S. units that conducted PHANTOM PHOENIX were newly arrived in 
Iraq, as some of the brigades that had shouldered the burden of the hard fighting of 2007 
rotated home. Colonel Michael X. Garrett’s 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, handed 
responsibility for Hillah, Najaf, and Karbala to Colonel Thomas James’s 4th Brigade, 3d 
Infantry Division, in early December. In Baghdad, Colonel Jeffrey Bannister’s 2d Brigade, 
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2d Infantry Division, handed control of the restive southeast Baghdad districts to Colonel 
Mark Dewhurst’s 4th Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, in late December. In January, the 
first surge brigade, Colonel Billy Don Farris’s 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, handed 
control of Adhamiyah to Colonel John H. Hort’s 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, while 
Colonel Paul Funk’s 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, transferred control of Taji and the 
northern Baghdad belt to Colonel Todd McCaffrey’s 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.4
To support MNC-I’s main effort, Odierno deployed his operational reserve, a Stryker 
squadron of the 2d Cavalry Regiment, to eastern Diyala to take part in the clearing oper-
ations there.5 Iraqi reinforcements moved to MND-N as well, with the 3d Brigade, 1st 
Iraqi Army Division, deploying from Anbar to eastern Diyala with less than a week’s 
notice to take part in the operation.6 For his part, MND-N commander Major General 
Mark P. Hertling was not satisfied with the provision of corps-level reinforcements for 
what he anticipated would be difficult fights in both Diyala and Mosul and asked MNC-I 
for another U.S. battalion for Mosul. Eventually, a squadron of the 3d Armored Cavalry 
Regiment (ACR) joined MND-N in the middle of the operation as 3d ACR units began to 
arrive.
For MND-N’s portion of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX, Hertling had decided 
that his division would focus on Diyala rather than Ninawa, although Ninawa stood 
out as the most violent province in the country once the violence in central Iraq waned 
in late 2007. Hertling believed another major operation would be required in Diyala to 
flush AQI and its allies out of the province’s agricultural areas before MND-N could turn 
its full attention to Mosul. He also believed that AQI would try to reestablish itself in 
the Za’ab Triangle rather than Mosul, and that the Za’ab area was where the final battle 
against AQI would take place.7
The focus of the clearing operations in Diyala was a 285-square-kilometer area north 
of Muqdadiyah that U.S. Soldiers nicknamed “the Breadbasket” for its agricultural ter-
rain. For several years, the towns in the Breadbasket had seen almost no coalition pres-
ence, and AQI fighters had used them as staging areas for attacks against Muqdadiyah 
and Baqubah with impunity. On January 8, troops from Colonel Jon S. Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 
2d Infantry Division, and troops of the Diyala-based 5th Iraqi Army Division entered the 
area to hunt for an estimated 200 AQI fighters.8 The fight was difficult for Lehr’s Stryker 
units. Crisscrossed with irrigation canals, the Breadbasket was an ideal insurgent sanctu-
ary, hard for armored vehicles to access, and covered by dense palm groves and marshes 
in which enemy fighters could easily hide. The insurgents also had had time to prepare 
their defenses. On the second day of the operation, January 9, six of Lehr’s men were 
killed and nine wounded when a local Iraqi led them into a house that AQI fighters had 
rigged to explode. This house-borne improvised explosive device (IED) slowed clearing 
operations by forcing U.S. units to enter every structure more cautiously and to be more 
careful about acting on tips from locals. “There is obviously a tradeoff between working 
with the local population to garner information and being set up by the enemy,” Pet-
raeus noted a few days later.9 In other places, U.S. troops found that inventive insurgents 
had even rigged date palm treetops with explosives to target U.S. patrols as they passed 
underneath. By January 20, U.S. and Iraqi troops were uncovering AQI bunkers, tunnel 
complexes, and weapons caches hidden among “eight-foot-high reeds” and date palms, 
Petraeus reported.10
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Source: DoD photo by Private 1st Class Kirby Rider (Released).
Soldiers From the 3d ACR Search for Weapon Caches in Canal Walls of  
“The Breadbasket.”11
However, MND-N’s clearing operations in the Breadbasket had meager results: only 
4 AQI fighters killed and another 30 detained or wounded, although coalition troops did 
manage an important raid that killed the Syrian AQI leader Abu Layla al-Suri on Janu-
ary 16 near Muqdadiyah.12 The small number of enemy fighters killed or captured indi-
cated, contrary to MND-N’s expectations, that AQI groups already had relocated from 
the Breadbasket to other areas farther north, such as the Hamrin mountains and Mosul.13 
MND-N’s main effort appeared to have gone into an area that AQI’s commanders and 
fighters had already abandoned.
While the MND-N troops cleared the Breadbasket, MND-C troops focused on Arab 
Jabour a few kilometers south of Baghdad. Despite a nascent Awakening group in the 
area, Arab Jabour had long been an insurgent support zone used by AQI and other mili-
tants to infiltrate fighters and car bombs into Baghdad. Colonel Terry R. Ferrell’s 2d Bri-
gade, 3d Infantry Division, oversaw the operations there, reinforced by the 5th Battalion, 
7th Cavalry sent from Anbar to give Ferrell three U.S. battalions for the task.14 Among the 
Iraqi forces present, Brigadier General Ali Freiji’s brigade of the 6th Iraqi Army Division 
received an additional Iraqi infantry battalion for the operation as well.15 Under the plans 
drawn up by MND-C commander Major General Rick Lynch, the clearing of Arab Jabour 
relied on intense firepower. On January 10, MND-C called in air strikes that dropped 20 
tons of munitions on suspected AQI targets in just 10 minutes in an effort to destroy AQI 
weapons caches and to reduce a defensive belt of IEDs that blocked important roads.16 
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A local Awakening leader estimated that the air strikes killed 20 AQI fighters, including 
a senior AQI commander.17 As the MND-C troops progressed deeper into AQI’s Arab 
Jabour sanctuary, they carried out similarly intense air strikes on January 16 and 20.18 On 
January 19, however, Ferrell’s brigade suffered the first battle death in an MRAP when a 
3,000-pound IED flipped over one of the mine-resistant vehicles and killed the gunner.19
Farther to the northwest, the Marine and Army troops that had massed to clear the 
area that MNC-I called area of operation (AO) Bedrock found extensive insurgent out-
posts in the remote areas east of Lake Tharthar. West of Samarra, the U.S. troops dis-
covered 10 car bombs at a large explosive production facility. On January 17, they also 
discovered a foreign fighter base camp that had a 300-meter tunnel system with multiple 
entrances and fighting positions hidden by reeds, all of which the U.S. troops destroyed 
with incendiary munitions.20
Source: U.S. Army photo by 1st Lieutenant Jonathan J. Springer (Released).
Soldiers From 1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division, Fire Artillery During Operation 
PHANTOM PHOENIX.21
Mosul was even more challenging. As clearing operations began with the arrival of 
1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, from Baghdad, the AQI fighters who had begun to gather 
in the Mosul area in fall 2007 repeatedly attacked the tightening ring of Iraqi-manned 
checkpoints and obstacles that locals dubbed the “Riyadh Line” after the new Ninawa 
Operations Commander, Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq. The Ninawa Opera-
tions Command began operating on January 15, bringing a much-needed layer of com-
mand and control to the city’s army and police forces. Still, even with a better command 
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structure, the city of two million was difficult to clear, especially its older west-side neigh-
borhoods with their narrow medieval streets that could not accommodate vehicles. On 
January 23, Iraqi troops investigating a tip in an apartment building in northwest Mosul 
found an insurgent cache of at least 20,000 pounds of explosives that detonated when an 
Iraqi soldier improperly probed the charge. The explosion leveled the entire building, 
killing 34 Iraqis and wounding 138 more, and leaving an enormous crater. The follow-
ing morning, when the newly appointed Ninawa police chief, Brigadier General Saleh 
Jabouri, arrived to investigate the site, he was killed by an AQI suicide bomber dressed 
as a policeman who wrestled him into a nearby vehicle before detonating a suicide vest.22
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Kieran Cuddihy (Released).
Soldiers From the 3d ACR During Combat in Mosul.23
The assassination was a serious setback for the new joint Iraqi Army and police cam-
paign to secure the city and, in Petraeus’s words, showed that “AQI still has the ability to 
strike.”24 It also caused a shift in priorities for both the coalition and the Iraqis. Angered 
by the attack, Prime Minister Maliki dispatched an Iraqi battalion from Baghdad to rein-
force the 2d Iraqi Army Division in Mosul, while Hertling responded by changing his 
division’s main effort from Diyala to Mosul and employing the 3d Squadron, 3d ACR, 
in the city. The arrival of the additional troops was timely. On February 11, the Badush 
prison outside Mosul, whose inmate population included an AQI command and control 
node, erupted into a riot that required the quick intervention of the 3d Squadron and 2d 
Iraqi Army Division to suppress the violent prisoners and prevent a jailbreak.25
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Farther south of Mosul, MND-N made better progress. In the long-time insurgent 
stronghold of Hawijah, Sunni insurgents felt increasing pressure from Operation PHAN-
TOM PHOENIX and from the newly formed 6,000-man Awakening group in the area. 
As a result, insurgent fighters began to come forward seeking amnesty from local Iraqi 
officials and Colonel David Paschal’s 1st Brigade, 10th Mountain Division. Throughout 
February and subsequent months, Paschal’s units publicized a program called “Restore 
Peace” in which insurgents who turned themselves in could register with the brigade 
and go through a 6-month reintegration process. A few insurgents turned themselves in 
during the first weeks of February, but on February 24, more than 100 insurgents walked 
into Forward Operating Base McHenry in Hawijah to seek amnesty. “I’m tired of being 
a target and running,” one insurgent explained to U.S. troops, while another testified, “I 
have not slept in my house for a year.”26
Back in Diyala, sectarian political tensions complicated the operation. On Febru-
ary 8, thousands of Sunni Awakening members, now renamed Sons of Iraq by MNF-I 
planners, abandoned their checkpoints to join in demonstrations against Diyala police 
chief Ghanem al-Qureishi, who they accused of sponsoring Shi’a death squads that tar-
geted Awakening members. For several weeks, U.S. commanders in Diyala were forced 
to scramble to mediate between the Awakening and the Shi’a-dominated Diyala police 
forces, showing that the province’s difficult sectarian politics meant that it was far from 
stabilized, even if AQI had lost its grip on most of its former territory there.27
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Russell Bassett (Released).
Sons of Iraq Staff a Checkpoint in Himbus.28
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Diyala was not the only PHANTOM PHOENIX operational area in which the Awak-
ening groups felt themselves under pressure. In January, MNF-I had recorded at least 
100 attacks against Awakening groups, almost four times as many as were recorded 
in December. In Baghdad on February 11, two car bombs had unsuccessfully targeted 
Sheikh Ali Hatem Suleiman, one of the Awakening leaders from Ramadi. Elsewhere, in 
separate incidents in Jurf al-Sukhr south of Baghdad and in the Za’ab Triangle in north-
ern Iraqi, U.S. troops mistakenly raided Awakening members, although it was possible 
the targeted men had in fact been insurgents using the Awakening as a cover.29
The stabilization phases of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX continued until July, 
but large-scale clearing operations began to wind down in February with coalition and 
Iraqi troops in possession of large swathes of formerly AQI-held territory. For the whole 
of the operation, the coalition lost 60 troops killed and the Iraqi security forces more 
than 500 killed. Meanwhile, the Sunni insurgent groups lost an estimated 900 killed and 
approximately 2,500 captured.30 By the end of PHANTOM PHOENIX’s clearing opera-
tions, most of AQI’s networks had been pushed beyond striking distance of Baghdad, 
although they could still carry out large attacks in the cities of Diyala and maintain a for-
midable clandestine presence in Mosul, where attack levels remained high. By February 
15, MND-C had completed the clearing of Arab Jabour and shifted focus to the clearing 
of Salman Pak on the opposite side of the Tigris, farther south.31 After 5 weeks of PHAN-
TOM PHOENIX’s clearing and holding operations, insurgent activity had diminished 
significantly, especially in Baghdad, where AQI no longer had freedom of movement 
in its traditional support zones around the city. By February, Baghdad had an average 
of just 11 attacks per day, down from 46 per day in June 2007. On February 17, MNF-I 
announced that insurgent attacks across Iraq had fallen sharply to an average of 82 per 
day, down from a daily average of 205 exactly 1 year before.32
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Nicholas A. Hernandez (Released).
Soldiers Meet With Iraqi National Policemen During a Patrol in Baghdad.33
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Political Progress and the Departure of III Corps
The theory behind the surge was that improvements in the security situation and 
the tamping down of Iraq’s ethno-sectarian civil war would give the Iraqi political fac-
tions breathing space in which to make progress toward political reconciliation. After a 
politically turbulent December, the Iraqi Parliament took steps that seemed to lend some 
credence to the theory. In January and February 2008, the Iraqi political parties began 
serious negotiations concerning a series of difficult political and security issues. In early 
February, Maliki began to include his main Sunni rival, Vice President Tariq Hashimi, in 
cabinet consultations on how to counter AQI’s resurgence in Mosul and to give Hashimi 
the floor in discussions with the Ninawa operations commander and the Ninawa provin-
cial governor.34 Meanwhile, the Parliament began negotiating the passage of several laws 
that the coalition considered essential for political reconciliation. These included a law 
defining the powers of the Iraqi provinces and the central government; a law establishing 
an amnesty process for those who had decided to abandon resistance against the govern-
ment; and a 2008 budget that divided oil revenues between the Iraqi Government and the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). On February 13, the Parliament passed all three 
laws at once. Petraeus received the news of the laws’ passage while walking through a 
west Baghdad neighborhood where attacks had fallen to almost zero after 2 years of sec-
tarian violence. “[Parliament speaker Mahmud] Mashadani had threatened the Council 
of Representatives with dissolution,” Petraeus reported, “and then he came right back on 
Wednesday with a savvy bundling of the three laws that gave everyone something they 
were looking for—that’s politics!”35
The legislative breakthrough also came the day before Odierno and the III Corps 
headquarters handed over the reins of MNC-I to Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin and 
his XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters, which had returned to Iraq for its second tour as 
the coalition’s operational headquarters. The timing was fitting. In his departing remarks 
the following day, Odierno noted that the Iraqis’ legislative successes were “the best gift 
[I] could have received.”36
The change in security conditions from the time of III Corps’ arrival in December 
2006 was stunning. Odierno and III Corps had taken up their responsibilities at a time 
when Iraqi civilian deaths averaged 3,500 per month, enemy attacks averaged 1,200 per 
week, and U.S. military deaths averaged more than 100 per month. By February 2008, 
those numbers had dropped to fewer than 600 Iraqi civilian deaths per month and fewer 
than 600 attacks per week, and only 29 U.S. troops had been killed in January 2008. The 
ethno-sectarian war had lost much of its energy as well: Iraq had witnessed about 2,000 
ethno-sectarian killings in December 2006, but that number dropped to just 100 in Febru-
ary 2008.37
The dramatic changes were due in large part to III Corps’ intense operations against 
AQI, which by the time of Odierno’s departure in February 2008 was a mere shadow of 
what it had been in late 2006. By attacking AQI’s support zones and safe havens around 
Baghdad, and by synchronizing the operations of the divisions in central and northern 
Iraq, Odierno and his command had enabled the coalition to retake the initiative for the 
first time since 2004. Odierno’s operations had succeeded in depleting AQI’s ranks, dec-
imating the group’s leadership, and pushing its fighters into far northern Iraq or into 
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remote areas of the Diyala River Valley far from Iraq’s population centers. What remained 
was to finish the Sunni insurgency in Mosul.
Denouement of the Turkey-Kurdistan Workers’ Party War
As Odierno departed Iraq, however, the campaign for Mosul competed with other 
problems for the coalition’s attention. The situation between Turkey and the insurgents 
of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) remained critical in early 2008. As the Turks con-
tinued their air strikes against PKK bases inside Iraq without a decisive result, the PKK 
continued to hit back inside Turkey, including a bombing attack against a Turkish patrol 
in Diyarbakir that killed 5 Turks and wounded 110. In early January, the Turkish general 
staff began to plan a ground incursion into Iraq to wipe out the PKK and requested U.S. 
intelligence support for their operations. U.S. military leaders outside Iraq were willing 
to provide this support, but Petraeus advised U.S. leaders “a kinetic-only approach to 
dealing with the PKK . . . especially with US ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and recon-
naissance] support to their operations, will only make matters more difficult in Iraq. Our 
forces don’t need another enemy and we certainly do not want to get into a situation 
where Iraq raises [United Nations] protection from Turkish action.”38 Petraeus also had 
doubts about the Turkish operational plan, which Turkish military officers briefed to U.S. 
counterparts in advance. “The snow depth, the altitude, the vertical feet up [and] down, 
the distance planned for travel, and the very difficult terrain” all indicated that “no one 
who planned that operation had been under a rucksack in recent years,” Petraeus later 
recalled.39
On February 21, 2008, the Turks launched a ground operation into Iraq with about 800 
troops, though the Turkish media outraged the Kurdish public by claiming 10,000 troops 
had crossed the border. As Petraeus had warned, the Turkish maneuvers immediately 
bogged down, indicating the Turkish commanders had not prepared well for the harsh 
winter conditions and the tough resistance from PKK fighters. After a week, the incon-
clusive operation ended as Turkish units withdrew into Turkey leaving the PKK intact, 
though the Turks claimed to have killed more than 200 PKK fighters.40
In the postmortem analysis of the operation, Petraeus wrote to Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Robert M. Gates, “We hope that all parties can now move toward political 
solutions and that we can avoid another large-scale Turkish military intervention that 
would further endanger the nascent political progress in Iraq.”41 The entire episode, how-
ever, demonstrated that there were regional problems affecting the Iraq campaign that 
only U.S. policymakers in Washington, not U.S. commanders on the ground, had the 
means to address. If Washington could not formulate a policy to stave off spoiler events 
such as the Turkish incursion, U.S. units in Iraq would pay the price.
THE BATTLE FOR BASRAH
The Arrival of Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin and XVIII Airborne Corps
Austin’s first challenge after he assumed command of MNC-I from Odierno on Feb-
ruary 14, 2008, was to continue to keep pressure on AQI and other militant groups as all 
five of the surge brigades began redeploying. To overcome a looming deficit of combat 
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forces, the 15 remaining brigades needed to expand their areas of operations once again. 
As Austin took command, he still had seven division-level headquarters with which to 
work. Major General Jeffery W. Hammond commanded MND-B, the 4th Infantry Divi-
sion; Lynch headed MND-C and the 3d Infantry Division; and Hertling led MND-N and 
the 1st Armored Division. Major General Graham Binns, General Officer Commanding 
the 1st (United Kingdom [UK]) Armoured Division, remained in control of Multi-National 
Division-Southeast (MND-SE) in Basrah, while Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) 
continued in its final year under the U.S. Marines, and a South Korean brigade remained 
in control of Multi-National Division-Northeast (MND-NE) in Kurdistan. Multi-Na-
tional Division-Central South (MND-CS), led by a Polish brigade at their headquarters in 
Diwaniyah, also contained a Georgian brigade and several smaller coalition contingents.
 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Laura M. Bigenho (Released).
General David Petraeus Supervising the Change of Command Between Lieutenant 
General Raymond Odierno and Lieutenant General Lloyd J. Austin III.42
When Austin assumed command of MNC-I, he saw his immediate objectives as 
holding the line in Baghdad and Anbar, completing the defeat of AQI in Mosul and the 
Diyala River Valley, and, when he could gather the capacity, gaining greater control of 
the south, where he believed the coalition had limited situational awareness.43 Austin 
believed that to accomplish these objectives, he needed to reapportion his forces signifi-
cantly across the country. Although the security situation in Baghdad had improved dra-
matically since early 2007, MND-B in February 2008 remained at peak strength, still in 
control of 6 brigade combat teams and 44 U.S. combat battalions, far more than either 
MND-N or MND-C.44 Austin and XVIII Airborne Corps knew that the security situa-
tion in Basrah was deteriorating—although the province recently had been transferred 
to Iraqi control—and the new MNC-I leaders were determined to turn south to secure 
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the city once AQI had been finished off in the north. This was the coalition’s planned 
campaign sequence as Austin arrived. The new corps commander had little warning that 
his priorities in the coming months were about to be turned upside down by a massive, 
unexpected clash between the government of Nuri al-Maliki and the Sadrist militias in 
Basrah and Baghdad that would bring some of the most intense fighting of the war.
The Rush to Provincial Iraqi Control in Basrah
The spring 2008 war between the Maliki government and the Sadr movement had 
been coming for a long while. The situation in Basrah had slipped out of control of both 
the coalition and the government in 2007. When Binns took command of MND-SE in 
August 2007, he came with strict orders from his British superiors at the UK Permanent 
Joint Headquarters to follow through on the transition plans begun by Major General 
Jonathan Shaw, his predecessor. Binns was to complete the withdrawal of British troops 
from bases inside the city to the Basrah Air Station outside the town, while handing the 
security portfolios for all of Basrah Province to the Iraqis so British forces could then 
withdraw from the country. “The UK had indicated that it had no long-term intention 
to remain in Iraq, and, therefore, exit was inevitable,” Binns recalled, “but the strategy, 
as I was delivering it, was one of transition increasingly to Iraqi security forces, and as 
a result, we would [drawdown] our presence. . . . I had been told to deliver a transition, 
and that’s what I was doing.”45
The British Government had been eager to transfer Basrah Province to the Iraqis for 
some time. Shaw had suggested moving the province to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) 
in April 2007, because British planners were counting on shifting troops from Iraq to 
Afghanistan even as the U.S. surge into Iraq was getting underway.46 Like Shaw, Binns 
also sought an early handover of security responsibility, preferably immediately after 
UK forces moved out of Basrah city in September to their main base at the Basrah Air 
Station. The move out of the city would result in provincial control in all but name. After 
all, British forces were no longer patrolling the streets of Basrah due to the summer 2007 
truce with Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) leader Ahmed al-Fartusi, and the UK’s position was that 
the Iraqis would never take charge of their own affairs unless the British left.47 Therefore, 
Binns pushed to “reduce the gap between leaving the palace and going to PIC.”48
Earlier proposals to speed up Basrah’s transfer to PIC had met with skepticism at 
coalition headquarters in Baghdad. MNC-I had determined that the Iraqi security forces 
in the province were not ready, a position generally shared by the central Iraqi Govern-
ment. In January 2007, Odierno had written to General George Casey, Jr., “the MND-SE 
[commander] now projects Basra to meet conditions for transfer of security to PIC in 
April 2007 (previously March 2007). I assess that more time is needed.”49 Petraeus, too, 
had urged the British Government on at least one occasion not to withdraw its troops 
too precipitously, and American officers in Baghdad raised doubts that conditions in the 
province merited a handover of security.50 It was doubtful that any of the four criteria for 
transferring to PIC—the level of the threat, the capability of the Iraqi security forces, the 
capability of the national and provincial governments, and the ability of coalition forces 
to re-intervene—had been met by the latter half of 2007. However, the temporary reduc-
tion in attacks on MND-SE after the truce with JAM may have created that impression.51
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The summer 2007 truce also had led to a drastic reduction in British operations 
against Sadrist militias, as the MND-SE headquarters developed highly restrictive rules 
of engagement to prevent their forces from upsetting the tenuous agreement. American 
forces in the sector, made up almost exclusively of elements of the Combined Joint Spe-
cial Operations Task Force (CJSOTF), were expected to follow the same rules—a situation 
that led to some frustrating episodes from the American perspective. On one occasion in 
2008, CJSOTF commander Colonel Christopher Conner requested permission for an air 
strike against militiamen setting up a rail system frequently used to launch rockets, but 
MND-SE denied the strike because, as Conner recounted, there was nothing loaded on 
the rails. When the militiamen began loading a rocket onto the rail, the CJSOTF asked 
for permission again, but were denied because the rocketeers had not demonstrated hos-
tile intent. As the special operators watched, the militiamen launched the rocket and 
began breaking down the launch system, but when the CJSOTF Soldiers made one final 
entreaty, their British counterparts denied the strike with the explanation that since the 
militiamen had no rockets left, they were not demonstrating hostile intent.52
On the streets of Basrah, however, it was clear that militias terrorized the city with 
impunity, while the city’s police were either infiltrated by militiamen or cowed by mili-
tia threats. Coalition commanders had deemed the 10th Iraqi Army Division so widely 
infiltrated by militants that the entire division was transferred north to Maysan and Dhi 
Qar Provinces. The fledgling 14th Iraqi Army Division that had been created to replace 
the 10th in Basrah was still being formed and trained. Neither the police nor the army 
were trustworthy or capable of enforcing the rule of law. On a political level, the provin-
cial council was riven by warring factions incapable of providing public services. Prime 
Minister Maliki was openly hostile to the Fadhila Party Governor Mohammed Musbeh 
al-Waeli, who seemed mainly occupied by a scheme to turn the province into a federal 
region under his rule and keep its massive oil revenues for his party rather than for the 
government in Baghdad. It was doubtful that MND-SE, with only 4,500 British troops 
available and an operating posture constrained by JAM accommodation, would be able 
to re-intervene to help resolve these conflicts.53
Despite these dynamics, Binns and MND-SE continued to press for PIC for Basrah 
Province, pointing to the trend of fewer militia attacks against the British base. In fall 
2007, Odierno and Petraeus finally acceded to a policy they believed originated in White-
hall and that they had no hope of altering. On December 16, MND-SE transferred con-
trol of the province to Iraqi authorities at a ceremony on Basrah Air Station attended by 
senior Iraqi officials and UK Foreign Secretary David W. Miliband. The speeches were 
upbeat about Basrah’s future, but hinted that the security environment was dangerous. 
Miliband admitted that Basrah was not “a land of milk and honey,” and Iraqi National 
Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie stressed that “the rule of law needed to be upheld, 
only the government should have weapons, and that political parties needed to unite and 
‘crack down on militias and religious extremists’.”54 Meanwhile, coalition officers judged 
downtown Basrah too dangerous for Miliband to visit.
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Source: U.S. Army photo by Sergeant Nicole Dykstra (Released).
Major General Graham Binns, Governor Mohammed Musbeh al-Waeli, National 
Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie, and Lieutenant General Mohan al-Freiji During 
the Basrah Transfer Ceremony.55
Because of Maliki’s ongoing dispute with Governor Waeli, the Prime Minister was 
loath to give Waeli control of the province’s security affairs, which complicated the terms 
of the PIC agreement. Waeli assumed responsibility for civil affairs, but he was forced 
to sign a letter of understanding that security matters were to be handled by the chief of 
the Basrah Operations Center, Lieutenant General Mohan al-Freiji. U.S. commanders had 
blocked Freiji from becoming the Baghdad operations commander just months before 
because he was both sectarian and tyrannical.56 UK forces formally agreed to continue to 
provide training to Iraqi security forces, assist Freiji at the Basrah Operations Command, 
and re-intervene only in extremis and only with Maliki’s approval. The latter condition 
was unlike other PIC agreements, which allowed American troops to re-intervene based 
on a local Iraqi commander’s request.
British forces also assured MNC-I that they would continue to patrol the Iranian 
border and secure key supply routes.57 Nonetheless, with provincial Iraqi control came a 
shift for the British from “tactical overwatch” to “operational overwatch,” which White-
hall intended to trigger the long-planned drawdown of troops from 4,500 at the end of 
2007 to 2,500 by the spring of 2008.58
Iraqi Security Forces in Basrah
Part of the UK leaders’ eagerness to leave Basrah was that, throughout 2007, British 
officials increasingly came to believe that the primary cause of violence in Basrah was the 
presence of UK forces. “Ninety percent of the violence was directed against us,” Binns 
argued. “If we didn’t present the target, then the figures would reduce, and coming out of 
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the city had a dramatic effect on the metrics that we used to measure the violence. I’m not 
pretending that the security situation significantly improved for Basrawis; it wouldn’t, 
and I knew it wouldn’t until the Iraqi security forces got back in there.”59 By this logic, a 
reduced British presence ostensibly would force the Iraqi security forces to take respon-
sibility for security. Echoing SECDEF Donald Rumsfeld’s ideas about the Iraqis’ military 
capacity, Binns also believed the Iraqi security forces “wouldn’t get better until they were 
given responsibility, and it was a bit like . . . taking the stabilisers off a child’s bike. They 
were going to wobble for a while and I was there to make sure they didn’t fall over.”60
In the new post-PIC arrangement, MND-SE would rely heavily on the strength, capa-
bilities, and loyalty of the Iraqi security forces in Basrah, which had been judged thor-
oughly infiltrated by militias. By September, when the British moved out of Basrah Palace, 
the new 14th Iraqi Army Division, created to compensate for the corruption of the 10th 
Iraqi Army Division, was only at half strength and suffering serious equipment short-
falls. Beyond the Iraqi Army, nearly every law enforcement unit in Basrah was under 
the influence of some political party’s militia. JAM had overwhelmingly infiltrated the 
Iraqi police, the port authority, and the Facilities Protection Service. The Islamic Supreme 
Council of Iraq (ISCI) and Badr Corps also had infiltrated some of the police units and 
controlled the National Intelligence Service bureau in the city. Fadhila had firm control 
over the Oil Protection Force, and Iraqi Hizballah controlled the Customs Police Force.61 
While provincial police Chief Major General Mohammed Jalil Khalaf Shuwayl was 
regarded favorably by coalition officials in Basrah, his force was heavily infiltrated and 
corrupt.62 Jalil’s predecessor had said in 2005 that he trusted only a quarter of his officers, 
a figure Jalil frequently repeated to coalition counterparts.63 Given the circumstances, 
Basrah’s “good cops” felt outnumbered and intimidated into submission, with much of 
the militia-infiltrated police effectively a part of a power struggle among militant groups 
rather than protectors of the population. The day after PIC, Jalil criticized the departing 
British, declaring to a reporter: “They left me militia, they left me gangsters, and they left 
me all the troubles in the world.”64
Basrah’s Descent into Chaos
Despite Shaw’s and Binns’s theory about the proximate cause of Basrah’s unrest, vio-
lence and crime skyrocketed within the city shortly after the British pullout. With the 
Iraqi forces too weak and unwilling to confront the militias alone, Basrah’s militias had 
free rein to compete violently for political control, to access economic resources and oil, 
and to control the security forces especially in neighborhoods such as Qibla and Hayani-
yah, Sadr City-like slums developed to accommodate rural migration to the city in the 
1970s and 1980s.65 Kidnapping, murder, extortion, rape, torture, and intimidation became 
commonplace in a city once a popular vacation destination on the Persian Gulf. On Feb-
ruary 11, 2008, CBS reporter Richard Butler was kidnapped from his hotel by JAM mem-
bers wearing police uniforms.66 The same month the director of the Basrah Electricity 
Department was kidnapped. Violence became so prevalent that Basrawis held a protest 
on March 8 to criticize the security forces for failing to protect the city, while local politi-
cians began calling contacts in the central government for help.67
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Basrah’s intellectuals, doctors, security officials, and former Ba’athists increasingly 
were targeted as Shi’a militias implemented a strict interpretation of Islamic law, purged 
secular thinking, and sought revenge against the Ba’ath. Barbers were also singled out 
for their willingness to commit the heretical crime of shaving beards. Attacks against 
women, usually carried out by militiamen bent on punishing “prostitutes” (women who 
were simply not dressed conservatively enough in public), became a focal point for the 
violence, making international headlines. According to the provincial council, 133 Bas-
rawi women were murdered in 2007, though unofficial numbers were much higher.68 In 
late November 2007, police chief Jalil handed coalition officials folders with photographs 
detailing the murders of 45 women, the majority of them executed in the preceding 3 
months for purportedly violating the militia’s strict interpretation of Sharia law. Most 
of the women were shot in the face, two were beheaded, and some tortured to death. 
Another 35 women reportedly were murdered in the first quarter of 2008.69
One of the unintended consequences of repositioning British forces outside the city 
was the loss of MND-SE’s situational awareness inside Basrah. Binns noted that, “coming 
out of the city did have an impact on my situational awareness. I found it difficult to keep 
track of what was going on in the city,” a factor that made it hard for MND-SE to gauge 
the downward spiral of the security environment inside the city, 6 kilometers away.70
Even the British truce with JAM leader Ahmen al-Fartusi began to break down by Jan-
uary 2008. Once MND-SE released Fartusi in December 2007 and the last remaining JAM 
prisoner in January 2008, the British no longer had any leverage over the militia. While 
indirect-fire attacks onto the MND-SE bases had dropped significantly after the accom-
modation with JAM, they continued nonetheless, with 5 in September, 9 in October, 11 in 
November, and 12 in December. In January and February 2008, rocket attacks on Basrah 
Air Station reached levels similar to the previous summer, before the truce with Fartusi.71 
When pressed by MND-SE, Fartusi claimed that rogue or non-JAM affiliated groups 
were responsible for the renewed attacks.72 While Fartusi was likely duplicitous, there 
were doubtless some JAM Special Groups commanders ignoring him, and other militias, 
like Thar Allah and Sayyed al-Shahadda, who were not beholden to the Fartusi deal or to 
the mainstream JAM groups.
Eventually word began to reach Baghdad that Basrah was in crisis. Although MND-SE 
lacked adequate information to report to MNC-I on the security situation inside the city, 
Iraqi authorities and politicians in Basrah reported independently to Maliki and the Iraqi 
cabinet on the dire state of affairs. Alarmed by these reports, Maliki dispatched Iraqi 
vice Chief of Defense General Nasier Abadi from Baghdad in early January to investi-
gate conditions in Basrah, and Abadi returned with a grim report of a city in chaos, with 
beleaguered Iraqi security forces (ISF) units outgunned and outnumbered by militants. 
In February 2008, Binns’s newly arrived replacement, Major General Barney White-Spun-
ner, General Officer Commanding the 3d (UK) Mechanized Division, quickly reached a 
similar conclusion. “[I]t was absolutely clear that we needed an operation to clear the 
Shi’a militias out of the city,” White- Spunner later recalled, though for such an operation 
to be effective, he believed it “really had to be Iraqi-led with us in support.”73 U.S. officials 
stationed with MND-SE in Basrah also frequently reported on the downward trend in 
the city in early 2008. “At some point in the very near future coalition forces will need to 
go kinetic in Basrah—the situation has gotten that bad,” one U.S. official told the visiting 
Odierno in early 2008.74 Odierno was highly sympathetic to the arguments, but stressed 
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the difficult balance between pushing the British to be more forward leaning and the 
political imperative to keep them in the coalition. Once MNC-I had dealt with Mosul, it 
could then turn its attention to Basrah, Odierno said.
 
Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 3d Class Jannine Hartmann (Released).
Major General Barney White-Spunner.75
General Freiji’s Plan to Regain Government Control over Basrah
As the security situation in Basrah worsened, Lieutenant General Mohan al-Freiji 
formed a plan to regain control of the city, loosely based on the security framework 
for Belfast in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as on recent U.S. successes in other parts of 
Iraq.76 British forces continued to train Iraqi security forces, which would later establish 
checkpoints and outposts across the city. Over several months, more Iraqi troops became 
available as they completed their training, and the Iraqi security forces would build 
new outposts before finally confronting the militias. The plan also called for increased 
patrols along the border to prevent Iranian assistance to the Shi’a militias. Beginning in 
the summer of 2008, Freiji envisioned that Iraqi troops would commence a 6-week weap-
ons amnesty and buy-back program, followed by house-to-house clearing operations.77 
Unlike Operation SINBAD, Freiji’s plan would put Iraqi troops in the operational lead for 
the first time, and add sufficient numbers of troops to clear and hold territory.
On March 4 and 5, Freiji briefed his plan to Iraqi and coalition leaders in Baghdad, 
including Maliki, Petraeus, Austin, White-Spunner, and the Iraqi security ministers.78 The 
U.S. officers were not impressed with Freiji’s concept or his presentation of it. “Mohan’s 
plan is not fully resourced, and his timeline is overly optimistic,” Petraeus reported 
to Gates.79 With the total number of U.S. brigades dropping to pre-surge levels by the 
summer, MNC-I would only be able to tackle one problem at a time and was necessarily 
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focused on finishing the campaign against AQI in Mosul. U.S. commanders also saw some 
inherent problems with the plan, particularly Freiji’s desire to fall back on the Saddam 
Hussein-era tactics of cordoning and bombarding populated areas, not accounting for 
the use of special operations, and not having a reconstruction plan. Petraeus directed the 
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) commander, Lieutenant 
General James M. Dubik, to help improve Freiji’s plan and suggested reconvening on 
March 21, with coalition plans for the northern offensive against AQI proceeding in the 
meantime.80
As the coalition looked toward Mosul, however, Maliki became more focused on 
Basrah. The Prime Minister raised the subject during the March 16 Ministerial Com-
mittee on National Security, arguing that the lawlessness in the southern city presented 
a greater problem than Mosul. Maliki and several of his ministers seemed genuinely 
concerned about Basrah’s security. As the U.S.-led surge had begun to quell the Sunni 
insurgency in late 2007, Maliki could afford to start looking at other areas that posed 
a threat to his government, and Basrah clearly stood out. Furthermore, Maliki increas-
ingly saw Moqtada Sadr and JAM as his primary political competition. In April 2007, 
the Sadrists had pulled their six ministers from Maliki’s cabinet over their demand for a 
timeline forcing the departure of U.S. troops, and in September, the Sadrists quit Maliki’s 
United Iraqi Alliance bloc in the Council of Representatives, leaving him to govern with 
a narrow majority.81 Maliki also was upset that Basrah’s economically vital port of Umm 
Qasr was entirely under Sadrist control.82 For Maliki, Sadr was no longer a Shi’a ally of 
convenience, but a political rival to be eliminated. By breaking the Sadrist grip on Basrah, 
restoring order, and delivering on economic growth, Maliki likely believed he could set 
up his Da’wa Party to win the south in the provincial elections scheduled for late 2008.
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie Informs General David Petraeus 
 on March 21, 2008, of Prime Minister Maliki’s Intention to Initiate  
an Offensive in Basrah.83
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At the scheduled March 21 meeting to review Freiji’s plan, Rubaie pulled Petraeus 
aside and informed him that Maliki had decided to accelerate plans for a security oper-
ation in Basrah and wanted to meet Petraeus the following day to discuss the matter. 
When Petraeus met Maliki, the Prime Minister blamed the British for Basrah’s falter-
ing security, announced he was deploying additional Iraqi security forces to the city, 
and revealed that he would travel to Basrah the following day with his own AK47 to 
deal with the situation. Stunned by Maliki’s plans, Petraeus argued vehemently that the 
government’s forces were not ready to execute the operation. If Maliki insisted on an 
operation in Basrah, Petraeus advised, the Iraqi leader should wait for more deliberate 
preparations to be made. When Maliki made it clear that he intended to go south imme-
diately, a chagrined Petraeus advised him to “take lots of money to Basra to help with 
inevitable logistical difficulties.” Petraeus offered to provide “movement support, intel-
ligence support, aviation-related maintenance and logistics support, and liaison teams to 
work with Iraqi special operations forces and to assist with close air support and attack 
helicopters, should they prove necessary.”84
The Prime Minister’s decision took MND-SE by surprise as well. Having seen at the 
early March plan briefings in Baghdad that Lieutenant General Freiji’s operation was 
not imminent, White- Spunner had departed on leave to Germany, where he planned to 
brief the soon-to-arrive British 7th Brigade on the additional resources needed to support 
Freiji’s plan, though the British commander quickly returned on learning of Maliki’s new 
intentions.85 Sitting in for White-Spunner at a conference with Austin and the coalition 
division commanders in Baghdad on March 21, the same day Petraeus learned of Maliki’s 
Basrah plans, Brigadier Julian Free, Commander, 4th (UK) Infantry Brigade, had listened 
to Austin describe the impending MNC-I operation against AQI in the north. “All I need 
from you, Julian,” Austin said, “is to avoid opening a second front for us.”86 The Iraqi 
Prime Minister’s surprise move, however, caused Free to return immediately to Basrah, 
where the British brigadier found himself reporting to Austin that a second front was 
indeed opening, less than 24 hours after the MNC-I commander’s injunction.87
“Maliki Has Bit Off More Than He Can Chew”
Despite their determination to restore Basrah to government control, Maliki and sev-
eral of his advisers clearly misunderstood the scale of the problem. During the March 
meetings in Baghdad, Rubaie had charged that Freiji was exaggerating the extent of the 
problem and characterized it, as former MND-SE commanders Shaw and Binns had 
done, as a criminal problem rather than an insurgent one.88 Even Maliki said the prob-
lem was caused by “criminals and gang leaders” in his March 22 meeting with Petraeus. 
Failing to understand how deeply the militias had become entrenched as they vied to 
take control of Basrah, the Iraqi leaders underestimated how fierce the militia resistance 
would be.89 This misperception was likely compounded by Maliki’s quick success in lead-
ing Iraqi forces to stop the intra-Shi’a violence in Karbala in August 2007. On March 24, 
Maliki, Minister of Defense Abdel Qader al-Obeidi, Minister of National Security Affairs 
Shirwan al-Waeli, and military advisers from MNF-I and the CJSOTF arrived at Basrah 
Palace, where they planned to direct Iraqi operations to retake the city.90 Interior Minister 
Jawad Bolani, who feared flying, drove down separately in an armored convoy. Angry 
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with the British for having made an accommodation with Fartusi to cede the city to militia 
control, Maliki did not consult with MND-SE about the impending operation and even 
ejected British officers from meetings that day. Despite Maliki’s hostility, Brigadier Free 
took the precautionary step of sending the commander of the Royal Dragoon Guards to 
help advise Freiji at the Basrah Operations Command in the Shatt al-Arab Hotel.91
Confident of an easy victory, Maliki ordered Freiji to execute Operation CHARGE OF 
THE KNIGHTS (or SAWLAT AL-FORSAN) the next morning, despite the fact that Iraqi 
reinforcing units, including the 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, with its U.S. Marine 
military transition teams (MiTTs) were still en route. At dawn on March 25, nearly 10,000 
Iraqi police and soldiers of the newly formed 14th Iraqi Army Division convoyed into 
militia-controlled districts to cordon them off and search suspected militia locations.
They were driving into a trap. Because of militia infiltration in the police and army, 
JAM commanders had plenty of time to mobilize their estimated 6,000 fighters and pre-
pare complex small arms and IED ambushes for the government convoys. Once the Iraqi 
columns entered militia neighborhoods and met stiff resistance, their advance immedi-
ately halted and their units fell into disarray. Without U.S. or British advisers embed-
ded in the Iraqi brigades, coalition aircraft could not engage militia targets or evacuate 
wounded Iraqi soldiers, leaving U.S. F-16s on station merely to fly extremely low in a 
show of force.
At the Basrah Operations Command, General Freiji seemed to have lost control of the 
operation. Lacking communications equipment, Freiji relied on several mobile phones 
and a map to issue orders.92 The bifurcation of command between Freiji at the operations 
center and Maliki at Basrah Palace further complicated coordination. Freiji had failed to 
impress coalition counterparts in his planning, and he did the same when the fighting 
began. At one point, Freiji asked his British counterparts for air or artillery strikes to take 
out militia positions. When asked to point out specific locations, he shouted, “Here!” 
as he waved his arm across the entire map of the city.93 More importantly, Freiji, under 
pressure from Maliki, scrapped the methodical plan he had developed with coalition 
assistance to retake Basrah district by district, and instead began to conduct hasty attacks 
with little thought for logistics or troop strength.
As Maliki’s and Freiji’s plans began to break down, JAM indirect-fire teams launched 
repeated rocket and mortar salvos at Basrah Palace, killing the head of Maliki’s security 
detail and forcing the Prime Minister to seek cover for hours. Frustrated with the ISFs’ 
poor performance and eager to deflect blame, Maliki announced that he was relieving 
Freiji of command in favor of Major General Abdel Aziz al-Ubaydi, although to every-
one’s confusion, Freiji remained in his headquarters and continued to issue orders after 
this edict.94 Conditions were not any better for Freiji at his operations center in the Shatt 
al-Arab Hotel, which also was targeted by heavy mortar, rocket-propelled grenades, and 
sniper fire throughout the day.
By the end of the first day of Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS, it was clear 
the militias were winning. JAM ambushes had killed about 50 Iraqi soldiers, wounded 
another 120, and destroyed dozens of vehicles, while the militia groups had lost approx-
imately 40 fighters.95 Not only did the militiamen prevent the Iraqi Army from achieving 
any of its objectives, but they also seized some provincial government buildings over-
night. The 14th Iraqi Army Division’s 52d Brigade, full of new recruits, had fallen into 
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disarray on the first day, with some of its soldiers beginning to desert as the fighting 
turned to their enemies’ advantage.
Similarly, nearly two-thirds of the Iraqi police either deserted or discarded their uni-
forms to fight alongside the militiamen.96 Only after Iraqi troops began to stream back 
into Shaibah Logistics Base west of the city did the 1st Battalion, The Royal Regiment 
of Scotland (The Royal Scots Borderers), and MND-SE learn how poorly the attack had 
gone.97
U.S. leaders in Baghdad soon realized that Maliki had precipitated a crisis that could 
derail the entire coalition campaign in Iraq. Conferring among themselves, Petraeus 
and Crocker concluded that they could not allow the Prime Minister to fail and give the 
Sadrists a major military and political victory. Even as Maliki’s troops reeled from the 
first day’s fighting, Petraeus and Austin quickly shifted resources and key personnel to 
Basrah, making the Prime Minister’s operation the MNC-I main effort. At Tallil Airfield 
in Dhi Qar Province, four AH-64 Apaches and two UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters were 
dispatched to provide attack and medevac support. Elements of the Iraqi special oper-
ations forces (ISOF) Brigade with their CJSOTF advisers were flown from Baghdad on 
multiple lifts of MC-130 aircraft, joining the regional ISOF Battalion already stationed in 
Basrah. The Baghdad Emergency Response Unit and Hillah Special Weapons and Tac-
tics (SWAT), two elite Interior Ministry units similarly advised by CJSOTF operational 
detachment alpha (ODA) units, also rushed to Basrah.98 At MND-SE, Brigadier Free also 
issued a “be-prepared” order for the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards, to reenter Basrah if nec-
essary with 14 Challenger II tanks and 40 Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, a maneuver 
that Whitehall had expressly forbidden before the battle.99 On the same night of March 
25, special operators from CJSOTF that MND-SE previously had prohibited from enter-
ing the city due to the Fartusi truce were able to make their way to Freiji’s headquarters, 
while Rear Admiral Edward G. Winters III, a U.S. Navy SEAL in charge of Iraqi special 
operations training, went to Basrah Palace by vehicle convoy. Army Colonel James H. 
Coffman arrived at Basrah Palace to advise Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, and reported 
to Petraeus that the operation stood a 50-50 chance of success.100
Despite the bad turn of events on March 25, the next day Maliki publicly demanded 
that the militias lay down their arms and hand over their leaders within 72 hours. Fight-
ing continued on March 26 and spread beyond Basrah to the southern Iraqi cities of Kut, 
Diwaniya, and Hillah, as well as to Zubayr, about 8 kilometers southwest of Basrah, where 
militiamen overran two police stations. The next day, the fighting spread to Nasiriyah, 
where the local Iraqi SWAT unit and its CJSOTF advisers fought off JAM militants in a 
56-hour battle.101 The Basrah confrontation was escalating into a war between the Sadrists 
and the government across the entire south.
On March 27, Austin and U.S. Embassy’s political-military counselor Marcie Ries flew 
to Basrah and then to the Basrah Palace to meet with Maliki. Still upset with the British, 
Maliki embarrassed Brigadier Free by ejecting him from the meeting, after which the 
Iraqi leader criticized the United Kingdom for letting militias take control of Basrah and 
MNF-I for not doing enough to help in the present crisis, before demanding more coa-
lition air support. Providing close air support was problematic, because the forward air 
controllers in the military transition teams were still en route and the Iraqi units in the 
city seemed neither to understand fully the rules of engagement nor to be able to provide 
MND-SE with accurate coordinates. Calming down Maliki, Austin convinced the Iraqi 
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leader to allow coalition advisers, including the British, to integrate more closely with 
Iraqi units to help provide the air support he requested. Maliki also ordered additional 
Iraqi units to deploy to Basrah, including the 1st Iraqi Army Division’s headquarters and 
the rest of its 1st Brigade, as well as alerting four other divisions to be prepared to offer 
support.102
Meanwhile, JAM groups launched a counterattack throughout Basrah, in what was 
to become the militia’s high-water mark during the operation. Police chief Jalil’s convoy 
was hit by an IED that killed 3 of his guards, after which Jalil reported that 28 police sta-
tions and army strong points had been simultaneously attacked at dawn. Hundreds of 
police officers were still defecting to the militias, and in the city’s Maqil District, militia-
men who had overrun a police station and checkpoint and blocked an ISF relief column 
trying to reach beleaguered troops at the Camp Apache ammunition depot. This time, 
the inexperienced 52d Brigade, 14th Iraqi Army Division, located in positions close to the 
JAM stronghold neighborhoods of Hayaniyah and Qibla, faced the worst of the fighting 
and simply disintegrated, with half of its 3,000 soldiers deserting.103
The Iraqi Army in Basrah, already demoralized by its defeats at the hands of the 
Sadrists, began to come apart as the weakness of the Iraqi logistics system derailed the 
Prime Minister’s offensive operations. A CJSOTF adviser who observed Iraqi planning 
efforts in Basrah Palace noted in a March 28 report: “There is no logistical resupply or 
support plan. The majority, if not all Iraqi forces are critically short of food, fuel, water, 
and ammunition. In several cases, units have none of the previous supply items men-
tioned. The reported average ammunition stores in the IA [Iraqi Army] are 4 magazines 
per man, but it is likely less than that. All of the commanders appear to understand that 
they are being led to disaster.”104 Without their own combat service support units, Iraqi 
Army units had been relying on privately owned gas stations to refuel their vehicles and 
local markets to purchase food, but when these closed down due to fighting, the Iraqis 
had no alternatives.105 Iraqi forces requested U.S. and British air support to stem the rout 
of their forces, but as before, the Iraqis’ lack of situational awareness and disinclination 
to mitigate civilian casualties sometimes led the coalition representatives to refrain from 
conducting the strikes. On one occasion, Iraqi commanders handed American advisers a 
napkin with numbers on it and instructed them to “bomb here.” When the advisers could 
not translate the numbers into grid coordinates, the Iraqis explained that the numbers 
were, in fact, a phone number, and that the man who answered the phone would know 
the location to bomb. When the Americans called the number, they were told to “bomb 
the white truck in the intersection . . . we know you can see the truck,” with no other 
explanation.106
As these actions unfolded in Basrah, the fighting also intensified in Baghdad, where 
JAM fighters from Sadr City and other militia-dominated neighbors had begun coordi-
nated attacks against the coalition and the Iraqi Government. What had begun as a short-
term security operation in one city was becoming a full-blown Shi’a civil war, with the 
Maliki government’s fate in the balance. Writing to Gates on March 30, Petraeus reported 
“at this point, my assessment is that Prime Minister Maliki has bit off more than he can 
chew in Basra.”
Maliki “remains in his own world,” Petraeus judged, and the Iraqi leader had “put the 
credibility of his government on the line in Basra.”107 The biggest problem, in Petraeus’s 
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view, was the mismatch between Maliki’s “publicly stated objectives,” essentially to elim-
inate the militias, and the actual capabilities of the Iraqi security forces to do it. Petraeus 
noted that the coalition was trying to provide Maliki with as much advice as possible “to 
improve planning and to help the Iraqis establish a battle rhythm” and provide essen-
tial enablers such as attack aviation, ISR coverage, and logistics. Such enablers, Petraeus 
said, could “put Maliki in an advantageous position for future negotiations” based on 
Ambassador Crocker’s recommendation to Maliki to “think hard about a political agree-
ment to enable this to come to as good a conclusion as possible.”108 However, the MNF-I 
commander appeared to have little faith that Maliki could actually win outright the civil 
war he had inadvertently entered.
Reinforcements Arrive
The situation in Basrah remained tense on March 28. Realizing that something needed 
to be done to repair Maliki’s relationship with the British and to provide more coalition 
surveillance and air support to the Iraqis, Austin had dispatched his MNC-I deputy com-
mander, U.S. Marine Major General George J. Flynn, and several hundred U.S. personnel 
to Basrah, including a 120-member Marine Corps tactical operations center to integrate 
into the MND-SE headquarters and the Basrah Operations Center. The arrival of so many 
Americans at the British headquarters was awkward. On one hand, many on the British 
staff realized that the truce with Fartusi, the British drawdown, and a lack of political will 
were some of the root causes for the violence in Basrah and they welcomed the U.S. assis-
tance. Others saw it as an American takeover of MND-SE. For White-Spunner and Free, 
however, the open fighting in Basrah meant that the truce was no longer in effect, the 
gloves needed to come off, and U.S. involvement was needed to stave off disaster. In any 
case, the arrival of the MNC-I contingent and the Marine Corps’ aviation assets suddenly 
gave MND-SE a capacity and combat power the British had not had in Basrah since 2003.
Flying immediately into Basrah, Flynn and Free met with Lieutenant General Freiji 
(who continued in his job thanks to his decades-long relationship with Defense Minister 
Abdel Qader) and the newly appointed 14th Iraqi Army Division commander, Major 
General Aziz Swaidy, to advise the Iraqis on how to salvage the situation. At the same 
time, U.S. F-16s, F/A-18s, Predators, and AH-64 Apaches began to hunt down the JAM 
rocket teams attacking Iraqi and MND-SE bases, while the first U.S. MiTT with the lead 
battalion of the 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, arrived and immediately called in 
air strikes to relieve 14th Division troops pinned down near Basrah University. “Once we 
had forward air controllers on the ground to verify targets, it really made a difference,” 
Free reported later.109 Help had finally arrived.
Between March 29 and 30, the rest of the Iraqi reinforcements trickled into the city. 
Troops from Colonel Charles A. Flynn’s 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, also arrived 
from Tallil to embed with the Iraqis and to help MND-SE coordinate fires. Meanwhile, on 
March 29, Iraqi special operations forces and their CJSOTF mentors commenced Oper-
ation LIGHTNING ANVIL, a series of nightly raids into the city with the support of the 
Scots Guards’ Warrior Infantry Fighting Vehicles that would kill 75 militia fighters over 
the following month.110 The British Task Force SPARTAN also would assist, conducting 
covert surveillance on targets for the strike teams.111
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As White-Spunner returned to Basrah on March 30, the reinforced Iraqi units and their 
coalition enablers were finally massing to retake the city. White-Spunner and Free agreed 
to insert British MiTTs with the 14th Iraqi Division and then retroactively requested per-
mission from London the next day, though given that the United Kingdom’s reputation 
was on the line, there was little chance of the request being denied. Rhine Company, 1st 
Battalion, The Royal Regiment of Scotland, and D Squadron, Royal Dragoon Guards, 
were assigned to the 14th Iraqi Army Division’s three brigades, as well as to Freiji’s 
headquarters. The decision to embed British advisers marked a major shift in the British 
approach to Basrah. By April 1, 14 of the 38 Iraqi units in the city had coalition MiTTs 
attached to them.112
The Tide Turns
Despite the coalition and Iraqi reinforcements, the situation remained fragile, and to 
some Iraqi leaders in Baghdad seemed on the point of failure. With Maliki away from 
Baghdad and disheartening reports coming out of Basrah, some of Maliki’s political 
opponents sought to take advantage of what they perceived to be the Prime Minister’s 
misstep. Expectedly, the Sadrists, with help from former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Ja’af-
ari and Ahmad Chalabi, began an attempt to engineer a no-confidence vote against 
Maliki, while an Iraqi Parliamentary delegation flew to Tehran to consult with the Ira-
nians about the crisis. Under Iranian pressure to negotiate, Moqtada Sadr issued a nine-
point cease-fire letter on that day, instructing his followers to cooperate with the Iraqi 
Government and labeling those who publicly displayed their weapons as criminals, even 
though his steps fell short of the Iraqi Government demand that the Sadrists lay down 
their arms. In exchange for the Sadrists’ disarmament, Maliki’s government promised to 
leave the rest of the Sadrists alone and allow them to participate in the next elections.113 
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
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The political situation in Baghdad looked grim for the Prime Minister, whose allies 
found themselves on the defensive as the Sadrists attempted to organize a no-confidence 
vote in the Iraqi Parliament. Back in Basrah, however, events outpaced the political nego-
tiations in Baghdad and continued to turn in the Prime Minister’s favor. At noon on 
March 30, Royal Dragoon Guards’ tanks crashed through blockades in Hayaniyah to 
allow the 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division, to fight the militia for an hour before pull-
ing back. Simultaneously, Interior Minister Bolani and a force of 300 men advanced to 
the port at Umm Qasr and found that militia groups had already abandoned it and had 
unwisely all gone to Basrah to take part in the battle there.114 Having achieved a symbolic 
victory and survived a week of militia bombardment, Maliki flew back to Baghdad on 
April 1 to deal with the political crisis that had arisen in his absence.
As the Prime Minister departed Basrah, beleaguered Basrawis, ready for change after 
months of being terrorized by the militias and angry at JAM for turning its weapons on 
the Iraqi security forces, began reporting the names and locations of hundreds of mili-
tia members on anonymous tip lines set up by MND-SE. Basrah’s Shi’a citizenry, fed 
up with the militias’ criminal behavior and religious extremism, welcomed the arrival 
of the mostly Sunni Iraqi Army reinforcements, who had deployed from the 1st Iraqi 
Army Division in Anbar Province. The integration of the MiTTs with Iraqi units also had 
increased the effectiveness of coalition air strikes and restored confidence to the Iraqi 
troops. Coalition staff support at Iraqi headquarters improved coordination between the 
disparate Iraqi security forces. More importantly, it allowed Flynn, White-Spunner, and 
Free to help Lieutenant General Freiji develop a more coherent plan to clear Basrah’s dis-
tricts systematically, instead of Freiji’s erratic headlong rushes into the city. While Freiji 
preferred to conduct yet another hasty attack on the JAM stronghold of Hayaniyah, Flynn 
and MND-SE convinced him to establish freedom of maneuver by first regaining control 
of the city’s main arteries. On April 2, Iraqi troops successfully cleared militia roadblocks 
and seized key intersections, while coalition air support easily destroyed militia fighters 
defending in the open.115
Source: DoD photo by Corporal Daniel Angel (Released).
Marines and Iraqi Forces During Fighting in the Latif District of Basrah on  
May 3, 2008.116
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The same evening, Maliki announced a 7-day cease-fire (eventually extended to 11 
days), though militia elements continued heavy indirect-fire attacks against Iraqi and 
MND-SE bases. The next day, the Prime Minister also announced plans to create 25,000 
jobs for Basrah and to spend $100 million for reconstruction.117 The lull allowed Iraqi 
Government officials to implement a modestly successful weapons buy-back program, 
reestablish logistics, receive additional reinforcements (including the 7th Iraqi Army 
Division’s 26th Brigade with its U.S. Army MiTTs), and organize for future clearing oper-
ations as MND-SE gathered vital targeting information.118 With the arrival of the 26th 
Brigade, Maliki’s forces in Basrah now included two Sunni-majority brigades from Anbar 
whose soldiers and officers had no qualms about fighting against Basrah’s Shi’a militias, 
a dramatic change from the militia-influenced local Iraqi Army and police units.
Determined to press his advantage against the Sadrists, Prime Minister Maliki used 
the terms of the cease-fire to continue operations by relabeling Operation CHARGE OF 
THE KNIGHTS a law-enforcement operation focused on arresting criminals based on 
warrants, and not directed against any particular group.119 Mainstream JAM members 
generally upheld the cease-fire, though some Special Groups ignored it and continued to 
fight. With these initiatives in motion, Maliki won a political victory when, at an April 5 
meeting of Iraq’s major political parties, the mainstream Shi’a, Kurdish, and Sunni par-
ties unanimously sided with the Prime Minister rather than with the Sadrists. Reporting 
to Gates on April 6, a cautiously optimistic Petraeus noted that JAM had been “bruised 
during the last couple of weeks” and their “supplies fairly exhausted.” “Overall, it 
appears that Prime Minister Maliki’s government is emerging from this crisis on a fairly 
solid basis,” the MNF-I commander assessed, an outcome he had not contemplated when 
Maliki began his ill-advised expedition 2 weeks earlier.120
SINBAD Redux
When Maliki’s cease-fire ended on April 12, Iraqi security forces spent the next 2 
days isolating the militia strongholds in the Qibla, Hayaniyah, Timinyah, and Five-Mile 
Districts, the same restive neighborhoods Operation SINBAD had failed to bring under 
control 15 months before. The Sunni-majority 26th Brigade also successfully cleared the 
Qibla area with little opposition, a fact that MND-SE leaders took as a sign of weakening 
militia resistance. As the Iraqi troops swept through Qibla, they found large stockpiles of 
abandoned arms collected on sidewalks, while local residents welcomed the Iraqi troops 
and pointed out militia hideouts.121 Learning from the key mistake of Operation SINBAD, 
Iraqi engineers constructed strongpoints at strategic sites after clearing these areas so 
they could then be held. By chance, on April 14, soldiers from the 14th Iraqi Army Divi-
sion’s 51st Brigade engaged a JAM cell firing from a house in the Jubailah District and 
discovered the kidnapped CBS journalist Richard Butler inside.122
The same aspects of the Qibla clearing were repeated over the next 2 months as the 
Iraqi brigades and their coalition advisers cleared other areas of the city. Seeing the omi-
nous signs, large numbers of JAM members began to flee, many of them to the town 
of Qurnah 70 kilometers to the northwest, or across the border to Iran. Most of their 
senior leaders had already left. After being released by the British in December 2007, 
Ahmed al-Fartusi had been recaptured in Baghdad on March 4—before CHARGE OF 
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THE KNIGHTS began—in a coalition operation to capture Special Groups leader Hajji 
Shibl, a member of Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous). Far-
tusi was meeting with Shibl ostensibly on behalf of the United Kingdom to negotiate the 
release of the British hostages taken from the Finance Ministry in 2007, and was re-re-
leased by MNF-I shortly after his capture.123 When CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS began, 
Fartusi fled to Beirut, where he issued threats against the British forces for breaking the 
truce, an absurd accusation, considering the heavy JAM bombardment against British 
and Iraqi Government troops.124 The notorious militia-linked Captain Jaffar of Basrah’s 
Special Crimes Unit, who had been responsible for the 2005 abduction of two UK sol-
diers, escaped to Iran in the midst of the fighting, as did a number of other JAM leaders.125 
The departure of JAM’s senior leaders after the first week of fighting significantly weak-
ened the resolve of the remaining militiamen and resulted in an uncoordinated insurgent 
defense of their districts, leading White-Spunner and others in MND-SE to express sur-
prise at “how quickly the Shi’a militias crumbled.”126
From the early days of the operation, however, there had been signs that the Sadrist 
militiamen in Basrah were not used to the kind of hard fighting against coalition troops 
that the Shi’a militants of Baghdad had become accustomed to by 2008. As the Marine 
Corps’ aviation assets arrived in Basrah during the weekend of March 28-29, for exam-
ple, MND-SE and MNC-I officers had watched night-vision video feeds of militiamen 
milling about the streets seemingly unaware that coalition sensors could detect them in 
the dark. As a result, the clearing of JAM’s main base in the Hayaniyah District on April 
19 turned out to be anticlimactic. MND-SE’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) identified 
militia fighting positions and IED emplacements for the Iraqis days before the assault. 
On the morning of the attack, British artillery fired a large number of flares and noise 
rounds to frighten the remaining militiamen before eight Iraqi Army battalions moved in 
against little resistance. Flynn advised General Freiji to attack the district north to south 
to ensure that units did not get too far ahead of their line of advance, while Freiji wanted 
to conduct multiple attacks at different entry points. Freiji agreed to Flynn’s suggestion, 
but changed plans the morning of the attack by rushing into the heart of the district with 
only his personal security detail and four tanks, luckily finding no resistance. Iraqi forces 
discovered over the next 2 days an estimated 50 caches with approximately 150 IEDs, 200 
rockets, and 300 mortars.127
The remaining clearing operations in Basrah city followed a similar pattern as in Qibla 
and Hayaniyah, and finally ended on May 6 in the Latif District. General Freiji left Basrah 
the next day, replaced by the able Major General Mohammed Jawad al-Hawadi, who had 
been present and performed well throughout the operation. Freiji returned to Baghdad 
to become an adviser to his old friend, Minister of Defense Abdel Qader, while Basrah’s 
police chief, General Jalil, was reassigned to a staff position in Baghdad.
Hawadi’s first test as Freiji’s successor was to clear the town of Qurnah on May 13. 
Freiji, who had planned the operation before his departure, was insistent on clearing the 
town despite Flynn’s warnings that coalition air support was in short supply, having since 
been reallocated to support operations in Baghdad and northern Iraq.128 Even without 
extensive air support, however, the operation went smoothly, highlighting that Sadrist 
resistance had completely collapsed and marking the close of Operation CHARGE OF 
THE KNIGHTS.
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For JAM, the battlefield defeat in Basrah had been severe. Interior Minister Bolani esti-
mated that 210 Sadrist militiamen had been killed, 600 wounded, and 155 captured, num-
bers that represented about one-sixth of JAM’s original fighting strength in Basrah.129 The 
coalition had 4 killed and 15 wounded. The result of the 50-day operation was unchal-
lenged Iraqi Government control of Basrah, which was now occupied by about 20,000 
Iraqi soldiers loyal to the Maliki government to ensure that the city did not fall back into 
Sadrist hands.130
THE BATTLE FOR SADR CITY
By the time the battle in Basrah had shifted in favor of Maliki and the coalition, a 
new and even bigger battle had opened in Baghdad, where the Sadrists and their allies 
undertook a large-scale attack against the Green Zone, the site of the U.S. Embassy and 
MNF-I headquarters and the seat of government for the absent Prime Minister Maliki. 
The Sadrist offensive prompted, in turn, a fierce battle for Sadr City that had been years 
in the making.
The Quintessential Safe Haven
Sadr City had been a thorn in the side of the coalition for years and had only grown 
more dangerous for coalition units over time. Since the deadly April 2004 ambush that 
killed eight 1st Cavalry Division Soldiers at the outset of the April uprisings, the coalition 
had had only a limited presence in and around the Sadrist-dominated neighborhood. 
Within Sadr City, roughly three categories of insurgent fighters enjoyed a safe haven. JAM 
fighters loyal to Moqtada Sadr concentrated on defending the Shi’a population in Sadr 
City and other Shi’a enclaves under the authority of the Office of the Martyr Sadr. The 
Shi’a militant Special Groups, meanwhile, received specialized training in Iran and were 
employed throughout the capital in a more offensive role under the authority of Irani-
an-sponsored militias such as Qais al-Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq or Abu Mahdi al-Mu-
handis’ Kata’ib Hizballah. The third element was a criminal component that exploited 
the lawlessness and violence in the city, operating much like a mafia organization but 
invoking the name of JAM to cover its activities. Together, these militants totaled an 
estimated 1,000-2,000 active fighters in Sadr City, but coalition officials believed Moqtada 
Sadr could mobilize as many as 20,000 for a larger uprising.131
 
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Jason Bailey, Joint Combat Camera Center, (Released).
A View of the Sadr City Area of Baghdad, March 29, 2008.132
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The isolation of Sadr City from the rest of Baghdad had begun with the onset of the 
surge in early 2007. Colonel Billy Don Farris’s 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the first 
surge brigade, was assigned much of east Baghdad, including the restive Adhamiyah 
and Sadr City, two districts with a combined population approaching 3 million people, 
approximately 40 percent of Baghdad’s total. “We occupied a piece of terrain that had 
turned south and had one company living in it . . . and we didn’t know who was who 
when we started. It was time to start over,” Farris later recalled.133 Before the surge and 
Farris’s arrival, northeast Baghdad had been assigned to a U.S. battalion headquartered 
40 kilometers away on the large U.S. forward-operating base near Taji, but once given 
responsibility for the area, Farris’s brigade began to erect massive 4-meter-high concrete 
walls to control population flow across east Baghdad. At the same time, the paratroopers 
set about targeting and dismantling insurgent networks and installing joint security sta-
tions and combat outposts to keep a closer watch on the neighborhoods alongside local 
Iraqi units.
Unlike the rest of his area of operations, however, Farris was not able to move directly 
against militants inside Sadr City. The coalition’s agreement with Maliki to restrict opera-
tions in the politically sensitive Shi’a neighborhood meant Farris was limited to isolating 
the enclave and conducting occasional targeted strikes against JAM and Special Groups 
leaders.134 Moqtada Sadr had declared a 6-month cease-fire after the Karbala fiasco in 
August, but the cleric’s subtle wording essentially authorized the Special Groups to con-
tinue attacking coalition forces. A number of militia leaders disregarded Sadr’s orders in 
any case—a fact that enabled the coalition to better distinguish Special Groups leaders 
from the more loyal JAM commanders who observed Sadr’s directive.135
One raid against JAM leaders in fall 2007 illustrated the difficulty of operating against 
the militants who used Sadr City as a base. A U.S. detachment making a nighttime raid 
on October 20 to capture a lieutenant of militia leader Abu Dura was surprised by dozens 
of militiamen and forced to call for close air support. According to MNF-I estimates, the 
ensuing air strikes killed more than 40 JAM fighters, but the Sadrists were quick to claim 
that the coalition had killed dozens of civilians, including worshippers at a Shi’a mosque.
The controversy over collateral damage immediately became a political crisis. Clearly 
under pressure from the Sadrists, Maliki demanded that MNF-I seek his approval for any 
future coalition activities in and around Sadr City.136 Petraeus reported to Gates that “we 
thus find ourselves walking a fine line between conducting aggressive operations against 
Shi’a extremists (particularly targets in Sadr City) and keeping the GOI [Government of 
Iraq] on board to negotiate the UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] and 
Strategic Partnership Declaration.”137 Concerned that the incident could push Maliki and 
other Shi’a parties into opposing the renewal of the soon-to-expire UNSCR that autho-
rized the coalition’s presence in the country, Petraeus agreed that any further action in 
Sadr City would require joint approval from Maliki and MNF-I.
While Farris’s freedom of action was further curtailed following the controversial 
October raid, he insisted that much more needed to be done in Sadr City, which had 
become an even more dangerous insurgent safe haven after the raid.138 Farris had a point. 
The cohesion of the Sadrist movement had been strained for years, but the ability to 
retain the Sadr City sanctuary allowed JAM and the Iranian-backed Special Groups free-
dom of movement the ability to project power against the coalition and Maliki’s Iraqi 
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Government forces throughout Baghdad.139 By the time Farris handed over his area to 
Colonel Hort’s 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on March 10, 2008, Farris’s brigade had 
constricted Sadr City by encircling it with checkpoints and joint security stations.140 Farris 
remained frustrated because he could not do more directly, as did Hammond, who told 
his staff at MND-B that “sooner or later we are going to have to deal with Sadr City. It just 
can’t sit there. It just can’t be a haven.”141
Source: U.S. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Luis Orengo (Released).
Major General Jeffery Hammond, Commander of MND-B, Greets Baghdad’s  
Governor Tah’an.142
Nevertheless, Hammond’s clear priority for MND-B operations was AQI, which he 
believed remained the “greatest threat to sustainable security” in Baghdad. Upon taking 
command of MND-B in December 2007, Hammond had requested that the coalition’s 
special operations forces reduce its focus on Shi’a militant targets in order to apply more 
resources to pursuing AQI.143 The MND-B commander’s judgment put him somewhat 
at odds with both Hort and Austin, who shared the view by spring 2008 that JAM and 
the Special Groups, by virtue of their Iranian-supported explosively formed penetrators 
(EFPs) network, posed the greatest danger to coalition troops in central Iraq.144
Fissures within the Sadr Movement
The political constraints on coalition actions against the Sadr City militants began to 
loosen in January 2008 when the Sadrists sharpened their opposition to the Maliki gov-
ernment in Parliament and JAM groups precipitated a clash with Maliki’s closest advis-
ers. On January 18, hundreds of JAM and Special Groups fighters surrounded a mosque 
in the Shu’la neighborhood of northwest Baghdad, where Iraqi national security adviser 
Mowaffaq Rubaie had gone to attend Ashura services. Demanding Rubaie’s surrender, 
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the Sadrist fighters had only been thwarted by the timely arrival of an armored convoy 
led by Interior Minister Jawad Bolani, which had enabled Rubaie’s escape through a hail 
of stones and Molotov cocktails. The action did not lead to a wider clash but made the 
Maliki government look weak and vulnerable in its own capital.145
In these actions, the Sadrists had begun to remove the political buffer between the 
JAM/Special Groups sanctuary and a coalition intent on eliminating it.146 Targeting the 
Sadr movement militants in the Baghdad region was complicated because it was unclear 
who comprised the Special Groups and who really controlled JAM in Baghdad. To begin 
with, opinions differed within the coalition and the Iraqi Government over which Shi’a 
militant groups to target. For almost 2 years, MNF-I and its commands had considered 
the Special Groups to be “Shi’a extremists” that were “irreconcilable” and under heavy 
Iranian influence, and would have to be targeted by coalition units and special operators. 
By contrast, coalition officials considered “mainstream JAM” groups—many of them 
loyal to Moqtada Sadr—to be more nationalist and “reconcilable,” and better approached 
by pressuring or enticing them to seek political avenues rather than violence to advance 
their interests. Prime Minister Maliki and his advisers, however, took precisely the 
opposite view. They believed that Moqtada Sadr was the one who had become extrem-
ist and irreconcilable, while the Special Groups—especially those under Qais al-Khazali 
and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq—had more mature leaders who could be “reconciled” and per-
suaded to lay down their arms in favor of entering the political process. In political terms, 
Maliki also continued to view Khazali as a preferred alternative to the troublesome Sadr, 
one who could potentially split Sadr’s grassroots base and deliver some of it to Mali-
ki’s Da’wa Party. To explore Maliki’s idea, coalition officials held discussions with the 
captive Khazali in late 2007 and early 2008, during which Khazali spoke of wanting to 
transform his militant group into a political party and sever ties with the Iranian regime. 
It was unclear if he was sincere or if the Iran-based militant leaders running his organiza-
tion, Akram Kabi and Mohammed Tabatabai, were interested in such ideas in any case.147 
Indeed, similar “heretical” ideas on Sadr’s part had caused Khazali himself and others to 
split from mainstream JAM.
The situation was further complicated by other Shi’a parties that tended to use nomi-
nal JAM groups to mask their own militant activities. This was particularly true of what 
the Shi’a militants referred to as the “Khamenei groups,” former JAM fighters who had 
been coopted by deputies of the Quds Force. Evidence also began to emerge in Janu-
ary 2008 that some Special Groups members were, in fact, Badr Corps members and 
that some violence previously attributed to JAM actually originated from ISCI and Badr 
operatives.148
Coalition officials were well aware of the troubled relationship between Moqtada 
Sadr’s loyalists and the Special Groups. The attack on Rubaie in Shu’la had almost turned 
into a clash between JAM militants loyal to Sadr and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq fighters loyal 
to Khazali, who had quarreled outside Rubaie’s mosque over which group had the right 
to take Rubaie prisoner. Sadr also had been harsh against “rogue JAM” commanders in 
2007, sending “noble JAM” or “golden JAM” tribunals from Najaf and Karbala to enforce 
discipline by expelling or even executing JAM commanders deemed to be disobedient 
to Sadr’s leadership. These fractures had been exacerbated by disagreements within the 
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Sadr movement over Sadr’s August 2007 freeze on JAM operations—disputes that began 
to mount again as the expiration of the 6-month moratorium in late February approached.
As the freeze was set to expire, Sadr decided, with a dramatic flourish, to extend 
JAM’s 6-month cease-fire by sending sealed envelopes to be opened by all of his clerics 
at Friday sermons, where his decision was publicly announced in mosques across Iraq. 
Because the movement was already fracturing, the renewed cease-fire did little to allay 
concerns over Sadr’s ability to control whether it would be followed. Petraeus remained 
hopeful that the splintering offered opportunities to accommodate the reconcilable ele-
ment in the Sadr movement, but he cautioned Gates by stating that “we fully anticipate 
that Iran will continue to pursue ways to exploit the Special Groups and other elements 
and parties for their purposes as the Sadr movement fractures.”149 Two weeks later, in 
early March, further signs of the disarray among JAM’s top ranks came when Sadr sud-
denly declared that he was temporarily withdrawing from his leadership responsibilities 
to further his religious education.
The Sadrist Attack on the Green Zone
Coalition officials in Iraq at the time of the Basrah and Sadr City battles assumed 
that the Sadrist attack against the coalition and the Iraqi Government in Baghdad in late 
March was a response to Maliki’s operation against Sadrist militias in Basrah. In retro-
spect, however, signs appeared that the Sadrist offensive in Baghdad was a preplanned 
operation whose start actually preceded the CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS. For instance, 
Sadr’s extension of the freeze on JAM operations in late February exempted the Special 
Groups, whom he authorized to resume attacks against the coalition. This was an import-
ant change in light of Sadr’s crackdown on rogue violators of the freeze order in late 2007 
and early 2008. One likely sign of the resumption of Special Groups operations was that 
EFP attacks and other violent incidents significantly increased in the week before Maliki 
went to Basrah. In the week after Farris and Hort’s transfer of authority, violent incidents 
in the city almost tripled from the previous week.150
Furthermore, the Shi’a militants’ indirect-fire attacks against the Green Zone, which 
marked the beginning of the Sadrist offensive, began 1 day before Maliki went to Basrah, 
not after. On March 23, the militias began raining rockets—most of them fired from Sadr 
City—at the Green Zone after a 6-month period in which indirect-fire attacks against the 
zone had been almost nonexistent.
As the barrage of rockets fell on the seat of the Iraqi Government, the scale of the 
Sadrist offensive was not immediately apparent. Rockets had fallen on the Green Zone 
often, but this latest wave emerged as something new. Indirect-fire attacks gradually 
escalated in the first 5 days of the Sadrist offensive (March 23-28), during which militants 
launched 91 separate barrages that dropped a total of 344 rockets and mortar rounds on 
the Green Zone, opening what became the most intense insurgent bombardment of the 
entire war.151 These indirect-fire attacks coincided with a coordinated JAM assault against 
all 11 ISF checkpoints around Sadr City belonging to the 11th Iraqi Army Division and 
the 1st National Police Division. During the attacks, JAM gunmen abducted 14 Iraqi sol-
diers in Kadhimiyah District and kidnapped General Secretary of the Council of Minis-
ters Tasheen al-Shaikhli from his home.
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Initially, the Sadrists were aided in late March and early April by extensive seasonal 
sandstorms that hampered the coalition’s ability to use sensors and air weapons teams to 
detect the militias’ indirect-fire teams. A curfew imposed on Baghdad’s neighborhoods 
usually kept the Sadrists from operating at night for fear of being spotted on Baghdad’s 
deserted streets. Under cover of the sandstorms, Sadrist rocket and mortar teams were 
able to bombard the Green Zone and its environs during daylight hours when the militia-
men could blend into the dense populations of Sadr City and other Shi’a neighborhoods.152
As the bombardment continued, the U.S. Embassy compound and military head-
quarters in the Green Zone frequently came under fire. In one incident, a rocket landing 
on the MNSTC-I gym killed several troops inside. By the second week of April, Pet-
raeus and Crocker’s headquarters began to resemble a refugee camp as more than 1,000 
embassy and MNF-I personnel sought shelter in the hardened embassy building rather 
than remain in the poorly shielded trailers and sleeping huts outside.153
The coordinated assault demonstrated Sadr’s operational reach to express his dis-
pleasure with the coalition’s presence and Maliki’s government. As Maliki’s surprising 
Basrah offensive began on March 25, Sadr continued his own offensive in Baghdad with 
calls for a “civil disobedience protest” and declared an end to the 6-month cease-fire 
that he had recently extended in February. The day before, in a BBC (British Broadcast-
ing Corporation) interview, Petraeus had publicly implicated the Iranian regime, stating 
“the rockets that were launched at the Green Zone yesterday, for example . . . were Ira-
nian-provided, Iranian-made rockets.”154 Sadr City in effect had become not only a Shi’a 
militia safe haven but also an instrumental staging area for an Iranian proxy war against 
the coalition. Considering the dramatic change in events, Petraeus informed Gates “this 
week we have shifted our stance from nation-building back to warfighting.”155
Route Gold
The intense indirect-fire attacks against the Green Zone—originating mainly from 
Sadr City and other areas east of the Tigris, though a few attacks originated from Jihad 
and Shu’ala/Hurriyah in west Baghdad—led coalition commanders to decide to seize 
the lower portion of Sadr City to deny its use as a militia firing point and to push JAM 
and the Special Groups northeast so they could not bombard the Green Zone with mor-
tars and rockets. The coordinated rocket and checkpoint assault also encouraged Maliki 
to remove most of the restrictions that had stymied anti-militia efforts for years. With 
Maliki’s permission on March 25, the same day Maliki’s Basrah offensive began, Hort’s 
brigade launched an operation to reclaim the checkpoints the militias had seized and 
establish a foothold in the southern sections of Sadr City, objectives that Hort’s troops 
and their partnered Iraqi units accomplished quickly. 
The next phase to gain control of Sadr City entirely, however, would take an addi-
tional 45 days and would also strain the Iraqi Army and National Police in Baghdad to 
the breaking point. Maliki had given permission for coalition and Iraqi forces to enter the 
Ishibiliya and Habbibiya neighborhoods south of Route Gold—the name coalition troops 
gave to Quds Street, which ran east-west across the lower quarter of Sadr City—but had 
ordered that only indirect strikes would be allowed into portions of Sadr City to the north 
of Route Gold. Typically, JAM and Special Groups rocket teams would cross to the south
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Colonel John Hort (left). Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Zachary Mott (Released).
Colonel John Hort, Commander of the 3d BCT, 4th Infantry Division, With Admiral 
Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.156
of Route Gold, launch rockets west across the Tigris River, and then move back north to 
fade into the depths of Sadr City. To eliminate the rocket firing points in Ishibiliya and 
Habbibiya, Hort’s brigade launched another operation to seize the one-third of Sadr City 
south of Route Gold.
The operation was the first major coalition move into Sadr City since the 1st Cavalry 
Division’s operations there in 2004. It was also an existential threat to the Sadrists’ power 
base in Baghdad. In addition to serving as the most effective launching point for JAM 
rocket attacks in the city, Ishibiliya and Habbibiya contained the Jamila market, the coun-
try’s largest shopping district and, as Hammond referred to it, a “cash cow” for JAM’s 
racketeering networks.157 For both its indirect-fire utility and its sources of cash, Sadr City 
south of Route Gold was key terrain that the Sadrists would fight hard to keep, result-
ing in 40 days of the most intense urban fighting in Iraq since the Fallujah operations of 
2004. Hort originally had allocated just a Stryker cavalry squadron—the 1st Squadron, 
2d Cavalry Regiment—to seize the neighborhoods south of Route Gold, but after EFPs 
destroyed six Stryker vehicles in the first week, it became clear that more U.S. troops 
would be required. A combined arms battalion, the 1st Battalion, 68th Armored Regi-
ment, soon joined the operation along with additional tank companies. The battalion’s 
M1 Abrams tanks and M2 Bradleys proved to be of high value during the urban fighting 
because of their armor protection and firepower. Eventually, Hort would commit almost 
an entire brigade’s worth of combat power to gain control of the rocket launch sites.
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.








































R U S A F A
9  N I S S A N
A D H A M I Y A H









THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
The plan also called for a significant role for the Iraqi Army in what coalition com-
manders hoped would be a validation of their capability. However, as both the 1st Bat-
talion, 68th Armored Regiment, and the 1st Squadron, 2d Cavalry Regiment, pushed 
northeast, they found it difficult to keep their Iraqi counterparts in the fight for several 
reasons. Since the launch of the Baghdad Security Plan, the Iraqi Army in Baghdad had 
been mainly a checkpoint-oriented army—comfortable with static security positions, but 
reluctant and incapable of conducting coordinated maneuver and offensive operations.158 
The Iraqi Army division assigned to Sadr City was manned by many east Baghdad resi-
dents who were well aware of JAM and the Special Groups’ ability to threaten their fam-
ilies.159 As a result, up to 700 Iraqi soldiers, many of whom were thought to have families 
in Sadr City, deserted in the first 2 days of fighting. Those units that remained intact did 
so mainly because of the influence of their embedded American advisers.160
Observing the difficulty of keeping the Iraqi units committed to the tough fighting, 
a frustrated Hammond suggested in an update briefing to Petraeus that the coalition 
should allow the Iraqi units and leaders involved in the operation against Baghdad’s 
militias to fail. Only by failing and taking losses, Hammond reasoned, would the Iraqi 
security forces learn their lesson the hard way and realize the need to improve. For Pet-
raeus, Hammond’s recommendation was detached from the gravity of the situation. The 
fighting in Baghdad was not a training exercise, but a pivotal battle of the war, the MNF-I 
commander replied, one that neither the coalition nor the Iraqi Government could afford 
to lose. Petraeus also judged that the battle had unexpectedly presented the coalition and 
the Iraqi security forces the chance, finally, to destroy the Shi’a militias, and that MND-B 
needed to seize that opportunity.161
Maliki already had come to a similar conclusion, and the political battle between the 
Prime Minister and the Sadrists in Baghdad continued to escalate in the first days of 
April. With operations against JAM now in full swing across Baghdad and the entire 
south, Maliki took steps to remove the JAM problem permanently, declaring that the 
Sadrists “would lose the right to participate in the political process” if JAM was not dis-
banded.162 Moqtada Sadr responded by declaring that JAM would disband only if directly 
ordered to do so by Grand Ayatollah Sistani—a political intervention that Sistani was 
highly unlikely to make—and by calling for a “million-man march” in Baghdad on April 
9, the 5-year anniversary of Saddam’s fall. Sadr’s call for an April 9 protest appeared to 
be a scheme to have tens of thousands of Sadrists march through Baghdad toward the 
Green Zone. With this in mind, MNF-I planners began to consider the danger that mobs 
of angry Sadr followers could penetrate the Green Zone perimeter—something similar to 
the overrunning of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran in 1979. This would create a no-win sit-
uation in which either the coalition’s headquarters might be overrun or coalition troops 
might be forced to fire heavy weapons on Sadr’s followers. With the situation in Basrah 
turning against him, however, Sadr abruptly canceled the march the day before it was to 
occur likely over fears of violence against JAM and a low turnout, either of which could 
further weaken his position.163
Two days later, on April 11, the Sadrists were dealt another blow when assassins 
killed senior Sadrist leader Riyad al-Nuri in Najaf. The murder hit close to home: Nuri 
was Sadr’s brother-in-law and had been one of the Sadr lieutenants, along with Qais 
al-Khazali, suspected of murdering Abdul Majid al-Khoei in Najaf in April 2003.
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The Battle of the “Gold Wall”
While the coalition and Iraqi attack into Ishibiliya and Habbibiya drew a fierce 
response from JAM and Special Groups, the next phase would draw an even greater one. 
The 11th Iraqi Army Division and the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, 
had established themselves firmly in outposts south of Route Gold, but JAM and Special 
Groups still had freedom of movement throughout the warren of alleyways and streets 
that connected northern and southern Sadr City. With the area south of Route Gold tenu-
ously secured, on April 15 Hort and the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, 
began building a concrete wall the length of the sector to partition Sadr City and separate 
Ishibiliya and Habbibiya from the northern two-thirds of the Sadrist enclave.164
 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Joseph Rivera Rebolledo (Released).
Soldiers Emplace Concrete Barriers Across Route Gold in Sadr City.165
The appearance of Hort’s units erecting enormous concrete barriers across Route 
Gold brought the Sadrist militiamen into the open as JAM and Special Groups command-
ers realized the wall would permanently separate them from their rocket-launch areas 
and the Jamila market. The militia commanders began to hurl their fighters at the wall 
builders to try to prevent this outcome. In Hammond’s words, “JAM impaled itself on 
the wall,” losing hundreds of fighters in an unequal fight against coalition units whose 
capabilities had evolved significantly since the grinding fight on the same streets 4 years 
earlier.
As the battle along the wall unfolded, the ground fight in Ishibiliya and Habbibiya 
and the air strikes in Sadr City looked old and new. The ground fight brought to bear the 
fundamentals of armored and dismounted combat in an urban environment. The preci-
sion air war, however, demonstrated an unprecedented level of technology that changed 
how the coalition could lethally engage a safe haven and support the ground war. Within 
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days, Hort controlled or directly accessed national-, theater-, division-, and brigade-level 
ISR assets that included Global Hawk, Predator, and Shadow UAVs; close air support 
and air weapons teams of AH-64 Apaches; aerostat balloons; guided multiple-launch 
rocket systems (GMLRS); and large numbers of coalition snipers.166 Although the 3d Bri-
gade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division, was still restricted from maneuvering north of 
Route Gold, these multiple layers of surveillance and strike capabilities had a devastating 
effect on the thousands of militiamen attacking the brigade combat team and its Iraqi 
partner units. Hundreds of JAM fighters died in fruitless assaults on the wall. The mili-
tiamen’s indirect-fire attackers suffered as well: coalition air weapons teams launched 85 
attacks (with a total of 200 Hellfire missiles) that destroyed many of the militias’ Irani-
an-trained 107-mm rocket teams.167
In the week that began on May 7, the coalition dealt what amounted to knockout 
blows to JAM and its leaders in Baghdad. Hort received from the CJSOTF a 30-man Navy 
SEAL sniper platoon with experience in Fallujah and Ramadi and deployed them just 
beyond the leading edge of the wall construction. From there, with the added protec-
tion of Bradley fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks, their deadly fire could reach a mile 
into Sadr City’s grid-like streets. The snipers quickly made an impact. Shortly after their 
arrival, a sandstorm grounded all coalition air assets, slackening the pressure the air 
weapons teams could place on the militia enemy. As JAM attempted to exploit the drop-
off in coalition air support during the sandstorm, the Navy snipers were not affected, 
registering kills of 46 fighters in 1 day. By May 15, after 8 days on the wall, Navy snip-
ers had killed 67 militiamen.168 Meanwhile, the ISOF Brigade and their CJSOTF advisers 
launched nightly dismounted assaults into Sadr City and conducted heliborne-targeted 
raids against Sadrist leaders.169 These missions, combined with targeted raids launched by 
the counter malign Iranian influence special operations task force, ground down JAM’s 
fighting capabilities and gave them no respite during the hours of darkness.
 
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Technical Sergeant Adrian Cadiz (Released).
A Massive Sandstorm Affected the Battle of Sadr City.170
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The coalition also had been tracking JAM and Special Groups leaders who were meet-
ing in trailers adjacent to Sadr City’s Imam Ali Hospital, where the militia commanders 
believed their proximity to a protected site would shield them from attack. Hort and 
MND-B had other ideas. After MND-B made targeting calculations to limit collateral 
damage, MNF-I and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) gave permission for a GMLRS 
strike on the militia meeting place. On April 29, 2 days after the sandstorm subsided, the 
GMLRS struck the trailers precisely, killing several top militia leaders while causing no 
damage to the nearby hospital. With JAM and Special Groups leaders and fighters dying 
at an alarming rate, most of the remaining leaders fled to Iran to escape the coalition’s 
increasingly lethal reach.171
The End of the Sadr City Battle
On May 10, Moqtada Sadr and the Government of Iraq agreed to a cease-fire. The 
14-point agreement required JAM to end all armed activities, accede to government con-
trol of Sadr City, and agree not to carry weapons in public. In return, the Maliki govern-
ment agreed to limit raids against JAM and to reopen the roads into Sadr City.172
As the Route Gold wall neared completion and with renewed confidence in the ISF’s 
capability, Maliki urged General Aboud Qanbar and other ISF commanders to move Iraqi 
troops quickly into northern Sadr City to exploit the militias’ tactical defeat. Hammond 
and Petraeus, less confident about ISF’s abilities, cautioned General Aboud to act more 
deliberately than Maliki wished, but as had been the case in Basrah, the Prime Minister 
and his advisers were intent on attacking much more quickly than their coalition coun-
terparts thought wise.173
The Route Gold wall was completed in a little over a week after the cease-fire agree-
ment on May 18, and 2 days later two Iraqi brigades moved north across Route Gold and 
occupied Sadr City without a fight. After 4 years during which both the coalition and the 
ISF had avoided major operations in Sadr City out of dread of a large-scale confrontation 
with the Sadrists, the Iraqi Army and its coalition advisers had walked into the Sadrists’ 
largest stronghold unopposed, just as they had done in Basrah. Rather than turning either 
Basrah or Sadr City into an Iraqi Stalingrad, as many analysts believed they could do, the 
militias had turned and fled, proving they were no military match for the ISF and coali-
tion forces together.
The Shi’a militias’ losses in Baghdad were severe and unsustainable. The coalition 
commands estimated that between March 23 and May 10, coalition troops killed 700 mili-
tia fighters in the battle for Sadr City, with an unknown number of additional militiamen 
wounded. The Sadrists publicly announced they had lost at least 1,000 killed.174 Coalition 
casualties in April had been high as well, with 41 troops killed in that month. After the 
seizure of Sadr City, May 2008 was a different story: the 19 deaths during the month were 
the fewest for the coalition since the 2003 invasion.175
Nor had the fight gone against the Shi’a militias just in Sadr City. In other parts of 
the Iraqi capital that had been militia strongholds, U.S. units and their partnered ISF 
units had been able to seize territory from JAM and other Shi’a militant groups as well. 
In the Rashid neighborhood, for example, Colonel Theodore Martin’s 1st Brigade, 4th 
Infantry Division, was in the midst of taking over control from Colonel Ricky D. Gibbs’s 
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4th Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, when the militia uprising began. Though the local 
5th National Police Brigade had withered under attacks from JAM, Martin’s and Gibbs’s 
brigades had been able to strengthen the two other National Police brigades and the 43d 
Iraqi Army Brigade in southwest Baghdad and to establish new joint security stations to 
control the former JAM-dominated territory.176
The end of the Sadr City militia safe haven brought with it a sharp decrease in the mili-
tias’ ability to deploy EFPs in the Baghdad region. After May 2008, increased surveillance 
and coalition activity decreased the militias’ freedom of movement and made it harder 
for insurgents to emplace larger arrays of EFPs. Instead, militia groups were forced to 
emplace single EFPs that were significantly less effective against coalition forces. Beyond 
Baghdad, Shi’a militants were still able to emplace larger arrays of EFPs and maintain 
their level of lethality, but overall, the Sadr City battle permanently reduced EFP effec-
tiveness across Iraq, and showed how important a safe haven the slum had been.177
***
In Basrah and Sadr City, MNF-I was compelled to commit to a battle it had not antic-
ipated and to draw its attention away from a final showdown with the Sunni insurgency 
in Mosul. Even so, Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS was a milestone in the Iraq 
War. After 5 years of campaigning, it was nearly unimaginable that such a large-scale 
operation would be necessary in what many coalition leaders had considered the sleepy 
backwater of the south, among a supposedly homogeneous Shi’a population. However, 
unchecked intra-Shi’a competition for influence, control, and resources proved to be 
just as destabilizing as the sectarian conflict roiling central Iraq. The operation in Basrah 
also dispelled the fallacy that a smaller British troop presence hunkered down at Basrah 
Air Station and the accommodation with a militia leader had reduced violence and had 
prompted the Iraqis to resolve their own problems. While MND-SE’s withdrawal from 
Basrah city had temporarily lowered attacks against British forces, it had ceded the city 
to militias and left the population without protection. The repositioning to Basrah Air 
Station removed British combat power from the equation when neither the Iraqi police 
nor Army was ready to secure the city. When militia forces filled the security vacuum, 
they made Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS an inevitability, even if it was incon-
venient for the coalition at the time. General Freiji’s UK adviser, Colonel Richard Iron, 
later explained to the press:
We have made some terrible mistakes in Iraq. . . . We released 120 of their prisoners and withdrew 
out of town, but when we moved out, lawlessness took over. As 90 percent of the attacks were 
against us, we thought that if we moved out we would remove the source of the problem. But 
actually Jaish al-Mahdi had been fighting us because we were the only obstacle to their total 
control.178
The Iraqi security forces’ poor performance during the first 3 days of Operation CHARGE 
OF THE KNIGHTS exposed a critical flaw in the British approach to training, advising, 
and assisting the Iraqi security forces. Colonel Iron later noted that the United Kingdom 
decided early in the war not to embed MiTTs with the Iraqi Army. “The argument against 
MiTTs at the time was that we could not guarantee their protection; since we were so 
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short of troops we could not provide them dedicated support at the same time as running 
our own operations. In retrospect, this was a poor decision: resourcing MiTTs should 
have been the first use of our troops, before our own operations.”179 Instead, the British 
had followed a concept of monitoring, mentoring, and training only at the training center 
at Shaibah, west of Basrah, but did not conduct partnered operations with the Iraqi units 
they had trained.
After the 10th and 14th Iraqi Army Division troops completed their training at Shai-
bah, Binns noted, “We didn’t then mentor them when they deployed on operation, and 
that was the significant difference between the way that we approached support and the 
way that the Americans approached support in Basra.”180 The difference between the U.S. 
and British approach to mentoring was not lost on several British commanders, who rec-
ognized the missing critical component. Whenever raising the issue from the field, British 
officers faced resistance from the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters in London, England, 
where British leaders deemed embedding too dangerous as well as contrary to British 
plans for troop reductions.181
With JAM and Special Groups hold over Basrah and Sadr City and with Amarah 
broken, several conclusions emerged. The militia groups that had defied the Iraqi Gov-
ernment since fall 2003 had lost at least 2,000 fighters killed, half of them in Baghdad 
alone. Ultimately, after 4 years of recoiling from operations against the militants in Sadr 
City and Basrah, the coalition had seen JAM and Special Groups resistance crumble more 
quickly than anyone had predicted, indicating perhaps that the militia threat had been 
overstated for at least 3 years. JAM was rendered operationally ineffective for more than 
a year, and even then, it would likely not return in the same form. The coalition and 
Iraqi troops conducting the March-June 2008 operations had overmatched the militias 
and come close to destroying them. Conversely, the Iranian regime had nearly lost its 
proxy militias altogether. The various Iranian attempts to broker cease-fires between the 
militias and the government were not intended to stabilize Iraq, but to rescue the Irani-
ans’ most important militant proxies from extinction.
In political terms, the civil war between the Iranian-backed Shi’a militant groups 
and the Shi’a-led Maliki government had ended in a clear victory for the Prime Minister 
who, by summer 2008, was unquestionably Iraq’s most powerful politician and bore little 
resemblance to the weak Maliki that Stephen J. Hadley had described to the National 
Security Council principals in November 2006. For the 5 years since the collapse of the 
Iraqi Ba’athist state in April 2003, nonstate factions and militant groups had appeared 
to be stronger than the new Iraqi state, but with the defeat of the Shi’a militant groups, 
the Maliki-led Iraqi state had retaken control of most of the country’s territory. With the 
Prime Minister strengthened politically and his most troublesome Shi’a political rivals 
swept from the field, coalition leaders now anticipated Maliki would be free to sign the 
U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement without impediment—an expectation that Maliki 
soon frustrated.
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CHAPTER 9
THE SURGE CULMINATES, SUMMER 2008
The coalition commanders faced a situation in spring 2008 they had not anticipated. 
Since formulating the surge campaign plan during spring 2007, General David Petraeus 
and other senior coalition leaders had expected to fight al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) to the 
finish before shifting their main effort to the Shi’a militant groups at some point in late 
2008, by which time the surge brigades would have left Iraq. Instead, the coalition had 
defeated the Shi’a militants by May 2008, far sooner than anyone thought possible. The 
coalition commanders now had to shift back to defeating AQI in northern Iraq with fewer 
troops at their disposal.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had complicated Petraeus’s “north first” strategy with 
Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS, but the Prime Minister’s gambit had several 
strategic benefits. By the operation’s end, the fighting had routed Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM), 
the Iraqi Government had defeated Iran’s militant proxies, and the Sadrists had lost any 
hope of ousting Maliki from power. With JAM and other Shi’a militias at a much-di-
minished capacity, there were fewer explosively formed penetrator (EFP) attacks, U.S. 
casualty rates dropped and criticism of the campaign in the United States slackened. U.S. 
commanders hoped this would allow them to resume the fight against AQI with fewer 
distractions.1
Still, the situation posed a conundrum for Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, the 
Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) commander, who was fighting different enemies 
at opposite ends of the country during the summer of 2008. He had to consolidate the 
gains his troops and the Iraqi security forces had won against the Sadrists in Baghdad 
and the south while dealing a knockout blow to AQI in the far north. These objectives 
would require increased reliance on the Iraqi security forces (ISF). The operations of 
summer 2008 also unfolded against the backdrop of changing political dynamics in Iraq 
that would make it increasingly difficult for U.S. leaders who hoped to put the U.S.-Iraqi 
security relationship on a stable long-term footing.
THE END OF THE SURGE
By July 2008, the last of the five surge brigades that had helped secure Baghdad 
and its surrounding belts had redeployed, requiring MNC-I to reallocate forces to fill 
the gaps. All told, the loss of the surge brigades, when combined with the drawdown 
of support personnel, resulted in a reduction of 22,000 troops, roughly one-seventh of 
the U.S. military strength at the peak of the surge.2 MNC-I also faced the drawdown of 
international forces throughout 2008. Multi-National Division-Center (MND-C) felt the 
losses most acutely. By December 2008, Major General Michael L. Oates’s 10th Mountain 
Division would be responsible for every province south of Baghdad except Basrah, an 
area about the size of California.3 After the June 2008 departure of the last 550 Australian 
combat troops from Dhi Qar Province, Oates moved Colonel Philip Battaglia’s 4th Bri-
gade Combat Team (BCT), 1st Cavalry Division, from the northern reaches of MND-C’s 
area of operations to fill the gap.4
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Similar moves took place in August after the nation of Georgia recalled its 2,000-man 
1st Georgian Brigade from Kut when fighting broke out with Russia back at home. The 
rapid withdrawal of the brigade, which departed Iraq on U.S. Air Force C-17s only 72 
hours after the Russian invasion, forced MNC-I to shift an artillery brigade quickly to 
their sector.5 The Georgian withdrawal also had larger international implications. The 
United States considered Russia the aggressor in its invasion of Georgia, assisted in 
returning Georgian units home, and issued stern diplomatic condemnations, raising con-
cerns about the future of any United Nations (UN)-approved security agreements in Iraq 
given Russia’s veto on the UN Security Council. Approximately 900 Polish troops rede-
ployed from Diwaniya in October 2008 as well.6 In total, 16 coalition partners withdrew 
from Iraq during 2008.7
Because of the reduction in U.S. and coalition forces, the remaining 15 U.S. combat 
brigades would have to cover more ground with fewer resources, and often single bri-
gades were responsible for entire provinces. This left few U.S. forces with which to rein-
force Multi-National Division-North (MND-N), where the 2d Cavalry Regiment occupied 
all Diyala Province; the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, covered Kirkuk Province; 1st 
BCT, 101st Airborne Division, oversaw Salahadin as well as some northwestern portions 
of Baghdad; and the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) had the largest territorial 
responsibility, covering Ninawa Province, including Mosul and a large portion of the 
Jazeera desert.8
The smaller U.S. force would encounter a much-improved security situation through-
out much of the country. In Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W), where the Sunni Awak-
ening had been underway for more than a year, the Marines maintained security despite 
losing 8 of 14 infantry battalions as part of the post-surge drawdown. Levels of violence 
continued to fall in Baghdad and Diyala as well. In June 2007, Iraq had experienced an 
average of 180 attacks of all kinds per day, but by mid-July 2008, attacks numbered fewer 
than 21 per day, a level not seen since January 2004.9
Only in Ninawa Province was there a marked deterioration in security. By late spring, 
one-third of all violent incidents in Iraq took place there, especially in the long-suffering 
provincial capital city of Mosul. This is where the coalition and the Iraqi Government 
turned their attention in mid-2008.
OPERATION DEFEAT AL-QAEDA IN THE NORTH 
Prime Minister Maliki’s decision to conduct a large-scale operation in Basrah had 
derailed Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) plans to conduct a U.S.-Iraqi offensive in 
Mosul during March 2008. However, even as the coalition focused on battling the Shi’a 
militants in southern Iraq and Baghdad, MNC-I planned to return the coalition’s main 
effort to Mosul at some point. In early February, following the disappointing results 
of Operation PHANTOM PHOENIX in Diyala, General Raymond Odierno and Pet-
raeus already had pressed Major General Mark Hertling to shift Multi-National Divi-
sion-North’s (MND-N) manpower and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
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(ISR) focus to Ninawa.10 In late March 2008, Austin and MNC-I began Operation DEFEAT 
AL-QAEDA IN THE NORTH (OPDAN), a synchronization of the division-level opera-
tions in northern Iraq that would last for the entirety of XVIII Airborne Corps’ rotation as 
MNC-I. OPDAN focused on Mosul and its surrounding regions. The city’s importance to 
AQI’s strength elsewhere in Iraq had become clearer as the group lost its grip in western 
and central Iraq. Forced out of Baghdad and denied access to Anbar, AQI had no choice 
but to regroup in the far north and fight to retain a foothold in the country. Petraeus told 
reporters in early March that, while Baghdad was crucial for al-Qaeda to win in Iraq, 
Mosul and its surrounding areas were vital for the terrorist group’s survival. One senior 
MNC-I officer agreed, later commenting, “If AQI had a Pentagon, it would be in Mosul.”11
During the months that the coalition and the Iraqi Army fought Shi’a militias in the 
south, Mosul’s security situation continued to deteriorate. Between February and April 
2008, AQI attacked nine coalition and ISF combat outposts in the city with large suicide 
car or truck bombs smuggled from Syria, destroying several of the compounds. The influ-
ence of Ba’athist insurgent organizations—the Awda (“Return”) Party and the Naqsh-
bandi Army—had grown as well.12
The departure of the surge brigades between February and July, however, meant that 
the coalition would have fewer resources for the operation than coalition commanders 
had hoped. In late March, when the coalition had planned for the Mosul operation to 
begin, Austin and MNC-I still had 19 U.S. brigades at their disposal, with Colonel Billy 
Don Ferris’s 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, the only one of the 5 surge brigades 
already redeployed. By the time the unplanned fighting against the Shi’a militias wound 
down in May 2008, MNC-I had redeployed a division’s worth of combat power and stood 
weaker than it had been in March. MNC-I would have to conduct its northern opera-
tions with only 16 U.S. brigades. Austin had no spare brigades with which to reinforce 
Hertling’s MND-N.
Austin took several steps to compensate for the loss of combat power for the north. 
He encouraged his Iraqi counterparts to shift ISF units from relatively quiet areas to rein-
force Iraqi divisions engaged in intense fighting in hot spots in northern Iraq. He also 
began to expand some of his own units’ areas of responsibility. On April 11, to relieve 
some of the pressure on Hertling’s stretched force, Austin moved the boundary between 
MNF-W and MND-N some 80 kilometers north, giving the Marines in the somewhat pac-
ified Anbar Province responsibility for portions of Ninawa and Salahadin Provinces that 
Hertling’s units could not adequately cover. The additional territory, designated Tempo-
rary Area of Operations Mameluke, was an 80-mile wide strip of the Jazeera desert that 
ran from the Syrian border to just north of Lake Tharthar. In this area, the Marines of I 
Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) would interdict foreign fighters along the southern 
infiltration routes from Syria before they could reach Baghdad or other major population 
centers.13 The shrinking of MND-N’s area of operations enabled the 3d ACR to focus its 
combat power on Mosul and enabled 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to focus on 
Salahadin’s populated areas.14
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Margaret Nelson (Released).
Kirkuk Governor Abdul-Rahman Mostafa, Major General Mark Hertling,  
and Colonel David Paschal.15
In another measure to mitigate the dearth of maneuver brigades for OPDAN, MNC-I 
gave responsibility for the vast western Ninawa Province—the northern Jazeera area 
where AQI had previously stationed its “border emir” in Sinjar and where the 3d ACR 
had created a U.S.-Iraqi light reconnaissance troop to cover the border zone in 2005—
to an ad hoc interdiction force comprised of the corps military intelligence brigade and 
special operations forces (SOF). Colonel Robert Ashley’s 525th Battlefield Surveillance 
Brigade (BfSB), which MNC-I moved from the Iranian border in Diyala Province to Tal 
Afar in early April, would use its ISR assets to watch for foreign fighter crossings from 
Syria. The Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) provided a battalion 
tactical command post and advanced operational base to be the 525th BfSB’s action arm, 
with the CJSOTF element and the 525th BfSB collocating their headquarters to ensure 
tight coordination.16
The battlefield surveillance brigade’s umanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), joint surveil-
lance target attack radar systems (JSTARs) downlinks, and long-range reconnaissance 
capabilities helped locate AQI elements for targeting by the CJSOTF and by some ele-
ments of the 3d ACR. For their part, the CJSOTF detachments used armed Toyota HiLux 
trucks and stripped their High Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV) 
of improvised explosive device (IED) armor protection, doors, and even windows to be 
able to conduct long-range desert interdiction missions.17 These patrols found that the 
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border area again had become an insurgent sanctuary. The special operators engaged in 
running gun battles with AQI technical vehicles and discovered abandoned AQI training 
compounds as well as mammoth caches of arms and supplies. One such location in west-
ern Ninawa stretched across a 19-structure compound and had weapons and explosives 
hidden in the walls of buildings, where, among other items, the U.S. commandos found 
M–16 rifles that had been provided to Lebanon as part of the foreign military sales pro-
gram.18 The cache also contained so many IED-making materials that it exceeded the abil-
ity of the green berets to destroy it with their own explosives. A B–52 strike completed 
the job.19 In another instance, a Special Forces team discovered a well-kept and expansive 
house in the middle of the desert, miles from the nearest settlement, where they captured 
a one-legged man whom they later determined to be AQI’s third in command.20
Despite discoveries like these, the BfSB, CJSOTF, and 3d ACR lacked sufficient maneu-
ver and aviation assets to cover the massive area they were assigned, which was larger 
than the state of Massachusetts. Despite its designation as a battlefield surveillance bri-
gade, the 525th BfSB had deployed to Iraq in September 2007 without fully changing 
from a standard military intelligence brigade to a BfSB. Most significantly, it lacked its 
authorized cavalry squadron that would have given it a way to attack the targets gen-
erated by the brigade’s ISR assets.21 As a result, the BfSB often detected foreign fighter 
crossings but could not do anything about it. This frustrated both 3d ACR commander 
Colonel Michael A. Bills and 525th commander Ashley. “The sheer distance involved was 
very problematic,” Ashley said later. “[T]here were occasions that we could see things 
coming over the border and we were not able to react to them.”22
Closer to Mosul, Iraqi commanders repositioned their units to operate in zones that 
the coalition could not cover. The 3d Iraqi Division, normally responsible for western 
Ninawa Province, assumed responsibility for the AQI-dominated towns on Mosul’s 
western outskirts, placing nine Iraqi battalions there to free the 2d Iraqi Division to focus 
on the city itself. On May 1, General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq’s Ninawa Operations Command 
became fully operational, ready to oversee both Iraqi divisions in the impending Mosul 
operation.23 With clearing operations inside the city planned for mid-May, Tawfiq’s Iraqi 
units created a cordon of checkpoints and combat outposts around the city and gathered 
intelligence indicating that AQI’s ranks in Ninawa included a large number of foreign 
fighters who had traveled from Syria.24 Many of these foreign fighters had come to Mosul 
via Abu Ghadiyah’s Syria-based facilitation network, including AQI fighters who killed 
13 Iraqi police officers on May 2, in an attack that Petraeus judged “could not have been 
carried out without the acquiescence of Syrian officials at some level.”25
Mosul: Operation MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS 
On May 10, 2008, the day after the Iraqi Government and the Sadrists agreed to a 
cease-fire in Baghdad, Tawfiq launched the long-anticipated operation to clear AQI from 
Mosul’s neighborhoods. As Bills’s 3d ACR cut off insurgent supply routes into the city, 
including the major route from Tel Afar to Mosul, the Iraqi 2d Division and Iraqi spe-
cial operations forces (ISOF) conducted 17 cordon and search operations inside the city 
along with targeted raids to round up high-value individuals from AQI and other Sunni 
militant groups.26 As he had done in Basrah, Prime Minister Maliki arrived soon after 
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the operation began with his interior minister and defense ministers in tow to take com-
mand and turn the security operation into a political initiative. Reaching Mosul on May 
14, Maliki named the Iraqi-led Operation UMM AL-RABIYAIN (MOTHER OF TWO 
SPRINGS) and began to assert Baghdad’s authority over the local government and secu-
rity forces. 
Unlike their counterparts in Basrah, the Iraqi units in Mosul did not suffer desertions in 
the early days of fighting, and AQI did not attempt to challenge the government forces in 
direct firefights. During the first week, Iraqi forces detained over 1,000 suspects, of which 
just under 200 had known connections to either AQI or its political front, the Islamic State 
of Iraq (ISI).27 At the same time, coalition special operators stepped up operations against 
AQI in northern Iraq, carrying out 69 raids against the group between May 12 and 18 that 
yielded 117 AQI-linked detainees, including 2 senior AQI commanders. On May 14, U.S. 
special operators in western Ninawa managed to capture Abu Umar al-Tunisi, one of 
AQI’s most senior Syria-based facilitators, generating additional targets by keeping news 
of the capture quiet and exploiting information obtained from his hideout.28
The Iraqi-led clearing of Mosul continued to the end of May, by which time General 
Tawfiq’s troops had conducted 177 battalion-level operations. One Iraqi raid uncovered 
what was probably AQI’s main distribution hub for IEDs and car bombs in Mosul: a 
building in east Mosul that contained more than 11 tons of homemade explosives and 
other bomb-making materials.29 At the same time, the U.S. special operators in western 
Ninawa exacted a heavy toll, detaining 32 AQI members in intelligence-driven raids on 
foreign-fighter facilitation networks in the 4 weeks following the launch of Operation 
MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS.30 The intense operations had a noticeable effect on the 
group’s ability to move freely and pay its operatives. “Some low-level AQI fighters are 
abandoning the organization due to lack of pay, and . . . the head of AQI, Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri, may have ordered a month-long halt of the flow of foreign fighters into Iraq,” 
Petraeus reported to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates on May 25.31 With the 
security operations proceeding smoothly, coalition and Iraqi officials turned their atten-
tion to reconstruction projects. Maliki allocated $100 million for that purpose, just as he 
had for Basrah and Sadr City.32
It was not yet clear if AQI had been defeated in Ninawa. Near the end of May, Iraqi 
Minister of Defense Abdel Qader reported that he considered the clearing of Mosul only 
40 percent complete, prompting Petraeus to conclude that the joint U.S.-Iraqi opera-
tion would not reach the “hold” phase of “clear, hold, and build” until the end of July.33 
Appearing to confirm this assessment, by early July MNF-I reported that 68 percent of 
all attacks in Iraq took place in the Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) area of 
operations.
Although AQI could not control territory, it mounted a counterattack of assassina-
tions and intimidation against Iraqi officials and civilians. On June 6, insurgent gunmen 
nearly killed Ninawa Governor Duraid Kashmoula as he traveled through a formerly 
AQI-held neighborhood, and on June 27, the governor had another near miss when an 
AQI car-bomb attack on his office killed 18 people and wounded another 80.34 On July 
9, insurgents attacked a Kurdistan Democratic Party compound in Mosul during a visit 
by General Tawfiq, killing eight people in an unsuccessful assassination attempt against 
the Iraqi commander. The car bombing came the same week Petraeus reported that 
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insurgents had assassinated 16 Mosul police officers in the space of 30 days, including a 
police brigadier responsible for issuing identification badges in the city.35 The following 
week, MNF-I recorded a 20 percent increase in attacks in Ninawa, a disheartening trend 
that led Austin and MNC-I to deploy an additional Stryker battalion from Baghdad to 
Mosul to reinforce the 3d ACR.36
The persistence of the insurgent groups in the Mosul area was caused by several com-
plex problems. Without a large and capable border force, northwestern Iraq remained 
a porous throughway for foreign fighters and for AQI members. Economic conditions 
made it difficult for the Iraqi Government to enlist local tribes to help cut down the for-
eign fighter flow. An ongoing drought in the Jazeera desert limited Ninawa’s agricultural 
output and led some sheikhs to smuggle goods, arms, and foreign fighters.37 The many 
small towns west and north of Mosul were difficult to secure and remained important 
safe havens for AQI and other militant groups. Some of the towns between Tel Afar 
and Mosul, such as Muhallabiyah and Sheikh Ibrahim, were under the near-complete 
control of the extremists—some captured by the 3d ACR in 2005 but later released—and 
would later function as important bases for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 
Hertling’s subordinates identified no fewer than 22 different militant groups operating 
in the MND-N area of operations, many with facilitation networks extending into Syria.38 
Whenever the coalition and ISF pushed AQI away from Ninawa’s populations, other 
groups, such as the Ba’athist Naqshbandi Army, filled the void and continued attacks 
against coalition troops and Iraqi officials.39
Finally, the ethnic fault lines running through Ninawa Province challenged the coali-
tion as well as the Iraqi Government. Most of the Iraqi troops who conducted Operation 
MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS were Kurdish. In discussions with American officials, the 
citizens of Mosul often referred to the Iraqi Army units in their city as peshmerga.40 In 
addition, the Sh’ia-majority 6th Brigade, 2d National Police Division, which had deployed 
from Baghdad for the operation, often dealt with Mosul’s population in a heavy-handed 
manner that Bills described as “pretty cruel.” The police brigade’s presence in the city 
grew so counterproductive that Bills persuaded General Tawfiq to redeploy it to Nina-
wa’s desert areas to search for enemy fighters.41 As Bills and the 3d ACR observed, the 
people of Mosul remained wary of the ISF and felt they were being policed by Shi’a and 
Kurdish troops with an anti-Sunni agenda.
These ethnic fissures made Hertling and Bills skeptical about the idea of creating 
large Sons of Iraq groups in Ninawa Province—and, in Hertling’s view, in Diyala as well. 
Both feared AQI would infiltrate any Awakening groups in Ninawa. Bills believed the 
diverse demographics of Ninawa meant that Sons of Iraq groups would make the prov-
ince even more volatile.42 Having been involved in the early days of the ineffective Iraqi 
Civil Defense Corps in 2003–2004, Hertling also saw limited utility in creating what he 
called a “highly paid neighborhood watch program” and was concerned about dissolv-
ing such groups once they had been created. He also believed they would drain human 
capital from more crucial areas. “Once you pay an Iraqi to stand around with a gun they 
are not going to want to do a whole lot of other things,” he later said. “We had doctors, 
lawyers, and teachers all joining the Sons of Iraq, even [some of] the police, because they 
were assured payment from the Americans and usually the payment for the doctors and 
lawyers was higher than they were getting as a doctor or lawyer.”43
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Because of these concerns, Hertling and MND-N decided not to create an Awakening 
movement on the scale that had taken place in MNF-W, MND-C, and Multi-National 
Division-Baghdad (MND-B). Instead, U.S. commanders in the north pressed their Iraqi 
counterparts to recruit new ISF battalions from the local Ninawa population, including 
Yezidis and Sunnis from western Ninawa, but the ethnic and sectarian fissures in the 
province and its capital remained a persistent problem.44
CONSOLIDATING VICTORY AGAINST THE SHI’A MILITANT GROUPS
As Operation MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS proceeded in Mosul, coalition and ISF 
units in southern Iraq and Baghdad attempted to consolidate the gains made against 
the Shi’a militant groups from March to May, especially against the Sadrists. The defeat 
of the Shi’a militants in Iraq’s southern cities created an opportunity for the coalition to 
extend its presence to areas that had been dangerous territory for it since 2004. On May 
24, just 4 days after Prime Minister Maliki sent Iraqi Army troops to occupy Sadr City, 
U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker visited Karbala and Najaf to mark the arrival of new pro-
vincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). This was a significant step since violence had kept 
the PRTs for most southern provinces on protected compounds in Hillah or Basrah for 
almost 2 years.45 Having PRTs in the Shi’a shrine cities expanded the coalition’s political 
and diplomatic role in the critically important religious hub of the south.
In Baghdad, coalition and Iraqi forces continued clearing operations in neighbor-
hoods that had long been militia strongholds, confiscating large quantities of weapons 
and explosives. U.S. troops maintained their presence in Sadr City south of Route Gold, 
while the Iraqi Army and police with a few coalition advisers occupied Sadr City’s north-
ern neighborhoods. In the 3 weeks following the Iraqi Army’s May 20 entry into Sadr 
City, Iraqi troops seized 118 weapons caches, including 90 EFPs and “enough rifles to 
equip nearly three battalions,” Petraeus reported on June 8.46
Coalition troops also conducted targeted raids against some of the militia-affiliated 
Iraqi officials whose political top cover waned once the Prime Minister turned against 
the militias. In one high-profile case on May 24, coalition special operators and the Iraqi 
National Police Emergency Response Unit arrested the director general of the Iraqi cor-
rections system, who had used his position to torture prisoners, extort money from fam-
ilies, and back death squad killings by Shi’a militants.47
Though most militia leaders had fled and their foot soldiers had dispersed, a few Shi’a 
militant cells in Baghdad continued attacks against American troops and other Iraqis. On 
June 4, as Shi’a militants prepared to fire improvised rocket-assisted munitions against 
a U.S. patrol base near Sadr City, a rocket detonated prematurely, killing the militants 
and some bystanders. The explosion left 18 Iraqis dead, 30 wounded, and destroyed 15 
houses.48 Two weeks later, a car bomb at a busy bus stop in the Shi’a-majority Hurriyah 
neighborhood killed at least 27 civilians and wounded 50. Responding to the attack, the 
local coalition unit, Colonel William B. Hickman’s 2d Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, 
quickly discovered that the bombing against mostly Shi’a civilians had not been the work 
of AQI, but of a local Special Groups commander who wanted the Shi’a civilians of Hur-
riyah to believe there was still a Sunni terrorist threat in the neighborhood to justify his 
militia. As Petraeus put it, the attack was meant “to reduce perceptions of security in 
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the neighborhood, justify Shi’a militia presence, and discourage the return of displaced 
Sunni families. We have presented evidence to the Iraqi Government in an effort to get 
them to publicly identify Special Groups (SG) as being responsible for the attack.”49
The Transformation of JAM
The defeat of JAM did not end the threat of Shi’a insurgency. However, it did force 
the largest of the Shi’a militant groups to change. In the wake of his militia’s operational 
downfall, on June 13, Moqtada Sadr announced that he intended to reorganize the Mahdi 
Army into two components: the Mumahidun, a civic and humanitarian organization, and 
a specialized militant wing that would operate secretly. According to the Mumahidun 
project guide, its members would be unarmed and strictly disciplined, and any violation 
of this policy would be dealt with harshly.50 The Baghdad-based Hazem al-Araji and nine 
other Sadrist clerics would lead this reformed movement.51
In July, Sadr followed up his earlier announcement by proclaiming the formation of 
the Promised Day Brigade, an organization of Sadrist militants authorized to continue 
resistance against U.S. troops. In Petraeus’s view, this was “not an entirely deft move,” 
because by announcing the creation of a new militia, Sadr ran the risk of having the 
Maliki government exclude his candidates from the upcoming provincial elections since, 
by law, no illegal militia could participate. Petraeus also noted that because “Sadr and 
most senior SG leaders are now in Iran, this action may increase perceptions that the Sadr 
Trend’s militia is beholden to and responds to direction from Iran. Sadr’s statement also 
exposes Iran’s role in facilitating violence in Iraq, thereby giving lie to Iran’s repeated 
commitments to stop lethal aid and support the Iraqi government.”52
Ultimately, however, these changes aided Sadr because Maliki, anticipating a political 
showdown with Abdul Aziz al-Hakim and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) in 
the upcoming provincial elections, had reached out to his defeated Sadrist foes to nego-
tiate a Da’wa-Sadrist reconciliation prior to the elections, something that Petraeus and 
other coalition leaders did not anticipate.53 Reconciliation with Maliki meant the new 
incarnations of the Mahdi Army could work largely unmolested by the Iraqi Govern-
ment. The flight of the militia commanders to Iran had left a new political power vacuum 
in east Baghdad and the southern provinces, one that Maliki’s Da’wa Party and Hakim’s 
ISCI hastened to fill prior to the provincial elections scheduled for late 2008.
Ali Faisal al-Lami and the Sadr City Assassinations 
As Sadr attempted to revamp his militia, many Special Groups members and JAM 
fighters opposed the truce Sadr had declared and were reluctant to stop fighting coali-
tion forces. Some had left JAM to join Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) or Kata’ib Hizballah.54 
Evidence that other Special Groups were filling the void after JAM’s defeat was evident 
in Baghdad in the summer of 2008. In June, MND-B moved troops and other support 
elements into Sadr City to follow up May’s military victory with civic action against the 
militia-affiliated politicians who had controlled the district. Because the militia loyalists 
who held the formal district council leadership had fled when the Shi’a militant groups 
left, U.S. officials hoped to establish a provincial reconstruction team in Sadr City and 
empower a new, anti-Sadrist chairman of the district council. AAH, however, did not 
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intend to let this happen. On June 24, 2008, a bomb detonated in a Sadr City District Advi-
sory Council meeting, killing six Iraqis, two American Soldiers, and two State Depart-
ment officials, including 57-year-old Deputy PRT Chief Stephen Farley. Another U.S. 
official, who stepped out of the room moments before the blast, survived. The sophis-
ticated bomb plot involved explosives packed in the headrest of an office chair that the 
attackers knew the meeting attendees would use.55
U.S. troops quickly uncovered a trail of evidence that led back to Ali Faisal al-Lami, a 
longtime aide to Iraqi politician Ahmad Chalabi. A senior official on Chalabi’s de-Ba’ath-
ification committee, Lami was closely allied with AAH and apparently had helped plan 
the assassination of Farley and other officials, intending to kill the new anti-Sadrist 
district council head. He also had long been suspected by other Iraqi officials of using 
the de-Ba’athification committee’s security details as death squads against Sunnis and 
Ba’athists, especially in west Baghdad. After the Sadr City bombing, Lami traveled to 
Beirut for consultations with Lebanese Hizballah, likely in connection with his mission 
to “unify Shi’a extremists throughout the region,” as Petraeus described it.56 He also had 
probably intended to wait there until the investigation of the bombing had passed. On 
August 27, however, Lami unwisely flew back to Iraq, where U.S. troops arrested him 
as he arrived at the Baghdad International Airport and moved him to the U.S. detention 
center at Camp Cropper, where he would remain for a year. “We believe Ali Faisal was 
directly involved in the 24 June attack in Sadr City against the District Advisory Council 
that killed two State Department employees, two Coalition Soldiers, and members of 
the council,” Petraeus reported to Gates on August 31.57 Petraeus also revealed to Gates 
that Lami was a member of the militant group headed by Akram al-Ka’abi, a reference to 
AAH. At Camp Cropper, Lami admitted to knowledge of sectarian death squad killings 
against former Ba’athists. He also asserted that Chalabi had been involved in the kill-
ings of former regime members, Iraqi Members of Parliament, and journalists, and that 
Chalabi had shared information on 450 former Ba’athists with Shi’a death squads so the 
Ba’athists could be targeted.58 Perhaps not coincidentally, unknown assailants tried but 
failed to assassinate Chalabi in Baghdad on September 5, just days after Lami’s capture, 
killing two bodyguards but missing Chalabi himself.59
Attacks like those in Hurriyah and the Sadr City District Council tempered the sense 
that the coalition and the Maliki government had won a decisive victory against the Shi’a 
militants. The day after the Sadr City bombing, Iraqi police liaison to Sadr City, Ferat 
Attriyeh, claimed that although the Iraqi Government had forced JAM and the Special 
Groups to give up their overt control over the slum, the militant groups remained present 
in the shadows. “They are still working inside the city. There are killings, lootings, they 
come and go in unmarked cars. They threaten anyone who works with U.S. forces. Out-
side the wall, they are still in control.”60
Amarah and Operation LOOK SOUTH
Farther south, the Shi’a militants suffered another significant defeat as the coalition 
and Maliki government turned to the longtime militia stronghold of Amarah, the capital 
of Maysan Province. While Basrah and Sadr City represented endpoints of a sophisticated 
and deadly Iranian smuggling network, Maysan and Amarah were the network’s hub.61 
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Under Major General Jonathan Shaw, MND-SE left Maysan in April 2007 and transferred 
responsibility to the Iraqis.62 With no coalition military presence, the province’s impor-
tance as a transit and supply point from Iran increased throughout 2007 and early 2008 as 
some of the militia commanders and fighters who fled Baghdad in the early days of the 
surge moved into Amarah.63
As the Sadr City battle wound down in May 2008, Austin asked the CJSOTF, MND-C, 
and other special operations forces (SOF) to develop plans to address the Amarah prob-
lem. Austin selected the CJSOTF plan, Operation YARBOROUGH, because it offered 
operational effects with minimal forces, allowing MNC-I to focus on Mosul. After the 
success of Iraqi security forces and the coalition in Basrah and Sadr City, the CJSOTF plan 
played on the Sadrist fears that a large-scale coalition offensive was imminent. Rather 
than follow through with YARBOROUGH, the CJSOTF hit the militias with a series of 
deception operations and raids designed to convince them to abandon Maysan before 
sustaining what could be heavy losses.
To prepare for the action, the CJSOTF moved a company of the ISOF brigade, an addi-
tional operational detachment, and the majority of its special operations aviation contin-
gent, which included helicopters, an MC-130 transport capable of leaflet drops, and an 
AC-130 gunship to Tallil Airfield in neighboring Dhi Qar Province. The operation began 
on May 9 when an armed Predator UAV killed JAM fighters on a major road to Amarah. 
Over the next several days, ISOF troops and their CJSOTF advisers launched raids into 
Amarah and established temporary checkpoints on roads surrounding the town, cap-
turing militiamen and telling the local population that the coalition was preparing for a 
major offensive. At the same time, the MC-130 dropped leaflets announcing that civilians 
should consider evacuating the city ahead of the impending operation. Overflights by 
F-16s and Predator UAVs increased, some of which bombed uninhabited desert areas to 
create the perception that the coalition was conducting air strikes against remote militia 
hideouts. As early as May 15, the operations began having an effect, as reports emerged 
that local militants were stockpiling weapons and emplacing IEDs. The raids, checkpoints, 
overflights, and leaflet drops continued for several weeks, with the addition of a feigned 
ground assault and the airdrop of humanitarian aid supplies to “refugees” from an imag-
inary attack, all designed to further fray the militia leaders’ nerves. When CJSOTF opera-
tors learned that militia leaders had ordered civilians to pick up and destroy the coalition 
leaflets, they printed new “wanted poster” leaflets with photographs of those responsible 
for the order, dropping 10,000 on Amarah the following night. As some JAM and Special 
Groups leaders fled to Iran, the CJSOTF dropped additional leaflets that listed those who 
had fled and warned those staying behind that they had been abandoned and left to die. 
By early June, the operation had achieved its desired effect: the majority of Maysan’s 
militia leaders had panicked and escaped to Iran rather than stay and face what they 
expected would be a Fallujah-style coalition attack.64
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Source: U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 2d Class Jack G. Georges (Released).
Air Force Loadmasters Prepare to Drop Pallets of Humanitarian Aid During  
Operation YARBOROUGH.65
The operation in Amarah was part of a broader MNC-I approach to defeat the Irani-
an-sponsored Shi’a militant networks in southern Iraq. Even before Operation YARBOR-
OUGH, Austin had decided the time was right to accept risk in the southern Baghdad 
belts and push toward the Iranian border region.66 Securing Baghdad and Basrah had 
not solved the problem of the rampant Iranian smuggling network through Maysan, Dhi 
Qar, and Muthanna Provinces. Ten days after the fighting ended in Sadr City, MNC-I 
issued the order for Operation LOOK SOUTH to snuff out the networks and directly 
counter malign Iranian influence. However, much of this area fell within the British Multi- 
National Division-Southeast (MND-SE) area of operations. Operation LOOK SOUTH 
creatively avoided the politically charged question of changing the British boundaries 
by establishing a temporary area of operations on May 30 that effectively carved out 
Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna Provinces from MND-SE for MND-C to control indef-
initely.67 Officially, the multinational division boundaries had not changed, but the real-
ity on the ground told another story. The British readily accepted the unofficial and 
unconventional change in responsibility across much of MND-SE and would see their 
area gradually shrink throughout the summer.68 The newly arrived U.S. 10th Mountain 
Division, which replaced Major General Rick Lynch’s 3d Infantry Division as MND-C 
at the end of May 2008, had four brigades to cover this vast expanse of southern Iraq. 
Under the command of Oates, the 10th Mountain Division further expanded MND-C’s 
area of responsibility following the scheduled departure of the Polish-led Multi-National 
Divi sion-Central South (MND-CS) in October.69
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Major General Michael Oates (left). Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Michel Sauret (Released).
Major General Michael Oates, With Major General Othman Ali Farhood al-Ghanimi, 
8th Iraqi Army Division Commander.70
The day after Oates took command of MND-C and Operation LOOK SOUTH kicked 
off, Prime Minister Maliki ordered Iraqi forces in Maysan Province to clear Amarah. The 
operation differed from those in Sadr City and Basrah since the 10th Iraqi Army Division 
planned it with American support. It was also to be Oates’s first operation. After hear-
ing his counterparts’ overcomplicated plan that called for several uncoordinated axes of 
advance that would lead to violent engagements inside the city, Oates gently suggested 
changes that simplified the operation and spared Amarah’s population. In the revised 
plan, the Iraqi Army would deploy a brigade to clear the capital from west to east toward 
the Iranian border, while Oates would position SOF east of the capital to interdict fighters 
attempting to flee toward the border.71
On June 19, troops from the 10th Iraqi Division and their U.S. advisers entered Amarah 
unopposed, an achievement born from the success of Operation YARBOROUGH. As the 
soldiers began to clear the city, they discovered large weapons and munitions caches that 
included almost 500 mortar rounds and 700 antitank mines.72 Over the course of a week, 
the ISF detained 65 suspected insurgents and found 52 weapons caches, some containing 
EFPs.73 Along with the dozens of militiamen, the Iraqi troops detained several senior 
local officials with Sadrist militant ties, including both the provincial governor and the 
provincial chief of police. Iraqi leaders in Baghdad also replaced the brigade responsible 
for the Iraq-Iran border in Maysan Province that had been ineffective for several years.74
On June 2, Prime Minister Maliki flew to Amarah, continuing his practice of being 
personally present for large-scale ISF operations. He arrived to find Iraqi Army units 
increasingly confident as they witnessed the defeat of the Shi’a militants in a third major 
militia stronghold city. “We saw a positive indicator of the growing confidence of the 
ISF in a bit of graffiti seen on the Yugoslav Bridge in the vicinity of Amarah last week,” 
Petraeus reported to Gates. “Presumably a JAM/SG member had scrawled on the bridge, 
‘We’ll be back.’ Below it, someone from the ISF responded with, ‘We’ll be waiting for 
you’.”75
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As had happened in Basrah and Baghdad after extensive shaping operations, another 
Shi’a insurgent base had fallen with relative ease into ISF and coalition hands. For the 
first time since 2003, the Iraqi Government controlled the entire lower Tigris River Valley 
from Baghdad to the sea, unvexed.
THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF THE SURGE
Return to Normality in Baghdad 
As the clearing operations in militia-dominated neighborhoods continued, the 
once-extreme violence in Iraq’s capital dropped to levels experienced in other capitals 
of the developing world. In early July, MNF-I’s spokesmen announced that the violence 
was at its lowest level since the war began. Economic activity had improved as well. On 
July 11, official Iraqi and U.S. economic reports calculated that the Iraqi economy was 
growing at an annual rate of between 8 and 9 percent. At the same time, the Gulf Region 
Division of the Army Corps of Engineers—Iraq’s largest employer—reported that only 3 
percent of its active projects faced security-related delays, down from more than 20 per-
cent in fall 2007.76
By midsummer 2008, life in Baghdad had returned to normal, something that Pet-
raeus and MNF-I looked to encourage. In one example, Petraeus had MNF-I assist farm-
ers in the lower Diyala Valley near Baghdad with the crop dusting of 159,000 acres of 
date palms to increase the yield of one of Iraq’s most important agricultural exports. Pet-
raeus also worked to reopen Baghdad’s public swimming pools (nicknamed “Operation 
SPEEDO”), calculating that this would give idle young men something to do and offer 
respite from the summer heat and sporadic electricity.77
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
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Baghdadis who had shunned public places at night in 2006 and 2007 now filled restau-
rants and shops. Commercial areas such as the city’s famous riverside Abu Nuwas Street 
reopened. In late August, a crowd of about 50,000 attended a soccer match in Baghdad, 
the largest sporting event since the 2003 invasion, with no security problems marring the 
occasion.78 To capitalize on the growing sense of improvement among Iraqis, Petraeus 
ordered U.S. military vehicles to “adhere to Iraqi traffic patterns and assume a lower 
profile with less aggressive and provocative security procedures” of the sort that had 
long raised Iraqis’ ire. Petraeus also directed U.S. units to begin removing what he called 
“detritus of war” from the streets of Baghdad and other cities, including the vast mass 
of concertina wire, sandbags, and construction material that had accumulated over 5½ 
years of violence.79
 
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Ian M. Terry (Released).
Iraqis Celebrate the Removal of Concrete Barriers From a Marketplace in Samarra.80
A more complicated problem arose in the resettlement of those Iraqis who had been 
forced to flee their homes during years of sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad and 
other parts of central Iraq. An estimated 5 million refugees and internally displaced per-
sons, or roughly 17 percent of the Iraqi population, had not returned home following 
the sectarian cleansings of 2005–2007.81 This had far-reaching political implications, espe-
cially with provincial elections scheduled to take place in late 2008. According to one U.S. 
Government report, of those displaced persons who attempted to return to Baghdad, 
“up to 70% . . . could not resettle in their own homes, either because someone else was 
living there or because the ethnic composition of the neighborhood made it unsafe.”82 The 
lack of a uniform procedure for adjudicating property disputes between squatters and 
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displaced persons had destabilizing potential, possibly encouraging both sides to elicit 
support from local militias.83
Nevertheless, Petraeus considered the situation promising as the summer ended. 
Reporting to Gates in the first week of September, he noted that almost 50,000 displaced 
Iraqi families had returned to Baghdad since December 2007, a figure that represented 
about a quarter of a million people. The U.S. brigade in the Rashid District reported almost 
1,500 families returned home in the last week of August alone.84 To help matters, the gov-
ernment announced that Iraqi troops would evict squatters from illegal residences; and 
Iraqi ministries would disburse compensation payments to squatters forced to move.85 
It surprised U.S. commanders that “Sunni and Shi’a alike seem generally receptive to 
the resettlement process,” though Iraqi media reports made it clear that the return of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) was popular and a welcome sign that the civil war 
was ending.86
Still, the return of IDPs was not entirely peaceful. Two Members of Parliament who 
attempted to organize the return of hundreds of mostly Sunni families to west Bagh-
dad had their homes blown up. One of the Parliamentarians, Mithal al-Alusi, accused 
Baghdad Operations Commander General Abud Qanbar of blocking the return of Sunni 
families, since bombers destroyed Alusi’s empty home, even though an Iraqi military 
checkpoint was just a few meters away.87 Nevertheless, by summer’s end such attacks 
were rare with an average of only four violent incidents per week across all of Baghdad 
Province.88
Petraeus Promoted, Odierno Returns
Petraeus oversaw these changes in Baghdad with the knowledge that his tenure as 
MNF-I commander was almost over. Spring 2008 saw an unexpected shuffle among 
senior U.S. commanders in the Middle East. In early March, Admiral William “Fox” 
Fallon suddenly resigned his post as U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander 
after allowing scholar-journalist Thomas Barnett to quote him in unguarded moments 
and cast him as a lone figure opposing the White House’s supposed drive toward war 
with Iran.89
With Fallon gone, CENTCOM Deputy Commander Lieutenant General Martin 
Dempsey filled the position temporarily. This led to an immediate change in the rapport 
between CENTCOM and MNF-I, which had been troubled during Fallon’s tenure. The 
relationship changed further in April 2008 when President George W. Bush nominated 
Petraeus as CENTCOM’s next permanent commander beginning in the fall. At the same 
time, Bush nominated Odierno, who had only left Baghdad in February and had been 
preparing to become Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, to succeed Petraeus as MNF-I com-
mander. The two generals underwent a Senate confirmation hearing together in late May 
and were confirmed a few days later. The Department of Defense (DoD) scheduled the 
MNF-I change of command for mid-September.
As a result of the impending promotion to command of CENTCOM, Petraeus began 
to look beyond the Iraq theater. With Fallon out of the picture, Petraeus took on some of 
the regional military diplomacy that normally would fall to the CENTCOM commander. 
Both with and without Crocker, Petraeus made visits in spring and summer 2008 to Saudi 
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Arabia, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Jordan, meeting with heads of state and senior security 
officials in each country to press them to improve their relations with the Iraqi Gov-
ernment and to crack down on foreign fighters and terrorist financiers. However, cir-
cumstances forced him to increasingly turn his attention to the deteriorating situation 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Odierno, meanwhile, faced the prospect of returning for a 
third command tour in Iraq, but this time with a break of only 7 months. He was slated to 
become the first U.S. officer since General Lucian Truscott to command at division, corps, 
and army levels in the same theater of war.
Questioning the Coalition Force Presence
The change in security conditions shifted attitudes toward the U.S. military presence 
in the country among both Iraqis and some coalition leaders. Even before the spring cam-
paign against the Shi’a militants had played out, some senior U.S. leaders had begun to 
indicate that security conditions in Iraq warranted shifting military resources to Afghani-
stan where security had deteriorated. In early April, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, said that troop commitments in Iraq prevented the 
United States from meeting force requirements in Afghanistan and elsewhere.90 The fol-
lowing week, Bush announced that he would suspend the drawdown of U.S. troops in 
Iraq after the departure of the last of the surge brigades in July, but on the same day, 
he instructed the U.S. military to begin planning for “conditions-based reductions” in 
Iraq to free up forces for Afghanistan. At the same time, the Army announced an end to 
15-month deployments for units going to Iraq: after August 1, Army units would serve 
12-month rotations.91
As the signs of a U.S. withdrawal mounted, the continued U.S. presence in Iraq became 
a major political issue among the Iraqi parties competing in the country’s provincial elec-
tions. The UN Security Council resolution that provided the legal justification for U.S. 
military involvement expired at the end of 2008, so Washington pursued a bilateral status 
of forces agreement (SOFA) that would allow a continued American presence. In mid-
March, Ambassador Robert Loftis, a State Department expert on status of forces agree-
ments, arrived in Baghdad with a team of technical experts to negotiate a new agreement. 
White House staffer Brett McGurk accompanied Loftis to negotiate a parallel strategic 
framework agreement (SFA) covering the broader U.S.-Iraqi relationship in economic 
and diplomatic matters.
By mid-May, the talks bogged down. The Maliki government was not keen on sep-
arating the SOFA from the broader SFA, preferring one comprehensive document that 
defined all future U.S.-Iraq relations. Petraeus also reported that Maliki hesitated to use 
“his political capital to urge the Council of Representatives to support the SFA” because 
he feared it might hurt his Da’wa Party and fracture his political coalition.92 The Prime 
Minister’s concern reflected changing public attitudes. The improved security situation 
in central and southern Iraq had increased the Iraqi public’s confidence in their govern-
ment security forces and led them to question the need for a continued coalition military 
presence. National polls of Iraqis in spring 2008 found that about two-thirds of Iraqis 
disapproved of the presence of coalition troops in the country, while a similar portion of 
Iraqis expressed confidence in the Iraqi Army and National Police. In keeping with these 
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polled attitudes, 144 of the 275 members of the Iraqi Parliament signed a letter on May 11 
calling for a timetable for the withdrawal of coalition forces.93
A few high-profile incidents by U.S. troops did not help the situation. On May 9, a 
U.S. Soldier in MND-B used a Koran for target practice at a firing range near the Baghdad 
Airport. Local Iraqis quickly learned of the event, forcing MND-B Commander Major 
General Jeffery Hammond to issue a formal apology and meet with local Iraqi leaders to 
soothe their anger.94 Nevertheless, the incident made national news in Iraq and helped 
fuel anti-coalition sentiment. Three weeks later, a committee of the Iraqi Parliamentary 
parties called for the Iraqi Government to reject the draft statement of principles for the 
U.S.-Iraqi relationship, increasing the pressure on Maliki to drive a hard bargain in the 
SOFA negotiations.95
At the same time, Moqtada Sadr organized a series of protests in Baghdad, the first 
of which drew 10,000 participants just a week after the Iraqi Army occupied Sadr City. 
“Although the demonstrations were fairly small compared to those in the past, basically 
representing the size of Friday congregations, they indicate the need for Iraqi leaders 
to begin to make the case for these accords,” Petraeus noted.96 In public statements, the 
Sadrists and their Iranian allies began drawing parallels between the draft U.S.-Iraq 
SOFA and the 1964 U.S.-Iran SOFA, a military agreement between the U.S. Government 
and the Shah that the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had used to build opposition to the 
Shah’s rule. Other Iraqis also drew parallels with the Portsmouth Treaty of 1948 between 
the Iraqi monarchy and Great Britain, a highly unpopular agreement that had led to a 
near-revolt in Baghdad. At the time, the significance of these previous agreements was 
lost on the U.S. officials negotiating the SOFA and SFA, but for Iraqis and Iranians they 
were full of historical meaning. MNF-I noted that Iraqi political factions were particularly 
sensitive to questions about whether U.S. forces would continue to have the authority 
to detain Iraqis, conduct unilateral operations, and maintain bases in the country. The 
question of legal immunity for contractors and third-country nationals employed by the 
United States was also a sensitive one on which many Iraqi politicians were not inclined 
to give the United States a great deal of leeway.97
The Iranian regime also exerted significant behind-the-scenes influence. Though the 
Iranians had suffered a setback with the operational defeat of their Iraqi militia proxies, 
they retained enough influence with the Iraqi political parties to obstruct the U.S.-Iraqi 
negotiations. On June 7, Maliki traveled to Tehran to meet with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei 
and Qassem Soleimani, ostensibly to confront the Iranian leaders with evidence of their 
destabilizing activities in Iraq, but in reality, the discussions revolved around Iranian 
opposition to the U.S.-Iraq SOFA. The Iranian leaders denied that any high-level Ira-
nian authorities had been involved in arming the Iraqi Shi’a militias and told Maliki that 
the SOFA and SFA were “unacceptable” and constituted a “new occupation of Iraq.”98 
“Given the Supreme Leader’s strident language about the United States during the visit, 
we can expect the Iranians to continue their strategic communications campaign against 
U.S.-Iraq SF/SOFA negotiations inside Iraq and in the regional media,” Petraeus reported 
after Maliki’s trip.99
With political conditions making the SOFA negotiations difficult, Crocker proposed 
to Maliki on June 26 that the two governments should sign a temporary “bridging agree-
ment” that would allow U.S. forces to operate in Iraq until they could reach a longer-term 
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SOFA.100 Two days later, however, a single incident by U.S. special operators almost 
derailed the entire SOFA process. On June 28, the special operations task force conducted 
a raid in a small town near Karbala that targeted the wrong house in a search for a Shi’a 
militant. Unfortunately, the targeted house belonged to Prime Minister Maliki’s sister, 
and in the course of the raid, the special operators killed one of her bodyguards, a young 
man who was one of Maliki’s relatives.101
The raid infuriated Prime Minister Maliki, who, like many Iraqi leaders, found it 
impossible to believe that the coalition had raided his family and killed one of his rela-
tives by mistake. In addition, the raid had taken place in one of the nine provinces sup-
posedly under full Iraqi control, but local Iraqi security officials asserted the coalition 
had conducted the operation without their knowledge. The incident was a clear setback 
for the United States, coming at the worst possible time in the stormy negotiations over 
unilateral U.S. military operations and immunity from Iraqi law for U.S. Government 
personnel and contractors.102
Allegations in the same week that the United States was using Iraq as a base to con-
duct operations inside Iran compounded the problem. In late June, The New Yorker mag-
azine published an article by journalist Seymour Hersh that claimed U.S. SOF had been 
sending operatives into Iran to prepare the way for an American war against the Iranian 
regime. The story raised Iraqi ire and lent credence to the Iranian regime’s claims that the 
United States wanted to retain bases in Iraq for the precise purpose that Hersh claimed. 
Partly to contain the damage from the Hersh story and from the raid in Karbala, Pet-
raeus took Prime Minister Maliki and Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie 
to visit the special operations headquarters in Iraq, the first time senior Iraqi officials 
were briefed there.103 Maliki’s past opposition toward special operations raids against 
Shi’a militant targets and the recent killing of his relative at the hands of U.S. comman-
dos added tension to the visit. The trip was intended to provide the Iraqi leaders the 
most up-to-date operational picture as well as to make the special operations activities 
more transparent. At the headquarters, Maliki and Rubaie visited an operations center, 
inspected the elite commandos’ high-tech equipment, and received assurances that U.S. 
special operators were neither slackening their efforts against AQI nor using Iraq as a 
platform to make raids into Iran. The special operations commanders “gave a terrific pre-
sentation that clearly impressed and moved the PM [Prime Minister],” Petraeus reported 
afterward, adding that Maliki “addressed our troops in the most complimentary terms 
and stressed again the importance of the U.S. to the fate of a free Iraq.”104 For his part, Pet-
raeus hoped that the visit had watered down some of Maliki’s opposition to a SOFA.105
Senator Barack Obama in Baghdad
The day after Maliki’s visit to Balad, another factor injected itself into the U.S.-Iraq 
SOFA negotiations. In the ongoing U.S. Presidential election campaign, Democratic can-
didate Barack Obama called for the United States to set a fixed timetable for withdrawal 
from Iraq. On July 4, Obama expanded on his plans, indicating that, if elected, he would 
withdraw all U.S. troops from Iraq within 16 months. Just days later, on July 19, Prime 
Minister Maliki told German journalists that he too believed American forces could 
safely be withdrawn from Iraq over a 16-month period, apparently endorsing Obama’s 
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campaign platform with a statement that Petraeus described as “a politically incautious 
remark.” The Iraqi Prime Minister mentioned the same 16-month withdrawal timeta-
ble in a videoconference with Bush, in which Maliki also said he saw no need for any 
non-American coalition forces beyond 2009.106
On July 21, 2 days after Maliki’s public remarks, Senator Obama met with Petraeus 
and Crocker in Baghdad as part of a visiting congressional delegation that also included 
future SECDEF Charles Hagel and Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island. In the course of a 
long briefing on the situation in Iraq, Obama laid out several arguments for withdrawing 
U.S. troops.
 
(Seated left to right) Senator Charles Hagel, General David Petraeus, Senator Barack Obama, Ambassador 
Ryan Crocker, and Senator Jack Reed. Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Lorie Jewell (Released).
Tense Discussions on Iraq War Strategy During a Congressional Delegation Visit on 
July 21, 2008.107
The meeting was collegial, but tense. Petraeus and Crocker argued that sectarian vio-
lence had slowed, but political progress had not yet matched the security gains. It was 
thus premature to assume Iraq could remain stable without U.S. troops. Much of the dis-
cussion between Obama and Petraeus dealt with shifting responsibility to Iraqi security 
forces, with Obama arguing that the United States needed to force the Iraqi Government 
to assume the lead in providing security, an idea Obama’s advisers labeled “conditional 
engagement.” Petraeus, however, noted that that approach had failed in 2006 and warned 
against handing the ISF more than they could handle. Obama also argued that the Iraq 
campaign was a distraction from the fight against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Petraeus replied that al-Qaeda itself had declared Iraq the cen-
tral front in its war against the West. The general also noted that calls to shift troops from 
Iraq to use them against bin Laden would require the United States to invade Pakistan—
bin Laden’s likely location. Obama and Hagel argued that Petraeus’s recommendations 
to maintain a large U.S. force in Iraq were infeasible, given the strain the Iraq War was 
placing on the U.S. Government, especially with an expanding financial crisis. Petraeus 
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replied that he understood that, in setting Iraq policy, U.S. leaders had to consider the 
larger strategic picture, but as the MNF-I commander his duty was to give his best mili-
tary advice on accomplishing the mission in his theater of operations. He indicated that 
it was up to his political superiors to accept his recommendations or change his mission. 
The visiting senators seemed to be pressing Petraeus to preclude that process by tailoring 
his military advice to a policy, Petraeus said.
After the contentious meeting, Petraeus and Obama met one-on-one, with the senator 
inquiring if there was anything additional that the general wanted to offer privately. Pet-
raeus responded by asking Obama to maintain his flexibility on Iraq and suggested that 
withdrawal within 16 months of taking office would too rapid and might jeopardize the 
progress made during the surge. It would be a suggestion that eventually bore fruit, as 
the 16-month timetable stretched to almost 3 years, with the last U.S. forces withdrawing 
December 2011.108 Other voices in Iraq amplified the arguments Petraeus and Crocker 
had made. Later in their visit, for example, the senators met Sunni Awakening leaders 
who warned that a hasty U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq would likely lead to a return 
to violence.109 After the July 21 discussions, it seemed clear that if Senator Obama became 
President, then an expedited U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was likely.
MALIKI’S WARNING SIGNS: DIYALA, THE ISOF, AND THE SOFA
Diyala: Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE, July–August 2008
As coalition leaders focused on completing the campaign against AQI in Mosul and 
institutionalizing the long-term U.S.-Iraq military relationship, the Prime Minister’s 
attention was on a different agenda. In the wake of his victory over his Sadrist rivals in 
Operation CHARGE OF THE KNIGHTS, Maliki increasingly structured Iraqi security 
operations toward his personal objectives. U.S. troops had conducted three large-scale 
operations in Diyala since summer 2007; the most recent in January 2008 found little 
evidence of a large AQI presence in the province’s populated areas. However, Maliki’s 
priorities differed from those of the coalition, and the Prime Minister decided in late July 
to conduct another large operation in Diyala. This one, which the Prime Minister named 
Operation BASHIR AL-KHAIR (GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE), was ISF-led. 
To oversee the Iraqi part of the operation, Maliki ordered Iraqi Ground Forces Com-
mander Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan to take charge of the newly created Diyala 
Operations Command, another regional command like those the Iraqis had in Baghdad, 
Basrah, and Ninawa.110 Ghaidan brought most of the 1st Iraqi Division and a brigade of 
the 9th Iraqi Mechanized Division to reinforce the 5th Iraqi Division already stationed in 
Diyala. For Hertling and MND-N, the lead U.S. units in the operation would be Colonel 
John RisCassi’s 2d Stryker Cavalry Regiment, which deployed to Diyala in July to replace 
Colonel Jon Lehr’s 4th Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, and Colonel Patrick White’s 2d Bri-
gade, 1st Armored Division. RisCassi’s troops would focus on Baqubah and on the seam 
between Diyala and Salahadin Provinces, while White would focus on the rural areas 
near Balad Ruz.
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Petraeus reported to U.S. leaders that Maliki indicated that he intended to begin a 
Diyala operation in July.111 Maliki’s decision to shift the focus of the ISF from Mosul to 
Diyala surprised Hertling and other MND-N leaders. They believed their forces in Diyala 
had almost completed the necessary clearing operations in the province and were ready 
to enter the hold and build phase.112 For his part, Petraeus was pleased to see the Iraqis 
taking the initiative, reporting to Gates that ISF planning and preparation “demonstrates 
that they have learned a great deal since the start of the Basrah operation in March.”113
This optimism did not last long as Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE 
quickly derailed. Petraeus cautioned that in Diyala the ISF would operate along sensitive 
ethnic and sectarian fault lines. “Unlike the situation in predominantly Shi’a Amarah 
and Basrah, this offensive [would] have to deal with a mixed population of Shi’a Arabs, 
Sunni Arabs and Kurds, plus the presence of peshmerga forces from the KRG [Kurdistan 
Regional Government],” he observed on July 20.114 As 50,000 Iraqi and U.S. troops began 
new clearing operations during the last week of July, Iraqi commanders seemed more 
interested in establishing an ISF presence in the province’s mixed-sect and mixed-eth-
nicity areas than in pursuing AQI. The Iraqi Army and police activities in the province 
seemed particularly focused on slowing Diyala’s Sunni Awakening groups, which had 
grown rapidly since fall 2007. Sunni distrust grew quickly as ISF began setting up check-
points to control the movement of Diyala’s population.115 In the first 2 weeks of the oper-
ation, the ISF arrested more than 1,100 Sunnis, many of whom were members of the Sons 
of Iraq. The arrests created the impression that Maliki was employing the ISF to combat 
the perceived political threat of the Awakening, which looked poised to dominate the 
upcoming provincial elections, rather than the security threat of AQI.116 In response, on 
August 11, the Sunni-led Diyala provincial council voted to sack Major General Ghanem 
al-Qureishi, the Diyala provincial police chief who had pressured the Sons of Iraq for 
months. This led to a confrontation with Maliki, who had consistently backed Qureishi.
The following day, tensions worsened when Iraqi Army troops and Kurdish pesh-
merga came close to an armed clash in the upper Diyala Valley. The Iraqi Army units 
pushing north in Diyala arrived on the outskirts of Khanaqin, a Kurdish-majority town 
guarded by the 34th Peshmerga Brigade since 2003, and ordered the peshmerga to depart 
within 24 hours. This confrontation quickly escalated to a national political crisis as the 
peshmerga troops refused to leave. Khanaqin was on the de facto dividing line between 
territory controlled by the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) in Erbil, and the demand for the peshmerga to withdraw equated to 
a demand by Baghdad for the KRG to cede territory that Kurdish leaders considered part 
of Kurdistan.
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Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 2d Class Paul Seeber (Released).
Diyala Provincial Police Chief Major General Ghanem al-Qureishi Converses  
With a Colleague.117
The Khanaqin confrontation came 2 months after the Iraqi and Kurdistan Govern-
ments had rejected a recommendation by UN Envoy Staffan DeMistura to designate sev-
eral of the disputed territories along the Green Line—including upper Diyala—under the 
control of one government or the other.118 The tense tactical standoff surprised the Kurd-
ish political leaders, who began to question the reliability of their political alliance with 
the major Shi’a parties in Baghdad, an agreement that had dominated Iraqi politics since 
2003.119 The standoff also shocked coalition leaders, because it represented an unexpected 
Shi’a-Kurdish dispute rather than the Sunni-Shi’a sectarian conflict that had dominated 
the 2005–2007 period. To avoid the outbreak of a Shi’a-Kurdish war that would serve no 
one’s interest but AQI’s, Hertling and MNF-I J–3 Major General Michael Barbero began 
intense shuttle diplomacy between ISF and peshmerga commanders, making clear to 
each side that the other was prepared to fight. Meanwhile in Baghdad and Erbil, senior 
U.S. generals and diplomats encouraged Prime Minister Maliki and KRG leaders to reach 
a political solution. Nevertheless, as U.S. commanders in Diyala discovered, the Shi’a 
Arab ISF commanders along the Green Line were just as eager for a fight against the 
Kurds as the Sunni Arabs had been.
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The ISOF Diyala Raid 
With the standoff in Khanaqin still unresolved, Sunni-Shi’a sectarian tensions boiled 
over when Prime Minister Maliki employed Iraqi troops against the Diyala provincial 
government that had sacked police chief General Qureishi. One week after Qureishi’s 
firing, the Prime Minister’s office—through counterterrorism service chief, General Talib 
Kenani—ordered the ISOF to arrest Hussein al-Zubaidi, Diyala’s Sunni governor. The 
ISOF raid, which the CJSOTF refused to support because of the lack of evidence linking 
any of the targets to insurgent activity, turned into a fiasco. On the night of August 18, 
ISOF elements raided the governor’s office in Baqubah, arresting two prominent local 
Sunni politicians, killing the governor’s secretary, and wounding four Iraqis in a clear 
attempt at political intimidation.120 As the Iraqi commandos left, they became involved in 
a firefight with local police and fired on American forces assisting the police. It took the 
personal intervention of General Ali Ghaidan to untangle the mess. The incident infuri-
ated Petraeus, who “condemned the operation in the strongest terms” and “emphasized 
to the [Iraqi Government] that Coalition support for the ISF is dependent upon their 
adherence to the rule of law.” “PM [Prime Minister] Maliki has ordered an investigation, 
but this incident is lamentable (especially as the PM ordered it),” Petraeus wrote to Gates 
a few days after the raid.121
These politicized ISF activities and the battle for political control in the province over-
shadowed the fact that in remote parts of Diyala, U.S. units were still working to track 
down AQI’s top leaders and prevent the group from retaining sanctuaries. White’s troops 
focused on Balad Ruz, where coalition commanders believed AQI leader Abu Ayyub 
al-Masri might be.122 Making contact with the enemy proved difficult, especially in the 
area that U.S. troops called the “Turki Bowl” south of Balad Ruz. In the first 2 weeks of 
operations in the Turki Bowl, White’s brigade experienced no direct firefights, but lost 
more than 30 vehicles to IEDs. It was unclear whether the IEDs were part of an active 
enemy defense or merely part of an abandoned defensive belt network. Either way, in 
the dry, reed-choked irrigation canals that crisscrossed the area, White’s troops found 
hundreds of ammunition caches before withdrawing in late August.123 Meanwhile, in the 
Baqubah area, RisCassi’s cavalry troopers found the security situation much-improved 
from the previous fall, but they still encountered occasional booby-trapped houses and a 
new type of threat—female suicide bombers. By the late summer of 2008, female bomb-
ers wearing suicide vests had become a persistent danger in Baqubah and Muqdadiyah, 
where they often passed through security checkpoints without being fully searched by 
male Iraqi troops used to avoiding public contact with women.124
Despite these activities, the ISOF raid in Baqubah and the ISF-peshmerga tensions in 
Khanaqin cast a pall over Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE and dimin-
ished its tactical gains. The politically motivated clearing and checkpoint operations 
stoked ethno-sectarian tensions in the province but did little damage to AQI’s residual 
capability. The operation “really spiked the sectarian violence in Diyala,” Hertling later 
conceded, adding that the operation “almost had a complete falling apart of what we had 
established over 9 months.” Rather than being a culminating victory against Sunni ter-
rorists in Diyala, the operation had become, in Hertling’s estimation, “one of the biggest 
downers of our time over there.”125
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The ISOF Under Maliki: The “Dirty Brigade” 
The disturbing ISOF raid in Baqubah was the culmination of a year-and-a-half-long 
effort by Prime Minister Maliki to take full control of the ISOF, Iraq’s premier counter-
terrorism force, and use it against his rivals. From 2008 onward, Iraqis increasingly saw 
the ISOF as Maliki’s political tool. That commando force, hailed as heroes for its role in 
the 2004 battles in Najaf and Fallujah, became known in popular parlance as the “dirty 
brigade” or, in a throwback to the days of Saddam Hussein, the “Fedayeen Maliki.”
Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Daniel Mennuto (Released).
ISOF Commandos Conduct Night Missions Near Amarah With a CJSOTF Adviser.126
This was a significant shift from early 2007 when the ISOF brigade was considered 
the crown jewel of the ISF. Originally created in late 2003 as the 36th Commando Battal-
ion and continuously mentored and advised by the CJSOTF, the unit had grown in size 
and capability to the point that it could conduct short-notice heliborne assaults and inte-
grate information received by its human intelligence networks into operations. The ISOF 
were under the operational control of the coalition, but having seen the organization’s 
performance against AQI and Sadrist militias, Maliki had long sought more authority 
over the unit. Unable to convince coalition leaders to permit substantive changes to the 
ISOF’s command control arrangement, Maliki opted for a fait accompli in January 2007 
by issuing an executive order removing the brigade and its parent headquarters, the Iraqi 
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Counterterrorism Command, from the Ministry of Defense and placing it under his own 
Office of the Commander in Chief.127
The CJSOTF, which had considerable influence over the brigade because of its author-
ity to approve leadership changes and its control over the unit’s pay and finances, resisted 
Maliki’s politicization of the ISOF.128 CJSOTF leaders argued to MNF-I that if the ISOF bri-
gade was beholden solely to the Prime Minister, it would become his Praetorian Guard, 
and political or sectarian targeting would undoubtedly follow. Removing the brigade 
from the Ministry of Defense also would upend the basic institutional services needed to 
keep the ISOF brigade functioning, such as recruiting, pay, logistics, medical care, and 
intelligence.129
With the Counterterrorism Command an unstaffed shell incapable of operating as a 
higher headquarters and MNF-I siding with the CJSOTF, Maliki’s executive order ini-
tially had little impact. However, the coalition’s unified opposition to Maliki’s moves 
changed in the summer of 2007 when Navy SEAL Rear Admiral Edward G. Winters III 
took command of the Iraqi National Counterterrorism Force Transition Team, a special 
operations organization created to help the ISOF brigade shift to full Iraqi control. Win-
ters was convinced that the unit could not reach its full potential under the Ministry 
of Defense where bureaucratic infighting made funding, logistics, and maintenance a 
perennial headache.130 Winters also believed sectarian officers in the Ministry of Defense 
subverted the ISOF brigade mission against insurgents and militias.131 Over CJSOTF’s 
objections, Winters and other senior special operations leaders in Iraq recommended that 
the Iraqis create an organization similar to United States Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM)—an independent entity to control the country’s special operations budget 
and act as its own armed service, representing ISOF interests at the ministerial level. In 
Winters’s view, the proposed SOCOM-like counterterrorism organization should report 
directly to the chief executive, thereby removing layers of bureaucracy that slowed 
responses to national-level terrorist incidents.132 Because this idea mirrored Maliki’s exec-
utive order and a transition to Iraqi control would have to happen at some point, Winters 
asked Petraeus to endorse Maliki’s proposal. Petraeus was initially noncommittal in part 
due to the CJSOTF’s opposition to the plan, but after Winters enlisted the support of a 
senior special operations commander in summer 2007, Petraeus relented and endorsed 
the proposal.133
The decision slowly changed the nature of the ISOF as Maliki loyalists moved into 
key leadership positions and the Counterterrorism Command grew from a shell to a 
functioning headquarters. Lieutenant General Taleb Dhia Kanani and Lieutenant Gen-
eral Abdul Ghani al-Asadi, two officers with a history of service in Saddam’s Army but 
no special operations experience, received top positions in the Counterterrorism Com-
mand and Service, prompting concern among CJSOTF officers and senior ISOF leaders. 
Kanani, a Maliki loyalist, previously had angered ISOF members when he investigated 
unfounded allegations that the Iraqi commandos had executed civilians during a March 
2006 raid of a JAM compound in Adhamiyah. Many ISOF commandos “were convinced 
that Kenani was the devil incarnate,” recalled a CJSOTF commander.134 Iraqi leaders also 
resisted the move. “[Maliki] just put two Iranians in charge of the ISOF brigade,” Colo-
nel Fadhil Jamil al Barwari, the brigade’s Kurdish commander, told a CJSOTF adviser 
upon hearing of the appointments.135 Under Kanani’s oversight, Shi’a officers with ties to 
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Maliki but little or no special operations experience began to replace experienced ISOF 
officers. CJSOTF advisers noticed alarming trends, “witnessing punitive reassignments 
of officers [and] ethnically oriented organizational changes,” and concluded that Maliki 
was cementing personal control of the brigade with these actions.136 These changes, com-
bined with other officer reassignments, amounted to placing “Shi’a sectarian commissars 
meant to watch over and make sure the ISOF does only the bidding of the Shi’a govern-
ment,” according to one CJSOTF commander.137 When Winters confronted Kenani about 
the personnel changes, the Iraqi general claimed the increase in Shi’a ISOF officers was 
the result of Kurds and Sunnis not wanting to leave their homes and move to the ISOF 
headquarters in Baghdad.138
As the leadership of the brigade changed, the CJSOTF struggled to keep the unit 
nonsectarian, insisting on maintaining ethnic quotas among the ISOF’s enlisted recruits 
to preserve the brigade’s original balanced composition of 61 percent Shi’a, 24 percent 
Sunni, and 12 percent Kurdish.139 Recruits submitted to polygraphs and counterintelli-
gence interviews to confirm they were not members of militias. Strict entry requirements 
also helped maintain the brigade’s makeup, with only 42 percent of applicants passing 
the unit’s selection course during 2008.140 On several occasions, these entry requirements 
blocked large groups of Shi’a soldiers that arrived without warning, alleging their assign-
ment to the brigade as replacements.141
Nevertheless, the purge of the brigade’s leadership and infiltration of its commanding 
headquarters had a sectarian impact. By early 2008, CJSOTF advisers noticed a higher 
failure rate when the brigade struck politically sensitive Shi’a targets and concluded that 
the new leadership was tipping off the targets or steering the raids toward token, low-
level Shi’a militants.142 Testing their theory, CJSOTF advisers helped loyal ISOF soldiers 
submit lengthy, “near perfect” target packages against Shi’a targets, but they were rejected 
without explanation every time, while similar packages for Sunni targets received easy 
approval.143 At the same time, CJSOTF leaders concluded that Iraqi leaders had begun to 
give the ISOF sectarian missions or to dispatch them against Maliki’s political opponents. 
When such missions occurred, the CJSOTF advisers refused to accompany the ISOF com-
mandos and notified MNC-I, who in turn worked with MNF-I to lodge formal protests.144 
On some occasions, the ISOF brigade conducted operations at the behest of Prime Minis-
ter Maliki and only informed the CJSOTF after the missions were concluded.
The August 2008 ISOF raid against the Diyala governor’s office was a turning point 
for CJSOTF leaders, who began to question their continued collaboration with the orga-
nization they had created. Concluding that the sectarian influence ran too deep to repair, 
CJSOTF advisers began to distance themselves from any ISOF operations that resembled 
sectarian intimidation and instead began to work more closely with the Ministry of the 
Interior’s Emergency Response Units, six elite special weapons and tactics battalions pat-
terned after the FBI’s hostage rescue teams and national counterterrorism teams.145 The 
CJSOTF’s separation from the ISOF was jarring to the many U.S. and Iraqi special oper-
ators who had worked closely in combat for almost 5 years. Many of the rank-and-file 
ISOF members recognized the sectarian change to their unit, but were powerless to stop 
it. “You taught us about being Iraqis . . . You taught us that our ethnicity is not part of it, 
[that it should be] Iraq first,” one saddened ISOF leader told a CJSOTF commander. “You 
taught us better than this.”146
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Maliki and the SOFA 
During the summer of 2008, U.S. leaders began to realize that the biggest impedi-
ment to a status of forces agreement was Maliki himself. U.S. leaders had believed that 
what held the Prime Minister from reaching a long-term military relationship with the 
United States was opposition from Shi’a militant factions and the Iranian regime, so if 
those two groups were neutralized, Maliki could sign a binding agreement. The Ameri-
can leaders initially believed that the military victory over Iran’s proxies in spring 2008 
had removed the SOFA’s biggest impediment, but they soon realized they were wrong. 
From his espousal of Senator Obama’s 16-month withdrawal timeline to his misuse of the 
ISF in Diyala, Maliki demonstrated that he viewed the continued U.S. military presence 
as an obstacle to his personal objectives. He was also reluctant to be, as Petraeus put it, 
“the first Iraqi leader to legitimize a foreign military presence in Iraq.”147
Nevertheless, Bush and other senior U.S. leaders pressed the Iraqi leader to final-
ize the U.S.-Iraqi agreement in August. Realizing the U.S. approach needed a reboot, 
Bush instructed White House official Brett McGurk, Ambassador David Satterfield, and 
Pentagon official Mark Kimmitt to take over the SOFA negotiations from Ambassador 
Loftis and his team. To give his new negotiators greater leeway, Bush authorized them 
to offer the Maliki government a specific timeline for U.S. troop withdrawal, something 
the President previously refused to consider. As the new talks got underway, Maliki and 
his advisers pressed the American team for a general withdrawal of U.S. combat forces 
by December 31, 2010, but conceded a need for a residual force beyond that date to train 
the Iraqi security forces.148
On August 4, the two sides agreed that the final U.S.-Iraq security accord would spec-
ify a departure date between 2010 and 2011, an understanding that led the U.S. negotia-
tors to assume Maliki had accepted the terms of the SOFA. However, they were wrong.149 
As days passed, it became clear that Maliki had not agreed with his own negotiators and 
had developed “cold feet” about the agreement, perhaps out of concern that Ayatollah 
Ali Husayni Sistani would oppose it, as Petraeus reported on August 10.150
On August 21, the negotiators finally agreed that U.S. combat troops would leave Iraq 
by the end of 2011, a concession that U.S. officials hoped would finally secure Maliki’s 
backing for the SOFA.151 Even with the specified departure date, however, the negotia-
tors on both sides understood that the agreement could be extended or rolled over later, 
meaning that a full U.S. military departure would not be set in stone. To close the deal, 
U.S. officials arranged a videoconference between Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on 
August 22, in which the American President made a personal entreaty to Maliki to sign 
the SOFA and settle the two countries’ military relationship. To the dismay of Petraeus 
and senior U.S. leaders, the Iraqi Prime Minister appeared nervous and noncommittal, 
declining Bush’s entreaty and claiming the matter needed more study and consideration.
The inconclusive meeting left U.S. leaders to question whether the events of 2008, in 
which Maliki had effectively overpowered his strongest political rivals, left the Prime 
Minister less inclined to strike an agreement with the United States rather than more. 
Commenting on the episode to Gates, Petraeus wrote that, in front of the President, 
Maliki had “delayed and dissembled, generally demonstrating considerable vacillation 
and lack of confidence.”152 Recounting the details of the videoconference to his senior 
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general officers the following morning, a frustrated Petraeus concluded that Maliki had 
failed an important test of statesmanship. “There was just no leadership in that room,” 
Petraeus said.153
In retrospect, what appeared to Petraeus and others as Maliki’s lack of confidence 
may simply have been the Prime Minister’s effort to stave off an agreement he saw as 
unnecessary. Maliki’s opposition to the SOFA may have reflected his growing confi-
dence, because of his successes in Basrah, Sadr City, Amarah, and his takeover of the 
ISOF brigade. In the days following the inconclusive videoconference, Maliki surprised 
his U.S. counterparts again by dismissing the Iraqi negotiating team led by a senior for-
eign ministry official and replacing it with the same group of Da’wa Party advisers who 
had negotiated the UNSCR rollover in late 2007. Led by Mowaffaq Rubaie, the new nego-
tiating team emphasized that any U.S.-Iraqi agreement would have to stipulate that apart 
from advisory teams and PRTs, U.S. troops would withdraw from all Iraqi cities by June 
30, 2009. To senior U.S. leaders, this withdrawal would happen over time anyway and 
thus be accepted with little cost.154 Nevertheless, the unresolved negotiations meant that 
Petraeus would be leave command in Iraq without a settled legal justification for his 
forces to remain beyond the end of the year.
***
Summer 2008 found the situation in Iraq much changed in the space of a year. Vio-
lence in Baghdad almost had ceased, the Shi’a militants had been routed, and AQI had 
been forced into the far north of the country. As large numbers of U.S. troops redeployed 
outside Iraq, the coalition’s morale was high. An impressive display of U.S. military com-
mitment came at Camp Victory on July 4 when Petraeus presided over a reenlistment 
ceremony for 1,215 U.S. service members in the ornate rotunda of Faw Palace, an event 
that MNF-I considered the largest mass reenlistment ever held.155 A week later, when Pet-
raeus and Crocker presided over their last Campaign Assessment and Synchronization 
Board together, the coalition leaders concluded that the coalition already had achieved 
the near-term security objectives of the 2007 joint campaign plan. In their estimation, 
the time had come to shift “from directly protecting the population to jointly achieving 
a level of security that can be maintained by Iraqi security and civil institutions with 
reduced Coalition involvement.”156
Petraeus himself spent his last weeks in Iraq shifting focus from Iraq to Afghan-
istan and other pressing problems he would soon be responsible for as CENTCOM 
commander. In early August, while U.S. and Iraqi troops conducted Operation GLAD 
TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE in Diyala, the MNF-I commander traveled to Afghanistan 
to assess what he anticipated would be a challenge rivaling that of Iraq and a major issue 
during the next Presidential administration.157 On August 17, Petraeus reported to Gates 
that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating and would require “‘thickening the 
force,’ both by generating more Afghan forces and by creating ‘Awakening’ style security 
arrangements wherever possible—in addition to increasing the Coalition forces there.”158 
Petraeus’s solution for Afghanistan would thus be to take pages from the Iraq playbook 
that had worked for him.
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In operational terms, the surge had indeed achieved most of its objectives by summer 
2008. The populations of central, southern, and western Iraq in particular were return-
ing to a normal way of life. But the events of the summer showed that political objec-
tives would be more difficult. As the pressure of violence decreased, Iraqis had begun 
to assert their sovereignty both in seeking to take over the leadership role in security 
operations and in driving a hard bargain for a long-term U.S.-Iraqi security agreement. 
The uncertainty of the U.S. Presidential election campaign affected the situation as well, 
given Obama’s well-publicized plans to withdraw from Iraq.
The continuing ethno-sectarian conflict in Diyala disappointed U.S. commanders in 
the north who had hoped to deal AQI a knockout blow and stabilize the restive province. 
Prime Minister Maliki’s refusal to sign a U.S.-Iraq SOFA struck a major blow to senior 
U.S. leaders in Baghdad and Washington, casting doubt on whether the strategic gains 
of the Iraq War could be consolidated. The problematic role of the Iraqi security forces in 
ethno-sectarian political disputes and the emerging tendency of Prime Minister Maliki to 
consolidate power were ominous signs of future instability. The Prime Minister’s actions 
made it unclear whether the coalition could accomplish its goals of good governance and 
national reconciliation—goals that coalition leaders believed necessary to ensure Iraq’s 
long-term stability. Finally, the campaign in Mosul remained unfinished. Though U.S. 
and Iraqi troops had pursued AQI to remote corners of the country, the extremists still 
could conduct limited but complex attacks in the north. As Petraeus prepared to leave 
Baghdad, all of this unfinished business would fall to his successor, General Odierno.
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CONCLUSION: THE SURGE, 2007-2008
The change in the operational situation in Iraq from the beginning of the surge to its 
end was sweeping. By mid-2008, most of the Sunni insurgents that had threatened the 
Iraqi state’s very existence in 2006 had either switched sides or fled to remote areas where 
they posed little danger to Iraq’s heartland. The Iraqi security forces that had struggled 
to function in 2006 had grown by more than 140,000 troops and operated throughout the 
country. The Iranian-backed Shi’a militias that had dominated large swaths of Baghdad 
and southern Iraq had been defeated. The Syria-based foreign fighter network that had 
funneled thousands of terrorists into Iraq was neutralized. Life in Baghdad had returned 
to normality just 2 years after the carnage of 2006. Anbar, Iraq’s most restive province in 
2006, was now at its most peaceful. For the first time since 2003, the Iraqi Government 
controlled the lower Tigris and Euphrates River valleys from Baghdad to the sea, and 
pacification of the upper Tigris and upper Diyala valleys seemed within reach.
All this seemed unlikely after Multi-National Force-Iraq’s (MNF-I) failed transition 
campaign in late 2006 when its internal strategic review acknowledged both a deteriorat-
ing security situation and a joint campaign plan with misaligned ends, ways, and means. 
General George W. Casey, Jr., sought to correct this and check the descent into sectarian 
civil war by accelerating the transition to Iraqi control and prodding the Nuri al-Maliki 
government into confronting the Shi’a militias and reconciling with the Sunnis. Casey 
had believed that drawing down was the surest way of maintaining an extended—albeit 
reduced—U.S. presence in Iraq, thus achieving the nation’s objectives. By the end of 2006, 
President George W. Bush no longer found this persuasive. The White House strategy 
review that had begun in the summer gathered steam in the fall and finally culminated 
in January 2007 with the announcement of the “new way forward” that included a surge 
of U.S. troops and a new commander. Replacing Casey as MNF-I commander 1 month 
later, General David Petraeus developed and implemented a strategy, distinct in many 
respects from its predecessor but most markedly so in its intentional realignment of ends, 
ways, and means.
The surge, of course, provided the coalition with additional means, chiefly the 5 U.S. 
brigade combat teams (BCTs) that arrived between January and May 2007 to raise the 
total number of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq to 20—the highest it had been since the 
invasion. Two more Marine rifle battalions and a regimental-sized expeditionary unit 
also deployed as part of the surge, joining with forces already on the ground to expand 
MNF-I’s operational reach into enemy sanctuaries throughout central Iraq. The commit-
ment of an additional division headquarters and its combat aviation brigade facilitated 
this geographical expansion by providing focused command and control—particularly 
across Baghdad’s southern “belts.” In 2007, the arrival of several additional provincial 
reconstruction teams extended the coalition’s reach, capitalizing on security gains to 
improve local governance and economic development. A surge of enablers gave BCT 
commanders capabilities that dramatically increased intelligence collection and analysis, 
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force protection, and population control. For example, full-motion video, document 
exploitation, and signals intelligence gave tactical leaders increased targeting proficiency 
and precision.
Time remained a finite resource, though. Frequently mentioning the tyranny of the 
“Washington and Baghdad clocks,” Petraeus sought to buy time in the United States by 
emphasizing the need for patience and promising to report on the effects of the surge 
to Congress in September 2007. In Iraq, Petraeus and U.S. Ambassador Ryan Crocker 
pursued reconciliation and capacity building as U.S. forces refocused on the reduction 
of sectarian violence. Even so, political progress came haltingly as Iraqi factions resisted 
compromise in the complex communal struggle for power and the Iranian and Syrian 
regimes intervened in the process.
The “new way forward” ushered in no sweeping change of the Iraq War’s desired 
end state, but Petraeus described his objectives differently, making protecting the civil-
ian population preeminent and setting a goal of a “baseline of security” by mid-2008 and 
“sustainable stability” by the spring of 2009. Neither Petraeus nor Lieutenant General 
Raymond Odierno believed quickly shifting to Iraqi control made sense so long as the 
Iraqi Government and its security forces were complicit in sectarian violence. As MNF-I’s 
emphasis on “Iraqi Army lead” and “provincial Iraqi control” receded, the reduction of 
violence emerged as the key measure of success, encouraging coalition units to concen-
trate on resolving the internecine struggle and allowing reconciliation at the local level. 
The coalition’s new metrics reflected Petraeus and Odierno’s judgment that transition 
could not precede reconciliation.
At the tactical level, Petraeus and Odierno pressed U.S. commanders to establish a 
persistent presence among the population. In Baghdad, this led to the creation or expan-
sion of dozens of joint security stations and combat outposts. The decision to maximize 
forward presence allowed a tactical change that eventually had a remarkable operational 
impact. BCT commanders positioning their battalions forward reported a sharp rise in 
intelligence tips that often blossomed into targetable information. As units successfully 
prosecuted those targets, killing or arresting insurgents and sectarians, more Iraqis came 
forward with information, confident their tips would be heeded. As the cycle continued, 
its effects compounded and expanded, dealing both insurgents and militias punishing 
blows that shifted the initiative to the coalition for the first time since 2004.
This same virtuous cycle enabled the spread of the Awakening that had begun in 
Ramadi in 2006. The spread of combat outposts facilitated engagement opportunities 
with local leaders that, at times, led to accommodations or cease-fires with former insur-
gents. As U.S. forces expanded their presence throughout western and central Iraq, Sunni 
tribes and insurgent groups fighting a desperate multi-front war against al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI), the coalition, and—especially in mixed-sect areas—Shi’a militias and the Iraqi 
security forces sought truces with their American foes. At the same time, U.S. command-
ers exploited this opportunity to persuade their erstwhile Sunni opponents to turn their 
guns against their common enemies, namely AQI and its extremist allies. Seizing such 
an opportunity often entailed tremendous risk for U.S. commanders, since Sunni fighters 
did not fall neatly and consistently into the categories of “reconcilable” and “irreconcil-
able.” While the Awakening was unquestionably an organic movement borne of Sunni 
discontent and an acknowledgment of their perilous prospects, there is likewise little 
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doubt that the actions taken by senior coalition leaders helped nurture and spread the 
budding movement.
Lines formed by tribal loyalties and insurgent affiliations with AQI blurred within 
the slightly broader context of a war within a war as clans and houses struggled for 
dominance in a local area. Odierno considered accepting the risk associated with this 
bottom-up reconciliation one of his most important decisions as Multi-National Corps-
Iraq (MNC-I) commander. To ease the Maliki government’s fears of a Ba’athist resur-
gence and to solidify the security gains of the Awakening as it spread from Anbar into 
Baghdad, the “belts,” and beyond, the coalition created organizations and processes to 
link these bottom-up efforts with the central government. Sectarian biases and suspi-
cions were difficult to overcome, and—though the ranks of the Sons of Iraq steadily grew 
well into 2008—the idea that a loose patchwork of local accommodations with U.S. units 
would eventually lead to a broad interconnected “quilt” knit together by national recon-
ciliation proved difficult to fulfill. Nonetheless, in the near term, employing forward-po-
sitioned American forces as a means of brokering ceasefires and enlisting Sunni fighters 
in the struggle against AQI threatened Sunni extremists by denying AQI its long-term 
safe havens and restricting its freedom of action.
Additional U.S. forces did not obviate the need for operational art. Commanders had 
to employ combat units in relation to key terrain and adaptive enemies. Not unlike the 
Sunni and Shi’a militants battling for control of Baghdad, coalition commanders made 
Iraq’s capital their main effort. As surge BCTs flowed into Iraq during the first half of 
2007, Odierno placed them in the city, but he also distributed headquarters and battal-
ions in the “belts” arcing north and south, where they began to push into sanctuaries that 
had long been without coalition presence. In June, with all of his forces in place, Odierno 
launched simultaneous operations across Baghdad and the “belts” even as MNC-I con-
tinued to exploit the Awakening in Anbar. Odierno’s innovation was to use four U.S. 
division-sized units in and around Baghdad for synchronized operations to secure the 
population and interdict “accelerants” that infiltrated the city from safe havens—many 
in the “belts.” With the arrival of “accelerants” halted, AQI and Shi’a militias were unable 
to stoke the sectarian fires through high-profile attacks.
By the fall of 2007, MNF-I had retaken the initiative, and AQI was reeling. Still, in spite 
of the surge, the coalition had to rely on economy-of-force efforts in Mosul and Basra. As 
the pressure increased in Baghdad and Anbar became more inhospitable to AQI fighters, 
the group’s leadership in Iraq retreated up the Diyala and Tigris River Valleys, regroup-
ing in Mosul. A battle for that city loomed in early 2008, but Prime Minister Maliki had 
other plans, launching an offensive against the Sadrists in Basra and Sadr City. Signif-
icant security gains in Baghdad and the impending drawdown of coalition forces did 
not eliminate the challenge Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin faced when he succeeded 
Odierno as MNC-I commander in early 2008. Thanks to an AQI stronghold in Mosul and 
Maliki’s unexpected decision to fight the Sadrists, MNC-I had to expand its operational 
footprint even as its troop levels steadily fell. Furthermore, Iraq’s factions continued to 
posture for advantage in the ongoing communal struggle for power, particularly as the 
various parties prepared for provincial elections.
The successes and disappointments of the surge had much to do with unity and dis-
unity of effort. A close, cooperative relationship between Petraeus and Crocker enhanced 
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the joint campaign and amplified the surge’s military effects. In mid-2007, the Multi- 
National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) modified its approach under a 
new commander, General James Dubik, and synchronized its support to the Iraqi security 
forces with MNC-I. By contrast, Multi-National Division-Southeast’s (MND-SE) devia-
tion from the MNF-I campaign plan in 2007 brought the British and American divergence 
to a head in 2008 and sowed the seeds for the crisis that precipitated Operation CHARGE 
OF THE KNIGHTS. Most notably, the Maliki government sought different end states 
than those of the United States—a point that became more prominent during the negoti-
ations over a U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement.
With the departure of the last surge BCT in the summer of 2008 and provincial elec-
tions set for early 2009, the surge had culminated. The coalition’s military gains were 
indisputable, setting the stage for a steady yet unprecedented drop in attacks soon after 
Petraeus departed for U.S. Central Command and Odierno returned to Baghdad to take 
his place. What remained to be seen was whether the U.S.-led coalition could translate 
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ODIERNO TAKES COMMAND
General Raymond T. Odierno assumed command from General David H. Petraeus on 
September 16 in Faw Palace at Camp Victory during a ceremony presided over by Sec-
retary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates. Odierno’s respite from Iraq had lasted barely 
7 months, but the character of the conflict had changed dramatically in his absence. The 
combined coalition-Iraqi offensive against Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) in Basrah and Baghdad 
in the spring, along with renewed operations against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in Diyala 
and Mosul in the late summer, had reduced the level of violence to near-record lows by 
the time Odierno took command. Territory that had been in enemy hands in 2006 and 
2007 was largely under Iraqi Government control by the fall of 2008, and the Sunni and 
Shi’a militant groups that had appeared on the verge of overwhelming the Iraqi Govern-
ment in 2006 were in retreat nearly everywhere. After a year and a half of intense combat 
operations under the surge, Odierno’s first task as Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) 
commander would be to shift the coalition’s focus onto the many noncombat activities 
and nontraditional missions needed to complete the operational victory the coalition 
troops, Iraqi security forces (ISF), and Sons of Iraq had won in 2007-2008.
Source: DoD photo by Jerry Morrison (Released).
General Raymond Odierno With Secretary of Defense Robert Gates During the 
MNF-I Change of Command Ceremony.1
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Since giving up command of Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) to Lieutenant Gen-
eral Lloyd J. Austin in February, Odierno had spent almost all of the intervening months 
preparing to return to Baghdad. In the weeks before he took charge of MNF-I, he and 
his close advisers pondered how they might need to adapt the campaign plan. In Odier-
no’s view, by late summer 2008 the coalition needed to “shift from security primacy to 
political primacy” and focus on supporting Iraqi political actions rather than conduct-
ing major security operations. Odierno still believed that fully defeating AQI and Irani-
an-sponsored militant groups required intense military operations. But, if mainstream 
Iraqi political groups would use the constitutional process, the coalition could support 
the governance and economic reforms needed to make a lasting political reconciliation. 
Overall, Odierno expected that MNF-I’s mission was to be stability and support opera-
tions, as well as peacekeeping.
Accordingly, Odierno planned to update the Joint Campaign Plan to reflect the new 
priorities and invited a team of external experts to Baghdad to assist with this update. 
He also reorganized MNF-I’s intelligence resources and directed them toward political 
issues, social movements, and broader regional dynamics, leaving MNC-I’s intelligence 
units to handle tactical and security-related matters. Odierno expected that support for 
the impending Iraqi provincial elections of January 2009 would be among the coalition’s 
top priorities once he took command, and that the subsequent 1-year period between 
provincial and national elections would be decisive for achieving the end state of the 
campaign. Above all, Odierno anticipated that the not-yet-finalized U.S.-Iraq security 
agreement would significantly alter the conditions under which his forces operated, as 
the Iraqi Government continued to assert greater independence and more control over 
the coalition’s activities. With the changed security environment and the likely expiration 
of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) under which the coalition 
had operated, Odierno believed the Iraqi Government would press for visible changes in 
the coalition’s mode of operations. This would include a reduction in his forces’ footprint 
in Baghdad and other cities and the return of the Republican Palace to Iraqi control.
Of course, MNF-I’s troop strength had already diminished by the time Odierno took 
command. As the 15-month tours of the surge brigades ended, the U.S. force in Iraq 
had returned to its late-2006 size of 15 brigades. Odierno and his advisers believed that 
political pressures both in Iraq and in the United States eventually would dictate further 
force reductions with the brigades that remained gradually assuming a training, advi-
sory, and overwatch role, leaving Iraqi forces responsible for security operations. As he 
left for Baghdad in early September, Odierno speculated that within 24 months MNF-I 
might evolve into an Office of Military Cooperation (OMC)—an “OMC-Egypt on ste-
roids”—with five U.S. brigades, which he considered “the minimum amount in case it 
goes south.”2
Zero Attacks
On September 19, 3 days after Odierno took command of MNF-I, there were no 
civilian casualties in the entire country for a 24-hour period. This was only the fourth 
occurrence since the 2003 invasion.3 October saw only 983 security incidents of all kinds, 
the lowest total since January 2004. On October 31, there was another 24-hour period 
without any civilian casualties.4 In the last week of November, there were 111 security 
incidents, the lowest weekly total since the end of 2003. In December, there were fewer 
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than 600.5 High-profile attacks such as car bombings fell to their lowest levels since 2004, 
though they still accounted for almost half of the casualties. The change was unmistak-
able: in 2007, an average of 124 coalition troops, Iraqi troops, and civilians were killed or 
wounded each day, but for 2008, the average was 47 per day.6
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant J. B. Jaso (Released).
A U.S. Soldier Plays Foosball With Children in Husseniyah Nahia.7
Although the ISF continued to lose more than 100 soldiers or police each month, espe-
cially in areas such as Mosul, life for civilians in central and southern Iraq returned to 
what Iraqis considered normal. Baghdad residents encountered a new problem with the 
volume of traffic on its streets, similar to other Arab capitals, and Iraqi officials began 
exploring options for mass transit projects.8 In a symbolic move, the famous Mutanabi 
book market reopened in December, 21 months after it had been destroyed by an AQI car 
bomb in March 2007.9
 
Source: DoD photo by Specialist Grant Okubo (Released).
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki at a Ceremony Reopening Baghdad’s  
Historic Mutanabi Book Market.10
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The Push for Improved Governance
With the improved security conditions, however, came heightened expectations 
among Iraqi civilians of a “peace dividend” with restored essential services and eco-
nomic activity. As violence receded in central and southern Iraq, the long-standing short-
age of electricity became the public’s top concern, one that threatened to undermine the 
government’s legitimacy. The Ba’athist regime provided unlimited free electricity, and 
the new Iraqi Government sought to follow that policy. Fall 2008 saw occasional angry 
protests by thousands of Baghdadis against the Minister of Electricity. Coalition leaders 
noted with worry that a large portion of Iraqi civilians believed public services had been 
better under Saddam Hussein, a perception that militants might exploit to inflame the 
security situation. In his third week in command, Odierno reported to Washington that 
electricity had become “the number one problem in Iraq.”11 However, the Iraqi ministries 
typically lacked the will or capacity to follow suit, leaving the Maliki government dogged 
by public dissatisfaction.
While the surge provided Maliki the breathing space needed to address the country’s 
thorny political challenges, U.S. leaders in the Green Zone feared that he could not or 
would not do so, particularly in parts of Iraq that had been under militant control. Even 
though Iraqi security forces were mostly able to establish a presence in liberated areas, the 
restoration of other government functions and essential services often lagged far behind.
To better assess the Government of Iraq’s performance and institutional capacity, 
MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy commissioned a Governance Assessment Team (GAT) 
under Colonel H. R. McMaster and Ambassador Larry C. Napper. Over several weeks 
in 2008, the team of civilian and military experts, many of whom had served on the Joint 
Strategic Assessment Team (JSAT) in 2007, investigated Iraq’s ministerial capacity, pro-
vincial administration, economic development, and political progress to determine how 
to help the Iraqi Government to reestablish the level of governance demanded by its 
population. The GAT validated what many coalition units had seen at the local level: 
corrupt and often sectarian state institutions, a shortage of quality mid-level officials, and 
the legacy of an overly complex Ba’athist bureaucratic system diminished government 
capacity and impeded political progress.12
The GAT found that money was not the problem: the Iraqi Government was not poor. 
Oil revenues increased by almost 10 percent from 2007 to 2008, spurred by the improved 
security situation in the north and anti-corruption measures at the Bayji refinery. By mid-
2008, the Iraqi Government was exporting about 1.8 million barrels per day at export 
prices of roughly $83 per barrel.13 The Iraqi economy was growing at a rate of about 7 
percent, and the government budget grew a whopping 22 percent from 2007 to 2008. 
The result was a government that had vast oil wealth at its disposal but little capacity to 
spend it effectively. The Maliki government “had more money than it knew what to do 
with,” observed Colonel Rick L. Waddell, a senior economist on the GAT.14
The problem, the GAT found, was that Iraqi civil servants responsible for finances 
were incapable of executing the government budget. In many ministries, senior civil ser-
vants had been purged as Ba’athists in 2003-2004, leaving only inexperienced junior offi-
cials or incompetent political appointees. Meanwhile, those professional civil servants 
who remained went about their duties as though they were still in the sanctions-era 
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bureaucracy of Saddam Hussein, when the goal had been to hoard resources rather than 
spend them and even minor decisions were made at the highest possible level.15 Risk 
aversion was still prevalent in early 2008, when most decisions were made by ministers 
selected for political loyalty rather than for professional competence.
Because the central Iraqi Government  lacked the capacity to spend its budget, the 
GAT recommended that local agencies be given more spending authority. Doing so 
would require political changes. Public finance management experts brought in by the 
coalition to analyze the convoluted process by which funds flowed from Baghdad to the 
provinces found that the central government did not distribute resources equitably to 
Sunni and Kurdish provinces.16 When the ministries allocated money or resources to the 
provinces, it was usually in a halting, unpredictable manner under the close control of 
ministerial officials using an antiquated paper-and-courier-based distribution system.17 
Similarly, without a modern banking system that facilitated electronic funds transfers, 
cash payments were the norm, facilitating corruption.
To help overcome this lack of government capacity, the GAT recommended that the 
coalition increase its advisory effort to the Iraqi ministries. The GAT found that, despite 
spending tens of billions of dollars on reconstruction through the Iraqi Reconstruction 
Management Office and other agencies, the U.S. Embassy was ineffective in improving 
the ministries, partly because it lacked sufficient advisory personnel and access to the 
Iraqi ministries. The GAT recommended that MNF-I use military officers to augment the 
Embassy’s advisers and military resources to ensure that coalition officials could travel 
to the ministries.18
The next major recommendation from the GAT involved connecting improvements 
in governance and economic development at the local or provincial level to the minis-
tries in Baghdad. The provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) and the embedded pro-
vincial reconstruction teams (EPRTs) worked together with the brigades at the local 
level striving to encourage this connection and good governance within their areas of 
operations.  However, there was only so much they could accomplish on their own. In 
Diyala Province, for example, Colonel Jon S. Lehr’s 4th Stryker Brigade Combat Team 
(BCT), 2d Infantry Division, discovered that the province’s budget, consisting of billions 
of Iraqi dinars, was managed by “an elderly woman in the basement of the provincial 
center using a ledger pad, straight ruler, and a pencil.”19 In Mosul, officials were unable 
to establish a municipal garbage collection program. Under Iraq’s centralized system of 
government, responsibility for trash collection fell under the Ministry of Public Works 
in Baghdad, which Michael Ensch of the Army Corps of Engineers described as “abso-
lutely dysfunctional.”20 Local EPRTs spent significant time and resources attempting to 
resolve these types of problems, but any improvement was short-lived if not sustained 
with assistance from the ministries in Baghdad.
Connecting the Iraqi provinces to the central government was not a straightforward 
matter. During years of insurgency, large swaths of the country had fallen out of contact 
with Baghdad. At the same time, the ministries had been a literal battlefield during the 
violence of 2006-2007, and ministerial officials had often lived and worked under siege, 
hunkering down and unable to attend to the business of governance. U.S. units and dip-
lomats in 2007-2008 often found themselves trying to reestablish a working relationship 
between the central government and its outlying territories. To forge connections across 
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the levels of government, U.S. forces frequently used “helicopter diplomacy” in which 
U.S. helicopters ferried provincial and central government officials between the capital 
and provinces.21 In many cases, the U.S. commanders and diplomats who transported 
senior ministerial officials to the provinces found that their Iraqi counterparts were vis-
iting the provinces for the first time and had never met their branch staffs there. This 
improved communication in the short term, but systemic changes were needed to ensure 
cooperation endured after the coalition left.
THE NORTHERN IRAQ PROBLEM
The Arab-Kurd Conflict
Among the problems Odierno faced was the worsening territorial dispute between 
Arabs and Kurds over the fate of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. As Odierno took command 
in mid-September, Arab-Kurd tensions threatened to fracture Iraq’s governing coalition 
and reignite the civil war—albeit along a different axis. In August, Iraqi Army troops and 
Kurdish peshmerga had come close to blows in the town of Khanaqin. That town and 
other parts of northern Diyala had been under peshmerga control since the early days 
of the war, but as the Iraqi security forces (ISF) proceeded up the Diyala Valley to clear 
AQI support zones during Operation GLAD TIDINGS OF BENEVOLENCE, they had 
aggressively entered areas the Kurdish Government considered under its control. The 
34th Peshmerga Brigade, which had occupied and worked to pacify Khanaqin since 2003, 
in turn defied orders from the Maliki government to withdraw and give way to Iraqi 
Army troops. Instead, the peshmerga had dug in, and both sides braced themselves for a 
possible civil war. U.S. military advisers in the area had worked to defuse the confronta-
tion, but commanders on both sides, Arab and Kurdish, seemed eager to fight.22
The armed standoff had grown serious enough that Major General Mark P. Hertling 
and his Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) hastily deployed additional troops and 
advisers to the Khanaqin area to separate the Arab and Kurdish units and prevent a 
costly battle between Iraqi forces that were supposed to be on the same side. “It was 
one of my three worst days in Iraq,” Hertling would later recall.23 For his part, Hertling 
was determined not to become embroiled in this Iraqi-Kurdish brinksmanship, telling all 
involved that in the event of ISF-peshmerga fighting, U.S. forces would support neither 
side. “I would pull back all my advisors,” Hertling told them. “I would tell all my other 
forces to return to their [bases]. I wasn’t going to take sides on this, and [they] would 
be responsible for any bloodshed.”24 Defusing the situation ultimately required Prime 
Minister Maliki and President Jalal Talabani to order their respective ISF and peshmerga 
commanders to stand down, after which leaders in Baghdad and Erbil negotiated a deal 
under which Kurdish police patrolled the city and the peshmerga withdrew.25
In one of his first acts as MNF-I commander, Odierno instructed MNC-I Commander 
General Austin to increase the number of U.S. advisers with all Iraqi units in eastern 
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Diyala to prevent further Arab-Kurd confrontations.26 The narrow escape in Khanaqin 
showed that a conflict that had largely pitted Sunnis and Arabs against one another 
before 2008 had the potential to develop into a full-scale Arab-Kurd fight as well. It also 
showed that the Shi’a-Kurdish political coalition, which dominated Iraqi politics since 
Maliki’s rise to power in 2006, was beginning to falter under the weight of competing 
claims over disputed territories and the broader implementation of Article 140 of the 
2005 Iraqi Constitution, which called for a referendum on Kirkuk’s future status and a 
de-Arabization of the city. The war against AQI and other Sunni terrorist groups had 
united the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Shi’a-led government in Baghdad 
against a common enemy, but as the AQI threat receded, the unresolved question of the 
relationship between Kurdistan and the central government remained, with the poten-
tial to cause conflict. If the Kurdish and Arab parties that made up Iraq’s national unity 
government began warring among themselves, the political implications would be “cat-
astrophic,” a visiting White House official warned Odierno in Baghdad. The fighting 
would be viewed externally as a sign that “the progress was not real.”27
Operations to Finish AQI in Mosul: Operation MOTHER OF TWO SPRINGS II
The dispute in Khanaqin was particularly costly because it was a distraction from 
the ongoing operations in Mosul, where, since late spring 2008, the coalition and ISF had 
been attempting finally to destroy AQI in the city. In the early fall, Operation MOTHER 
OF TWO SPRINGS II was a three-phased effort to target important AQI figures, clear the 
remaining neighborhoods where AQI enjoyed support zones, and then restore Mosul’s 
civilian governance capacity.28 Throughout the early fall, coalition and Iraqi special oper-
ators carried out targeted raids against AQI leaders in Mosul in advance of large-scale 
operations by U.S. and Iraqi conventional forces planned for mid-October. Some of these 
shaping operations yielded significant results. On October 5, special operators in Mosul 
cornered and killed Abu Qaswarah, a Swedish militant who had been among AQI’s most 
prominent field commanders and its northern emir before becoming overall deputy to 
AQI commander Abu Ayyub al-Masri.29 The materials found with Abu Qaswarah were 
a treasure trove of records rivaling the Sinjar records in scale and detailing hundreds of 
AQI attacks over time.30 The files also revealed the organization’s financial networks, 
operational guidance, line and block charts, and even guidance on operational security.31 
These records yielded strategic insights about AQI’s inner workings and led to further 
raids that netted dozens of other AQI members.
At the same time, a series of raids against AQI’s “Finance Emirs” constricted the orga-
nization’s cash flow. AQI fighters received little or no pay for several weeks, forcing them 
to rely on crime, extorting payments from businesses such as the Northern Oil Company, 
the AsiaCell phone company, and the state-owned Northern Cement Company.32 AQI 
leaders also demanded money from government employees and small businesses such 
as neighborhood pharmacies, a practice that eroded the group’s support.33
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant JoAnn Makinano (Released).
A Soldier From 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment Conducts a Patrol in Mosul.34
In a desperate bid to polarize Ninawa Province and attract local Sunni Islamist sup-
port, AQI tried to incite sectarian war against Ninawa’s Christian population. In early 
October, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, leader of AQI’s political front, the Islamic State of Iraq, 
declared war on Christians, directing assassinations, bombings, and threats that eventu-
ally caused 13,000 of the city’s Christians to flee their homes—more than half of Mosul’s 
Christian population.35 Meeting on October 12, Maliki and the Iraqi National Security 
Council concluded that AQI and other insurgents had infiltrated Mosul’s police force 
and were undermining the city’s security from within.36 The impending coalition-ISF 
operations would therefore include two additional National Police brigades to replace or 
reinforce Mosul’s local policemen.37 Maliki and other ministers also decided to remove 
Ninawa Operations Commander Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq, a Sunni officer 
who had previously commanded the 9th Division in eastern Baghdad, and replace him 
with Major General Hassan Kareem Khudeir, a Shi’a officer who had also served in Bagh-
dad and was believed to have close ties to Maliki’s Da’wa Party. Maliki and other Iraqi 
leaders were concerned that the instability in Mosul could disrupt the provincial elections 
scheduled for January 2009 just as it had in January 2005. Odierno believed the coalition 
itself might have to stop the intimidation of Mosul voters.38 Iraqi leaders believed that the 
outcome of Ninawa’s provincial elections would have national significance and would 
shape the elections scheduled for 2010.39 These political concerns heightened the stakes 
for the impending security operations in the province.




Source: DoD photo courtesy Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq (Released).
U.S. Soldiers Intercept a Vehicle Whose Occupants Had Been Observed  
Emplacing a Roadside Bomb in Mosul.40
On October 15, Iraqi Army and police forces working with MND-N units began 
clearing Mosul of suspected insurgent cells and recovering buildings that had fallen into 
insurgent hands.41 MNF-I had expected the Mosul operations to last until mid-January, 
but AQI’s operational tempo and leadership had been so disrupted that resistance faded 
quickly, especially as additional Iraqi National Police, Iraqi Army, and coalition troops 
flowed into the city.42 By October 26, Odierno reported to Gates that the city was stabi-
lized and insurgent attacks across Iraq were slackening.43 Whether these security gains 
would last depended on political reform and improved governance.
The Abu Ghadiyah Raid and the Disruption of the Foreign Fighter Network
In addition to its losses in Mosul, AQI suffered another major setback on October 26 
after a daytime raid struck the Syrian border town of Albu Kamal, opposite the Iraqi town 
of Al Qa’im on the Euphrates River. Abu Ghadiyah, the young Iraqi militant who was 
the long-time head of AQI’s vast foreign fighter facilitation network in Syria, was killed 
during the operation. For at least 3 years, the majority of al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters had 
been funneled into Iraq by Abu Ghadiyah and his network of facilitators, including most 
AQI suicide bombers. The Albu Kamal raid was a significant blow to the extremist orga-
nization, hindering foreign fighter flow for months while temporarily severing the con-
nection between the jihadist organization and its regional supporters. MNF-I concluded 
that this reduced the number of non-Iraqi suicide bombers available to AQI commanders 
in Mosul and forced them to adjust and appoint new field emirs.44 Syrian officials pub-
licly denounced the raid and claimed to have no knowledge of Abu Ghadiyah’s activities, 
but evidence of the Assad regime’s direct support for AQI’s foreign fighter network indi-
cated that the regime’s protests were disingenuous.
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With their lead border facilitator dead and with clearing operations in Mosul gaining 
momentum, some remaining AQI leaders fled to western Ninawa and the Jazeera desert, 
the same area where Abu Ghadiyah’s foreign fighters had long made their way toward 
Mosul and the Tigris Valley.45 Since 2004, the western Ninawa city of Tel Afar had been 
a favored staging base for AQI and its foreign fighters, and in fall 2008, Odierno noted 
the need to deploy additional Iraqi and coalition troops there to prevent AQI from again 
reestablishing it as an insurgent stronghold.46 Much of the responsibility for stepping up 
the coalition presence in the Tel Afar and Jazeera area would fall to Multi-National Force-
West (MNF-W) because MNC-I had reassigned western Ninawa and the Syrian border 
zone in the Jazeera desert to MNF-W earlier in the year in order to free MND-N to focus 
on Mosul.47 By early December, MNF-W’s operations near the border made it difficult 
for AQI leaders and fighters to move along the Jazeera infiltration routes through which 
they had once traveled freely; and the Syrian-based network Abu Ghadiyah had headed 
struggled to send more than a trickle of foreign fighters into Iraq.48
Aftermath of the Mosul Operations
By early November, the ISF-led operations in Mosul had driven most AQI fighters 
from the city. Violence dropped to near zero, and the Christian families who had fled in 
October began returning.49 AQI’s previously powerful Mosul networks were in disarray, 
forced to forgo their usual distributions of cash to allies and clients in other provinces 
during October and November. Captured AQI members reported they had not been paid 
in many months.50
Resolving the longer-term causes of violence in Ninawa would take more than clear-
ing operations and the sustained disruption of AQI’s terrorist operations. Despite the 
heavy presence of Iraqi forces, MND-N believed that there was no rule of law in the 
city.51 For years, it had been difficult to get terrorists and insurgents convicted in Mosul’s 
courts, where AQI and other groups were able to intimidate or bribe Iraqi officials and 
even occasionally break prisoners out of jail. In addition, Mosul’s unemployment rate was 
70 percent, making the city’s residents vulnerable to criminal and insurgent influence.52 
The fighting across Ninawa also created thousands of long-term displaced persons (2,500 
in Tel Afar alone) who could be radicalized. The province was divided ethnically and 
politically, creating fissures that AQI and others exploited. MND-N believed Ninawa’s 
Kurdish deputy governor and local Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) chief, Kesro Goran, 
was locked in a power struggle with Arab parties ahead of the 2009 provincial elections 
that Arabs who had boycotted the January 2005 elections hoped to use to retake control 
of the provincial government.53
There were also questions of the reliability of ISF in the province. As AQI lost its grip 
on Mosul and western Ninawa, the group offered large cash rewards to Iraqi soldiers or 
police who assassinated American troops, a move that probably caused two incidents in 
November during which rogue Iraqi soldiers killed U.S. troops in Mosul and Biaj. In the 
Biaj killings, fellow Iraqi soldiers helped the assassin flee toward the Syrian border before 
loyal Iraqi border troops caught him.54
The task of tackling these issues would fall to new MND-N leadership. On Decem-
ber 9, General Mark Hertling and his 1st Armored Division handed responsibility for 
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northern Iraq to Major General Robert L. Caslen, Jr., and the 25th Infantry Division, the 
same division that the 1st Armored had replaced as MND-N only a year before.
THE QUEST FOR STABILIZATION
The Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team
Improvements in security came much faster than MNF-I leaders had anticipated, 
leading them to seek parallel economic and political progress.55 To identify such oppor-
tunities, Odierno and Ambassador Ryan Crocker formed a Joint Campaign Plan Assess-
ment Team (JCPAT), bringing in a wide range of experts to “review the ways in which 
we promote reform without undermining the GoI’s [Government of Iraq’s] exercise of 
sovereignty and how we must operationalize our procedures in response to the changing 
strategic environment.”56
Led by retired Marine General Anthony Zinni, the JCPAT included Ambassador 
Ronald Neumann, Ambassador Robin Raphel, future Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Michelle Flournoy, historian Kimberly Kagan, future White House official Colin 
Kahl, and Brookings Institution scholar Kenneth Pollack.57 After weeks of inquiry in Iraq, 
the team determined in late October that “the positive developments in Iraq were very 
real, but very fragile.”58 Making the gains of the surge last would take political reconcilia-
tion. The Iraqi Government would need to integrate the Sons of Iraq into the ISF, continue 
political engagement with the Sunni Awakening, and build government capacity.59 How-
ever, the JCPAT noted that the necessary shift from security operations to stabilization 
would reduce coalition advantage.60 The team warned that Prime Minister Maliki was 
becoming less interested in a sustained U.S. military presence in Iraq, especially if he 
concluded that withdrawal offered him an opportunity to consolidate power further.61 
The JCPAT cautioned against direct action against the Iranian regime and argued that a 
“strong, unified Iraqi polity” was the best way to minimize Tehran’s influence.62
Like the earlier JSAT, the JCPAT gave MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy an analytical basis 
for a new campaign plan to reflect changing conditions.63 Most of its conclusions and 
warnings would prove accurate, but in 2008 MNF-I found remedies increasingly difficult 
to implement, especially where Iraqi political reconciliation was concerned.
Transition of the Sons of Iraq
Operations between May and November 2008 brought Mosul firmly under govern-
ment control and pushed AQI and other northern insurgent groups farther away from the 
population centers of the upper Tigris Valley. Like the JCPAT experts, coalition leaders 
believed the Sunni insurgency’s future strength depended on nonmilitary variables. The 
most important was the future of the Sons of Iraq, the armed manifestation of the Sunni 
Awakening that had done so much damage to AQI in Anbar and the Baghdad region 
since late 2006. Having recruited and paid more than 100,000 Sons of Iraq, MNF-I agreed 
to transfer them to the government’s payroll by the end of 2008, in exchange for Maliki’s 
acceptance of the program. MNC-I began the transfer in early October 2008, starting with 
the 51,000 in the Baghdad region, the majority of whom received their monthly salary of 
$300 from a special government committee without incident.64
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Source: DoD photo by Specialist Chuck Gill (Released).
Members of the Gazaliyah Guardians, a West Baghdad Awakening Group,  
Register for Payment From the Iraqi Government.65
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant James Hunter (Released).
An Iraqi Army Officer Pays a Sons of Iraq Member in Ameriyah.66
Beyond Baghdad, however, the transition was less smooth. MNF-I and Maliki agreed 
to shift all Sons of Iraq to official government employment in 2009, with 20 percent of 
them to be absorbed into the ISF, but there were early signs that it would be difficult 
to hold the Maliki government to this pledge. As preparations began in November to 
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transfer the 8,000 Sons of Iraq in Diyala to government control, coalition leaders became 
alarmed by continued sectarian tension between the Shi’a-led ISF and the largely Sunni 
Sons of Iraq that had emerged during security operations in Diyala in July and August. In 
the space of a few weeks, government forces detained several Sons of Iraq leaders, with 
one, Sheikh Bashir al-Judani, dying in the custody of the Interior Ministry’s Major Crimes 
Unit. Confronting Maliki on the matter on October 23, Odierno warned that the ISF’s 
behavior would undermine the government’s legitimacy and create instability as the 
important January provincial elections approached. Maliki defended the raids against 
Sunni leaders that he considered to be “Ba’athists” and claimed that one Sunni detainee 
in Diyala was suspected of carrying out the 1999 assassination of Ayatollah Muhammad 
Sadiq Sadr, Moqtada Sadr’s father.67
The dispute over the Diyala Sons of Iraq illustrated the problems in the broader rela-
tionship between the Sunni Awakening and the Maliki government. In Sunni-dominated 
Anbar, the Maliki government had been relatively quick to endorse the Awakening and 
accept a paid security role for thousands of local Sons of Iraq. However, in the mixed-sect 
Baghdad belts, Maliki and his Shi’a colleagues had been much more skeptical of the Sons 
of Iraq, demanding a long vetting process especially in the areas that had seen the most 
sectarian violence and displacement before 2008. In mixed-sect Diyala, where Sunnis 
were a demographic plurality but where the balance of power among the ethno-sectarian 
communities was still in question, government skepticism of the Awakening and the 
Sons of Iraq hardened into recalcitrance. The Sunni election boycott of January 2005 had 
allowed Shi’a and Kurdish minorities to control Diyala’s police and provincial govern-
ment, but the Sunni Sons of Iraq could potentially reverse that if mobilized for the Jan-
uary 2009 provincial elections. Maliki and other Shi’a government leaders also believed 
many of the Sons of Iraq were simply Sunni insurgents who had made a temporary pact 
with the coalition but would eventually return to warfare against the Shi’a-led govern-
ment.68 Their fears were not unfounded: coalition officials saw multiple signs of AQI and 
other Sunni insurgent groups attempting to recruit Sons of Iraq members back into the 
insurgent camp.69
There were other reasons for government officials to distance themselves from the 
Sons of Iraq as well. Senior Iraqis assigned by the Prime Minister to manage the Sons of 
Iraq portfolio faced frequent pressure from Shi’a parties and Iranian-sponsored militants, 
accusing them of empowering Sunni militants. Bassima Luay Hasun al-Jaidri, the Maliki 
loyalist who headed the Iraqi Government committee overseeing Sons of Iraq integra-
tion, became the subject of a criminal investigation along with her military deputy, while 
another committee member, Major General Mudher al-Mawla, was wounded in an early 
December assassination attempt.70
The success of transferring the Sons of Iraq to the government would determine 
whether the Sunni Awakening would endure and would act as a bellwether of the Maliki 
government’s support of broader reconciliation efforts. The events of late 2008, however, 
demonstrated that the Maliki government did not share MNF-I’s sense of urgency or the 
coalition’s belief that the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq were the key to preventing a 
badly damaged AQI from regaining a foothold in Iraq’s Sunni areas.
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Diminishing American Casualties
American casualties dropped dramatically in summer 2008. U.S. units had suffered 961 
fatalities in 2007, making it the costliest year of the war.71 In 2008, U.S. fatalities dropped to 
322, even with the large-scale offensives of the surge campaign, and weekly battle casual-
ties dropped 57.8 percent between 2007 and 2008.72 By the summer of 2008, U.S. casualties 
from non-battle incidents such as electrocution, fires, mine resistant ambush protected 
(MRAP) rollovers, and suicides began to approach the number of combat casualties. In 
both September and November 2008, U.S. non-battle deaths (15 in September and 10 in 
November) exceeded those killed in action (8 in September and 6  in November).73
To cut down on fatal accidents, MNF-I assigned Task Force SAFE, a group Petraeus 
had originally created to investigate deadly electrocutions in troop buildings, to assess 
vehicle rollovers and other accidents and then suggest preventive measures.74 The inves-
tigation paid particular attention to MRAP accidents, with good reason. The MNF-I 
investigators discovered that 51 percent of MRAP accidents were due to vehicle roll-
overs, incidents that well-trained drivers knew how to avoid. MNF-I leaders endorsed 
the investigators’ conclusion that “the MRAP must be treated in training as a combat 
vehicle, hence requiring crews to undergo the same level of comprehensive training we 
provide to crewmen for all other weapons systems.”75
The U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement
Even though coalition commanders expected to have 15 brigades in 2009, they knew 
that the United States and its partners might be forced to withdraw all troops by the 
end of 2008. As the months passed, the yet-unsigned U.S.-Iraqi security agreement came 
to occupy a large portion of MNF-I’s attention. Before taking command, Odierno had 
learned from counterparts in the White House that Maliki was “getting cold feet” about 
the draft U.S.-Iraq agreement allowing U.S. troops to remain in the country after 2008. 
With elections on the horizon in both 2009 and 2010, the Iraqi Prime Minister was reluc-
tant to expend the political capital necessary to finalize the deal.76 Meeting with White 
House official John Hannah in Baghdad the day before his change of command, Odierno 
learned that the negotiations were proving deeply divisive for the Iraqi political lead-
ership. The religious parties in particular were publicly against the agreement, though 
behind closed doors most Iraqi political leaders acknowledged that the sudden departure 
of U.S. troops at year’s end would be disastrous. Addressing rumors that the George 
W. Bush administration was thinking through a “Plan B” in case the negotiations col-
lapsed—such as returning to the UN to ask for an extension of the UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1790—Hannah revealed to Odierno that “there is no Plan B.” Either 
the two sides would finalize the agreement or U.S. and other coalition troops would leave 
by the end of December.77
For his part, Odierno believed the security agreement would require extensive MNF-I 
planning and would likely change the way that U.S. troops operated inside Iraq.78 It was 
unclear, for example, whether and how the tens of thousands of contractors working for 
MNF-I would function and whether they would remain immune from Iraqi laws. Plan-
ning for the contractors’ possible departure was complicated by a Defense Department 
order that prevented MNF-I from holding discussions with contractors about post-2008 
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arrangements.79 The delay in signing the U.S.-Iraq agreement also put other coalition 
countries in limbo, because most governments were waiting for the United States to con-
clude its bilateral agreement with the Maliki government before pursuing their own.80
Inside Iraq, the security agreement quickly became the most polarizing domestic polit-
ical issue as the provincial election season began. Sharp disagreements among the major 
Iraqi parties paralleled ethnic and sectarian rifts. Among the Shi’a parties, the Sadrists and 
their allies demanded the immediate expulsion of U.S. troops and organized numerous 
public protests against the agreement. They prevented Maliki from publicly embracing 
the agreement out of fear of losing ground to Iranian-backed parties in the January 2009 
provincial elections—though both Maliki and Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq privately 
supported a continued strategic relationship with the United States. Among the Sunni 
parties, leaders such as Vice President Tariq Hashimi publicly argued against an indefi-
nite American military presence, demanded restraints on U.S. operations against Sunni 
targets, and pressed for the release of Sunni detainees. Privately, however, most Sunni 
leaders expressed fears that a U.S. withdrawal would lead to a Shi’a campaign of violence 
against the Sunni population. Only the Iraqi Kurds publicly expressed full support for 
a continued U.S. presence, and some Kurdish leaders even suggested that U.S. troops 
could remain in Kurdistan if the government in Baghdad did not ultimately approve a 
status of forces agreement. Addressing the Council of Representatives, Speaker of Parlia-
ment Mahmud Mashadani wryly observed that where the U.S.-Iraq security agreement 
was concerned, Iraq’s Sunni politicians opposed it in public but supported it in private, 
Shi’a politicians supported it in public but opposed it in private, and Kurdish politicians 
supported it in both public and private.
In addition to the Sadrists, some other parties saw opposing the security agreement 
as a way to weaken Maliki, whom they felt was concentrating too much power in Bagh-
dad. Odierno observed that some Iraqi leaders considered constraining Maliki a higher 
priority than legalizing the U.S. military presence, which many Iraqis assumed would 
continue with or without an agreement. “Our assessment is that some Iraqi leaders have 
mistakenly concluded that the U.S. is not sincere about the necessity of a SOFA [status 
of forces agreement] and we will continue to operate in Iraq without an agreement when 
the UNSCR expires,” Odierno observed in his first weekly report to Gates in September.81
Iranian pressure was a significant factor as well. Upon returning to Baghdad in mid- 
September, Odierno reported to Gates that he was surprised by “the constant negative 
drumbeat regarding the SOFA” coming from Iran and was concerned that “Iran has 
seized the messaging initiative” with “an effective and wide-ranging” propaganda cam-
paign.82 By late October, Odierno concluded that Maliki had been swayed by Iranian 
influence and was delaying the agreement to drive a harder bargain with the United 
States.83 To counter the Iranian regime’s influence, Odierno directed MNF-I leaders to 
brief their Iraqi counterparts on the numerous security activities that would immediately 
cease and the vast capabilities that would no longer be at the Iraqi Government’s disposal 
if the coalition suddenly departed. He also advised MNF-I planners to quietly conduct 
“prudent planning should we be absent a legal framework” when the UNSCR expired.84
Nevertheless, on November 27, the Iraqi Parliament approved the security agreement, 
though Sunni support only came after making the pact subject to a nationwide referen-
dum. Passage followed a series of heated Parliamentary sessions with walkouts by the 
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Sadrists and other anti-American parties and the sudden resignation of the notoriously 
erratic Speaker Mashadani. The raucous scenes on the floor of the Parliament did not 
bode well for future U.S.-Iraqi relations.
Among other stipulations, the final agreement required U.S. combat forces to redeploy 
outside of Iraq’s cities, villages, and localities by June 30, 2009. Complete withdrawal of 
all U.S. forces from Iraq would follow by December 31, 2011. In the interval, the agree-
ment would place further constraints on U.S. operations:  searching households would 
require a warrant, and arrests or detention of Iraqis would require prior approval from 
an Iraqi court. Finally, as residual damage from the Nisour Square incident, most of the 
U.S. military’s contractors would lose their immunity to Iraqi law.
 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Derren Mazza (Released).
President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki Sign  
the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement.85
The Departure of the Coalition and Redrawing of Battle Space
Dragging out the negotiations led several smaller coalition members to withdraw. In 
October, the Polish contingent that had long served as the Multi-National Division-Cen-
tral South (MND-CS) headquarters left, handing Forward Operating Base Echo in 
Diwaniyah over to a U.S. battalion. The South Korean troops in Iraqi Kurdistan withdrew 
from Erbil in early December, ending the mission of Multi-National Division-North East 
(MND-NE). Ten other smaller coalition contingents also left by the end of the year, forc-
ing significant tactical changes. “We cannot underestimate the effect of losing our coali-
tion partners,” Odierno wrote to Gates on October 5. “In many cases, they relieved U.S. 
forces from internal security requirements as well as occupying key battle space. This will 
cause us to expand U.S. responsibilities as we reduce our footprint.”86 It was essential that 
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MNF-I maintain a forward presence in each province, Odierno judged, and to cover the 
new gaps MNC-I would have to make boundary and battle space changes for the remain-
ing units just 9 months after Austin had redrawn unit boundaries following the depar-
ture of the surge brigades.87 In November, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) 
took control of the southern portions of Baghdad province previously held by Multi-Na-
tional Division-Center (MND-C). MND-C, meanwhile, extended its battle space south to 
encompass the provinces of Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna. It also prepared to assume 
oversight of Multi-National Division-Southeast (MND-SE) following the planned 2009 
withdrawal of British troops from Basrah. MND-N expanded its battle space to Erbil to 
cover the territory previously overseen by the South Korean headquarters of MND-NE.88
 
Source: U.S. Army photo by Specialist Creighton Holub (Released).
U.S. and Romanian Army Soldiers Review Plans During an  
Observation Mission Near Nasiriyah.89
The departure of coalition partners affected the various headquarters in Baghdad as 
well. Since 2003, the United Kingdom and Australia had provided up to 20 flag officers 
to the staffs of the theater and operational commands; their impending absence would 
leave a gap that Odierno believed would require 12 additional U.S. generals to fill.90 Even 
harder to replace would be Task Force KNIGHT, the British special operations contin-
gent that had played an important role in the campaigns against AQI and other extrem-
ist groups and had an especially significant effect against AQI’s car-bomb networks in 
Baghdad. But with the expiration of the UNSCR, the British were reluctant to leave their 
special operators open to charges of violating European Union human rights legislation, 
illustrating one of the complexities of coalition warfare in the 21st century.91
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***
For the coalition, the situation on the ground in Iraq felt like a military victory by late 
2008. With only a handful of violent incidents on most days, Iraq had begun to resemble 
other countries in the Middle East. AQI, which once had seemed capable of causing the 
collapse of the Iraqi state, was on the run in a shrinking corner of northwest Iraq, with 
its most important Syria-based kingpin dead and its foreign fighter networks in disarray. 
With the security situation improving to a degree that would have been unthinkable at 
the beginning of the year, MNF-I’s intent to shift to a stabilization mission seemed timely 
and necessary to cement the security gains.
However, warning signs abounded. The incapacity of the government meant that 
Iraqi leadership in stabilization tasks such as governance and economic development 
would come slowly. The receding of AQI in northern Iraq gave way to a potential Arab-
Kurd war in which the governments in Baghdad and Erbil would be on opposite sides. 
Finally, there was the turbulent way in which the U.S.-Iraqi SOFA had been reached. The 
Sadrists and the Iranian regime had been able to use the issue to regain some of the polit-
ical advantage they had lost during the spring of 2008. At the same time, Prime Minister 
Maliki had proved to be a reluctant signer, leading some coalition leaders to question 
whether he intended to maintain a long-term security relationship with the United States.
As if to illustrate the difficulty of the situation for the United States, the December 
14 ceremony in Baghdad to mark the passage of the security agreement ended in chaos 
when an Iraqi journalist threw his shoes at President Bush in protest during a joint press 
conference with Maliki. It was Bush’s final public act related to the Iraq War. Barely a 
month later, the United States would have a new President and a dramatically different 
Iraq policy.
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CHAPTER 12
OUT OF THE CITIES, JANUARY-JUNE 2009
A NEW IRAQ POLICY FOR THE UNITED STATES
The arrival of the Barack Obama administration in January 2009 brought a dramatic 
change in the American policy and posture in Iraq. As a candidate, then-Senator Obama 
had advocated a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, and upon taking office, he moved 
quickly to implement this plan.
In late October 2008, before the Presidential election, General Raymond Odierno 
approved the early departure of one brigade based on Iraq’s improving security condi-
tions, but in early December he recommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that U.S. forces 
remain in Iraq for the full 3 years specified in the December 2008 Security Agreement, at 
levels based on local conditions.1 Odierno envisioned a “flexible plan” that would include 
deliberate decision points at which commanders in Iraq would have the latitude to make 
“careful transitions” in U.S. troop levels.2
However, the new administration’s policy guidance ran counter to Odierno’s recom-
mendation. On President Obama’s first day in office, the National Security Council (NSC) 
tasked Odierno and Ambassador Ryan Crocker to develop three different options for the 
timed drawdown of U.S. troops in a fixed period of either 23 months, 19 months, or 16 
months. The last of these reflected the time that Obama had pledged to withdraw Amer-
ican forces. The NSC specified that none of these options was to be conditions-based.
On January 28, 2009, Odierno and Crocker told Washington that the 23-month with-
drawal timeline offered the least risk to security and political gains, but the President 
chose the 19-month timeline. The specifics of the drawdown were important: Obama 
directed that the U.S. “combat mission” should end within the 19-month period, after 
which no U.S. “combat troops” could remain in Iraq. However, an undetermined resid-
ual force could remain beyond the expiration of the “combat mission” to lend military 
assistance. The NSC left Odierno and Crocker to determine the exact purpose and size 
of the military assistance mission while also instructing Crocker to define the size of the 
U.S. diplomatic mission.3
As they highlighted the risks of rapid withdrawal, Odierno and Crocker ran into resis-
tance. When the National Intelligence Council prepared a draft national intelligence esti-
mate on Iraq in February 2009, Odierno and Crocker objected to what they believed was 
an overly optimistic assessment of the security situation both considered unsustainable 
without a major U.S. military presence. Odierno and Crocker were concerned that a too-
rosy intelligence estimate would encourage policymakers to disengage without consid-
ering the negative consequences.4 It was also the third year in a row that Multi-National 
Force-Iraq (MNF-I) had disagreed with a national intelligence estimate on Iraq.
At the same time, MNF-I hosted a RAND Corporation team conducting a congres-
sionally mandated “withdrawal study” to assess whether U.S. troops should stay in the 
country through 2011 or withdraw sooner.5 The options that the study team was asked 
to consider, which were potentially faster than those the President envisioned, illustrated 
the mounting political pressure to reduce the U.S. troop presence in Iraq.
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POLITICAL CULMINATION OF THE SURGE: THE JANUARY 2009  
PROVINCIAL ELECTIONS
By early 2009, Washington was more optimistic about Iraq than those struggling with 
the obstacles on the ground. Certainly, the January 2009 Iraqi provincial elections had 
gone well. Many Sunnis had boycotted the previous provincial elections in 2005, as had 
the Sadrists, and both groups had thus been frozen out of local government for the 4 years 
that followed. During that time, the Sadrists and Sunni rejectionist groups had conducted 
separate, multi-year insurgencies against the Iraqi Government and the coalition. The 
January 2009 elections provided an opportunity to redress local political imbalances that 
had been one of the most important drivers of conflict. The incumbents who had won 
power in the boycotted January 2005 election were reluctant to hold provincial elections 
in 2009, fearing they would lose some local power. However, pressure from the Awak-
ening, the Sadrists, the Iraqi Shi’a clerical leaders in Najaf, and the United States forced 
the issue. The voting took place January 31 except in the three predominantly Kurdish 
provinces, which planned to vote later, and in Kirkuk, where the Arab-Kurd political 
deadlock made voting impossible.
The 2009 provincial vote was the most peaceful election Iraq had experienced since the 
2003 invasion. During the 2005 elections, there were more than 400 attacks per week. To 
prevent similar events in 2009, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the Iraqi security 
forces (ISF) carried out a series of spoiling attacks, supported by a surge of intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) resources from U.S. Central Command (CENT-
COM).6 With 750,000 Iraqi soldiers, police, and other government officials deployed, the 
2009 elections saw less than a quarter of the attacks that had taken place in 2005, though 
five Sunni candidates in Mosul were assassinated before the voting.7
The January 2009 elections brought sweeping change to Iraq’s local governments. The 
Iraqi electorate penalized the incumbent parties, whom Iraqis blamed for the sectarian 
warfare of 2006-2008, voting them out of power in each of the 14 provinces that held 
an election.8 MNF-I found the results encouraging on several levels. The Sunni commu-
nities that had boycotted the election 4 years earlier turned out to vote in large num-
bers in Anbar, Ninawa, Salahadin, and Diyala. In many cases, they voted for candidates 
associated with the Awakening who had advocated national reconciliation, factors that 
Odierno and MNF-I believed would begin to reverse the broader Sunni community’s 
perception of its own marginalization.9 Parties that ran on secular nationalist platforms 
polled significantly better than Islamist parties, reversing the trend of the 2005 national 
elections. Parties associated with Iran polled most poorly of all—especially the Islamic 
Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which lost control of seven southern governorships. 
Most significant in Odierno’s view was that the Sunni “Hadba Gathering” bloc headed 
by Osama Nujaifi, Sheikh Abdullah al Yawar, and other Ninawa notables took control of 
the Ninawa provincial council from the Kurdish parties that had won it in 2005. MNF-I 
hoped the transfer of power in Mosul from Kurdish politicians to Sunni ones would rob 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other rejectionist groups of their remaining political support 
in the province that was AQI’s sole remaining sanctuary.10 These political trends seemed 
to bode well for the national elections scheduled for late 2009 or early 2010, and seemed 
to indicate that the surge campaign of 2007-2008 might have set the stage for a stable Iraq.
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DRAWDOWN AND CHANGE OF OPERATING POSTURE FOR MNF-I
After the January elections, MNF-I turned its full attention to implementing Obama’s 
new drawdown policy and implementing the security agreement that the George W. 
Bush administration had finalized in late 2008. Under Obama’s directive, MNF-I would 
need to reduce U.S. troop levels from 142,000 in February 2009 to about 50,000 at the 
end of summer 2010, a reduction that would require a near-continual redeployment of 
troops, redrawing of unit boundaries and transfer of responsibilities across the coun-
try. The diminishing force also would have to change the way it operated. The U.S.-Iraq 
security agreement specified that U.S. troops would leave Iraq’s cities by June 30, 2009, 
after which American units could no longer conduct unilateral operations or raids but 
would have to work through their ISF counterparts to obtain warrants from Iraqi courts 
ahead of any operation. They would also be required to coordinate their movements and 
operations with their ISF counterparts—with the Iraqis having the power to veto U.S. 
operations.
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
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THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
Most of the units that would have to adopt this different way of operating were newly 
arrived. The annual turnover of coalition units that had taken place between February 
and April in each year since 2004 occurred again in 2009. The number of U.S. brigades in 
Iraq held steady at 15, but the overall troop strength had decreased. By February, MNF-
I’s total strength was down to 147,000, from a high of 182,000 at the height of the surge 
in October 2007.11 It would continue to fall through the summer. In early March, Odierno 
announced that MNF-I would shrink by another 12,000 American and 4,000 international 
troops by September. As the drawdown progressed, MNF-I would lose most of its multi-
national character, becoming almost a solely American force. Most of the foreign contin-
gents already had departed Iraq with the expiration of the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council Resolution at the end of 2008.
On March 31, the British Multi-National Division-South East (MND-SE) departed Iraq 
as well, ending Great Britain’s 6-year deployment in southern Iraq. During that time, 
British units had suffered 179 troops killed and more than 5,000 wounded. In a ceremony 
at the Basrah airfield, British Foreign Secretary David Miliband watched as MND-SE 
handed control of its area of operations to Major General Michael Oates’s Multi-National 
Division-Center (MND-C), which had been gradually expanding its battle space south-
ward from Baghdad since June 2008 and would be renamed MND-South after the British 
departure.
Source: DoD photo by Specialist Darryl Montgomery (Released).
British Major General Andrew Salmon, Commander of MND-SE,  
Hands Responsibility for Southern Iraq to U.S. Major General Michael Oates,  
Commander of MND-C.12
The withdrawal of MND-SE left Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) with four U.S.-
led division headquarters. In addition to Oates’s MND-C headquarters in the south, Major 
General Robert Caslen’s 25th Infantry Division remained in control of Multi-National 
Division-North (MND-N), with about 23,000 troops spread among its 4 brigade combat 
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teams (BCTs). In March, II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) arrived to assume duties 
as Multi-National Force-West (MNF-W) in Anbar, replacing I MEF. In the same month, 
Major General Daniel Bolger’s 1st Cavalry Division arrived to become Multi-National 
Division-Baghdad (MND-B), replacing Major General Jeffery Hammond’s 4th Infantry 
Division in command of 35,000 U.S. troops and 6 BCTs in the Baghdad region. These four 
divisions would fall under a new corps command. A few days after the British departure, 
Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin and XVIII Airborne Corps departed as well, replaced 
by Lieutenant General Charles H. Jacoby, Jr.’s I Corps in early April. The XVIII Airborne 
Corps’ year in Iraq had opened with the unexpected war against the Shi’a militant groups 
across central and southern Iraq but had ended with Iraq at its calmest since the 2003 
invasion. Whereas Austin had assumed command of 20 U.S. brigades and more than 
10,000 international troops in early 2008, Jacoby took command of a force that by Sep-
tember would consist of only 12 U.S. brigades covering the entire country. Jacoby also 
inherited a shrinking support structure. By the end of March, the coalition had 133,000 
contractors supporting its operations, a decrease of 18,000 since the beginning of 2009.13
With this smaller operating force and fewer enablers, Odierno and his senior com-
manders had 5 months, February through June, to make as much progress as possible. 
During these last months of relatively unconstrained operations, MNF-I worked to accel-
erate the development of the ISF that would have to take full responsibility for their 
nation’s security by midsummer. Odierno’s units also intended to maintain pressure on 
AQI in northern Iraq with a final U.S.-Iraqi offensive against the extremist group in its 
remote sanctuaries. MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy hoped to continue reconciliation ini-
tiatives such as the Sons of Iraq and to fragment further the Sunni insurgency, bringing 
additional portions of it to the negotiating table. At the same time, MNF-I intended to 
neutralize the Iranian regime’s Shi’a militant proxies and prevent their resurgence in 
Iraqi cities. Above all, MNF-I would have to vacate its many bases, outposts, and joint 
security stations in the Iraqi cities without allowing enemy forces to exploit them. This 
was a tall order.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES DEVELOPMENT
The Iraqi Army and Iraqi National Police, which would have to fill the gap as the 
coalition’s troops diminished, had come a long way since the civil war of 2006, when 
Sunni and Shi’a militants had outmatched an ISF riddled with sectarianism and corrup-
tion. The ISF’s overall strength had grown rapidly, reaching 565,000 soldiers and police 
by the end of 2008, compared to 323,000 2 years earlier.14 At the time of Obama’s policy 
change in January 2009, the Iraqi Army had 175 combat battalions along with 5 special 
operations battalions and 5 infrastructure security battalions.15 These units and the Iraqi 
police had taken the lead role in securing the January 31 provincial elections, splitting 
duties between them so that an inner ring of police guarded polling sites while the Iraqi 
Army secured an outer perimeter, with coalition troops in an overwatch role. The Interior 
Ministry had even deployed 500 female police officers to search and counter the threat 
of female suicide bombers as the voting took place.16 With roughly 750,000 Iraqi soldiers, 
Iraqi police, and coalition troops on duty election day, the voting occurred without inci-
dent. After passing the test of election security, in February and March the ISF displayed 
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a growing capability to conduct population security when it deployed more than 40,000 
soldiers and police to secure the Arba’een pilgrimage route to Karbala in response to a 
wave of attacks against Shi’a pilgrims. The following month, the ISF secured more than a 
million pilgrims as they gathered for a Shi’a religious holiday in Samarra.17
However, beyond these relatively simple infantry- and police-based security activi-
ties, MNF-I found it difficult to develop the Iraqi military’s more advanced capabilities. 
In early 2009, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense established a program to oversee the purchase 
and fielding of M1A1 tanks from the United States, an addition that would finally give 
Iraq’s ground forces an offensive capability.18 The new tanks would be a critical capabil-
ity in an Iraqi military that the coalition and Minister of Defense Abdel Qader intended 
to grow to a strength of 352,000, with 14 army divisions. But in spring 2009, coalition and 
Iraqi military leaders learned that the rest of the Iraqi Government and Parliament was 
willing to fund only 253,000 Ministry of Defense forces, far fewer than Qader and MNF-I 
expected and believed the security situation required as U.S. forces withdrew. Finding 
ways to overcome the shortfalls in funding and manpower fell to Lieutenant General 
Frank Helmick’s Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).19
Meanwhile, the Iraqi Air Force, which once was one of the most capable in the Middle 
East, lagged far behind the army. Though the Iraqi Ministry of Defense was moving ahead 
with plans to expand its air force personnel to about 6,000 and to open a training center 
at Tikrit air base, the air force lacked a modern jet fighter. Plans for Iraq to buy F-16s and 
their accompanying training aircraft from the United States moved slowly because of the 
same budget shortfall that cut the Ministry of Defense’s overall troop strength. The Iraqi 
Air Force had an air operations center capable of overseeing 350 sorties per week, but it 
lacked the broader air traffic control capability needed to control Iraq’s airspace.20
Development of the small Iraqi Navy outpaced the air force. It operated 40 or more 
patrols each week in the Persian Gulf, where about 90 percent of Iraq’s oil exports flowed 
through vulnerable terminals. The Iraqi Navy also was building a new pier and seawall 
at the country’s only port of Umm Qasr, where the Navy would station a fleet of newly 
purchased Italian patrol boats.21 Despite these positive developments, the coalition’s pro-
gram to train the Iraqi Navy fell victim to politics in 2009. Odierno and other U.S. lead-
ers hoped to maintain as large a force of trainers and advisers from other countries as 
possible, particularly from Great Britain. The Nuri al-Maliki government, unfortunately, 
did not share MNF-I’s sentiment. After the departure of MND-SE, MNF-I and its North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) counterparts hoped to quickly negotiate an agree-
ment with the Iraqi Government under which a British military assistance mission could 
remain in the country, including the naval contingent training the Iraqi Navy in Umm 
Qasr. 
In late 2008, the United Kingdom (UK) and Iraq agreed that British troops could 
remain in the country until May 31, 2009, while the two countries negotiated a lon-
ger-term arrangement. However, as the deadline approached, Maliki seemed to view 
British training with ambivalence and sought only to limit the legal immunities for UK 
forces. At times, the Iraqi officials seemed driven by their long-standing resentment of 
their former British colonial masters. Iraqi politics played a role in the rocky negotiations 
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as well. “[T]he PM [Prime Minister] sees a UK agreement as a political vulnerability 
exploitable by his political rivals,” Odierno reported to Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
Robert Gates after the Anglo-Iraqi negotiations stalled in mid-May.22 In the meantime, 
with no settled UK-Iraq agreement, other NATO countries were reluctant to deploy their 
own contingents of trainers and advisers, leaving NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), 
the multinational training arm of MNSTC-I, at just two-thirds of its required strength.23 
In the last days of May, with no legal basis for staying in the country, the remaining Brit-
ish contingent, including the entire UK naval training mission, left for Kuwait to await 
news of whether the Iraqi Government would allow them to return. At the 11th hour, 
Maliki and the UK Government reached an agreement that would permit British forces to 
remain in Iraq for an additional year, but Maliki limited the British contingent to just five 
ships and 100 troops ashore, far fewer British troops than MNF-I had hoped to include in 
the NATO training mission.24
That Maliki was willing to allow a severe disruption in the training and advisory pro-
gram for one of Iraq’s military services surprised and dismayed coalition commanders, 
but it was a sign of things to come. Within days of the UK-Iraq agreement, Maliki and 
Qader began pressing U.S. leaders to change the name of MNF-I to U.S. Forces-Iraq to 
reflect the departure of the other national contingents.25
THE CONTINUING PURSUIT OF AQI
Back to Diyala and Mosul
As the coalition withdrawal from the Iraqi cities drew closer, MNF-I leaders and 
their Iraqi counterparts decided to conduct additional combined operations in northern 
Iraq where AQI still had sanctuaries and support. Despite a series of four large-scale 
security operations in Diyala in 2007-2008, the province remained unstable. Diyala was 
“a microcosm of the nation’s political challenges, with its Shi’a population maintaining 
close ties across the Iranian border via the Old Silk Road, its Ba’athist enclave serving as 
a key Sunni buffer zone, AQI attempting to hang on, and Arabs and Kurds disputing the 
status of northeastern parts of the province,” Odierno wrote to Gates in March.26 Some 
AQI commanders and fighters fleeing the fall 2008 operations in Mosul had been able to 
make their way back to their old sanctuaries in the sparsely populated badlands east of 
the Diyala River and in the Hamrin Mountains to the west, where they were beyond the 
reach of coalition and Iraqi troops but close enough to populated areas to launch attacks, 
especially against the Sons of Iraq. The Diyala Operations Command was created in 2008 
to partner with MND-N and coordinate ISF activities against this threat, but by early 
2009, Prime Minister Maliki had grown frustrated with its performance and sacked its 
commander. The residual AQI presence in Diyala was both a security and political threat, 
because AQI attacks had the potential to cause Sunni-Shi’a or Arab-Kurd strife as the 
newly elected provincial council parties attempted to form a local government in which 
Sunnis were likely to have the leading role.27
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Source: DoD photo courtesy U.S. Navy (Released).
An Explosive Ordnance Technician Prepares to Destroy a Bunker  
During Operations in Diyala Province.28
MNC-I and Iraqi forces launched a series of operations in spring 2009 to push AQI 
out of its remote sanctuaries and prevent the group from launching attacks into the cities 
of the Diyala Valley as coalition troops prepared to leave. In early March, a large oper-
ation involving the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, and the 21st Iraqi Army Brigade 
took aim at AQI in the countryside near Balad Ruz, especially in the area coalition troops 
called the Turki Bowl, which had been difficult for U.S. units to clear in 2008. As U.S. and 
Iraqi soldiers pushed into parts of the Turki Bowl that were inaccessible except on foot or 
motorcycle, they uncovered extensive AQI bunker complexes, some of which had to be 
reduced by air strikes after firefights with the extremists.29 A second phase of the oper-
ation in late March uncovered large remote weapons and ammunition caches that AQI 
had abandoned.30
Meanwhile, farther north, U.S. and Iraqi troops cleared the areas around Hamrin Lake 
between Muqdadiyah and Khanaqin, another hard-to-access area where AQI groups 
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had a safe haven for several years.31 AQI responded by showing it could attack larger 
nearby towns. A late March suicide bombing killed 26 civilians in Jalawla near the shores 
of Hamrin Lake, and 2 deadlier bombings the following month in Baqubah killed 80 
people.32
The operations near Khanaqin risked rekindling the political crisis that had taken 
place when Iraqi Army troops and peshmerga faced off against each other the previous 
fall. Arab-Kurd tensions already had been stoked again in February when Prime Minis-
ter Maliki decided to deploy the 12th Iraqi Division to the vicinity of Kurdish-controlled 
Kirkuk, ostensibly to protect oil infrastructure in the area but in actuality to assert polit-
ical advantage over Iraq’s Kurdish parties.33 When Iraqi troops began to push toward 
Khanaqin again in April, the Iraqi Army, the peshmerga, and MNC-I exchanged liaison 
officers and conducted a combined rehearsal of the operation in order to avoid another 
confrontation.34 It was a cooperative model that Odierno would apply along the entire 
Green Line in 2010.
U.S. and Iraqi troops conducted further clearing operations in Mosul at the same time. 
As had been the case in Diyala, the late 2008 operations in Mosul had disrupted AQI but 
not fully dislodged the group from its long-term support zones in and around the city. 
Part of the problem was the ISF’s inability to hold neighborhoods once they were cleared. 
“In the past, the ISF in Mosul have been reluctant to maintain a presence in cleared neigh-
borhoods, favoring raids and checkpoints instead,” Odierno explained to Gates in Feb-
ruary 2009.35 This assessment followed a difficult week during which four AQI suicide 
car bombs targeted Iraqi and coalition troops, with one of them killing 3d Battalion, 8th 
Cavalry Regiment, commander Lieutenant Colonel Gary Derby and his three-man per-
sonal security detail.36
 
Source: U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sergeant JoAnn S. Makinano (Released).
U.S. Army Soldiers and Iraqi Police Search Houses in West Mosul  
During Operation NEW HOPE.37
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On February 20, MNC-I and the ISF launched Operation NEW HOPE, which Odierno 
described as a “comprehensive COIN [counterinsurgency] operation” involving six 
additional U.S. battalions, as well as forces from both the 2d and 3d Iraqi Divisions in 
Ninawa.38 By the beginning of March, the combined U.S.-Iraqi troops had established a 
presence in AQI’s former neighborhoods and appeared to have disrupted the extremists’ 
operations, especially its ability to collect funds through extortion.39 Within days of enter-
ing the neighborhoods, Iraqi and coalition units began to report a significant increase in 
tips from the local population. The increased tips drove targeted operations against AQI 
leaders such as the Islamic State of Iraq’s “Minister of Oil,” who was captured in the first 
week of March.40 A few weeks later, coalition special operators apprehended a series of 
senior terrorist leaders in the area, including Ahmad Mohammed Ali al-Tai, the AQI 
“Wali” (governor or guardian) of the entire Mosul region.41
Yet the sprawling metropolis of 2 million people was not wholly under coalition-ISF 
control, especially the city’s old quarter, where a maze of narrow streets and passage-
ways made clearing and holding operations difficult. In the medieval neighborhoods of 
Old Mosul, AQI maintained a presence that it used to launch an average of 35 attacks 
per week across Mosul in April and May, far higher than the weekly average in any 
other province.42 On April 9, an AQI suicide bomber drove a dump truck packed with 
10,000 pounds of explosives into an Iraqi police compound in south Mosul just as a U.S. 
patrol entered. The attack killed 5 U.S. Soldiers and 3 Iraqis while wounding more than 
60 people. It was the largest U.S. death toll from a single attack in more than a year.
To combat the AQI threat in Old Mosul, a combined force of the 1st Iraqi National 
Police Brigade, a local police battalion, and U.S. forces systematically cleared the thou-
sands of buildings. By late May, an Iraqi emergency response battalion had arrived to 
become the hold force.43 The operations appeared to have significant results: MNF-I 
observed in late May that AQI’s improvised explosive device (IED) and indirect fire 
attacks in Mosul had become largely ineffective.44 MNF-I also learned that AQI financiers 
had lost the ability to extort funds from their richest targets in the north, including the 
AsiaCell phone company, Bayji oil refinery, and Badush cement factory, leading to an 
assessment of a 50 percent drop in income.45
Despite the progress, both coalition and Iraqi commanders felt that fully securing 
Mosul would require several more months beyond the June 30 deadline for withdraw-
ing U.S. forces from the cities. After patrolling the city himself, Odierno believed MNF-I 
needed 4 to 6 additional months, in part, because AQI leaders were desperate to main-
tain a foothold in the city and were committing resources from across Iraq to the fight. In 
April, Ahmad Zayd, one of AQI’s captured Mosul emirs, had told coalition officials that 
AQI considered Mosul “its last opportunity at retaining viability in the country of Iraq,” 
indicating that the group would invest heavily in regenerating its presence in the city if 
coalition-ISF military pressure were relieved.46
Rampant corruption in Mosul’s courts worried coalition leaders as well. Hundreds 
of AQI and other insurgent detainees captured during the springtime operations were 
freed by intimidating or bribing judges and other Iraqi officials.47 Similarly, AQI and 
other insurgent groups infiltrated the Mosul police forces. To counteract the penetration, 
the coalition and the Interior Ministry opened a new police college with a vetted training 
cadre that could screen recruits to keep out AQI sympathizers, but this process of gener-
ating trusted police would take time.48
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Source: DoD photo by Specialist Daniel Nelson (Released).
General Raymond Odierno Meets With MNC-I Commander Lieutenant General 
Charles Jacoby and MND-N Commander Major General Robert Caslen, Jr.,  
in Mosul.49
In response to these concerns, Ninawah Operations Commander Major General 
Hassan Karim and MND-N commander Caslen provided a joint assessment to their 
chains of command in which they recommended that coalition troops remain inside the 
city until October 31. Even though Odierno doubted Maliki would accept the 4-month 
extension beyond the June 30 deadline, he was able to convince the Iraqi Ministry of 
Defense to dispatch two additional army brigades to the city later in the month.50 Nev-
ertheless, in mid-June, Odierno reported to Gates that “our commanders remain uneasy 
about our reduced presence in Mosul,” just days before the withdrawal deadline.51
AQI’s Resilience
AQI had staying power in Ninawa Province because its Syria-based foreign-fighter 
network had been rebuilt after the raid that killed Abu Ghadiyah in October 2008. Under 
the leadership of a new kingpin called Abu Khalaf, the former Ghadiyah network pushed 
North African AQI operatives from Syria into Mosul to carry out suicide attacks. Work-
ing through CENTCOM, MNF-I provided the Tunisian Government with information to 
interdict the jihadi network, but not before the Tunisian terrorists had carried out several 
major attacks in Mosul. On March 31, a Tunisian suicide truck bomber attacked a police 
headquarters next to Mosul’s main train station, and on April 9, another Tunisian drove 
the explosive-laden truck that killed five U.S. Soldiers and three Iraqis.52 As AQI’s Mosul 
networks came under intense pressure during Operation NEW HOPE in March and 
April, AQI leaders apparently requested a surge of suicide bombers from the Syria-based 
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facilitation network, which helped the terrorist group maintain its operations in Mosul 
even as its local networks were dismantled.53
The reemergence of the Syria facilitation network forced MNC-I to position additional 
ISR resources in western Ninawa where AQI’s “Border Emir” had operated earlier, and 
to conduct additional spoiling raids on the infiltration routes across the Jazeera desert.54 
The problem was not just a Syria-based one, however. In early May, MNF-I reported 
the discovery of a Kurdish AQI “battalion” that pushed fighters and weapons into the 
Mosul area from the east. Meanwhile, far to the south, some AQI operatives rousted from 
Ninawa Province returned to the seam between the northern Baghdad belts and eastern 
Anbar. Those who migrated back to the Abu Ghraib and Karmah areas attempted to 
reconstitute support bases in areas from which the Sons of Iraq had driven them during 
2007-2008.55 Within Baghdad itself, AQI’s car bomb network was being rebuilt after a 
long period of near-dormancy.56
As these AQI networks began to reactivate, they benefited from complacency in Bagh-
dad. In early March 2009, AQI struck the Interior Ministry in east Baghdad and killed or 
wounded 71 job applicants who were queued there. On March 10, an AQI suicide bomber 
penetrated a government-sponsored reconciliation conference in Abu Ghraib, killing 33, 
including an Iraqi Army battalion commander.57 In both cases, MNF-I found that the 
ISF had experienced a breakdown in discipline and situational awareness, a problem 
that later allowed AQI to conduct 7 coordinated car bombings against Shi’a neighbor-
hoods that killed and wounded more than 100 civilians.58 These vulnerabilities in the ISF 
defenses indicated to coalition commanders that AQI could exploit the impending depar-
ture of U.S. troops from the city. MNF-I also noted that AQI had stepped up attempts to 
regain freedom of movement in the western Baghdad belts and in Ramadi by striking 
agreements with other local insurgent groups, thereby positioning themselves to respond 
to coalition and ISF countermeasures as well as take advantage of the coalition departure 
on June 30.
To counter the increase in ISF checkpoints in central Iraq in 2008, AQI began using 
large numbers of female suicide bombers, whom Iraqi police and soldiers tended not to 
check closely. In 2008, there were 36 attacks by female suicide bombers, compared to just 
7 for all of 2007.59 In late November, a Sunni cleric in Dhuluiyah helped coalition and 
Iraqi troops uncover a ring of 21 AQI women.60 Three months later, in February 2009, 
Iraqi forces arrested Samira Ahmed Jassim, a woman from Diyala known as the Mother 
of Believers, who had orchestrated 28 female suicide bombings in the previous 18 months 
and was suspected of recruiting more than 80 female suicide bombers on behalf of the 
AQI-allied group Ansar al Sunna. Once detained, the Mother of Believers revealed that 
she specifically targeted rape victims for recruitment, capitalizing on their sense of shame 
in Iraqi society, and that Ansar al Sunna sometimes organized the rapes in the first place 
in order to create recruitment opportunities.61 AQI and Ansar al Sunna’s female suicide 
bombers were particularly effective at penetrating security for large gatherings such as 
Awakening meetings or pilgrimages.
Having suffered from a loss of public support in 2007-2008 because of its brutal prac-
tices in Sunni areas, AQI adjusted its tactics in early 2009 to lessen collateral damage 
from its attacks against coalition targets. AQI fighters began using Russian-made RKG-3 
armor-piercing grenades to attack coalition-armored vehicles, which did not cause the 
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level of civilian casualties that large IEDs tended to do. In the 6-week period coincid-
ing with Operation NEW HOPE during March-April 2009, there were 46 RKG-3 attacks 
against coalition targets, and the throwers detained were often youths paid to conduct 
the attacks, rather than hardened AQI members.62
Source: U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Corporal James F. Cline III (Released).
RKG-3 Grenades.63
As the late spring operations to clear Old Mosul began, premeditated “green on blue” 
attacks reappeared, something that was difficult to counter or predict. On May 2 at a com-
bined U.S.-Iraqi outpost south of Mosul, two Iraqi soldiers opened fire on U.S. Soldiers, 
killing two Americans and wounding three. One shooter was killed, while the second 
was captured along with an Iraqi police captain who had facilitated the attack. The inci-
dent, the fourth of its kind since late 2008, illustrated AQI’s continued ability to attack 
vulnerable U.S. troops in a partnership role.64
While seeking to limit civilian casualties in Sunni areas, AQI sought to cause more of 
them in Shi’a areas. The first half of 2009 saw an expansion in AQI’s use of suicide vest 
(SVEST) attacks to infiltrate through checkpoints and carry out high-profile bombings in 
gatherings and crowded areas. In mid-April, SVEST attacks killed more than 400 civilians 
in 1 week, with significant attacks taking place in Diyala just as Iraqi and coalition troops 
were clearing AQI caches and hideouts there. In one attack in Muqdadiyah, a suicide 
bomber killed 57 Iranian pilgrims in a restaurant, while another SVEST attacker killed 53 
Iraqis at the Kadhimiyah shrine in Baghdad. At the end of the bloody week, special oper-
ators traced the SVEST operation to a cell near Balad, and, as the operators closed in on 
the target, seven of the cell members detonated their SVESTs, killing themselves before 
capture.65 The following week, police in Kirkuk caught a would-be SVEST attacker and 
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made an important tactical discovery. The bomber was so heavily drugged that he almost 
died from the narcotic, suggesting that in some cases AQI might manipulate unwilling 
bombers.66
In another important aspect, however, AQI’s early 2009 adaptations were less suc-
cessful: the VBIED network struggling to reestablish itself in Baghdad proved far less 
effective than its 2006-2007 predecessors. On April 29, for example, of 12 coordinated 
AQI car bombs, only half detonated; coalition forces found that the other 6 had been 
packed with simplistic, low-yield munitions that lacked the sophistication and size of 
previous AQI VBIEDs.67
At the same time as AQI’s botched car bombs, the group benefited from an Iraqi Gov-
ernment failure in information operations during a bizarre, high-profile incident spear-
headed by Maliki’s office. In late April, Maliki and his spokesmen announced that Iraqi 
troops had captured Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, AQI’s 
political organization. Strangely, however, the Iraqi officials detaining the man did not 
grant MNF-I access to “Baghdadi” or immediately share information from his interroga-
tions, and based on multiple sources, MNF-I confidently judged that the Iraqis had not in 
fact captured Baghdadi. Nevertheless, for almost a month, Maliki and Iraqi Government 
spokesmen continued to declare that “Baghdadi” had been captured and was making 
“confessions” that implicated a large number of prominent Sunni politicians and Sons of 
Iraq leaders in acts of terrorism. Despite MNF-I’s warnings that the captured man was 
an impostor, the Maliki government used the information to issue arrest warrants for 
several Sunni leaders, including some associated with the Iraqi Islamic Party.68 Not until 
June 2009 did the Maliki government admit its mistake, which had already done serious 
damage to its credibility on counterterrorism just days before the June 30 transition to 
Iraqi security lead in Iraqi cities. In retrospect, the incident represented another warning 
sign of Maliki’s tendency to issue specious claims in order to centralize his power base 
further and to seek retribution against Sunni politicians and leaders.
THE CHALLENGE OF RECONCILIATION
Problems With the Sons of Iraq: The Adel Mashhadani Affair
By late April 2009, MNF-I reported that 18,000 Sons of Iraq had been absorbed into 
Iraqi Government jobs, but there were signs that the overall reconciliation initiative was 
in danger as U.S. troops prepared to leave some of the key urban areas where the Awak-
ening had flourished during the surge.69 The Baghdadi hoax and the political fallout from 
the Maliki government’s actions against Sunni leaders came at a sensitive time for the 
Sons of Iraq program, which had been transferred to the Iraqi Government just weeks 
beforehand. Many Sons of Iraq leaders distrusted the Maliki government’s intentions 
and considered slow salary payments and arrests of the group’s members evidence of the 
Prime Minister’s ill will toward the program. MNF-I and MNC-I acted as a buffer between 
government and Sons of Iraq, often protecting the group’s leaders from arrest. However, 
on March 28, 2009, MNF-I sent special operators with Ministry of Interior forces to arrest 
a prominent Sons of Iraq leader in Baghdad.
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Adel al-Mashhadani headed a large Sons of Iraq group in the east Baghdad neigh-
borhood of Fadhil and was closely associated with senior political leaders such as Ayad 
Allawi. After having originally helped to quell the Sunni insurgency in east Baghdad, 
Mashhadani had become a local mafia boss. “We have known for months that Mashha-
dani was extorting store owners, setting up illegal checkpoints, and refusing to cooperate 
with ISF, and a warrant was issued for his arrest,” Odierno explained to Gates the day 
after the arrest, while describing Mashhadani as “a charismatic leader whose brutality 
led to his arrest.”70 Mashhadani was taken into custody without incident, but in the hours 
after his capture, his Sons of Iraq followers fought Iraqi troops and U.S. Soldiers from 5th 
Squadron, 73d Cavalry Regiment, part of General Bolger’s MND-B. About 15 of Mashha-
dani’s men were killed, and the situation turned into an all-night standoff after Baghdad 
Operations Commander General Abud Qanbar deployed 3 Iraqi battalions to surround 
Fadhil. At dawn, more than 100 of the remaining Mashhadani followers surrendered, 
ending the crisis.71
Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant James Selesnick (Released).
Troops of 3d BCT, 82d Airborne Division, Rush to the Scene of Fighting Between 
Iraqi Security Forces and Adel al-Mashhadani’s Sons of Iraq Group.72
The public outcry from Iraq’s Sunni community led MNF-I to expect widespread Sons 
of Iraq desertions. However, few of the 92,000 Sons of Iraq left their positions in the 
aftermath of the Mashhadani arrest, though slow salary payments stemming from the 
early 2009 budget cuts fueled Sunni perceptions of government bias against them.73 To 
alleviate these concerns, MNF-I and Iraqi Government officials convened a conference of 
Sons of Iraq leaders from around the country in Baghdad in mid-May and assured them 
continued U.S. and Iraqi Government support.74 In the coming years, however, these 
assurances would mean little. An Iraqi court eventually sentenced Mashhadani to death, 
and the Maliki government executed him in January 2014.
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Reconciliation With the Iraqi Ba’athists in Syria
The Baghdadi and Mashhadani affairs also came at a bad time for the coalition’s effort 
to reconcile with former Iraqi military officers and Ba’athist officials living in Syria and 
Jordan who supported the insurgency. Maliki had used the fictional Baghdadi confes-
sions to allege a vast Sunni terrorist conspiracy against his government involving AQI, 
the Ba’ath Party, and the Sunni parties in the Iraqi Parliament, all with the complicity 
of the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad. Maliki’s claims came just weeks after MNF-
I’s Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) had opened negotiating channels with the 
Political Council for the Iraqi Resistance. This umbrella group included Jaysh al-Islami, 
and Syria-based New Ba’ath Party leader Mohammed Yunis al-Ahmad, who had long 
been associated with the Sunni insurgency in Ninawa and was a rival to Izzat Ibrahim 
al-Douri among the remnants of the Saddam Hussein regime. The FSEC’s objective had 
been to get these insurgent groups to declare and enforce cease-fires inside Iraq. FSEC 
had opened these channels in December 2008 via former republican Guard General Raad 
Hamdani, who had connections with former military officers living outside Iraq. He and 
FSEC had encouraged those officers to apply for reinstatement of their jobs or pensions 
under the 2008 Iraqi Government law that had revised Coalition Provisional Authority 
(CPA) Order No. 2.75
In both the cease-fire discussions and the reintegration of former military officers, 
MNF-I stressed to interlocutors that Sunni insurgent and Ba’athist leaders would have 
to reconcile with the government. However, Maliki’s anti-Ba’athist stance threatened 
the FSEC’s outreach efforts. The same week that the FSEC made contact with Ahmad, 
the Maliki government angered Sunnis by demanding that Iraqi President Jalal Talabani 
approve the execution of General Sultan Hashem, Iraq’s former Minister of Defense, who 
had been sentenced to death for his part in the anti-Kurdish Anfal campaign of the late 
1980s.76 Hashem was reviled by Iraqi Shi’a and Kurds but remained popular in his native 
Mosul, leading coalition officials to fear that his execution would destabilize the north. 
Ultimately, Talabani stood firm and denied Maliki’s request, temporarily subduing the 
sectarian sparring.
The coalition differed in 2009 from Maliki and his allies on the prospect of reconcil-
iation with former regime officers and officials based in Syria and Jordan. Maliki was 
skeptical, believing that the Ba’athists were behind most of the insurgent and terrorist 
violence and were determined to overthrow the democratic government. Maliki also dis-
agreed with the United States as to whether Bashar al-Assad could be persuaded to crack 
down on the Syrian-based terrorist and insurgent networks. Engaging Assad on this was 
a centerpiece of the new Obama administration’s Middle East policy, so U.S. delegations 
quickly began visiting Damascus, Syria. For his part, Odierno worked in spring 2009 to 
operationalize the Obama administration’s new Syria policy by brokering security talks 
among Iraq, Syria, and the United States to secure the porous Syria-Iraq border. In ini-
tial bilateral talks with the Iraqis, however, Syrian representatives rebuffed Baghdad’s 
concerns about Iraqi Ba’ath Party members in Damascus and instead protested the raid 
against Abu Ghadiyah the previous October.77 Despite these inauspicious beginnings, 
U.S. leaders in Washington instructed MNF-I to conduct bilateral military-to-military 
talks with the Assad regime and share information on foreign fighter networks operating 
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in Syria. Leading the U.S. delegation, the MNF-I chief of staff, Major General Guy Swan, 
proposed a trilateral assessment of Syria-Iraq border crossings to curtail terrorist and 
criminal activities there. The Assad regime responded by pressing for a broader discus-
sion on economic and political issues, essentially seeking to end the U.S.-led isolation of 
Syria.78 For their part, MNF-I leaders believed that the United States could pressure the 
Syrian regime to crack down on terrorist networks. MNF-I officers reported that Assad 
was worried that the future drawdown of U.S. troops could lead to the fragmentation of 
Iraq and a spillover of unrest to Syria.79
Back in Baghdad, however, Maliki and other Iraqi leaders were convinced of the 
Assad regime’s bad faith and declined to participate in the trilateral initiative. In retro-
spect, the Iraqis had good reason for this view. Throughout the spring and summer, the 
Syrian regime’s provocative actions on the border and tolerance of AQI undercut the idea 
of shared security interests with either Iraq or the United States.80
The Rise of Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqshbandi
Some of Maliki’s concerns about a Ba’athist resurgence inside Iraq were justified. As 
AQI struggled to maintain its presence in the upper Tigris Valley and Mosul in the face of 
U.S.-Iraqi security operations, another insurgent organization began to take over the mil-
itant leadership role that AQI had held since 2005. The Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqsh-
bandi (JRTN), or Naqshbandi Army, was a militant group associated with Douri’s wing 
of the Ba’ath Party and ideologically founded on a curious mixture of Ba’athism and 
Sufi Islamism. JRTN had grown out of a Sufi order of Iraqi military officers led by Douri 
during Saddam’s “Faith Campaign” of the 1990s, but after the fall of Saddam’s regime, 
it had become a potent militant group enjoying a base of support in Hawijah, eastern 
Anbar, and Mosul.81 While AQI sought headlines with its operations, JRTN preferred to 
work behind the scenes.82 Though Douri and some other JRTN leaders were themselves 
Sufi, the group tended to be associated with Sunni nationalist interests, and its main polit-
ical cause was to prevent the Kurdish takeover of Kirkuk and other disputed territories of 
the north. By late spring 2009, MNF-I noted JRTN’s increasing militant activities in Mosul 
where AQI had once held sway and considered them a threat to long-term stability.83 
MNF-I observers also noted that JRTN seemed well funded but carefully masked its role 
in terrorism. JRTN leaders seemed willing to enter into tactical alliances with AQI and 
other terrorist groups hoping to claim credit for driving coalition troops out of northern 
cities after the June 30 withdrawal deadline.84 Though the Ba’athists and Douri appeared 
in 2009 to be far from power and out of the Iraqi political mainstream, the local strength 
of JRTN indicated that Douri’s loyalists would remain a force capable of influencing pol-
itics and potentially destabilizing areas of northern Iraq in the future.
THE IRAN PROBLEM
As MNF-I formulated its plans to withdraw from Iraqi cities and drawdown U.S. 
forces in the country, its commanders grappled with the difficult problem of ensuring 
that Iran’s militant proxies did not regain their former strength in central and southern 
Iraq. The military defeat of Shi’a militants in 2008 led to more than half a year of subdued 
activity on their part, but, during the first weeks of 2009, they increased their attacks 
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against U.S. units and the ISF with assistance from the Iranian regime. In mid-January, 
Shi’a militants in west Baghdad launched the first rocket attacks against Camp Victory in 
more than a month, and U.S. and Iraqi troops investigating the firing points found ammu-
nition manufactured in Iran. The use of explosively formed penetrators (EFP) increased, 
killing three U.S. Soldiers in January. Late in the month, U.S. troops captured a five-man, 
Iranian-trained EFP cell.85
These and other attacks against coalition units elsewhere in southern Iraq were the 
work of the same three major Shi’a militant groups that had fought the coalition in 2008: 
Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH), and the remnants of Jaysh al-Mahdi, 
now renamed the Promised Day Brigade. MNF-I adopted different approaches toward 
each group. MNF-I sought to neutralize Moqtada Sadr’s newly reorganized Promised 
Day Brigade before it reached maturity by disrupting its activities, fracturing its existing 
networks, and deterring it recruitment. Against KH, the militant group created by Quds 
Force proxy Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, MNF-I destroyed its cells wherever they could be 
found. Throughout the first weeks of 2009, the coalition carried out intelligence-driven 
raids against both the Promised Day Brigade and KH, including operations that led to 
the capture of one of Abu Dura’s senior lieutenants and that disrupted KH’s indirect fire 
teams in Basrah.86
MNF-I’s strategy for AAH, the group commanded by the imprisoned Qais al-Khazali, 
was similarly adjusted toward reconciliation rather than conflict. In late 2008, Odierno 
agreed to support the Maliki government’s negotiations with Khazali and his followers, 
by which Maliki hoped to persuade the group to disarm and become a political party. 
The decision brought an end to the conflicting positions that the Maliki government and 
MNF-I had held since 2006, during which time the coalition had targeted AAH while 
Maliki had attempted sporadic political reconciliation talks with the group. In return 
for ceasing its targeting of AAH, MNF-I required that the group end all acts of violence, 
decommission its weapons, stop accepting support from the Iranian regime, and no 
longer take or hold hostages. When both Prime Minister Maliki and AAH representa-
tives agreed that their negotiations would include a “roadmap” toward these points and 
that AAH members would observe a cease-fire with the coalition, MNF-I agreed in early 
January to stop targeting AAH and to release four imprisoned members.87 MNF-I also 
demanded that AAH provide proof of life for U.S. Army Sergeant Ahmed al-Taie whom 
it kidnapped in November 2006, and for the five British citizens AAH had abducted from 
the Iraqi Ministry of Finance in 2007.88
Odierno and other senior U.S. commanders were not sanguine about the reconcilia-
tion with AAH, especially as they learned more about its commanders’ deep connections 
to other irreconcilable Shi’a militants.89 Unfortunately, however, the 2008 security agree-
ment required the United States to turn over all its detainees to the Iraqi Government. 
Odierno believed MNF-I needed to get as much as possible for releasing Khazali and the 
hundreds of AAH members in U.S. detention centers rather than eventually setting them 
free with no quid pro quo.90
Through February, AAH members appeared to abide by the cease-fire, but there 
were signs the cease-fire would not last. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps of Iran 
(IRGC) Quds Force continued to train and equip Iraqi militants at camps in Iran, and EFP 
strikes against U.S. troops began to rise in the latter half of the month, with eight EFP 
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attacks taking place in a 6-day period. From his base in Iran, AAH deputy commander 
Mohammed Tabatabai began recruiting militants willing to conduct attacks that could 
not be traced back to AAH, probably to circumvent the cease-fire.91
Iran’s military posture indicated that it considered it important to maintain proxies 
inside Iraq for use against the United States in the event of a larger regional conflict. 
Throughout March 2009, MNF-I observed the Iranian regime continuing to train, equip, 
and direct Iraqi Shi’a militant groups—including Sadr’s Promised Day Brigade—to 
attack the coalition. MNF-I also saw indications that KH might ramp up attacks against 
U.S. troops as they withdrew from the Iraqi cities, and that KH continued to receive sup-
port from Lebanese Hizballah. Coalition analysts also tracked KH’s attempts to construct 
“mega-IRAMs” carrying a 1,000-kilogram warhead that could be used in a mass-casualty 
attack against U.S. facilities, something KH had repeatedly tried to do since 2007.92
Against this backdrop, MNF-I’s negotiations with AAH began to break down. 
Although the MNF-I FSEC met with 250 Baghdad-based Special Groups members 
in March hoping to reach an agreement, by April it was clear that AAH members no 
longer accepted the January cease-fire.93 With the suspension of reconciliation talks, AAH 
stepped up its indirect-fire attacks against the Green Zone, targeting the U.S. Embassy, 
and MNF-I prepared to resume operations against the militant group.94
Ironically, as AAH walked away from the talks, Sadr reached out to MNF-I himself. 
After months of special operations raids against his Promised Day Brigade, Sadr sent an 
intermediary to Odierno to request the release of a Sadrist prisoner. Judging the prisoner 
to be relatively low threat, Odierno agreed, telling Gates on May 3 that he would “see if 
this leads to anything.”95
With targeting restrictions against AAH lifted, the coalition and ISF resumed raids 
against the group with mixed results. On April 27, a coalition raid in Kut went awry and 
resulted in the death of an Iraqi woman with connections to local Shi’a politicians. The 
incident, which quickly made national news in Iraq, led an outraged Maliki to demand 
that coalition special operators cease all raids. To get the Prime Minister to back off this 
demand, Odierno agreed that all future counterterrorism raids would be cleared through 
the Iraqi Government. The following week, on May 5, Iraqi troops captured a large weap-
ons cache at the Amarah home of Hayder Gharrawi, an AAH affiliate and longtime IRGC 
Quds Force associate. The cache included, among other munitions, 50 rocket rails and 151 
EFP plates. Along with the weapons, the Iraqi troops also discovered letters dating from 
November 2007 written by Jason Creswell, one of the British citizens AAH abducted from 
the Ministry of Finance in 2007. The find indicated that Creswell had been alive months 
after the abduction and that he had been in the hands of an Iraqi militant with long-time 
connections to the Iranian regime.96
Less than 2 weeks after the Gharrawi raid, MNF-I reported that AAH and other Quds 
Force proxies had stepped up their indirect fire against the Green Zone by 125 percent 
since April, and that the 27 EFP attacks in the first half of May already exceeded the total 
of 25 for the month of April.97 A few days later, MNF-I noted that senior AAH members 
had returned from Iran to the west Baghdad neighborhoods of Hurriyah and Sh’ula, 
apparently to prepare for a summer offensive against the coalition.98
Odierno and newly arrived U.S. Ambassador Chris Hill were incensed to learn in 
late May that IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani planned to visit Erbil in 
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the Kurdistan Region on June 6. Confronting Iraqi President Talabani, Odierno and Hill 
protested that “Soleimani’s presence inside of Iraq would send the wrong message” at a 
time when his militant proxies were intensifying their war against the U.S. presence in 
the country.99 The same week that Soleimani intended to be in Erbil, Iraqi troops captured 
a truckload of 59 improvised rockets being moved by a Shi’a militant group through 
Maysan Province near the Iranian border, along the same route from the Shalamcheh 
border crossing point that Soleimani’s subordinates used to move weapons to central 
Iraq to attack U.S. troops and facilities.100
Despite the resumption of attacks by the Quds Force’s Iraqi proxies, in early June 
MNF-I agreed to a proposal by the Maliki government to reopen reconciliation talks with 
AAH. At the Iraqi Government’s request, Odierno agreed to release Laith al-Khazali, 
the younger of the Khazali brothers who had been captured with Qais al-Khazali and 
Ali Mussa Daqduq in Basrah in 2007. Under the deal worked out among the Khazalis, 
the Maliki government, and MNF-I, Laith al-Khazali would travel to Iran to persuade 
Akram al-Kabi and other AAH commanders to enforce the cease-fire agreed to by Qais 
al-Khazali. The Maliki government hoped these arrangements would convince AAH to 
disarm itself in time to participate in the 2010 Parliamentary elections as a political party. 
Odierno hoped that Laith al-Khazali’s entreaties to AAH commanders would “further 
split AAH into reconcilables and non-reconcilables.”101 After 2 weeks of freedom, MNF-I 
officials noted that Laith al-Khazali was keeping his end of the bargain by pressing AAH 
members to agree to the cease-fire. In a grim show of good faith, on June 21 AAH turned 
over to the Iraqi Government the remains of two of the five British citizens taken from 
the Ministry of Finance. One of the dead was Jason Creswell, whose letters soldiers had 
found in Amarah just weeks before.102
As the June 30 deadline approached, MNF-I’s work to neutralize the Iranian-spon-
sored Shi’a militants remained far from complete, and the withdrawal from the cities 
would make it difficult for U.S. units to maintain contact with the enemy. A further diffi-
culty was that the U.S. units in southern Iraq in spring 2009 were operating in that region 
for the first time and had little local knowledge or understanding of the enemy there. For 
6 years, the four southernmost provinces had been the responsibility of the British units 
of MND-SE, which had extensive local information, long-standing relationships, and 
human intelligence networks. However, much of the British knowledge did not transfer 
in the transition between MND-SE and the 10th Mountain Division in March. This loss of 
operational understanding was compounded when the 34th Infantry Division of the U.S. 
Army National Guard, deploying to Iraq for the first time, replaced the 10th Mountain 
Division just 7 weeks later. At that point, MNF-I’s understanding of the operating envi-
ronment in the far south was significantly degraded.
The Mujahedin e Khalq (MeK) Conundrum
MNF-I’s problem with Iranian proxies was linked to the continuing challenge of the 
MeK, an Iranian opposition group that Tehran wanted to see expelled from Iraq. In the 
early days of the Iraq War, the Iranian regime had enlisted the help of the Badr Corps 
to pressure and occasionally attack the MeK at its base at Camp Ashraf in Diyala, and 
encouraged the Iraqi Government to take diplomatic actions against it.
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The MeK problem was complicated. Its members were protected by UN authority, 
but many countries designated it a terrorist organization. As a result, few countries 
were willing to accept MeK members as refugees. In any case, its cult-like leadership 
prevented many of them from leaving. In private conversations in late 2008, Maliki had 
assured MNF-I leaders that his government would not forcibly deport MeK members to 
Iran. However, other Iraqi officials had told U.S. counterparts that the Iraqi Government 
would require Camp Ashraf residents to return to Iran or move to a third country and 
would deal with any MeK political activities through the Iraqi judicial system.103 MNF-I 
and the U.S. Embassy were caught between their obligation to protect the MeK under 
international law and the requirement eventually to cede control of Camp Ashraf to the 
sovereign Iraqi Government. Turning the MeK camp over to Iraqi control appeared to 
U.S. officials to be certain to doom the residents to abuses or to forced repatriation to Iran, 
where death sentences awaited many of them.
As June 30, 2009, approached, it appeared that elements of the Iraqi Government 
intended to expel MeK from Camp Ashraf, which U.S. troops had turned over to Iraqi 
control. Fearing the MeK members would seek asylum in Europe and escape prosecution, 
the Iranian regime increased pressure on Maliki to extradite them.104 In response, Iraqi 
leaders planned to conduct a census of the camp and issue arrest warrants for MeK lead-
ers—a move with international implications.105 On February 20, the Iraqi Government 
assumed full authority over Camp Ashraf, with U.S. forces providing overwatch from 
nearby Forward Operating Base Grizzly. Shortly after assuming control, Iraqi officials 
initiated their census of the Camp Ashraf population, though they refrained from exe-
cuting arrest warrants.106 During the following weeks, Iranian pressure became more evi-
dent. On February 25, an Iranian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) entered Iraqi airspace 
and overflew the Camp Ashraf area, nearly 129 kilometers from the Iranian border, for 
more than an hour before U.S. troops shot it down.107 Days later, in a meeting with Pres-
ident Talabani, Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei demanded “the implementation 
of our agreement regarding the expulsion of the [MeK] hypocrites.” Talabani reportedly 
replied that the Iraqi Government would expel the group.108 During a trip to Iran during 
the same period, Iraqi National Security Adviser Mowaffaq Rubaie announced that the 
camp would close within 2 months.109
In a public relations move during mid-March, the MeK claimed Iraqi troops had beaten 
its members when entering the camp in an attempt to expel some of them.110 Meanwhile, 
the Iranian regime continued to accuse the United States of training the MeK to conduct 
operations in Iran, an accusation perhaps meant to justify the Iranians’ own surrogate 
activities in Iraq.111 Tensions over MeK and Camp Ashraf would continue through the 
spring and summer, with no resolution in sight.
LEAVING THE CITIES
The Departure From Baghdad
By June 2009, U.S. troops already had left most Iraqi cities. Among the urban centers 
that still had U.S. garrisons, MNF-I leaders found Mosul to be the most worrisome, given 
the continuing presence of AQI. The most complicated and largest withdrawal, however, 
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would take place in Baghdad, where, by the end of the surge, U.S. troops maintained 
more than 80 forward operating bases, combat outposts, and joint security stations. These 
would have to be reduced to one-sixth that number by June 30.
 
General Abud Qanbar Hashim al-Maliki (left). Source: DoD photo by  
Sergeant Travis Zielinski (Released).
Major General Daniel Bolger, Commander of MND-B, Greets General Abud Qanbar 
Hashim al-Maliki, CG, Baghdad Operations Command (BOC).112
U.S. units required several months to prepare for the departure from the city. In Feb-
ruary, when Bolger’s 1st Cavalry Division succeeded Hammond’s 4th Infantry Division 
as MND-B, the division controlled 6 BCTs and 35,000 troops across its area of operations. 
Several of the BCTs were still based within the city on large urban forward operating 
bases such as Loyalty, Rustamiyah, and Justice. To move out on schedule without dis-
rupting Baghdad’s security, Bolger decided to shift his units into “belt posture.”113 MND-
B’s brigades and battalions would move their command posts and support bases to the 
belts outside the city while shrinking their presence inside it. From their new bases in 
the belts, MND-B’s units would remain close enough to respond to ISF requests for help 
if necessary. As Bolger put it, after June 30, the division would focus on securing the 
“doughnut” around Baghdad and would leave the ISF to secure “the hole in the dough-
nut”—the city itself.114 The approach amounted to a return to the operating posture that 
MND-B had taken in 2005-2006, with U.S. units distancing themselves from populated 
areas and consolidating on large bases on the outskirts of the city.
Combined operations and planning continued despite the shift. After June 30, U.S. 
units still partnered with Iraqi brigades and divisions, and maintained an extensive advi-
sory presence in Baghdad. However, there were no unilateral U.S. operations. In antici-
pation of the day when Iraqi units would plan and lead their own operations in the city, 
some U.S. units began merging their operations centers with those of their Iraqi partners. 
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Colonel Joseph Martin’s 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division, for example, relocated its com-
mand post inside the west Baghdad headquarters of the Iraqi 6th Division, the brigade’s 
partner unit.115 Elsewhere in Baghdad, Bolger and MND-B agreed with their Iraqi coun-
terparts to maintain a U.S. presence at key joint security stations (JSS) across the city. The 
process of selecting which stations would remain in operation proved difficult. Bolger 
urged General Qanbar and his BOC to keep 17 of Baghdad’s 55 joint security stations 
open, but Qanbar and the BOC agreed only to 14. To Bolger’s disappointment, the BOC 
insisted on closing three joint security stations in sensitive Shi’a-majority neighborhoods, 
including JSS Sadr City—the outpost that U.S. troops had fought hard to create during 
the campaign against Jaysh al-Mahdi in 2008. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Government agreed 
that after June 30, 1,000 U.S. troops would remain as advisors at the 14 remaining urban 
JSS.116
By mid-June, U.S. units were making their final moves out of Baghdad and other 
cities. The operations against AQI in Diyala and Ninawa had ended, and U.S. troops had 
turned over their final base in Mosul.117 To reduce the visible presence of U.S. troops in 
the Baghdad area and reinforce Iraqis’ perception that MND-B was leaving the city as the 
U.S.-Iraq security agreement required, Bolger ordered his units to move to reverse cycle 
operations, making routine movements such as logistical resupply convoys only during 
nighttime hours.118
Militant groups marked the approaching withdrawal deadline with significant attacks 
that were likely meant to assert that the U.S. withdrawal amounted to an insurgent vic-
tory. On June 24, a massive car bomb in Sadr City killed 69 Iraqis and wounded more 
than 100 in an all-too-familiar scene in the Shi’a slum neighborhood. On June 28, troops 
from the 2d Battalion, 5th Cavalry, were traveling near Sadr City when their convoy was 
hit by a series of EFPs, severing both legs of battalion commander Lieutenant Colonel 
Timothy Karcher. Immediately after evacuating their commander to the military hospital 
in the Green Zone, Karcher’s men suffered another EFP attack that killed Sergeant Timo-
thy David.119 David was the last U.S. Soldier killed in Baghdad ahead of the withdrawal. 
On July 1, MND-B, which at its peak during the surge had controlled 9 U.S. brigades, now 
commanded 4 brigades and 20,000 U.S. Soldiers, and the Iraqi capital was without U.S. 
operating units for the first time since April 2003.
***
The days immediately following the withdrawal from the cities were calm, but there 
were some warning signs. Although the U.S.-Iraqi committees had worked out detailed 
coordination guidelines for how U.S. forces would function after June 30, Iraqi officials in 
Baghdad initially refused to allow American troops to provide security for U.S.-funded 
governance and economic development projects. This decision delayed some key proj-
ects for several weeks. Although the Iraqi Government eventually reversed this decision, 
there was a sharp drop-off in U.S.-ISF combined patrols in July. Senior U.S. command-
ers worried the decline in combined operational tempo would allow militant groups 
to become active again.120 The new requirement for a warrant from an Iraqi judge for 
all counterterrorism raids also constrained U.S. military operations at first, although 
Bolger and MND-B later realized that, because Iraqi courts had very broad jurisdiction, 
480
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
a cooperative judge in Baghdad could authorize raids “practically unlimited in time or 
space.”121 Judicial warrants for military operations proved awkward for U.S. units. As 
Bolger later described, “War is not police work, and the entire idea of searching for ter-
rorists with a warrant sure seemed to mix the two.”122
In their first days of planning and executing operations on their own, ISF commanders 
impressed MNF-I leaders by completing complex security missions in Anbar and central 
Iraq. In one instance, the Interior Ministry was able to coordinate multiple ISF agencies 
during a targeted counterterrorism raid near Rutbah.123 In another, the ISF managed to 
plan and provide security for 2 million pilgrims traveling to the Kadhimiyah shrine in 
northwest Baghdad.124 In mid-July, Odierno reported that coordination among the Iraqi 
Army, Interior Ministry, and Sons of Iraq in Anbar had enabled the Iraqis to respond to 
car-bomb attacks and increase the frequency of patrols and searches.125
Yet, there were a few ominous signs of what some ISF leaders intended to do with 
their new autonomy. In late July, Iraqi Army and police forces carried out an operation 
at the MeK compound at Camp Ashraf that turned deadly. The Maliki government had 
deployed police to the MeK compound, but its residents blocked the camp entrance and 
initiated a standoff. On July 28, Iraqi police and army forces forced the issue, using bull-
dozers and tanks to break through the gates and enter the compound to establish a police 
station there.126 To the Iraqi troops’ surprise, MeK members blocked the Iraqi vehicles’ 
advance with their bodies. The ensuing violence left 9 dead and more than 200 wounded 
before the Iraqi troops halted their attempt.127 In Odierno’s view, the Iraqi Government 
had overestimated its forces’ capabilities, while the MeK had miscalculated that the Iraqis 
would refrain from using force.128
Meanwhile, a series of events in Mosul indicated that as Generals Karim and Caslen 
had feared, AQI was taking advantage of the U.S. forces’ absence in the city to pressure 
the ISF leaders who were now responsible for Ninawa’s security. In a 6-day period in 
early July alone, AQI carried out seven attacks against ISF leaders in the city, prompting 
Odierno to warn that the group was repeating the tactics that had “effectively broke[n] 
the IA and IP [Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police]” in Mosul in 2004 and 2006.129 In the weeks to 
come, AQI would exploit the coalition’s departure from the cities by launching an offen-
sive not just in Mosul, but also in Baghdad, where AQI bombers would carry out some of 
the war’s largest attacks at the very edge of the Green Zone.
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TOWARD THE DEFEAT OF AQI, AUGUST 2009-JULY 2010
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and other leaders hailed Multi-National Force-Iraq’s 
(MNF-I) June 30, 2009, withdrawal from Iraqi cities as a significant Iraqi achievement. 
However, with U.S. troops leaving the population centers, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and 
other insurgent groups tried to show that the government could not secure Iraq’s cities 
on its own. Although it had lost the ability to operate openly and hold territory, AQI 
lashed out in late 2009 in a series of attacks in Baghdad that shook the Maliki government.
In the months that followed, MNF-I and the Iraqi Government fought back and 
regained ground lost to AQI. Together, they mounted operations that dealt the group a 
near-fatal blow in spring 2010. They did so against a difficult backdrop of changing U.S. 
strategic guidance, the Arab-Kurdish political conflict, a protracted Iraqi election crisis, 
and a creeping consolidation of power by Maliki. These factors combined to dim hopes 
for Iraq’s future stability.
THE AUTUMN 2009 BOMBINGS
AQI Shifts its Strategy
As MNF-I planned its move away from Iraqi cities during 2009, its leaders expected 
that AQI would intensify its attacks to discredit the Iraqi security forces. Even ahead 
of the June 30 withdrawal deadline, MNF-I believed that AQI was shifting its strategy. 
Under constant pressure from both coalition brigade combat teams (BCTs) and special 
operations forces, and having lost much of its popular support, AQI refocused its attacks 
on MNF-I and Iraqi Government targets to avoid civilian casualties.
AQI’s capacity had plummeted from its high during 2006-2007, when the organiza-
tion had controlled large swaths of northern and central Iraq and seemed on its way to 
creating a bona fide “Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).” By mid-July 2009, MNF-I estimated that 
the combined strength of all Sunni Arab resistance groups in the country, including AQI, 
had fallen to between 1,450 and 3,550 fighters, too few to operate as an insurgent army.1 
Likewise, across the country, the number of security incidents hovered around 200 per 
week, a rate consistent with summer 2003 levels.2
Only in Ninawa Province could AQI carry out a high rate of attacks and infiltrate Iraqi 
Government ranks to strike from within those ranks. During the winter of 2008-2009, 
AQI operatives and their contacts within the Iraqi Army and National Police carried out 
several insider or “green on blue” attacks against U.S. military detachments in the Mosul 
area. The attackers usually were Iraqi security force (ISF) members recruited or coerced 
by AQI or other insurgents, and they principally targeted coalition advisers embedded 
in ISF units. One such attack in February 2009 killed members of a U.S. police transition 
team in Mosul and proved that AQI and other groups continued to be able to penetrate 
the Mosul police force.3
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The Mosul police themselves were hit even harder as violent incidents nearly doubled 
after the coalition’s departure from the city. In the first week after the withdrawal of U.S. 
combat units, AQI and its allies carried out seven assassination attempts against senior 
ISF leaders in Mosul. During the first 6 weeks after the withdrawal, they killed at least 
68 policemen in the Mosul area.4 General Raymond T. Odierno reported to Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates that the intensified pressure against Mosul’s security 
forces resembled the insurgent campaigns that had led to the collapse of the city’s police 
force in 2004.5 A shortage of more than 5,000 policemen and 1,300 investigating officers 
in the undermanned Ninawa police force made the situation worse.6
Despite its continued activities against the ISF in Mosul, AQI suffered serious set-
backs in far northern Iraq. It faced constant pressure from the extensive system created 
to target the group’s foreign fighter networks. For almost 6 years, AQI and its allies had 
been reinforced by Salafi militants from throughout the Arab world, most entering via 
Syria. During 2009, that system broke down as the United States and other countries 
made a concerted effort to disrupt them.
While the group facilitating the flow of foreign fighters had regenerated somewhat 
in early 2009, it had never fully recovered from the 2008 raid that killed Abu Ghadiyah. 
On the heels of the loss of Abu Ghadiyah, the network suffered another blow when Leb-
anese authorities arrested a major Kuwaiti AQI facilitator with the nom de guerre “Al 
Hajj.”7 By mid-2009, Abu Khalaf, Abu Ghadiyah’s successor, fled Syria under pressure 
from Bashar al-Assad’s security forces, relocating into the Iraqi border area.8 Within Iraq, 
MNF-I had begun shifting some coalition troops to the Syrian border zones as coalition 
units left the cities in late spring, a move that MNF-I judged had reduced the foreign 
fighter flow even further, to an estimated rate of only five per month.9 The wider network 
of AQI’s Salafi militant allies suffered another setback in July when coalition special oper-
ations forces (SOF) and Iraqi troops captured four top leaders of Ansar al Islam during a 
24-hour period in Mosul, including Mullah Halgurd, a Kurdish militant who served as 
the group’s deputy leader.10
Since late 2008, the coalition had sought to limit AQI’s local financing in Ninawa. 
For several years before 2009, AQI had extorted large sums of money from the AsiaCell 
phone company, Iraq’s second-largest mobile phone provider. However, when AsiaCell 
stopped payments in mid-2009, AQI blew up three of the company’s cell towers and 
attacked the company’s headquarters building in Baghdad.11 Ninawa Governor Atheel 
Nujaifi also asked for coalition help to rein in corruption within his provincial govern-
ment, which he believed was providing cash to AQI. Multi-National Division-North 
(MND-N) responded by forming a joint interagency task force in Mosul to address both 
government corruption and AQI financing.12
These and other initiatives against AQI made it nearly impossible for the group to 
operate openly. Reviewing AQI’s mid-2009 operations, Odierno noted that the organiza-
tion had reverted to its earlier terrorist tactics. Where it once had been able to control ter-
rain and carry out a wide variety of attacks that included improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) and complex ambushes, pressure now limited the group to high-profile bombings 
about once every 3 weeks—a 70 percent reduction since the dark days of 2007-2008. On 
July 6, Odierno fatefully predicted to his staff that AQI would increasingly have to rely 
on high-profile car bombings.13
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“Bloody Wednesday,” August 19, 2009
Odierno’s prediction came true the following month as AQI began a string of bomb-
ings in Baghdad that were among the deadliest of the entire war. On the morning of 
August 19, two large truck bombs struck Iraq’s Finance Ministry and Foreign Ministry 
just a few minutes apart. The bombs devastated the buildings as well as the lines of 
employee cars queued to enter the ministry compounds for the start of the workday. Two 
more blasts followed in commercial districts elsewhere in the city. The day’s final death 
toll listed 75 killed with another 749 injured.14
The bombings stunned the Iraqi population and the government, which had seen 
Baghdad settle in a relatively safe pattern after the summer 2008 end of the Sadrist upris-
ing. The attacks also undermined the Maliki government’s assertion that the ISF could 
secure Iraq’s cities after the departure of coalition troops. Under intense public scrutiny, 
Prime Minister Maliki immediately blamed the Syrian regime and Syrian-based “Saddam 
loyalists.” The Prime Minister had visited Damascus only 1 day before the bombings 
expressly to reestablish Iraq-Syria relations after a long rupture, but in the wake of the 
bombings, he broke off relations once again. Within days, the Iraqi Interior Ministry 
began to arrest suspects associated with the Ba’ath Party. On August 23, the government 
broadcast a confession by one suspect who said that he acted under orders from Iraqi 
Ba’athists in Syria, after which Iraq expelled the Syrian ambassador in Baghdad, an act 
that the Syrian regime reciprocated in Damascus.15 Maliki also declared that Iraq would 
not participate in the nascent trilateral talks on counterterrorism and border security by 
the United States, Iraq, and Syria.
Despite the Iraqi Government’s insistence on Syrian involvement, MNF-I saw no evi-
dence that anyone other than AQI had planned and executed the August 19 bombings. 
For Odierno and other coalition leaders, the main failing had been the lax security mea-
sures of a complacent ISF, a factor that MNF-I leaders had been concerned about since 
beginning the transition out of the cities in the spring. “[O]ur joint, interagency assess-
ment is that AQI is responsible for the bombings. We have no evidence directly linking 
any foreign entities,” Odierno reported in early September.16 Nevertheless, Odierno sig-
naled his support for the international pressure Maliki was putting on Syria, given the 
Assad regime’s long-standing support for AQI facilitators.17
As conflict with the Assad regime intensified, the Iraqi Government took steps to 
address some of its security problems. Eleven ISF commanders were arrested for neg-
ligence in allowing the August attacks and Iraqi police and Army units were placed on 
alert, with all leave canceled. The operational pace of coalition special operations forces 
units returned to pre-June 30 levels, indicating that the Iraqi Government was willing to 
drop many of its reservations about coalition counterterrorism raids.18 This showed quick 
results: by late September, AQI had compartmentalized its operations, tasking individ-
uals rather than cells, a security measure that made complex operations more difficult.19 
Within MNF-I, coalition leaders hoped the bombings had been a “wakeup call” or an 
“Iraqi 9/11” for ISF leaders who underestimated the continuing terrorist threat.20
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The October 25th Bombings
Within weeks, further attacks in Baghdad proved these speculations premature. On 
October 25, AQI operatives based in the western Baghdad belt struck the Ministry of 
Justice and the nearby Ministry of Public Works in two coordinated vehicle bombings. 
The attacks caused more than 800 casualties, a higher toll than the August 19 attacks, and 
showed that the increased security measures were insufficient.
AQI’s political front, the ISI, immediately claimed responsibility in an online state-
ment declaring that “suicide bombers targeted the dens of infidelity and pillars of the 
rejectionist Shi’ite state in the land of the caliphate.”21 Nevertheless, as he had done in 
August, Maliki again blamed the Syria-based Iraqi Ba’ath for the bombings. The con-
tinued difference of opinion between U.S. commanders and Maliki was significant. U.S. 
leaders insisted the Iraqi Government still faced an AQI problem and should not have 
relaxed internal security measures. Maliki claimed the security problem originated out-
side Iraq, and that the coalition forces drew violence to the Iraqi cities by their presence.
The October 25 attack showed that AQI had made inroads in the western belt between 
Baghdad and Anbar, including the former AQI safe havens near Lake Tharthar. “It is clear 
to me that AQI is trying to reestablish itself along the seam between Anbar and Baghdad 
provinces,” Odierno had written in mid-September. A few weeks later MNF-I had noted 
that AQI high-profile bombings in eastern Anbar were damaging the credibility of the 
ISF and the provincial government.22 A Mercedes bus used as a vehicle bomb on October 
25 resembled a similar bomb found 2 weeks before in an AQI car-bomb factory in Abu 
Ghraib, just west of Baghdad. In response, MNF-I and Iraqi troops increased their patrols 
in the “seam” area to an average of 27 per day by the beginning of November.23 MNF-I 
found that the October 25 suicide bombers had probably been detainees in either the U.S. 
or Iraqi systems, leading Odierno to halt all releases of AQI-affiliated prisoners and slow 
down transfers of MNF-I’s remaining 7,000 detainees to Iraqi Government custody.24
In Baghdad itself, the October 25 bombing led to tighter ISF physical security mea-
sures, especially regarding traffic congestion which the attackers had used to move 
through the city undetected.25 The bombings showed that the Iraqi security forces relied 
on fake bomb detection wands that soldiers and police uselessly waved around vehicles 
at checkpoints—phony equipment a British businessman had sold to Baghdad for tens of 
millions of dollars with the collusion of corrupt Iraqi officials.
Beyond the security shortfalls in Baghdad and eastern Anbar, broader dynamics 
made central Iraq less secure than it had been since late 2007. The initial transfer of the 
Sons of Iraq to Iraqi Government payrolls had gone relatively smoothly in late 2008 and 
early 2009. Within 6 months, however, the government had become chronically late 
paying the Sunni militias and had begun arresting their leaders, rounding up 25 from 
July to September 2009.26 Much of the government’s hostility stemmed directly from 
Prime Minister Maliki, who “considered some of these Sons of Iraq groups to be nothing 
more than terrorists who were now getting paid for operating checkpoints,” according 
to Ambassador Christopher Hill.27 By fall 2009, Odierno was deeply concerned that the 
Iraqi Government’s failure to embrace the Awakening and the Sons of Iraq was creating 
an opening for AQI.28 AQI’s attempted resurgence took place in the cyber realm as well. 
Though it enjoyed less popular support than ever inside Iraq, the group continued to use 
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its sophisticated media outlets to broadcast propaganda throughout the region, claiming 
to be regaining its former strength. The coalition’s seeming inability to counter AQI and 
ISI propaganda—as well as that from Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqshbandi and Shi’a 
militant groups—frustrated MNF-I leaders, who had sought but not received authority 
to shut down AQI-affiliated media outlets.29
The December 8th Bombings
Despite the Iraqi Government’s tighter security measures, the MNF-I J-2 predicted 
in mid-November that another major attack was likely to occur around December 15.30 
The estimate would prove to be prescient. On December 8, suicide car bombers targeted 
the Ministry of Finance, a major Iraqi courthouse, and a busy overpass near the Ministry 
of Labor. AQI immediately claimed responsibility for the attacks that killed 50 Iraqis 
and wounded more than 200.31 The combined ISF-coalition response to the attacks was 
quicker and more thorough than in August and October, when the ISF had waited to ask 
for coalition help. Coalition technicians determined that the same bombing ring had car-
ried out the October and December attacks.32
The attacks did less damage than the earlier ones mainly because of the ISF’s improved 
operational procedures, but evidence that AQI could still penetrate into the heart of Bagh-
dad shook public confidence in the Maliki government. The day after the bombings, the 
Iraqi Parliament summoned the Prime Minister to an unprecedented 6-hour, closed-door 
session to grill him on his handling of Iraq’s security. Partly to deflect blame from himself 
and avoid a no-confidence vote, Maliki sacked General Abud Qanbar, the long-time head 
of the Baghdad Operations Command.33
According to Gates, the December 8 bombings showed that AQI was “down, but not 
out.”34 Two weeks after the attacks, MNF-I reported that some Iraqi civil servants had 
stopped going to work in the ministries out of fear.35 With national elections just weeks 
away, Iraqi politicians responded by exchanging accusations of blame, including Maliki. 
In the days after the attacks, the Prime Minister asserted that the bombings had been the 
work of AQI sympathizers who had infiltrated the ISF, an allegation that MNF-I lead-
ers warned Maliki would reinforce Iraqis’ doubts about the ISF’s ability to protect the 
population.36
THE “RESPONSIBLE DRAWDOWN”
Despite the AQI offensive, the March 2010 national elections had the potential to pro-
duce a national unity government that could help heal Iraq’s ethno-sectarian divisions 
and further eclipse Iraq’s Sunni and Shi’a militant groups. As a result, U.S. commanders 
believed that 2010 would see U.S. forces complete the transition to stability operations. It 
would also be a year of troop reductions. Given President Barack Obama’s instructions 
to end the U.S. combat mission by September 2010, U.S. forces would have to conduct a 
“responsible drawdown,” as the President termed it, from about 100,000 U.S. troops to 
50,000 by the end of August.
With U.S. units withdrawing from Iraq’s cities and shifting to stability operations, 
Odierno adjusted the joint campaign plan that had governed the coalition’s military and 
civil activities. In fall 2009, he enlisted a team of experts led by General (Ret.) Leon LaPorte 
492
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
to examine the strategic situation in the country and recommend changes. The Joint Cam-
paign Plan Assessment Team (JCPAT) viewed a renewed civil war as more likely than 
a return to large-scale insurgency, and recommended that the command concentrate on 
preventing civil war. LaPorte’s team also suggested lowering the Iraqi expectation for 
continued U.S. military presence and assistance, noting, “Iraqis do not seem to accept 
that there will be a major decline in U.S. presence starting in summer 2010.”37 Finally, the 
JCPAT noted a disconnect between MNF-I’s conditions-based approach to the impend-
ing troop drawdown and the time-based guidance Obama had given earlier in the year 
and urged the command to adapt to the political deadlines.38
The JCPAT’s conclusions matched a September 2009 internal strategic risk survey that 
asked dozens of senior MNF-I, Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I), and U.S. Embassy 
leaders to identify the most significant risks to U.S. strategic goals in Iraq. Two emerged: 
the danger of an Arab-Kurd war, and the unwillingness or inability of the Iraqi Gov-
ernment to “balance” against “malign Iranian influence.” The officials surveyed also 
identified sectarianism, a lack of economic development, and ineffective governance as 
obstacles to stability.
With these recommendations and risks in mind, Odierno decided that U.S. troops 
should shift from full-spectrum operations to stabilization operations. As U.S. troops with-
drew, MNF-I and MNC-I would transfer their activities to the Iraqis and U.S. Embassy. To 
manage their much-reduced forces, MNF-I and its many subordinate commands would 
consolidate into one headquarters, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), at the beginning of 2010. The 
new USF-I would no longer be a coalition command since other nations had pulled their 
forces out of Iraq in 2009, with the exception of small contingents assigned to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission-Iraq.
The new campaign plan, published November 15, 2009, codified these changes, 
which were further detailed in a new operations order, OPORD 10-1, released January 
1, 2010. The order laid out how the future USF-I would shift to stability operations while 
simultaneously drawing down to a “transition force” by August 30, 2010, the date set 
by Obama for the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq. The order also directed USF-I’s 
subordinate units to focus on three major tasks for 2010: the “responsible drawdown 
of forces” to fewer than 50,000 troops by the end of August; support for the conduct of 
the March 2010 Parliamentary elections; and the August 2010 transition from Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM to Operation NEW DAWN, in which new Advise and Assist Brigades 
(AABs) would replace the combat brigades that had been deploying to Iraq since 2003.39 
After August 2010, the command would continue to perform counterterrorism opera-
tions, but the vast majority of its forces would focus on developing Iraqi Government and 
security force capacity while completing a full “responsible redeployment” no later than 
December 31, 2011, as stipulated in the 2008 Security Agreement. OPORD 10-1’s “end 
state” envisioned “an increasingly competent and capable GoI [Government of Iraq], an 
ISF capable of maintaining internal security and . . . a foundation for a lasting U.S.-Iraq 
security partnership.”40
To oversee the new mission, Odierno reorganized his headquarters for the remainder 
of the campaign, merging the three previously independent operational headquarters 
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into a single command. MNC-I and MNF-I merged and the Multi-National Security 
Transition Command (MNSTC-I) became an Advise and Train directorate within the 
new amalgamated headquarters. In the new structure, Odierno would have three deputy 
commanders: one each for Advise and Train, Operations, and Support. These changes 
shrank the size of the operational headquarters elements to 2,200 personnel by spring 
2010, very different from the 7,000-strong headquarters of the surge era.41
Beyond Odierno’s headquarters, MNF-I’s four multinational divisions shifted to 
three U.S. divisions—north, center, and south—each with two AABs augmented with 
dozens of senior officers and noncommissioned officers to embed with partner ISF units. 
OPORD 10-1 envisioned a “transition force” of just more than 53,000, divided between 
about 12,000 troops and enablers at the USF-I level; about 18,000 troops and enablers at 
the division and theater levels; and about 23,000 troops in the AABs.42 Geographically, 
Major General Anthony Cucolo’s 3d Infantry Division was responsible for northern Iraq, 
Major General Terry Wolff’s 1st Armor Division focused on Baghdad and Anbar, and 
Major General Vincent Brooks’s 1st Infantry Division covered all of southern Iraq. This 
transition force was in far fewer locations than in previous years. From a peak of 495 
bases and installations at the height of the surge, MNF-I had reduced its presence to just 
281 bases by the publication of the new campaign plan on November 15, and decreased 
to fewer than 100 by September 2010. The closure of almost 400 bases and installations in 
a space of about 2 years proved a vast logistical undertaking, requiring a significant share 
of MNF-I/USF-I’s manpower and planning capacity. As the bases closed, USF-I reduced 
the large population of support contractors from a high of approximately 160,000 in 2008 
to fewer than 60,000 by late 2010.43
Not all of the senior leaders in Baghdad were completely satisfied with the new 
campaign plan and OPORD 10-1. USF-I Deputy Commanding General for Operations 
Lieutenant General Charles Jacoby had misgivings about the timing of the headquarters 
consolidation given the 2010 election season, the drawdown of brigades, and ongoing 
security operations in areas such as Ninawa. Jacoby believed these activities still required 
a separate corps headquarters to manage. “We should have gotten to 50,000 and gotten 
steady before [reorganizing],” Jacoby said later. “Trying to [shift to stability operations] 
in the middle of the election . . . where we were trying to get Iraqi units positioned to 
replace U.S. units as we were moving chess pieces off the battlefield at a quicker and 
quicker pace, was an operationally flawed concept.”44
For Odierno, the changes in the Joint Campaign Plan and OPORD 10-1 were part of the 
inevitable U.S. exit from Iraq. He believed the U.S. campaign had always been destined to 
end by handing off security responsibilities to the Iraqi Government and its forces, but he 
also understood that the earlier transition plan of 2005-2006 was attempted too soon. Sur-
veying the situation in late 2009, Odierno believed that the conditions for a resumption 
of the transition plan were now present, with a greatly expanded ISF deployed across the 
country and the Iraqi political groups competing far less through violence than through 
elections and the government structures.45 If the political progress could continue, then 
USF-I could accept the risk involved in drawing down by almost 50 percent to the transi-
tion force level of 53,000, Odierno judged.
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Iraqi Security Forces Shortfalls and Competition With Afghanistan
There were risks to the new campaign plan. The continued development of the ISF 
was not a sure thing. For U.S. forces to depart without a return of violence and instability 
the ISF had to improve its operational capabilities and expand its geographic coverage 
while the Iraqi Government took over full responsibility for funding it. By late 2009, the 
government’s budget was in crisis. The recession of 2008 and the accompanying drop 
in oil prices had created a significant funding shortfall. The Iraqi cabinet responded by 
cutting the ISF development budget to half of what was required to produce what USF-I 
considered the “minimum essential capability.”46
The financial problems came at a particularly bad time. USF-I had assumed the oil-
rich Iraqi Government would be able to pay for the many costly capabilities needed for 
the country to defend itself without U.S. troops. The slashing of the defense budget risked 
the building of an air defense capability and the creation of an Iraqi Air Force. Accord-
ingly, Odierno asked the Pentagon for $3.5 billion in security assistance to make up the 
difference. The cash-strapped Pentagon resisted until Odierno warned the Joint Chiefs 
that the shortfall threatened the President’s withdrawal timeline.47
The budget crunch was not the only problem. By this point, Afghanistan had become 
a higher priority than Iraq for the U.S. Government. When the President ordered the 
drawdown of U.S. combat brigades in Iraq, Odierno advised that the mission could be 
accomplished with fewer combat troops. However, the scarce “enablers”—combat sup-
port systems such as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and special oper-
ations forces—would need to remain in larger numbers through 2011 so that the combat 
units would not lose situational awareness, mobility, and force protection. Odierno also 
believed the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) and the congressio-
nally sponsored Iraqi Security Forces Fund would become more important as U.S. units 
left.48 Throughout 2009, the U.S. commands in Iraq found themselves competing with 
Afghanistan for enablers and funds at every level.
Early in 2009, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander General David H. 
Petraeus had reapportioned 40 percent of the Iraq theater’s ISR to Afghanistan, a decision 
that Odierno believed introduced unnecessary risk to the Iraq mission. Petraeus believed 
himself under pressure from senior U.S. leaders to shift assets to Afghanistan, which 
the President concluded had long been under-resourced. This pressure mounted after 
the President announced on December 1, 2009, that the United States would send an 
additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan for an 18-month “surge.” The decision pushed 
Petraeus to accelerate the movement of forces into Afghanistan through the U.S. logistics 
network in the Middle East, a change in priorities for ports, shipping, and air bases that 
restricted the flow of resources into Iraq.49
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Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Alexander Snyder (Released).
Soldiers Load a C-130 Aircraft at Balad Air Base, Iraq, Bound for Bagram Air Base, 
Afghanistan.50
OPORD 10-1, USF-I’s plan for a transition force of 53,000 after August 2010, did not 
reflect Obama’s intent to leave a “residual force” of between 35,000 and 50,000 in Iraq. 
The troop level that MNF-I leaders considered a minimal “floor” exceeded the White 
House’s “ceiling” by 18,000. Odierno did not resist making Afghanistan the main U.S. 
effort, but he bristled at the idea that additional resources for Afghanistan should come 
from Iraq rather than from other theaters.51 Illustrating Odierno’s point, the last Marine 
command left Anbar in January 2010, handing over responsibility for the province to the 
1st Armored Division. After 6 years in western Iraq, where they had done some of their 
hardest fighting since World War II, the Marines shifted to Afghanistan’s Helmand Prov-
ince. Thereafter, U.S. ground operations in Iraq would fall solely to the U.S. Army.
 
 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Daniel Schneider (Released).
Marines Case the Colors of II Marine Expeditionary Force During a Ceremony  
Marking the End of the Marines’ Presence in Anbar Province.52
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The war in Afghanistan also put considerable pressure on the special operations ele-
ments in Iraq. While the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) effort 
in Iraq remained unchanged, in 2009 the special operations task force shifted its main 
effort to Afghanistan. In July, the Ranger elements from the task force departed Iraq, 
handing other joint SOF elements responsibility for countering malign Iranian influence. 
The next month, the joint task force shifted its forward headquarters to Afghanistan, 
leaving a smaller command and control element in Iraq.
Tension in U.S. Civil-Military Relations in Baghdad
The ISF budget shortfall and downgrading of the Iraq theater’s importance in U.S. 
strategy came as USF-I and other DoD elements worked to implement the President’s 
instructions to hand “lead agency responsibility” to the State Department by September 
2010. USF-I leaders identified more than 1,000 functions and missions the U.S. Embassy 
would need to take over in 2010 and 2011. But MNF-I representatives learned that their 
U.S. Embassy counterparts did not intend to continue some of what USF-I considered 
to be core U.S. military functions in the country. For example, the State Department and 
other civilian agencies were not equipped to train the Iraqi Army and police in the way 
the U.S. military had done since 2005. The very different capabilities of USF-I and the U.S. 
Embassy led many senior USF-I leaders to believe the State Department would discon-
tinue—or fumble—many mission-essential tasks once U.S. troops left.
The departure of Ambassador Ryan Crocker in mid-2009 struck a blow to U.S. mili-
tary and U.S. Embassy relations and made the handover of responsibility more difficult. 
The close rapport Odierno and his command enjoyed with Crocker ended when Ambas-
sador Chris Hill arrived in 2009 with what he believed was a Presidential mandate to 
“civilianize” the U.S. presence in Iraq and to make the Baghdad Embassy a “normal” U.S. 
diplomatic mission in which the ambassador was the President’s personal representative 
with final authority over all operations in the country.53
 
Source: DoD photo courtesy Joint Combat Camera Center Iraq (Released).
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Christopher R. Hill With Iraqi Policemen  
in Qadisiyah Province.54
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Hill’s desire to assert embassy control over military activities led to considerable ten-
sion. After his first embassy briefing, a joint meeting with MNF-I and Iraqi governors, 
Hill fumed at what he perceived to be the Embassy’s subordination to its military coun-
terparts. He asked his staff “whether this was how briefings had always been conducted, 
with the commanding general handling 95 percent of it while the ambassador sat like a 
bobble head doll, nodding his approval.”55 Afterward, he declared that he would lead 
future meetings, which would be attended by equal numbers of soldiers and diplomats. 
Hill also reduced the civil-military working groups and asserted embassy authority over 
security and administrative functions but later blamed his uniformed counterparts for 
any friction. “[T]he military really had some trouble letting go,” he said, because “the 
military and its camp followers were used to running everything in Iraq.”56
In addition to differing views on the civil-military relationship, Hill and the U.S. mil-
itary commanders had differing conceptions of the Iraq conflict. Having just emerged 
from the intense operations of the surge, U.S. military leaders regarded the relative stabil-
ity of 2009 as fragile and dependent on continued security operations and political prog-
ress. Hill, by contrast, appeared to believe that Iraq had stabilized, and it was time for 
the U.S. military to leave. He pushed back against Odierno’s idea of “drivers of conflict” 
that needed to be addressed to consolidate security. Hill also believed the United States 
should extricate itself from what he saw as Iraqi business. Toward this end, he began 
withdrawing long-standing embassy participation in Iraqi Government security and eco-
nomic functions, later commenting that he was “appalled by the idea that anyone but 
Iraqis should be in attendance at an Iraqi national security meeting.”57 Hill also sought 
to extricate the United States from a number of international issues in which MNF-I had 
played a leading role, such as the complex matter of the Mujahedin e Khalq (MeK). The 
ambassador and his embassy team considered the MeK issue to be a “constant irritant” 
that should be left to the Iraqis or an international body such as the United Nations (UN), 
and he prohibited U.S. negotiators from interacting with the group.58
These disagreements over strategy soon became clashes of personality. As top leaders 
disagreed, relations became tense at lower levels as well. After 5 years of being housed 
with MNF-I in the Republican Palace in Iraq’s Green Zone, the U.S. Embassy moved 
to its immense new compound in early 2009. Once there, Hill’s staff gradually limited 
MNF-I’s presence in the building, severing many of the day-to-day, civil-military work-
ing relationships that had existed since the days of the Coalition Provincial Authority 
(CPA) and Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7). After half a decade of increasingly 
close partnerships, the U.S. diplomats and military officials in Baghdad were returning 
to the fractious civil-military relations that had developed between Ambassador Paul 
Bremer and Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez. This deterioration would hamper the 
U.S. mission in Iraq after 2009, when the country would enter a protracted political crisis 
for which the U.S. military and diplomatic representatives in Baghdad would advocate 
sharply different responses.
THE COMBINED SECURITY MECHANISM
One major political challenge of early 2010 was the continued Arab-Kurd conflict in 
northern Iraq. Having ceded provincial power by their misguided boycott of the January 
2005 provincial elections, the Sunnis of northern Iraq voted in large numbers in January 
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2009 and won majorities or pluralities in Ninawa, Salahadin, and Diyala. Though the 
Sunni vote represented an embrace of the political process and thus a political defeat for 
AQI, it also precipitated a political struggle that threatened to spill over into violence and 
destabilize the country through the last 3 years of the U.S. military presence in Iraq.
The August 2008 confrontation between Arab troops and Kurdish peshmerga in 
Khanaqin was just the first in a series of low-level standoffs. Upon assuming command 
of MND-N in late 2008, Major General Robert Caslen concluded that “the peace dividend 
of the surge was that the Iraqi Army now had the ability to focus on what had previously 
been their adversary, the Kurds,” and that the central government in Baghdad was intent 
on rolling back the Kurdistan Regional Government’s control of Kirkuk.59 “We quickly 
found ourselves in the middle of an ethnic conflict,” Caslen recalled. “There were 12 sep-
arate times that there was a standoff between Kurds and Arabs with guns pointed at each 
other . . . [and] American soldiers standing in between.”60
Kirkuk and Khanaqin were not the only flashpoints. In Ninawa Province, the Sunni 
Hadba Gathering, a party running on an anti-Kurdish platform, won 19 of the provincial 
council’s 37 seats in the January 2009 elections and promptly formed a provincial gov-
ernment under Atheel Nujaifi with greatly reduced Kurdish participation.61 In response, 
Ninawa’s Kurdish leaders withdrew from their posts and refused to recognize Nujaifi 
as governor.62 The situation came to a head in May 2009 when peshmerga forces pre-
vented Nujaifi from traveling to Bashiqa, an oil-rich, Kurdish-administered district east 
of Mosul.63 The governor turned back to Mosul before the situation escalated, claiming 
Kurdish leaders had issued a “shoot to kill” order if he attempted to enter the town. 
These continuing jurisdictional disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government 
and its Arab counterparts caused ethnic strains all along the Green Line. By summer 
2009, Odierno concluded that tension between Kurds and Arabs was the “No. 1 driver of 
instability” in all of Iraq, creating a real threat of ethnic civil war.64
 
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Christopher Kozloski (Released).
Ninawa Provincial Governor Atheel Nujaifi Addresses Iraqi Police  
Academy Graduates in Mosul.65
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Combined Checkpoints and the Golden Lions
One problem was that the Green Line was not an internal boundary, but a demili-
tarized zone, with peshmerga checkpoints set up to the north, Iraqi Army checkpoints 
some distance to the south, and a seam of often populated territory between the two. 
AQI and other insurgents used this seam to move with relative ease from the Syrian 
border to Mosul, and as far east as Kirkuk.66 All along the Green Line, Sunni insurgent 
groups exploited Arab-Kurd tensions and stoked ethnic conflict. In Taza, a majority Tur-
koman town of 20,000 just south of Kirkuk, an AQI car bomb in June 2009 killed 75 and 
wounded 254, leaving locals convinced that AQI had targeted the quiet town to “ignite 
the sectarian sedition in Iraq.”67 The attack was just one in a series of provocative bomb-
ings made possible by the absence of a security presence within the seam.
Doing away with this causeway of insurgent activity was not a simple matter of 
maneuvering troops to establish a security presence. The U.S. forces that traditionally 
acted as the neutral security presence for several years continued to drawdown through-
out 2009, leaving MND-N without the troops or the time for peacekeeping. In an effort 
to establish an effective security presence within the disputed area and build confidence 
between Arabs and Kurds, Odierno formulated a tripartite peacekeeping arrangement 
known as the Combined Security Mechanism. Odierno and other U.S. commanders rec-
ognized that the problem was political. “The problem was not that a Kurdish policeman 
and an Iraqi soldier would necessarily go to guns on each other,” one U.S. brigade com-
mander recalled. “It was because their leadership would.”68 The aim of the Combined 
Security Mechanism was cooperation between militaries first, and then, in Odierno’s 
words, “have the political stuff follow.”69 By October, the concept evolved into a series 
of Combined Security Areas with checkpoints reporting to regional Combined Coordi-
nation Centers, all jointly manned by peshmerga, ISF, and U.S. troops.70 A committee 
comprised of Jacoby, Iraqi Lieutenant General Ali Ghaidan, and a senior Kurdish security 
official pored over maps to plot the precise locations and boundaries of the security areas 
and checkpoints. The meetings were complex, back-and-forth negotiations with U.S. offi-
cers mediating between the two Iraqi groups.71 “There were differences in things that 
did not seem important to us but were important to them,” said one senior U.S. officer, 
and U.S. officials found themselves “moving [checkpoints] sometimes only hundreds of 
yards to make people happy.”72
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Source: DoD photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Matthew Leistikow (Released).
An Iraqi Federal Policeman, a U.S. Army Soldier, and a Kurdish Peshmerga Fighter, 
Members of the Golden Lions Combined Security Force, on Patrol Near the 
 Green Line.73
The most innovative security mechanism was a Combined Security Force made up 
of equal parts ISF, peshmerga, and U.S. troops who manned the combined checkpoints 
and patrolled the security areas together. To bring the three forces together, MND-N set 
up joint training schools for platoons of Iraqis, Kurds, and Americans.74 Each squad in 
the combined platoons was ethnically mixed, with soldiers from all three armies eating, 
sleeping, and training as a cohesive unit. To enforce the single unit identity further, the 
mixed force was given the name “Golden Lions” and outfitted in distinctive uniforms 
worn by both Kurds and Arabs.75 By summer 2010, the Golden Lions were performing 
their mission throughout northern Iraq’s disputed territories, part of the first Arab-Kurd 
peacekeeping mechanism along the Green Line in the country’s history.
Still, the combined checkpoints and Arab-Kurd units needed an accompanying polit-
ical consensus to prevent ethnic conflict, as one incident in early 2010 illustrated. As 
the combined checkpoints were erected along the Green Line in January 2010, Odierno 
insisted that the peshmerga dismantle their unilateral checkpoints inside the disputed 
internal boundaries areas.76 However, the new joint security architecture failed in its first 
major test. On February 1, 2010, the Sunni Arab governor of Ninawa, Atheel Nujaifi, set 
out from Mosul in a convoy of dozens of vehicles to visit the peshmerga-occupied eastern 
districts of the province, but Kurdish leaders in Erbil deployed peshmerga and zerevani 
(Kurdish police) to block Nujaifi’s way into the Kurdish-held districts.77 Kurds along the 
route assaulted the governor’s convoy and briefly fired at Nujaifi’s vehicles. Nujaifi’s 
entourage responded by arresting nine Kurds on the scene and jailing them in Mosul 
on “terrorism” charges.78 The situation worsened when Kurdistan Regional Govern-
ment (KRG) officials, most likely acting on orders from KRG President Massoud Barzani, 
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arrested eight Arabs, escalating the affair into a hostage exchange crisis.79 The situation 
was finally resolved on February 22, when Deputy Prime Minister Rafe al-Issawi and U.S. 
officials arranged the simultaneous release of the hostages from both sides. 
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
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The episode showed the fragility of the peace along the Green Line where U.S. offi-
cials had been surprised by what Odierno termed “a complete breakdown within the 
peshmerga forces in implementing the agreed-upon joint security architecture.”80 It also 
showed that preventing civil war would not be easy, and that the United States played an 
essential moderating role among the rival Iraqi political groups.81
THE EVISCERATION OF AL-QAEDA IN IRAQ, JANUARY-MAY 2010
The bombings of autumn 2009 had shown that AQI remained a potent threat despite 
having lost almost all its territory during 2008-2009. The group also had succeeded in 
sowing discord among the fractious political parties as they prepared for the Parliamen-
tary elections of March 2010. However, within weeks of AQI’s final high-profile attacks 
against the Iraqi ministries in Baghdad on December 8, 2009, USF-I, coalition SOF, and 
the Iraqi security forces began a series of operations that would bring AQI closer to defeat 
than at any point during the long Iraq War. The crushing of AQI in spring 2010 would 
change the organization in unanticipated ways, greatly reducing its capacity to harm the 
Iraqi population and interrupt the political process. The decimation of AQI would also 
lay the groundwork for the terrorist group’s later evolution into the Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant (ISIS).
Breaking the Bombing String
The autumn 2009 bombings had a significant impact on Iraqis, even though the last of 
the three did far less damage than the rest. With Iraq’s March 7, 2010, Parliamentary elec-
tions just weeks away, USF-I leaders were concerned that AQI could disrupt the politi-
cal process or perhaps thwart voting in some areas as it had done in 2005. Accordingly, 
U.S. and Iraqi SOF focused on AQI in Mosul and other strongholds ahead of the voting. 
Investigations of the autumn bombings had yielded a great deal of intelligence about 
AQI’s structure and operations, so that USF-I analysts believed by January that they had 
a clearer idea of AQI-ISI’s inner workings than at any other point in the Iraq War.82
This new understanding of AQI’s organization paid off on January 4, when U.S. and 
Iraqi troops simultaneously struck 16 targets in Mosul, resulting in several high-profile 
captures and the death of several more leaders, including AQI’s “Border Wali” who was 
responsible for bringing foreign fighters into the north.83 The following week brought 
another significant gain in Baghdad, where on January 12, U.S. and Iraqi SOF foiled a 
fourth set of coordinated car bombings, breaking the string of massive attacks against 
the Iraqi Government.84 Just 10 days later, on January 22, U.S. SOF conducted a raid that 
killed Abu Khalaf, the senior AQI facilitator who had inherited Abu Ghadiyah’s Syr-
ia-based foreign fighter network after the latter’s death in October 2008. Though pressure 
from the Syrian regime already had marginalized Abu Khalaf, his death still hurt AQI’s 
Syria-based network.85
AQI’s setbacks in Mosul and on the border did not prevent the group from attacking 
the Arba’een pilgrimage in early February, when AQI suicide bombers and IEDs killed 
and wounded more than 500 of the several million pilgrims making their way to Karbala. 
The January U.S.-Iraqi operations did appear to break AQI’s momentum in Baghdad 
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after the carnage of the fall, and the biggest gains against the extremist group were still 
to come.
The Wali of Baghdad
The Maliki government’s erroneous claim to have captured Abu Omar al-Baghdadi 
in April 2009 harmed its credibility. Ironically, it proved the first step toward the dev-
astation of AQI’s senior leaders the following year. Ahmad Khamis al-Majma’i, the AQI 
detainee that Maliki’s forces mistakenly thought was Baghdadi was, in fact, one of the 
AQI leader’s lieutenants who sometimes acted as Baghdadi’s stand-in.86 In the course of 
his interrogations, Majma’i explained how Baghdadi and his organization moved and 
operated to evade detection, information that allowed the Iraqi Government to begin 
infiltrating AQI’s Baghdad networks.87
The first major payoff from Majma’i’s information was the capture of AQI’s so-called 
wali (governor or guardian) of Baghdad, a Moscow-born, 35-year-old former Ba’athist 
named Manaf al Rawi, whom the Iraqi Government believed had masterminded the 
autumn bombings. After Saddam Hussein’s fall in 2003, Rawi had been recruited by Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi and had fought in the first battle of Fallujah before being captured 
by coalition troops in June 2004. Task Force 134, the command responsible for coalition 
detention operations, had released him in November 2007, after which Zarqawi’s succes-
sor Abu Ayyub al-Masri integrated him back into AQI’s operational network, making 
him head of AQI’s Baghdad operations by the end of 2008.88 On March 11, 2010, Iraqi 
federal police arrested Rawi just 2 miles from Camp Victory, after which ISF interroga-
tors held him for more than a week without informing USF-I.89 For an additional 2 weeks, 
Iraqi officials did not allow USF-I access to Rawi, perhaps wary of sharing their detainee 
after the embarrassing public disagreement with MNF-I leaders over the falsely identi-
fied Abu Omar al Baghdadi the year before. Prime Minister Maliki did not allow USF-I 
officers to join Rawi’s interrogation until April 4, the same day a string of AQI car bombs 
in Baghdad struck the Iranian, Egyptian, and German Embassies, with another bomb 
defused at the French Embassy.90
As USF-I joined the questioning, Rawi gave his captors detailed and extensive infor-
mation about himself, the AQI leadership network, and the group’s plans.91 According 
to Rawi, AQI in Baghdad had been subdivided into three sectors, one encompassing 
the east side of the city and two more covering the north and south halves of the west 
side. The group’s internal communications were governed by security measures so strict 
that Rawi and other AQI sub-leaders never personally met their superiors, but instead 
received instructions only by courier or from ISI “minister of war” Abu Ayyub al-Masri—
an arrangement that left Rawi with wide latitude to plan and carry out operations in the 
city as he saw fit.92
Among other plots, Rawi explained that Masri had entrusted him with the early plan-
ning of a major external operation ordered by AQI senior leader Ayman al-Zawahiri—a 
high profile attack against the 2010 FIFA World Cup games in South Africa.93 He also 
revealed that AQI had hatched a plot to hijack aircraft and fly them into Iraq’s Shi’a 
shrines to incite a sectarian war, as their former leader Zarqawi had intended by the 
Samarra mosque bombing of 2006.94 The threat to the shrines prompted a rapid response 
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from the Iraqi Government, for which such an attack would have spelled disaster. Gov-
ernment ministries scrambled to account for Iraqi planes and examine the backgrounds 
of Iraqi pilots, while USF-I moved quickly to deploy an antiaircraft capability to Najaf 
and other threatened areas.95 The plot against the shrines did not come to fruition, how-
ever, because AQI’s top leaders were about to meet their end.
The Elimination of AQI’s Senior Leadership
In addition to these plots, Rawi provided information that led directly to Masri and 
Baghdadi. Along with Rawi’s lengthy confessions, which were later broadcast on Iraqi 
and regional television, information released by disgruntled AQI members via social 
media in 2013-2014 explained how Rawi’s capture eventually led to the evisceration of 
almost the entire AQI/ISI leadership. Masri had instituted extreme operational security 
measures in fall 2009 after the death of AQI operations chief Brigadier General Moham-
med Nada al-Juburi (also known as al-Ra’i). Both Baghdadi and Masri had remained in a 
static location, with the latter only communicating with Rawi by courier and then relying 
on Rawi to disseminate his orders to the other provincial walis. Also actively involved 
in the dissemination of Masri’s orders was Ibrahim Awwad al-Samarra’i, (also known as 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or Ibrahim al-Badri), the future ISIS caliph whose Baghdad home 
served as the primary distribution point for AQI senior leaders’ correspondence.96
In an AQI organization whose leadership had been depleted by 6 years of rapid turn-
over, Masri had come to place great trust in Rawi due to the latter’s long jihadi pedigree 
and experience, but this reliance would prove to be the AQI leader’s undoing. Oper-
ating on Rawi’s information, ISF troops captured the complete AQI records for Anbar 
Province, which included orders from Masri to the AQI walis for Anbar and Ninawa to 
supply Rawi with revenue, fighters, and suicide bombers. Taken at face value, the AQI 
records showed that as much as 80 percent of AQI’s revenue in Ninawa was being sent to 
Rawi to finance operations in Baghdad.97
The captured documents provided an operational and administrative picture so com-
plete that, according to Prime Minister Maliki, gaining corroboration though detainee 
interrogations was relatively easy. In effect, the same clandestine bureaucracy that had 
served AQI so well in the past, enabling it to remain resilient in the face of severe attrition, 
now proved lethal to the group. As part of a combined U.S.-ISF operation that the Iraqis 
called LION’S LEAP, the exploitation of the captured AQI documents led to the immedi-
ate capture of several senior AQI leaders. They were Abdallah Azzam Misfir al-Qahtani 
(also known as Sinan al Saudi), a former Saudi Army officer who was the architect of 
the planned World Cup attack; Tariq Hassan Abd al-Qadir (also known as Abu Yasin 
al-Jaza’iri), the AQI emir of west Baghdad; and Muzahim al-Janabi, who oversaw AQI’s 
operations in southern Baghdad from his base in Lutufiyah.98
These three high profile captures yielded information exposing the hiding place of 
Masri and Baghdadi in the Tharthar region approximately 10 kilometers outside the city 
of Tikrit, on the edge of the former area of operation (AO) Bedrock and just a short dis-
tance west of Major General Anthony Cucolo and MND-N’s headquarters at Camp Spe-
icher.99 In a manner eerily reminiscent of Saddam Hussein, or later, Osama bin Laden, the 
two AQI men had lived in a simple mud building since September 2009, communicating 
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with AQI senior leaders in Pakistan and a handful of key subordinates through trusted 
couriers.100 A measure of how removed Masri had become from the day-to-day admin-
istration of his own organization can be seen in one AQI member’s claim that follow-
ing al-Ra’i’s death, Masri appointed a new operations chief—a former Ba’athist colonel 
named Samir Abd Mohammed al-Khlifawi (aka Hajji Bakr)—without having any prior 
contact with or knowledge of the man.101 Apart from their wives, the only individuals 
present at the house were Baghdadi’s son and Masri’s aide de camp. Masri’s own wife 
later claimed to the Arabic press that during her time living near Lake Tharthar she never 
saw any trace of the ISI that her husband purportedly led.102
On April 18, 2010, U.S. troops and their counterparts from the Iraqi 54th Brigade 
identified Masri’s and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’s isolated safe house and set up a cordon 
around it to prevent the AQI leaders from escaping.103 Once the American and Iraqi troops 
revealed themselves, the women living in the house came outside and, after some initial 
denials, admitted that Baghdadi was there. After a failed attempt to persuade Baghdadi 
to surrender, the troops raided the house, and after a firefight, Baghdadi, Masri, Baghda-
di’s son, and Masri’s aide blew themselves up rather than be captured.104
The seizure of the AQI leaders’ hideout yielded a trove of documents and more than 
six terabytes of data that enabled special operations forces to mount a series of assaults 
against other AQI leaders. In the days following the April 18 raid, U.S. and Iraqi forces 
captured and interrogated 16 AQI senior aides and their bodyguards.105 On April 20, U.S. 
and ISF troops killed Ahmad Ali Abbas Dahir al-Ubayd, AQI’s commander for northern 
Iraq, and 3 days later captured Mahmoud Suleiman, a leading AQI operations officer 
in Anbar.106 On May 4 in west Baghdad, U.S. troops and ISF counterparts dealt AQI-ISI 
another major blow when they captured Abu Abdullah al-Shafi, the head of Ansar al 
Islam, who had been one of the few leaders of the jihad to survive 7 years into the war 
and had been considered a potential successor to Masri. Coinciding with other AQI losses 
and mass surrenders in the Hamrin Mountains of Diyala and Sharqat in Ninawa, these 
raids crippled the group.107 By mid-May, Odierno reported that at least 32 of AQI’s top 42 
leaders had been killed or captured since the beginning of March, the most severe lead-
ership losses the organization had suffered since beginning operations in Iraq in 2003.
Measuring the Impact on AQI
The thousands of handwritten letters, documents, CDs, computers, and audio record-
ings captured by coalition troops yielded tremendous insight into AQI’s inner work-
ings, including direct correspondence between Masri and al-Qaeda senior leaders in 
Pakistan.108 Among the information recovered was Masri’s last major operational plan 
to target a large number of Christian churches in Baghdad. The information also con-
firmed previous coalition assessments that AQI was suffering from both financial and 
manpower shortages, indicating the degree to which the group already had declined 
prior to the deaths of its leaders.109
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Source: DoD photo by Private 1st Class Jared Eastman (Released).
Major General Anthony Cucolo, Commander of MND-N.110
While coalition and Iraqi SOF units carried out the raids that destroyed AQI’s opera-
tional leadership, Cucolo and MND-N undertook an offensive against AQI’s vast finan-
cial empire in northern Iraq. In early 2010, U.S. analysts came to understand the extent to 
which Iraq’s northern petroleum industry had become a black market that fed insurgent 
groups of all kinds, especially through the trafficking of the gasoline produced at Iraq’s 
largest refinery in Bayji.
Smugglers routinely stole gasoline from tankers once they left Bayji and resold the 
stolen gas to illegal roadside gas stations that dotted the highways in northern Iraq, 
many of them affiliated with AQI. The process involved not just AQI and other insur-
gent groups, but also a vast network of government officials, trucking outfits, and gas 
station owners.111 Cucolo and Major General Nasser Ghanam, commander of the 2d Iraqi 
Army Division in Mosul, formulated a combined plan to disrupt this illicit network. 
The controversial Ghanam previously served as a brigade commander in Abu Ghraib, 
where he notoriously attempted to repress Abu Azzam’s large Awakening group against 
MNF-I’s wishes in 2007. In Mosul, however, Ghanam seemed more eager to assist his 
U.S. partners.112 Under Ghanam and Cucolo’s combined direction, 3 MND-N battalions 
intercepted gasoline smugglers at the Iraq-Syria border north and west of Mosul while 
Ghanam’s troops and Iraqi border forces shut down all 117 of the identified illegal gas 
stations in the north and arrested the operators at each one.113 The shutdown of the gas 
stations disrupted the black market cash flow at precisely the time AQI found itself des-
perate for money and new leaders.
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The cumulative loss of leadership and finances crippled AQI. Even before the April 
18 raid, USF-I had estimated that AQI’s strength had been cut to fewer than 100 fighters 
in Mosul and Baghdad and no more than 1,000 in the entire country. The April and May 
raids slashed these numbers further.114 In early May, Odierno reported to Gates that AQI 
“had never before lost so many key leaders or been tested as they were now.” By June, 
both U.S. and Iraqi officials judged that AQI effectively had been cut off from secure 
communications with the broader al-Qaeda network.115 The documents captured later 
from Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad in 2011 supported this as bin Laden 
was still seeking detailed biographies for the new AQI leadership as late as June 2010.116 
Not until mid-July 2010 were al-Qaeda’s senior leaders able to reestablish direct commu-
nications with AQI leaders inside Iraq.117 Isolated from their counterparts outside Iraq, 
AQI’s remnants inside Iraq fell into disarray during the late spring of 2010 with various 
mid-level leaders jockeying to fill the group’s power vacuum. Subsequent AQI insider 
accounts painted a picture of the group’s network in chaos.118
Even so, the remaining AQI leaders of Baghdad and Mosul moved quickly to demon-
strate that their organization was not extinct. On May 10, 2010, AQI operatives carried out 
coordinated attacks against 24 targets in Mosul, Baghdad, Fallujah, Hillah, and Basrah, 
killing 119 and wounding more than 350.119 In Tel Afar on May 14, they detonated a truck 
bomb on the field during a children’s soccer match and followed with suicide vest bomb-
ers amidst the crowd of panicked parents, causing more than 130 casualties.120
Nevertheless, for USF-I leaders the AQI operations of May-June 2010 showed that the 
effectiveness and sophistication of the group’s attacks had greatly diminished. To gather 
their resources to maintain a presence in Mosul and Baghdad, AQI’s remnants had to 
cede many of their former operating areas to other insurgent groups such as the Naqsh-
bandi Army.121 There were still “decentralized cells . . . attempting to continue to execute 
the last orders given,” Odierno noted, but these had no hope of disrupting the ongoing 
Iraqi election process or achieving AQI’s ultimate goal of destabilizing the Iraqi Govern-
ment.122 It was an assessment the captured Wali of Baghdad shared. Interviewed in his 
captivity on May 18, Manaf al-Rawi told CNN, “It is 80 to 100 percent harder to operate 
for al Qaeda these days.”123
THE IRAQI POLITICAL CRISIS
The Disputed 2010 Elections
The rapid U.S.-Iraqi operations that decimated AQI’s leadership in early 2010 had 
taken place alongside a protracted political crisis that threatened to undermine the secu-
rity gains. The Iraqi Parliamentary election of March 2010 was a high-stakes contest for 
control of the two traditional pillars of the Iraqi state: vast oil revenues that reached more 
than $100 billion in 2010 and a huge security sector of over 900,000 troops and police. 
The political battle of 2010-2011 would have profound consequences for the U.S. cam-
paign in Iraq, casting a shadow over USF-I’s plans and initiatives as U.S. forces began to 
drawdown.
Four major coalitions competed in the election. As in 2005, the major Kurdish parties 
formed a Kurdish Alliance to secure their share of the new Parliament. Iraq’s Sunnis, 
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meanwhile, followed the Kurdish example by forming a single electoral list headed by 
former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, reversing the fragmentation that had hurt Sunni 
prospects in 2005. The country’s Shi’a parties had fragmented into two large coalitions by 
2010: Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law coalition, with the Da’wa Party at its center; 
and the Iraqi National Alliance comprised of ISCI, Badr, and the Sadrists.
The period prior to the election was volatile. As the parties published their candi-
date lists in December and January, the Iraqi Parliament’s de-Ba’athification commit-
tee—formed under Ahmad Chalabi’s leadership in the early years of the war—threw 
the election campaign into disarray. Led by Chalabi’s deputy, Ali Faisal al-Lami—only 
recently released from a year of U.S. captivity after his role in the assassinations of U.S. 
officials in Sadr City in 2008—the committee used its dubious legal authority to nullify 
the candidacy of more than 500 allegedly Ba’athist-linked candidates, including some 
who previously had been elected to Parliament.124 The move weakened Allawi’s Sun-
ni-majority Iraqiyah coalition that had a large number of former Ba’athists while helping 
the Shi’a-majority coalitions, leaving the Sunni community to conclude that their candi-
dates were being specifically targeted.125
After months of security planning, Iraqi and American officials were pleased when 
the elections occurred on March 7 with little violence. From their base in the Green Zone, 
Maliki and his State of Law allies believed they would win about 120 seats in the new 
325-seat Parliament, a total that would have given them a leading role in forming the next 
government.126 However, the results of the vote were a surprise to all involved. As the 
tallies came in from Iraq’s provinces in mid-March, Iraqiyah finished first in the voting, 
gaining 91 seats to Maliki and State of Law’s 89.127 The unexpected result was due at least 
in part to Allawi’s success in attracting secular Shi’a voters, who elected a dozen Shi’a 
candidates from Baghdad and the south as part of the Sunni-majority Iraqiyah. Maliki 
and State of Law, conversely, did poorly in Sunni-majority areas and lost ground in Shi’a 
provinces to the Sadrists, who unexpectedly increased their seat count from 29 to 40.
According to the standard interpretation of the Iraqi constitution and the 2005 prece-
dent, the electoral result meant that Allawi and Iraqiyah should be given the first chance 
to form a new government. Maliki and his allies, however, had other plans. As the official 
results were announced in late March, Maliki secured a ruling from Iraq’s constitutional 
court that whatever parties could form the largest post-electoral bloc would win the right 
to form a government, regardless of the election results. The decision was legally ques-
tionable and, given Chief Justice Medhat Mahmood’s previous connections to Maliki 
during the Site 4 and Jadriyah Bunker scandals, many Sunnis saw the ruling as overt sec-
tarianism and illegitimate. With trust in Iraq’s legal system undermined, the electoral pro-
cess devolved. Maliki took the matter further by demanding recounts in areas where his 
coalition had done poorly and accusing the United States and the UN of undercounting 
his coalition’s votes. He publicly denounced Iraq’s electoral commission as complicit and 
signaled his intention not to recognize Iraqiyah’s victory. Privately, Maliki sent threat-
ening messages to several members of Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission 
before attempting to obtain arrest warrants against them. The matter concerned Odierno 
enough for him to consider the possibility of USF-I providing security for the electoral 
commission’s headquarters.128 Further complicating the situation, Lami’s de-Ba’athifica-
tion committee disqualified an additional 52 candidates on April 26—an act applauded 
by Maliki as he fought to maintain his hold on power.129
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Maliki’s Consolidation of Control
Signs that Maliki intended to use government institutions to alter the election out-
come in his favor worried USF-I leaders, who had already become alarmed by the Prime 
Minister’s consolidation of control of Iraq’s security forces and intelligence community 
in 2009-2010. Over the course of 2009, Maliki had asserted his power over operational 
Iraqi units via the Office of the Commander in Chief, headed by General Faruq al-Araji. 
Eventually he circumvented the Ministry of Defense to take control of command appoint-
ments and issue tactical orders without using the formal chain of command.
A similar process played out in the Iraqi intelligence community. The United States 
had expended great effort professionalizing Iraq’s principal intelligence apparatus, the 
Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), under the leadership of the former military offi-
cer Mohammed Shahwani, a Sunni Turkoman who opposed Iranian involvement in Iraq. 
For 6 years, Shahwani led the INIS in a clandestine war against Iranian-sponsored oper-
atives inside Iraq, including some operatives from the Shi’a-led rival intelligence agency, 
the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs. When Shahwani suddenly resigned 
in the wake of the autumn 2009 bombings in Baghdad, Maliki seized control of the INIS 
and dismissed 376 intelligence officers, often using de-Ba’athification as a justification. 
In their place, Maliki appointed political loyalists, many from the Da’wa Party. The new 
Da’wa-affiliated intelligence officers had difficulty in penetrating Iraq’s Sunni commu-
nities and often focused on regime preservation and the targeting of the Prime Minis-
ter’s political opponents rather than on AQI. Some experts, especially those in CJSOTF, 
believed this purge of capable Sunni intelligence officers blinded the Maliki government 
from observing the resurgence of the ISI and its transformation into ISIS in later years.130
Maliki also obtained control of the Special Tactics Unit (STU), a small INIS paramil-
itary unit that had been constructed as part of Iraq’s intelligence infrastructure, but had 
eventually entered into an advisory relationship with the CJSOTF. Under Maliki’s author-
ity, the STU was removed from the INIS and attached to the Counterterrorism Service, 
which was itself under the direct control of the Prime Minister’s office. In the description 
by CJSOTF commander Colonel Mark Mitchell, the STU in its new incarnation became 
a “hit squad” used to “disappear” Sunni election candidates or to arrest them on vague 
corruption charges. The STU often held its detainees without acknowledgement in the 
unit’s private detention facilities in Baghdad, where CJSOTF officials who attempted to 
inspect the facilities were denied access. In the face of the STU’s behavior, the CJSOTF 
withdrew its advisers and severed ties with the unit in March 2010.131
The Election Crisis
As Maliki began a campaign of chicanery to overcome his election loss and hold onto 
the premiership, postelection events split the senior U.S. officials. Odierno warned Wash-
ington that Iran was trying to block Allawi and Iraqiyah from forming a government and 
aimed to assemble Iraq’s Shi’a parties into a governing coalition under Tehran’s domina-
tion. In a April 4 memo, Odierno cautioned that Iran’s electoral manipulation could result 
in “the worst case scenario for security, stability, and our continued strategic partnership 
with Iraq as it excludes significant Sunni participation, potentially causes the Iraqi people 
to lose faith in the democratic process, as the leading candidates are excluded from the 
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government formation.” The result could be “a compromise Shi’a Prime Minister who is 
beholden to Iran.”132
Hill and other senior U.S. Embassy officials disagreed, arguing that there were limits 
to Iranian influence that prevented Tehran from becoming as dangerous as Odierno 
and USF-I believed. Hill’s political counselor, Gary Grappo, argued, “in many places in 
Iraq, the Iranians were doing a great job of wearing out their welcome,” and that while 
Iran was trying to “buy off” Iraqi politicians to obtain greater influence, few Iraqis were 
cooperating.133 In answer to Odierno’s warnings, on April 20, Hill himself told President 
Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that “the risk of Iraq becoming an Iranian 
client state was ‘negligible’.”134
Despite Hill’s assurances, days after the vote results were announced in Baghdad, 
Iraqi President Jalal Talabani flew to Tehran to broker discussions among the major Shi’a 
parties about a consensus Prime Ministerial candidate—and about returning Talabani 
himself to the President’s office.135 Though the Shi’a parties did not agree on a candi-
date—largely because of their collective resolve to deny Maliki’s return to power—the 
conference in Tehran appeared to offer the Iranian regime the chance to steer the govern-
ment formation process. Having expected a chance to form his own government, Allawi 
warned in May that the electoral machinations could potentially drive the country back 
into a civil war that would “not remain within the borders of Iraq. It will spill over and 
has the potential to reach the world at large, not just neighboring countries.”136
As the month of May passed with no new government, and with the Iranian regime 
and Maliki blocking Allawi’s path, Odierno expressed reservations about continuing the 
“Responsible Drawdown of Forces” to 50,000 Soldiers by the August 2010 deadline.137 The 
USF-I commander remained concerned about Maliki’s use of extraconstitutional powers 
to usurp the role of the security and intelligence ministries. Odierno and some other U.S. 
officials also believed Maliki’s attempt to overturn the election constituted a dangerous 
power grab that might eventually destabilize the political situation and return Iraq to 
sectarian violence, unraveling the extensive security and political gains the United States 
had made. Odierno was so concerned with the direction Maliki seemed to be taking that 
he warned Washington that Maliki might stage “a rolling coup d’état of the Iraqi state.”138
Hill agreed with the assessment of Maliki’s intentions, but unlike Odierno, the ambas-
sador believed Maliki’s return to the premiership was the best outcome for U.S. inter-
ests. Iraq required a Shi’a leader, Hill told other U.S. officials in Baghdad, and Maliki, as 
the strongest of the Shi’a leaders, would be the most reliable U.S. partner. Allawi had, 
in Hill’s view, disqualified himself by relying on a mostly Sunni coalition; a situation 
that Hill believed was the equivalent of a black South African politician leading a white 
Afrikaner political party.139 Echoing this sentiment, political counselor Gary Grappo later 
commented, “[R]ealistically speaking there was no chance . . . that Allawi, himself a Shi’a, 
would win the election as the leader of a largely Sunni political coalition. . . . 60 to 65 
percent of the country was Shi’a, [and] after what they had experienced not only under 
Saddam but all previous regimes, they were not about to trust this crowd that was basi-
cally the leftovers from the Saddam era.”140 Hill also believed it was not appropriate for 
the United States to meddle too deeply in internal Iraqi affairs. Iraq was a sovereign 
nation, Hill told Vice President Joseph Biden, and “picking and choosing winners (and 
losers) was way beyond anything we could do. . . . Perhaps back in 2004 or 2005, but in 
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2010 Iraq was its own country with its own political system, which we would interfere 
with at our peril.”141
After discussions with Biden in Washington in the late spring, Odierno had under-
stood that U.S. leaders intended to remain neutral in the government formation negoti-
ations among the Iraqi parties. However, in talks with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad in July, 
Biden signaled that the United States would not support Allawi’s candidacy as Prime 
Minister and implied that the United States had decided to help Maliki retain the pre-
miership. This change of plan confounded Odierno, who warned Biden that if Maliki 
were allowed to prevail over the Iraqiyah coalition that had technically won the elec-
tions, the Prime Minister and his allies could be counted on to conduct reprisals against 
the Sunni-majority Iraqiyah in order to marginalize them politically, probably reignit-
ing sectarian violence in the process. To answer these concerns, Biden told Odierno and 
other U.S. officials in Baghdad that Iraq’s Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds would always detest 
one another, just as the Irish and the British had, and implied that trying to construct a 
national reconciliation pact among them was futile.142
***
The summer of 2010 found Iraq in a much-improved security condition but a precar-
ious political situation. USF-I and the ISF had rebounded from AQI’s massive autumn 
bombings and had pulverized the terrorist group, neutralizing its ability to conduct large-
scale attacks. In northern Iraq, after fits and starts, USF-I’s combined security initiative 
offered a means to keep the peace between Arabs and Kurds along Iraq’s volatile Green 
Line. These developments seemed to offer hope that the reduced transition force could 
successfully conduct the stabilization operations needed to cement the gains of the surge.
These hopes began to founder, however, as the disputed Iraqi election results dragged 
into a political crisis. The Sunni-majority Iraqiyah electoral victory in March 2010 marked 
the political culmination of the Sunni Awakening, but the combined efforts of Prime 
Minister Maliki, the Shi’a political parties, and the Iranian regime threatened to nullify 
Iraqiyah’s victory. The situation caused a split within the U.S. Government that found 
USF-I and the U.S. Embassy on opposite sides, exacerbating the divide that had opened 
between the two with the arrival of Hill in 2009. By late summer, with Iranian and Amer-
ican policymakers ironically aligning against the candidacy of Allawi, Maliki remained 
in his position as caretaker Prime Minister, standing athwart the constitutional govern-
ment formation process so that it could not proceed without him. Instead of a function-
ing government, for the foreseeable future Iraq would have a bitter Sunni-Shi’a divide 
that threatened to rekindle the embers of sectarianism. This political crisis overshadowed 
USF-I’s evisceration of AQI and cast doubt on the U.S. ability to cement the gains of 
2007-2009.
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FROM NEW DAWN TO ZERO, AUGUST 2010-DECEMBER 2011
In June 2010, just weeks after Iraqi President Jalal Talabani led government formation 
talks among Iraq’s Shi’a political parties in Tehran, the U.S. Senate confirmed General 
Lloyd Austin as the next commander of U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) and General Raymond 
Odierno as the next Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. The handover between the two was 
scheduled for the end of August, coinciding with President Barack Obama’s directed 
change of mission for USF-I and the departure of the last U.S. combat brigades. After 
Austin’s assumption of command, the U.S. operation in Iraq would be renamed from 
“IRAQI FREEDOM” to “NEW DAWN” to signal the shift to a noncombat mission.
Odierno used his final month in Iraq to begin determining what forces and resources 
the United States would need after December 2011 when the U.S.-Iraq security agreement 
expired. As his staff analyzed what might be accomplished with a residual force of vari-
ous sizes and capabilities, Odierno concluded that it would take at least 25,000 troops to 
sustain a strategic partnership with Iraq.1
Back in the United States, Austin had begun work on the residual force question as 
well. Before taking command, he oversaw wargames based on the possible scenarios 
facing the United States as the U.S.-Iraq security agreement expired in late 2011, including 
the chance the United States would be forced to “go to zero.” The wargames highlighted 
that without a residual U.S. force, USF-I would find it difficult to hand off hundreds of 
military activities to the U.S. Embassy, wind down support for provincial reconstruction 
teams, and deactivate the existing command and control structures. The United States 
would also be hard pressed to maintain stability along the Kurdish-Arab Green Line or 
help the Iraqis prevent the resurgence of the Islamic State.2
 
Vice President Biden (left) General Odierno (right) and Ambassador Jeffery (center).  
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant 1st Class Roger Dey (Released).
Vice President Joseph R. Biden Meets General Raymond Odierno and Ambassador 
James Jeffery in Baghdad.3
520
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
On August 31, Obama announced an end to “the American combat mission in Iraq,” 
a step he had first promised as a Presidential candidate more than 4 years earlier. Oper-
ation IRAQI FREEDOM had concluded, Obama declared, and Iraqis now had taken the 
lead for their own security, though USF-I would remain on hand until the end of 2011 to 
advise and assist them. The President added that the promise of American partnership 
was contingent on the Iraqis moving forward “with a sense of urgency to form an inclu-
sive government that is just, representative, and accountable to the Iraqi people.”4 At the 
same time, Obama said that U.S. involvement in Iraq had to be balanced against other 
pressing issues such as Afghanistan and the need to restore America’s economic strength 
at home.5
The day after the President’s remarks, September 1, 2010, Austin took com-
mand from Odierno in a formal ceremony in Baghdad. Odierno’s departure as 
USF-I commander coincided with the replacement of Ambassador Christopher Hill, 
whose relationship with Odierno and his command had grown more tense as the 
Iraqi election impasse deepened. Instead of Hill, Austin would partner with U.S. 
Ambassador James Jeffrey, a veteran Arabist who had served as an Army officer in 
Vietnam and, unlike Hill, arrived at the Embassy with extensive Iraq experience.
Together, Austin and Jeffrey set out to repair the civilian-military relationship that had 
deteriorated during Hill’s tenure, bringing their staffs together for combined planning 
and team building.6
 
Behind Austin are (left to right) Vice President Biden, Secretary of Defense Gates, Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mullen, and U.S. Central Command Commander General Mattis. Source: DoD 
photo by Sergeant 1st Class Roger Dey (Released).
General Lloyd Austin During His Assumption of Command of USF-I from  
General Raymond Odierno.7
THE INTERREGNUM
Austin and Jeffrey took up their duties in a nation that had been trying to form a gov-
ernment for almost 6 months. In early 2006, the Iraqi political parties’ inability to reach 
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an agreement while the country slipped into civil war had hamstrung General George 
Casey, Jr., and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I). In 2010, with the country far less vio-
lent than in 2006, the Iraqis were even more deeply deadlocked, as Prime Minister Nuri 
al-Maliki worked to prevent Ayad Allawi from forming a new government in the hope 
of eventually forcing all of the parties to agree that only he could be Prime Minister.8 To 
prevent Allawi’s Sunni-majority Iraqiyah coalition, which had won a plurality of Parlia-
mentary seats, from being shut out of power, Vice President Joseph Biden suggested in 
late summer that Maliki return as Prime Minister but share power with a new strategic 
policy council to be headed by Allawi. In Biden’s concept, Allawi’s council would deter-
mine policy and strategy for the Iraqi security forces (ISF), the Iraqi defense budget, and 
the particulars of the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship. The idea, while politically creative, 
was flawed. Iraq’s Maliki-friendly courts were sure to challenge the council’s constitu-
tionality. Without firm constitutional justification, the proposed compromise amounted 
to a gentlemen’s agreement that would rest on the goodwill and good faith of the major 
parties—a risky venture, considering Maliki made it clear he did not intend to dilute his 
power as commander in chief.
The prolonged negotiations over the formation of the government came at the same 
time U.S. officials expected to coordinate with their ISF counterparts to transfer many 
military and diplomatic activities. The uncertainty of the political situation made Iraqi 
officials reluctant to make decisions. Reconciliation initiatives stalled as well, as USF-I 
had difficulty getting officials of Maliki’s caretaker government to demonstrate contin-
ued support for the Sons of Iraq, which continued to face attacks and intimidation from 
Sunni insurgents.9 As the months passed, U.S. commanders also found their ISF coun-
terparts and caretaker government officials unwilling to act against militant groups as 
intensely as they had in 2008 and 2009, especially Shi’a militants.10 After Shi’a militants 
rocketed the U.S. Embassy on September 23, U.S. officials noted the perpetrators had 
little fear that the ISF would pursue them. By mid–October, a full month had passed since 
USF-I or the ISF had attacked the top-tier militant networks in a meaningful way. Some 
U.S. officials suspected the Iraqi militants were testing the new commander, Austin, to 
gauge his reaction.11
Like the United States, the Iranian regime had become impatient with the pace of 
Iraq’s government formation as the stalemate dragged on through the summer. By Sep-
tember, Iranian leaders had decided to support Maliki and had begun to pressure Iraq’s 
Kurdish and Shi’a leaders to back Maliki as well. In Tehran, General Qassem Soleimani, 
head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force, reportedly reminded 
Iraqi leaders that U.S. forces would soon leave Iraq, but Iran would always be their pow-
erful neighbor. Soleimani’s terms to the Iraqis were simple: Maliki would remain Prime 
Minister, Talibani would remain President, and the U.S. military would be forced to leave 
Iraq by the end of 2011 as the U.S.-Iraq security agreement required. Iraqi leaders who 
cooperated would benefit from Iranian political assistance and cash payments, while 
those who defied Iran would suffer “dire consequences.”12 With both the United States 
and Iran backing Maliki’s return, all that remained was for Iraq’s other major parties to 
negotiate for as much power as possible in a second Maliki government.
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OPERATION NEW DAWN AND THE “RESPONSIBLE DRAWDOWN OF 
FORCES”
The Advise and Assist Mission
In Operation NEW DAWN, Austin and his command continued to work with ISF even 
as they withdrew. Austin saw three components to his mission.13 First, U.S. forces would 
advise, train, assist, and equip the ISF “so that they are capable of COIN [counterinsur-
gency] operations, maintaining internal security, and have developed the foundation for 
external defense.” Second, U.S. forces would conduct combined operations to neutralize 
al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other violent extremist networks. Third, U.S. forces would 
help increase the capacity of the Iraqi ministries and other institutions.14 Additional key 
tasks included helping to reduce Kurd-Arab tensions and balancing Iranian influence.15
To accomplish these missions, Austin had an initial force of 50,000 troops, with 7 
Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs) spread across the three remaining U.S. divisions. In 
his initial guidance, Austin warned that USF-I could not afford to be surprised since the 
diminished U.S. troop level in the country left the command little flexibility and depth. 
To maintain their situational awareness and force protection, the AABs needed closer 
relationships with the ISF.16 Austin noted that USF-I would have to rely on Iraqi units to 
secure the American lines of communication during the final withdrawal if it came.17
The AABs were a departure from the Army’s preference to train its combat units 
mainly for high intensity conflict while treating stability operations as a secondary focus. 
Instead, the AABs were designed expressly for the new post-combat mission in Iraq, 
with their organization and training modified to better assist Iraqi units—army, police, 
and border forces. Some AAB commanders saw this new role as analogous to that of the 
observer-controllers at the Army’s combat training centers, mentoring and conducting 
operations simultaneously.18 In addition, the AABs provided their Iraqi partners with 
intelligence and targeting assistance, air and logistics support, planning, and command 
and control. The AABs’ mission also included helping improve Iraqi governance, espe-
cially by providing security for the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) still operating 
across Iraq. Some AAB commanders even saw supporting the PRTs as their primary 
mission.19
Each AAB contained a civil affairs company, psychological operations teams, combat 
camera teams, and additional contracting officers and lawyers. Each brigade also had 
a human terrain team comprised of civilian social scientists—anthropologists, sociolo-
gists, and political scientists—to analyze local Iraqi political and economic dynamics. 
The brigades also had five Stability Transition Teams (STTs), which were essentially the 
military transition teams (MiTTs), special police transition teams (SPTTs), and border 
transition teams (BTTs), renamed. Each STT had 14 senior officers and noncommissioned 
officers (NCOs) who worked with ISF counterparts until the expiration of the security 
agreement at the end of 2011.20 Unlike their predecessors, the STTs were organic to the
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Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
Map 23. Disposition of U.S. Forces, USF-I Operation NEW DAWN, September 2010.
brigades, reflecting lessons learned from the 2005-era transition teams that suffered from 
unity of command challenges and lacked support when operating independently inside 
a brigade’s battlespace.21 Making the STTs part of the brigade’s structure also made them 
more flexible. If certain Iraqi units needed more mentoring than others, an AAB com-
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The earlier transition teams had focused on the battalion level of the Iraqi Army, but 
the STTs paired with brigades and divisions instead. Partnering at the higher level freed 
transition teams to assist the Iraqi border forces, an element of the ISF that had a reputa-
tion for looking the other way as Iranian weapons and agents were smuggled into Iraq.23 
In one instance highlighting the border guards’ ineffectiveness, during the 36th Infan-
try Division’s 8-month deployment to Iraq’s nine southern provinces in 2011, the Iraqi 
Border Police did not seize a single contraband weapon.24
Along with their nontraditional organization, the AABs underwent very different 
pre-deployment training than COIN-oriented brigade combat teams. NCOs and junior 
officers attended an abridged civil affairs course at Fort Bragg, NC, to develop gover-
nance and reconstruction skills and add capabilities and depth to the few PRTs assigned 
to each brigade. Almost every Soldier attended Arabic language classes, and key leaders 
received additional training, often at the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute. 
Many units were trained in city management and civic administration. Some AABs sent 
leaders to train with the U.S. Border Patrol; others worked with the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture. Reflecting hard lessons from the early phases of the MiTT program, the STTs 
were assigned to their AABs early enough to attend pre-mission training with the rest of 
the brigade. Even the PRTs, usually including their assigned State Department personnel, 
attended pre-mission training.25
In contrast to USF-I’s drawdown and changed missions, special operations forces 
(SOF) in Iraq prepared for a long-term presence, believing they would remain for coun-
terterrorism and security force assistance missions long after conventional forces left. 
Envisioning an enduring mission similar to those in the 1990s in Kuwait and Colombia, 
special operations elements altered their command structure and rotational policies. To 
sustain the unity of effort, SOF leaders created a new headquarters, Joint Forces Special 
Operations Component Command-Iraq (JFSOCC-I), headed by a Special Forces general 
officer who would command Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Arabian 
Peninsula (CJSOTF-AP) and all other special operations elements in Iraq. To promote 
unity of effort further, SOF leaders ended the 7-year-old policy of rotating 5th and 10th 
Special Forces groups as the CJSOTF-AP headquarters every 7 months. The 5th Special 
Forces Group (Airborne) received permanent responsibility for the CJSOTF-AP head-
quarters, freeing the 10th Special Forces Group to refocus on Europe. This new arrange-
ment, prompted by years of frustration due to the differing approaches between the two 
groups, matched a 2004 proposal that SOF leaders had rejected in favor of the rotational 
policy.
Below the SOF headquarters level, there would be no drawdown in forces, with the 
USF-I commander insisting that the CJSOTF maintain its full complement of three battal-
ion-sized task forces that would be the last units to leave Iraq in the event of a full with-
drawal. Those task forces increased the length of their deployments from 7 to 9 months 
to avoid rotating units and headquarters at the same time and to match more closely the 
conventional units’ deployment schedule. Maintaining a large special operations foot-
print as U.S. conventional forces drew down was challenging. Much of the success of 
special operations forces in previous years came from their symbiotic relationship with 
conventional forces that provided base security, logistics support, medical evacuation, 
and quick reaction capabilities. As conventional forces receded across Iraq, many special 
operations elements had to be repositioned to maintain their support.26
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Among the AABs, the declared end of combat operations and the constraints of the 
security agreement created an entirely new operational rhythm, making their experience 
fundamentally different from the COIN-oriented brigades that had come before them. As 
the number of brigades in USF-I shrank, the amount of territory each AAB covered grew, 
which paradoxically forced some AABs to increase the number of bases they occupied in 
order to maintain contact with the Iraqis they advised.27 The larger areas of responsibility 
created logistical and medical evacuation challenges, with each AAB commander forced 
to weigh carefully where to position Soldiers safely so that any casualties could be evac-
uated to medical facilities within the “golden hour.”
The pace of security operations slowed significantly as Iraqis assumed the lead, in part 
due to the security agreement’s requirement for U.S. units to obtain evidence-based war-
rants from Iraqi judges before offensive operations. Local reconstruction projects slowed 
as well once the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) took the lead in U.S. development efforts. Projects based on military necessity 
that were commonplace during earlier years, such as hiring unemployed Iraqis to pick up 
garbage to eliminate improvised explosive device (IED) hiding spots, no longer passed 
muster. Reflecting the transition to Iraqi civil authority, the PRTs and AABs coached Iraqi 
officials to nominate their own reconstruction projects, approving only those that could 
be sustained after the United States departed.28
To a certain degree, Operation NEW DAWN represented a return to Casey’s transi-
tion plan from 2005 to 2006, but under more favorable circumstances. Many U.S. officers 
cited the same rationale for the diminished American role that MNF-I had used 4 years 
earlier, arguing that an American drawdown would push the Iraqis to improve their own 
capabilities and avoid the dependency trap. For example, Major Jason Bullock, a battery 
commander in 1st Battalion, 82d Field Artillery, echoed the same concerns that Casey and 
General John Abizad had had with Iraqi dependency and praised the security agreement 
as a way to overcome those concerns:
The U.S. military is still full of [Soldiers] who would much rather do everything unilaterally, but 
good leaders know that’s a road to nowhere, except more time in Iraq. The security agreement was 
a forcing function not only for U.S. troops to embrace partnership and try to develop the ISF, but 
also a wakeup call for the ISF that we are not going to be here forever and they are on the clock to 
get to the level they need to get to before we leave.29
The Battle of the Palm Grove
The first significant test of the idea that USF-I’s units should coach from the sidelines 
as the ISF took responsibility for security within Iraq’s borders came shortly after Austin 
took command. On September 11, 2010, in Diyala Province where politicized Iraqi Army 
leaders had kept USF-I advisors at arm’s length, a large Iraqi force became bogged down 
in an engagement against a much smaller Sunni insurgent force in an agricultural area 
about 50 miles from Baghdad.30 When locals reported to a nearby Iraqi Army unit that 
a group of AQI fighters had gathered in a palm grove to construct bombs, an initial ISF 
attack against the insurgents collapsed on contact. After the first assault failed, at least 
seven different Iraqi units responded to the scene, each unable to mount a coordinated 
attack against an AQI force that may have been as small as a squad. A number of senior 
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Iraqi officials descended on the area, including the commander of Iraqi Ground Forces 
Command, General Ali Ghaidan, and watched ISF units mount a series of unsuccessful 
assaults in column formation. The situation did not improve until U.S. Soldiers from 2d 
Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the local AAB, arrived with rotary wing reconnaissance, 
close-air support from attack helicopters, and indirect fire. On September 12, U.S. F–16s 
dropped two 500-pound bombs on the AQI position—the first such airstrike since June 
2009—after which Iraqi troops maneuvered into the palm grove to find the AQI fighters 
gone. The Iraqi troops had failed to establish a cordon around the area as U.S. firepower 
dislodged the insurgents, apparently allowing the AQI men to escape.31
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Brandon Bolick (Released).
Iraqi and U.S. Soldiers Maneuver During the Battle of the Palm Grove.32
This incident provided several lessons for the USF-I command team. The Iraqis had 
made contact with the enemy before notifying the nearest U.S. unit that they might need 
assistance, so that the AABs and their subordinate formations had been forced to deal 
with the action as it unfolded.33 As they had been trained to do, the local U.S. troops 
under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Molinari had refrained from taking over the battle from 
the Iraqis. In Molinari’s words, he had taken “an appetite suppressant” when it had come 
to letting his more capable U.S. Soldiers take the lead and instead focused on providing 
as much assistance as the ISF leaders were willing to accept.34 Similarly, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Robert Cone, USF-I’s deputy commander for operations, had monitored the situation 
and instructed USF-I’s subordinate commanders to wait for the Iraqis to ask for assis-
tance rather than offer it unsolicited. In Cone’s view, since the Iraqis would soon have to 
conduct such engagements without U.S. operational support, they had to stop relying on 
immediate U.S. assistance.35
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The Battle of the Palm Grove showed that Iraqis’ capacity for independent action 
was limited. In its aftermath, Cone concluded that USF-I’s top priority for ISF develop-
ment should be training the Iraqis in combined operations at the platoon and company 
level, where they had failed at the Palm Grove. Cone also reviewed the Iraqis’ problems 
with command and control, another shortfall during the fighting. In his opinion, the Iraqi 
regional commands that had proliferated during 2007-2009—including the Diyala Oper-
ations Command, which technically had been responsible for the battle—had received 
a great deal of attention but did not serve the longer-term interests of the Iraqi Army. 
Cone believed the Iraqis needed an operational organization that looked beyond imme-
diate tactical problems in specific locations, a function that the disparate operations com-
mands could not fulfill. Accordingly, Cone avoided direct dealings with Iraqi division 
commanders and instead used General Ghaidan, commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces 
Command (IGFC), as his primary interlocutor, in hopes of developing the IGFC into 
a senior-level headquarters focused on the welfare of the Iraqi Army as an institution, 
capable of maintaining and training fielded forces and capable of thinking beyond the 
next crisis.36
Back in Diyala, the AAB’s battalion-level after-action review revealed that the Iraqi 
troops not only had struggled with basic conventional tactics, but had also mistreated 
local citizens and detainees, a counterproductive factor in a COIN campaign.37 In the 
aftermath of the September 11-12 fiasco, Molinari found the 5th Iraqi Army division far 
more willing to seek the AAB’s help, which eventually resulted in collective training and 
battalion-level live fire exercises.38 In the larger sense, the Battle of the Palm Grove left 
U.S. commanders with the unsettling sense that years of training and billions of dollars 
of expenditure might have accomplished little.
COIN Capabilities vs. Modernization
The debacle in Diyala illustrated how far the Iraqi forces were from the capability the 
U.S. military thought that they needed. In 2009, Prime Minister Maliki had believed his 
security forces capable of maintaining domestic order in Iraq, and U.S. leaders generally 
had agreed. The Iraqi Army that the U.S.-led coalition helped create was proficient at 
internal security tasks such as staffing checkpoints and conducting light patrols. How-
ever, Iraqi leaders had been overconfident in the ISF’s broader abilities to operate without 
U.S. assistance. Although Iraqi leaders decided to purchase M1A1 tanks, M113 armored 
personnel carriers, attack helicopters, and M198 howitzers, Iraqi units in 2010 could nei-
ther execute combined-arms operations at any level nor defend and control their own air-
space. In 2009, MNSTC-I estimated Iraq needed another 12 years to become self-sufficient 
in defense matters, a decade beyond the term of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement, but the 
same assessment also had optimistically assumed no serious threat from another regional 
state, a diminishing level of sectarian conflict, and a waning insurgency.39
In the aftermath of the Diyala incident, Austin and his command conducted a thor-
ough assessment of the state of the Iraqi Army in October 2010, with sobering results. 
Many Iraqi commanders were absent, and in some cases driven by political allegiance 
rather than professional responsibilities. The Iraqi Army and Iraqi police did not cooper-
ate. The Iraqi Army’s logistics and unit staffing systems were abysmal. Across the army, 
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ammunition remained in short supply. In some units, soldiers “hot bedded” in bunks 
due to a shortage of barracks space.40
Lieutenant General Cone (second from left). Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Daniel Yarnall 
(Released).
Lieutenant General Robert Cone, USF-I Deputy CG for Operations, With General Ali 
Ghaidan, Commander of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command.41
Another major problem was that constant operations against AQI and other militant 
groups wore their combat units down. Iraqi leaders rarely pulled units from the front 
lines to refit and train, often leaving them in the fight until they became combat inef-
fective. But even if Iraqi units could have rotated through training, the army as a whole 
lacked a training management system, a fact that Austin labeled his “number one gap 
and concern for ISF” in November 2010. Without it, the United States could not be confi-
dent the Iraqi Army could maintain its proficiency following USF-I’s departure.42
Fixing these problems was difficult. Iraq’s inability to form a government hindered 
USF-I’s efforts to help Bagdad plan and modernize its forces. Iraqi defense budget short-
falls further complicated matters.43 As the Iraqis’ newly purchased U.S.-built military 
hardware began to arrive, the government struggled to pay for and maintain it. By the 
end of 2010, the Iraqis had received 3 Bell helicopters and 51 of the projected 140 M1A1 
tanks, but the government only budgeted a third of the estimated $1.5 billion needed to 
maintain the new equipment. The shortfall created the risk that the ISF’s expensive new 
systems might quickly fall into disrepair.44
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Source: DoD photo by Technical Sergeant Randy Redman (Released).
An M1A1 Abrams Tank From the Iraqi 9th Mechanized Division.45
The Interior Ministry was just as problematic as the Defense Ministry. Austin had 
hoped the Iraqi police could assume a larger security role, freeing Iraqi Army units to 
refit and train. However, as U.S. commanders took stock in late 2010, they concluded that 
the Iraqi police were not ready to take over the internal security role from the Iraqi Army, 
and that USF-I’s efforts and resources supporting the police would be better directed to 
the army.46 Terminating assistance to Iraq’s police forces was a significant shift. Since 
2005, the U.S. command in Baghdad had viewed “police primacy” in Iraq’s security affairs 
as a critical component of the U.S. campaign based on an assumption that a successful 
counterinsurgency required effective civil policing. Though the security situation had 
improved greatly since the dark days of 2006 and 2007, there had been no commensurate 
growth in the capability of the Iraqi police—provincial or federal—that would enable 
them to relieve the army of its internal security role. The federal police also resisted coop-
eration with the Iraqi Army, and often avoided cooperation with local police.47
Elsewhere among the Interior Ministry’s forces, Iraq’s border forces remained under-
manned and poorly equipped despite several years of effort to improve them. The forces 
at the ports of entry on the Iranian border near Basrah required special attention, in Aus-
tin’s judgment. In the west, USF-I had no visibility on the operations at the three border 
crossing points in Anbar. North of Anbar there was concern that the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK) had infiltrated some of the police formations.48 USF-I recognized a few 
encouraging signs, notably the CJSOTF-advised Emergency Response Brigade, which 
had a reputation for a willingness to “hit anyone,” fuse intelligence, conduct network tar-
geting and crime scene exploitation, and carry out professional development and leader 
530
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
training. Austin remarked that units like this would be important for force protection as 
USF-I departed.49 Unfortunately, they were rare.
The End of U.S. Detention Operations
The 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement also required USF-I to transfer detention oper-
ations to the Iraqis. In summer 2010, USF-I completed a 19-month process of releasing or 
relinquishing custody of more than 22,000 detainees and closing the U.S. theater intern-
ment facilities, finally fulfilling former Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rums-
feld’s 2004 goal of getting the United States “out of the Iraqi prison business.”
Under the terms of the security agreement, all detainees held by the coalition had 
either to be released or transferred to Iraqi correctional facilities with an arrest warrant 
or detention order approved by Iraqi officials. This task fell principally to Task Force 
134 commander Major General David E. Quantock, a military police officer who had 
been previously assigned to fix the failed detention operations at Abu Ghraib in 2004. As 
USF-I’s lead for detention operations from late 2008 to spring 2010, Quantock had to sort 
through the detainee population and determine those too dangerous to release. Working 
with the military police, criminal investigation division (CID) agents, intelligence person-
nel, and 56 lawyers, the task force ultimately released over 12,000 detainees and trans-
ferred another 8,000 to Iraqi custody.50 A further 400 foreign fighters from 22 countries 
were repatriated through the International Committee of the Red Cross.51
The task force found sorting dangerous detainees from benign ones difficult, despite 
having continually segregated its detainee population based on threat level. To issue 
the arrest warrants or detention orders that USF-I needed to transfer internees to Iraqi 
authorities, Iraqi courts required either confessions or two eyewitness statements. Given 
the potential for retribution, eyewitness testimony was rare, and the original coalition 
arrest packets often could not be shared with the Iraqi courts because they contained 
classified information. The coalition’s modern forensic techniques, such as identifying 
fingerprints on an IED, explosive residue detection, videotapes or photographs of a crim-
inal act, or DNA evidence, appeared too many Iraqi judges almost like “witchcraft,” 
Quantock observed.52 After a series of education programs for judges and negotiations 
with Iraqi officials, local courts slowly accepted some of these techniques as evidence, 
but corruption among the Iraqi judges remained a problem. In the restive city of Mosul, 
for example, judges often released inmates within 24 to 48 hours of transfer from USF-I. 
Sectarianism also played its part, Quantock noted, with the Maliki government “almost 
exclusively asking for Shia releases,” often in the face of substantial evidence against the 
detainees.53
Even physically transferring detainees to Iraqi control was not simple. U.S. officials 
and international human rights organizations worried that Iraqi prisoners would be 
subject to torture and abuse after being transferred from the well-regulated coalition 
detention facilities to the less-regulated Iraqi prisons. To guard against this, Task Force 
(TF) 134 transferred detainees only to facilities that met United Nations (UN) standards. 
The task force also initiated several programs to improve the Iraqi corrections system to 
those levels, including constructing a $28 million facility aimed at logisticians, mid-level 
supervisors, and wardens, and organizing several academies that could train 700 Iraqi 
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prison guards at a time.54 As Iraqi corrections officers completed their training, they part-
nered with U.S. guards for additional mentorship, assuming responsibility compound by 
compound within each detention facility.55 Corrections Assistance Transition Teams, the 
detention equivalent of MiTTs, comprised of military police, engineers, medical officers, 
and lawyers, crisscrossed Iraq weekly to inspect Iraqi prison facilities and certify them 
according to international standards.56
Source: U.S. Army photo by Private 1st Class Candace Mundt (Released).
Major General David Quantock With Iraqi Ministry of Justice  
Official Dara Nour al-Deen.57
As inmates were transferred to Iraqi control, TF 134’s footprint shrank quickly. By the 
end of 2009, the task force oversaw one military police brigade in a mainly advisory role, 
down from two military police brigades in 2008. In September 2009, TF 134 shut down 
the sprawling Camp Bucca, with facilities capable of holding over 30,000 detainees, and 
shifted Bucca’s remaining inmates to the Camp Taji theater internment facility, which 
itself reverted to Iraqi control in March 2010. When USF-I consolidated its operational 
subordinate commands in early 2010, TF 134 furled its colors, becoming a directorate 
within USF-I, with Quantock at its head as a deputy USF-I commander for detention 
operations.
In July 2010, Quantock’s successor in that post, Major General Jerry Cannon, com-
pleted the handover of the Camp Cropper Theater Internment Facility to the Iraqi Minis-
try of Justice (MoJ), with the exception of 225 high-value detainees that the United States 
continued to hold until the end of 2011.58 The handover of Camp Cropper to the Iraqi Gov-
ernment was inauspicious. Within days, the camp ran out of potable water and sewage 
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overflowed in the detainees’ living areas, prompting the Iraqis to request the return of 
American assistance and advisors. To make matters worse, as these problems arose, the 
prison warden disappeared and four top Islamic State leaders escaped.59
Throughout 2011, USF-I’s detention directorate helped the Iraqi Justice Ministry con-
solidate control of detention operations which were fragmented across several ministries. 
This effort suffered, however, from the fact that like other ministries, the Ministry of 
Justice was without a minister during the interregnum period, and few mid-level bureau-
crats were willing to make important decisions on their own.60
At the same time, USF-I worked to resolve the future of the 60 remaining detainees, 
with the Lebanese Hizballah commander Musa Daqduq among them. U.S. officials aimed 
to establish a degree of confidence that the final detainees could be handed over to the 
Iraqi Government and held in a maximum security facility without risk that they could 
escape and return to the battlefield. Unfortunately, many released detainees had already 
returned to the fight. Scores released in the final months and days of the Iraq campaign 
eventually assumed leadership roles in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), prompt-
ing a senior Special Forces officer to quip to Army historians in 2015, “I really hope we 
kept the biometric information from all the detainees we took.”61
IRAQ’S POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION
The Erbil Agreement
By late November 2010, Iranian pressure on Maliki’s behalf forced the Iraqi Shi’a par-
ties to accept his return as Prime Minister. Even the Sadrists dropped their objections, 
though Maliki reportedly agreed to hand over some of his party’s southern governor-
ships to Sadrists as part of the deal. With the Shi’a bloc unified at last—however begrudg-
ingly—the major Iraqi factions met in Erbil to hammer out the conditions of Maliki’s 
return.62 The specific terms of the Erbil Agreement of December 10, 2010, remained secret, 
but the public learned that Maliki agreed to a power-sharing arrangement including an 
expanded presidency council of Maliki, Talabani, Barzani, and Iraq’s two Vice Presi-
dents to decide major policy questions. In addition, Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiyah would have 
the right to select a Defense Minister with the provision that the choice would not be a 
politician, nor would the new Interior Minister and Iraqi National Intelligence Service 
(INIS) director. To secure the Kurdish parties’ backing, Maliki reportedly agreed to their 
demands for greater control over their region’s oil reserves and revenues.63 Maliki ulti-
mately honored none of these pledges, but making them allowed him to hold onto the 
premiership. Iraq had been without an elected government for 278 days, the longest such 
period any modern parliamentary democracy had experienced at that point.
The Shi’a Militant Problem
U.S. and Western leaders hailed the Erbil Agreement and looked forward to a return 
to political stability in Iraq. For USF-I, however, the aftermath of the Erbil Agreement 
brought the return of old enemies. In the first days of January 2011, Kata’ib Hizballah 
(KH), the Iraqi Shi’a militant group most closely controlled by Iran’s Quds Force and 
General Qassem Soleimani, attacked both the Camp Victory base complex and Forward 
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Operating Base (FOB) Kalsu, 50 miles south of Baghdad near the town of Iskandariyah. 
At Camp Victory, KH fired nine 107 mm rockets and one 240 mm rocket from fixed sites 
close to the camp’s perimeter, indicating the group had sufficient time to prepare its 
firing positions and coordinate its attack. At FOB Kalsu, the main base of the 3d Armored 
Cavalry Regiment, KH attacked with six 240 mm rockets and nine large 333 mm impro-
vised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAMs). The use of so many IRAMs, a signature Quds 
Force weapon, led Austin to conclude that both the Iraqi Shi’a militants and their Iranian 
sponsors had decided to pressure the United States to leave Iraq in 2011.64
Source: DoD photo by Airman 1st Class Brian Ferguson (Released).
Improvised Rocket-Assisted Munitions.65
Captured IRAM launchers
Amid these attacks, Moqtada Sadr made an unexpected return to Iraq on January 5, 
following 4 years in Iran. In his initial public appearances, Sadr told his followers to sup-
port the ISF and signaled his approval of the U.S. troop withdrawal timeline, but he once 
again called for resistance against U.S. troops. USF-I analysts concluded correctly that his 
return would create trouble for USF-I in the year to come.66 By late March, Sadr’s Prom-
ised Day Brigade restarted its operations against U.S. troops, hitting the Green Zone with 
4 rockets in an attack that would have been more damaging had a U.S.-Iraqi quick-re-
action force not raided the firing point and found 16 more rockets on improvised rails 
attached to timers.67
These attacks were part of a trend of increasing Shi’a militant activity across Iraq. On 
March 20, Shi’a militants conducted seven assassination attempts over a 5-hour period 
in Baghdad. USF-I concluded that Qais Khazali’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH) was respon-
sible for the attacks, one of which severely wounded the commander of the 6th Iraqi 
Army Division.68 Fifteen months after his release from U.S. detention as part of the Force 
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Strategic Engagement Cell’s (FSEC) attempt to reconcile with the Shi’a militants, Khazali 
once again was waging war against the United States and its Iraqi partners.
The Day of Rage and the Return of Political Violence
The resurgence of Shi’a militant attacks accompanied an unexpected political chal-
lenge to Maliki’s government. The wave of Arab Spring uprisings across North Africa 
and Syria in early 2011 swept into Iraq as well. As the Mubarak regime crumbled in 
Egypt during February 2011, large demonstrations against the Maliki government broke 
out in Baghdad and other major cities such as Basrah and Nasiriyah. The protesters 
initially demanded political reforms, a crackdown on government corruption, and the 
improvement of electricity and other public services. Unlike in Egypt, where protest-
ers demanded both the ouster of the Mubarak regime and a change in the system of 
government, in Iraq, protesters were content with their democratic form of government 
but demanded a leadership change. By mid-February, an ad hoc grouping of disaffected 
youths, Sunni activists, Sadrists, Iraqi communists, and other small anti-Maliki factions 
brought tens of thousands of Iraqis into the streets to demand that Maliki step down. A 
smaller but similar movement arose in Kurdistan, where young activists demonstrated 
against corruption within the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).69
On February 25, 1 month after the massive Cairo, Egypt, protests, activists in Bagh-
dad, Sulaimaniyah, and 10 other Iraqi cities organized a “Day of Rage” against Iraq’s 
ruling parties. The results were ugly. Maliki attempted in advance to dissuade Iraqis 
from participating, warning that AQI or Ba’athist militants might use the gathering to 
incite violence.70 The protests went forward anyway, and Iraqi and Kurdish security 
forces fired into the crowds in some cities, killing at least 29 protesters. In Baghdad, Iraqi 
troops quelled a large demonstration in Tahrir Square by firing at protesters. In Basrah, 
where Iraqi units refrained from such measures, the crowds forced the provincial gover-
nor, a Da’wa Party member, to resign.
The Day of Rage passed with 43-recorded protests across the country, though, to the 
surprise of many, no terrorists launched attacks against the large crowds. Responding to 
the popular pressure, Maliki announced he would limit himself to two terms as Prime 
Minister and reduce the salaries of senior officials. In the days following the Day of Rage, 
Iraqi Government officials reportedly offered cash, car loans, or land to Iraqi journalists 
to change the tone of their coverage.71
But Da’wa Party loyalists and security officers also began a wide-ranging crackdown, 
arresting hundreds of protest organizers. “The intelligence services are collecting infor-
mation about activists and after the demonstrations they have been making arrests and 
detaining people,” one organizer told reporters in early March.72 The measures damp-
ened popular enthusiasm for the anti-Maliki demonstrations, leading U.S. officials in 
Baghdad to report, “We anticipate PM [Prime Minister] Maliki will conclude that he has 
been strengthened by the relative[ly] small scale of the protests and the ISF’s success in 
ensuring security.”73
The protests’ anti-Maliki energy dissipated partly because of other political dynam-
ics that distracted from the demonstrators’ original purpose. In northern Iraq, Kurdish 
leaders used the Day of Rage demonstrations as a pretext to deploy a division-sized 
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peshmerga force to Kirkuk and to disputed areas of the Diyala valley, only withdrawing 
after a month of negotiations with the government. The peshmerga incursion heightened 
Arab-Kurdish tensions and gave Maliki an issue with which to appeal to Arab anti-Kurd-
ish sentiment just when the protests against him were most intense. In Mosul, thousands 
of Sunni Arabs, including Ninewa governor Atheel Nujaifi, protested against KRG Pres-
ident Massoud Barzani and demanded that the U.S. military not remain in Iraq beyond 
December 2011.74 Some U.S. observers interpreted Barzani’s deployment of Kurdish 
troops to Kirkuk and Diyala as efforts to convince the United States that it was still needed 
as a guarantor of peace along the Green Line.75 Whatever the case, U.S. Division-North 
(USD-N) commander Major General David Perkins, whose 1st Armored Division had 
succeeded Major General Anthony Cuccolo’s 3d Infantry Division as USD-N, declined to 
have his troops drawn into the standoff between Kurdish and Iraqi Army units, insisting 
to both sides they would have to resolve the crisis on their own.76
In another distraction from the anti-Maliki movement, Iraq’s Shi’a parties staged 
large protests in March and April against Bahrain’s Sunni minority regime, which had 
cracked down on Bahraini Shi’a protestors and invited Saudi troops to help restore order 
in the country.77 The Iraqi Parliament suspended its work in protest, and Maliki and other 
Iraqi leaders warned that the Bahrain crisis could expand into a regional sectarian war. 
Large rallies led by Moqtada Sadr in particular became not just a domestic Iraqi political 
issue, but also a serious concern for the United States. Highlighting the presence of the 
U.S. Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, Sadr and other Iraqi Shi’a leaders accused the United States of 
supporting the crackdown on Bahrain’s Shi’a and used that accusation to denounce the 
U.S.-Iraqi status of forces agreement being negotiated by the Obama administration and 
the Maliki government.78 This illustrated that gaining popular or Parliamentary support 
for keeping U.S. troops in the country beyond 2011 would be difficult for Maliki and his 
allies.
In contrast to the uprisings that eventually toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
and Yemen and caused a civil war in Syria, the protest movement against Maliki fizzled 
out for reasons specific to Iraq. Other than Moqtada Sadr, none of Iraq’s major political 
figures joined the protests. The protesters also found organizing via social media difficult 
because of Iraq’s frequent electricity shortages—which, ironically, were one of the causes 
of the protests in the first place. The Iraqi protests also did not draw the same attention in 
the west that those in other countries had, though there was some criticism of the meth-
ods Maliki loyalists used against activists. In June 2011, Human Rights Watch reported 
that the ISF in Baghdad had stood by while Maliki supporters attacked protesters or 
had participated in the violence against protesters. At protests on June 10, “instead of 
protecting peaceful demonstrators, Iraqi soldiers appeared to be working hand in hand 
with the thugs attacking them,” a Human Rights Watch report related, adding that the 
Ministry of Defense had deployed more than 150 plainclothes security officers to infil-
trate the protests and intimidate or attack the demonstrators.79 The intimidation of activ-
ists continued outside the protests, culminating in the September assassination of Hadi 
al-Mahdi, a popular radio talk show host who had been an important protest organizer. 
Four hours before being murdered at his Baghdad home, Mahdi posted on Facebook that 
Da’wa Party loyalists had issued death threats and were on their way to intercept him.80 
The assassination marked the seventh such killing of an Iraqi journalist in 2011.
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These killings were just one sign that the political violence that had plagued Iraq 
from 2004 to 2006 was reappearing. The vacant Ministry of Defense and Interior positions 
remained problematic for the Iraqi and U.S. Governments as the status of forces agree-
ment (SOFA) negotiations progressed, but when Maliki named nominees for the posts, 
Ali Faisal al Lami, the de-Ba’athification committee chairman who had disrupted the 2010 
elections, blocked the appointments on grounds that the candidates had Ba’athist ties. 
Lami’s maneuver had a violent outcome.81 On May 26, 2011, professional-style gunmen 
shot him in his car near Sadr City.82 It was just one of many attacks on Iraqi Government 
officials that spring. As Iraq scholar Michael Knights noted, a wave of killings of Iraqi 
officials meant that by June 2011, “senior Iraqi politicians and bureaucrats were attending 
multiple funerals per week.”83 Chalabi blamed Lami’s murder on Ba’athists, but U.S. ana-
lysts concluded that Lami’s former allies in AAH, which had grown increasingly friendly 
with Maliki in 2011, were behind the attack. When Austin brought up Lami’s death with 
Maliki, the Prime Minister unsympathetically noted that Lami “had a lot of blood on his 
hands.”84
The Return of AQI and End of the Sons of Iraq
As the Shi’a militant groups reemerged in early 2011, AQI demonstrated that it had 
begun to recover from the attacks of the previous year. The resurgence began with the 
scramble among AQI members to form a new leadership cadre in April-May 2010, a pro-
cess that resulted in the takeover of the organization by figures connected to the former 
regime of Saddam Hussein.
In contrast to the orderly succession of Abu Ayyub al-Masri as AQI leader after Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, there is no evidence that AQI anticipated or 
planned for the catastrophic leadership losses of spring 2010. According to internal doc-
uments from al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Atiyah Abd ar-Rahman contacted AQI on April 22 to 
authorize the group to appoint interim leaders on its own until al-Qaeda’s central leaders 
could reestablish reliable communications.85 AQI publicly acknowledged the deaths of 
its leaders on April 25, but waited until mid-May to announce its new leaders officially, 
who emerged after much infighting.86 Despite its heavy losses, the group still had a small 
number of surviving leaders qualified to take over.
According to former AQI ally Mullah Nadhim al-Juburi, those familiar with AQI’s 
internal structure expected a new emir of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) to come from 
AQI members with jihadi pedigrees and extremist religious credentials, such as Shaykh 
Yunis al-Mashhadani, engineer Abd al-Rahim al-Ani, or Abdallah al-Mufti.87 Instead, the 
weeks following the deaths of Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Umar al-Baghdadi wit-
nessed a takeover of AQI by militants who tended to have Ba’athist as well as religious 
backgrounds.
According to AQI insider accounts, Samir Abd Muhammed al-Khlifawi, known more 
commonly as Hajji Bakr, a former Ba’athist colonel and AQI’s newly appointed oper-
ations chief, moved quickly to seize control of the organization. Lacking the requisite 
religious credentials to serve as emir himself and hobbled by past ties to senior Ba’athists 
such as Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Hajji Bakr aimed to install as ISI’s new emir his own 
protégé, Ibrahim Awwad al-Samarra’i (known to other jihadists as “Abu Du’a” or, later, 
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as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi or Caliph Ibrahim), a lit-
tle-known cleric elevated to the AQI shura council 
less than 3 months before the deaths of Masri and 
Abu Umar al-Baghdadi.88 Like many of ISI’s senior 
leaders, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been a detainee 
at Camp Bucca, released after 11 months in 2004 
as a low-threat detainee. Some AQI members later 
claimed that amid the dispersal of AQI leaders 
during April–May 2010, Hajji Bakr used his control 
over the organization’s courier network to create 
the appearance of consensus support for Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi and to rig a shura council vote in his 
favor.89 One AQI member later claimed that a major-
ity of AQI’s imprisoned leaders opposed Baghdadi’s 
appointment, but they were unable to influence the 
process.
To appease al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan, Hajji 
Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appointed Nu’man 
Salman Mansur al-Zaydi, a Moroccan trained in 
Afghanistan by bin Laden’s lieutenants, to succeed 
Abu Ayyub al-Masri as war minister of the ISI. Zaydi 
had traveled to Iraq in 2006 and 2007 and displayed 
an anti-Shi’a sectarian ideology reminiscent of that 
of Zarqawi. Following his appointment as “war minister,” he announced a new offensive 
to avenge Abu Ayyub al-Masri.91 In contrast to Masri, however, Zaydi played little role 
in AQI’s internal politics, content to let Hajji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi oversee 
matters so long as they did not interfere with his ability to wage jihad.
Once in control of the entirety of AQI, Hajji Bakr reorganized the movement in ways 
that resembled the Ba’ath, forming a new secret police (mukhabarat) cadre under a com-
mander named Abu Safwan Rifai to prevent further leadership losses.92 In short order, 
the AQI mukhabarat grew to 100 members who worked to purge internal dissent and 
had wide-ranging authority above that of the provincial walis. From the ranks of these 
mukhabarat, ISIS leaders later would draw the commanders of the paramilitary forces of 
the “Islamic Caliphate” across Syria and Iraq.93 Hajji Bakr and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also 
formed a new shura council that included jihadists with Ba’athist ties.94 In addition to 
Hajji Bakr and Abu Safwan Rifai, other key members of the new shura council included 
the former Iraqi Army colonel Fadel Ahmad Abdullah al-Hayali (aka Abu Muslim 
al-Turkmani or Hajji Mu’tazz), Abd al Rahman Mustafa al-Qaduli (aka Abu Ali al-Anbari 
or Abu Alaa al-Afiri), and former Iraqi Army captain Adnan Ismail Najm al-Bilawi (aka 
Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Bilawi).95 Bilawi would later become the top intelligence official 
within ISIS, while Hayali and Qaduli, both Turkomans from Tel Afar, would become 
ISIS’s key operational commanders.
These new ISI leaders concentrated in their early months on replenishing the organi-
zation’s empty coffers rather than stepping up attacks against coalition forces or the Iraqi 
Government.96 By the beginning of 2011, they had recovered enough to restart large-scale 
Source: ISIS propaganda image.
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terrorist activities. In mid-January, they launched six suicide attacks over a span of 4 days 
that killed 8 Iraqi soldiers and 38 civilians, and wounded more than 250 more Iraqis. 
The worst attacks occurred on January 20, when a pair of suicide car bombers killed 
or wounded 147 Arba’een pilgrims in Karbala.97 The ISF had planned ample security 
measures for the pilgrimage, but Austin observed after the attack that “with six million 
pilgrims on the road, it’s hard to protect them all.”98 On January 27, a suicide car bomber 
killed or wounded more than 100 people in a funeral procession in central Baghdad, 
showing that AQI, now calling itself the ISI almost exclusively, had regained its ability to 
breach the capital and cause mayhem.99
Alongside these mass-casualty attacks, ISI focused on targeting Iraqi Government and 
ISF officials, and began to do damage on a scale that Iraq had not seen for more than a 
year.100 On January 17-19, ISI suicide bombers carried out large attacks in Ramadi, Tikrit, 
and Baqubah, the first of which attempted—for the third time—to assassinate the Anbar 
provincial governor but managed to kill the deputy governor instead. The attacks con-
tinued in February, with a three-car-bomb assault near the KDP headquarters in Kirkuk 
and multiple attacks against ISF and Shi’a pilgrims in Samarra that caused hundreds of 
casualties.101
The rejuvenated ISI benefited from the Maliki government’s rejection of the Sons of 
Iraq, the group that had had a decisive, crushing impact on AQI in 2007-2008. Throughout 
most of 2010 and 2011, the Maliki government stopped finding government jobs for Sons 
of Iraq members. As of July 2010, only 41,000 of an estimated 94,000 Awakening members 
had been hired and integrated into the government, with only 9,000 in security jobs.102 
At the same time, the Interior Ministry began stripping Awakening movement secu-
rity forces of their rank and salary, effectively leaving many unemployed.103 The Maliki 
government blamed the problems on budget shortages, but many Sunnis perceived the 
freeze as evidence of the government’s reluctance to integrate them into the state. Former 
Awakening Council leader Nathem al-Jabouri opined in late 2010 that Sahwah members 
had only two options: “Stay with the government, which would be a threat to their lives, 
or help al-Qaeda by being a double agent.”104
Events seemed to support Sunni frustration, such as the Interior Ministry’s decision to 
bypass the Sons of Iraq when hiring large numbers of new police for Ninewa Province in 
early 2011. USF-I leaders pressed the Iraqi police commands to hire former Sons of Iraq 
temporarily as contractors until government jobs became available, but the Interior Min-
istry rebuffed the idea of a mixed force of contractors and government employees on legal 
grounds. USF-I reports identified “Shia dominance within the MoI,” as the real reason.105 
In the meantime, USF-I looked for other ways to find the Sons of Iraq useful, paid work 
and prevent them from returning to their former lives as insurgents. USF-I tried assigning 
some of the Sons of Iraq to pursue human intelligence on the Syrian border and in Sunni 
provinces but this was unsuccessful. A program to offer $4,000 small-business grants in 
lieu of government jobs met with no more success. Another proposal involved retraining 
Sons of Iraq members to be farmers, tractor repairmen, or gas station attendants, but the 
Maliki government had little interest.106
The strongest evidence that ISI had begun to regain its strength came on March 29 
when its militants carried out one of the deadliest strikes of the war against provincial 
leaders. A group of about 10 insurgents disguised as Iraqi police attacked the Salahadin 
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provincial council building in Tikrit with a car bomb, small arms fire, and suicide vests. 
Once inside the government center, the militants took hostages and then systematically 
slaughtered them during a protracted gun battle with the ISF. The ISF assaulted the 
building twice, finally securing it 5 hours later. Five Iraqi soldiers died in the fighting 
while 53 Iraqi civilians were killed, including 3 provincial council members and 2 jour-
nalists. Nearly 100 others were wounded. U.S. troops did not participate in the assault but 
responded to Iraqi requests for ISR and close-air support.107 The attack sent shockwaves 
through the Sunni communities of northern Iraq, which had presumed after spring 2010 
that ISI had been neutralized. The provincial reconstruction team for Salahadin reported 
that the province’s population was “stunned” by the violence and that the general sense 
of security that had grown in the previous months had all but vanished after the attack.108
The apparent resurgence of ISI, coupled with Iraq’s growing political instability and 
questions about the ISF’s effectiveness led Austin to request that 4th AAB, 1st Armored 
Division deploy to Iraq in May to replace 4th AAB, 1st Cavalry Division in USD-N. The 
Joint Staff and Defense Department had hoped that the brigade in Iraq could return home 
without a replacement, but Austin believed the removal of an AAB from northern Iraq 
would be too risky given the deterioration in security and political conditions. The deploy-
ment of the additional AAB was unpopular within the Pentagon, since it would slow the 
drawdown and complicate USF-I’s withdrawal, but the additional brigade would give 
Austin a fresh reserve force for the remainder of the mission.109
Austin’s decision proved prescient, as on August 15, ISI hit 17 cities nearly simultane-
ously with a series of bombings, killing 74 and injuring over 300. The attacks produced 
the most casualties Iraq had experienced in a single day for over a year.110 Shi’a and 
Christian neighborhoods in Kut, Baghdad, Baqubah, Karbala, and Najaf bore the brunt. 
Less than 2 weeks later, ISI hit the massive Sunni Umm al Qura Mosque in West Baghdad 
with a suicide-bomber, wounding 30 and killing 28, including a Member of Parliament.111 
To many analysts, the strikes, launched during the month of Ramadan, appeared to be 
an attempt by ISI to reignite the sectarian civil war that had been nearly extinguished but 
was being given new life by Maliki’s partisan moves. ISI’s spokesman appeared to con-
firm as much, promising, “Do not worry, the days of Zarqawi are going to return soon,” 
in the wake of the bombings.112
The ISI, which had been on life support for most of 2010, was back in force. Hajji 
Bakr had managed to transform what had been the largely symbolic leadership of the 
ISI into a supreme authority for the organization, with himself as the power behind Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi. His restructuring of the group’s leadership cadre had recast former 
Ba’athist officers as leaders of the global jihad, and their military expertise soon would 
make the organization more effective than its earlier incarnations under Zarqawi and 
Abu Ayyub al-Masri. These developments set the group down the path that would lead 
to the Islamic State’s conquest of large swaths of northern and western Iraq.
The Mujahedin e Khalq Problem, Continued
The quandary of what to do with the UN-protected but terror-listed MeK, which had 
bedeviled U.S. commanders and diplomats since 2003, came to the fore again when a deba-
cle at the MeK camp in Diyala gave U.S. officials a preview of how the Iraqi Government 
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intended to treat the group once the U.S. military left. The Iraqi Army had assumed con-
trol of external security at Camp Ashraf, the MeK’s base, in June 2010, after which the 
MeK and Iraqi troops had confronted each other in clashes that U.S. forces could not 
sort out due to ambiguous rules of engagement and force protection guidelines. As Col-
onel Malcolm Frost and his 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, the local AAB in Diyala, 
worked to advise and assist their ISF counterparts, Frost concluded that Camp Ashraf 
and the MeK would have to be handled carefully to prevent violence. If not restrained, 
Frost judged, the Shi’a-dominated Iraqi Government would settle old scores with the 
MeK and fulfill Iran’s wish of forcing the organization to leave Iraq.113
Major General Perkins (center), Colonel Frost (right).  
Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Brandon Bolick (Released).
Major General David G. Perkins, Commander of MND-N, With Colonel Malcolm 
Frost, Commander, 2d BCT, 25th Infantry Division, and Iraqi Officers.114
Frost’s predictions came true in early April. After the drawdown of U.S. observers 
from the direct vicinity of Camp Ashraf, Frost discovered that the Iraqi Ground Forces 
Command had ordered the Diyala Operation Center to attack the MeK compound. Frost 
persuaded Diyala Operations Commander Lieutenant General Tariq Abd Al-Wahb Jasim 
Mahdi al-Assawi to refuse the order, but Assawi was quickly relieved of his command 
and replaced by his deputy, who followed the IGFC order. On April 8, while IGFC com-
mander General Ali Ghaidan looked on, the 5th Iraqi Army division moved into Camp 
Ashraf and immediately clashed with the MeK there. As the Iraqi and MeK casualties 
mounted, Frost led his own headquarters and medics back to Camp Ashraf, ignor-
ing ISF demands to remain outside the camp’s perimeter, and set up an aid station for 
the hundreds wounded inside the compound.115 UN officials on the scene reported 34 
people killed and more than 300 wounded in the fighting, the vast majority of them MeK 
members.
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The crisis at Camp Ashraf led to tense confrontations between U.S. officials and the 
Maliki government. Commenting on the situation to CENTCOM and the Pentagon, 
Austin reported that senior Iraqi officials had been “consistently deceitful” when ques-
tioned about what was happening.116 Ambassador Jeffrey and the U.S. Embassy contin-
ued to work with the UN to try to resolve the fate of the MeK, but the Iraqi Government 
appeared determined to remove the group forcibly from Camp Ashraf even if it required 
violence.117
THE PATH TO ZERO
Operation NEW DAWN, which debuted in August 2010, was intended as a stability 
operation as U.S. troops left Iraq, but after 9 months, the country was less stable than 
when the operation began. Transferring security affairs to Iraqi control had ground to 
a near halt during the long political stalemate after the March 2010 elections. The Shi’a 
militant groups and AQI-ISI had both returned to the battlefield, reviving security threats 
that once seemed finished. Austin, Cone, and other USF-I leaders realized the ISF were 
not ready to handle Iraq’s security on their own.
The ISF’s violence against the protesters and the MeK in spring 2011 put U.S. com-
manders in an awkward position: USF-I’s mission was to empower the ISF, but if ISF 
leaders reverted to Saddamist-type practices and functioned as a political tool for Prime 
Minister Maliki, they would call U.S. security assistance into question. In the 8 months 
remaining in USF-I’s mission, whether the United States and Iraq reached an agreement 
on a residual force or not, U.S. troops would have further to go than anyone had antici-
pated to support the goal of leaving behind a stable, self-sufficient Iraqi state.
Planning for Post-2011: A Residual Force
On January 25, 2011, Austin met with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral 
Michael W. Mullen and General James N. Mattis, the CENTCOM commander, to discuss 
the requirement for a new status of forces agreement that would leave a residual force 
in Iraq. Mullen and Mattis proposed a 24,000-strong force built around three advise-and-
assist brigades and some “boutique” items like special operations forces and aviation 
support that could be drawn down easily if necessary.118 Mattis noted that keeping at 
least one brigade in northern Iraq would mitigate Arab-Kurd tensions along the Green 
Line and that any force could be drawn down as conditions improved.119 Austin reported 
that both Prime Minister Maliki and Ayad Allawi supported the idea, at least privately. 
Mattis believed Maliki would agree to a force of up to 25,000 U.S. troops as long as they 
were only in a training role.
In February, Austin and his USF-I staff analyzed the pros and cons of residual forces 
ranging from 10,000 to 24,000 and concluded that the risk of mission failure grew as the 
force level dropped, and that the residual force should not be smaller than a full strength 
division.120 The Iraqi security forces, though improving, would be hard-pressed to assume 
responsibility for Iraq’s internal and external security by the end of the year. The Iraqis 
would have a continued need for security assistance and capacity-building after 2011, 
but Austin believed it would not be possible for U.S. forces to provide it from outside 
Iraq. Austin also worried about the potential for the Iranian regime to fill the void left by 
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the departing U.S. military presence and the danger to U.S. troops if the withdrawal pro-
ceeded too quickly.121 To hedge against future instability, USF-I hoped, in addition to the 
residual force, to preposition enough equipment at different locations in Iraq to enable 
the United States quickly to deploy a force of three BCTs to the country.122
In Austin’s and Cone’s view, strategic risk and security should shape U.S. decisions. 
A robust residual force would not only benefit Iraq but also provide security assurances 
for Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, and Israel.123 However, Austin also believed it would be dif-
ficult to steer deliberations in Washington away from troop numbers and costs.124 Cone 
worried that discussions about residual force would focus solely on trainers and would 
shortchange force-protection requirements.125
These military recommendations for a residual force ran counter to the preferences 
of the Obama administration. In late 2010, administration officials suggested to reporters 
that the United States could get by with between 5,000 and 10,000 troops in Iraq. Reports 
were that the President himself was considering a force that small. By April, Obama 
confirmed these reports, making clear to senior U.S. officials that maintaining more than 
10,000 troops was no longer an option, a constraint that frustrated SECDEF Robert Gates 
as well as the U.S. military leadership in Iraq.126
Inauspicious Start for SOFA Negotiations
Negotiations with the Maliki government about a new SOFA and a residual force 
intensified in spring 2011, with the expiration of the existing agreement only 8 months 
away. With time growing short, negotiators on both sides tacitly agreed U.S. troops could 
remain past the deadline without a finalized SOFA if the Iraqi Government formally 
requested them.127 On April 16, Maliki told visiting Congressman John Boehner, speaker 
of the House of Representatives, that while he felt Iraqi forces could secure the country 
after 2011, he would welcome American training and equipment.128 On May 8, Maliki had 
a similar meeting with Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham, Austin, and Jeffrey, 
but when the visiting congressmen pressed him about the need for agreement on a resid-
ual force, the Iraqi leader countered that the U.S. Government had not yet told him what 
kind of force it wished to leave in Iraq after 2011. Without a specific proposal, the Prime 
Minister had had nothing to present to the Parliament, so the issue had languished.129 The 
senators later wrote that Austin and Jeffrey told them after the meeting that U.S. leaders 
in Washington had not yet decided how many troops to propose.
Maliki’s shaky political standing hampered the negotiations as well. Some polls indi-
cated that less than 20 percent of Iraqis wanted U.S. troops to remain, but at the same time 
Iraqis were worried about the security vacuum following an American withdrawal.130 
Sadrist resistance to the negotiations put Maliki in a political bind, given his dependence 
on the Sadrist Parliamentary bloc for his position as Prime Minister.131 In late May, Sadr 
led a large protest against the SOFA and threatened to reconstitute the Jaysh al Mahdi 
militia if the U.S. military remained.132
Maliki created additional unrest himself. During a Parliamentary recess in May, Maliki 
violated the Erbil Agreement by naming his allies Faleh al-Fayadh and former Minister 
of Defense Abdel Qader to ministerial-level national security posts, but maintained the 
Ministries of Defense and Interior portfolios himself.133 These moves deepened the public 
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battle between Maliki and Ayad Allawi, who remained in a position to threaten Maliki’s 
shaky governing coalition. Maliki feared that if he committed publicly to a new SOFA 
and residual force, Allawi would attack his policy on nationalist grounds and rob him of 
his thin margin of support.134 Maliki himself was at times ambivalent toward the SOFA, 
as a continued U.S. presence would likely be an obstacle to his consolidation of power. 
Meanwhile, Obama had set August 1 as an unpublicized deadline for the Iraqis formally 
to request a residual force. During a videoconference with Obama in June, Maliki asked 
for additional time to shore up political support for the agreement and cited Allawi’s 
opposition as an obstacle.135 In July, President Talabani convened a meeting of the major 
political blocs in hopes of reaching a unified position in favor of U.S. military support, 
but Allawi’s bloc refused to agree to a residual force until the 2010 Erbil Agreement was 
implemented and the vacant security minister posts filled.136
Despite the political turmoil, many Iraqi military leaders considered some American 
military presence necessary. Abdel Qader, now Maliki’s chief advisor on defense matters, 
had consistently acknowledged that the ISF would require continued training through 
2018.137 In July, Major General Fadhel Barwari, the ISOF commander, told The New York 
Times, “The Americans need to stay because we don’t have control over our borders.”138 
The next month, Iraqi chief of defense General Babakir Zebari told reporters, “Iraqi sol-
diers and officers would like the American forces to stay in Iraq until they’re capable of 
doing the job 100 percent. . . . If I were asked about the withdrawal, I would say to politi-
cians, ‘The U.S. Army must stay until the Iraqi Army is fully ready in 2020. . . . If America 
withdraws its forces and one of the neighboring countries causes problems, then we’re 
going to have a problem’.”139
The Spike in Shi’a Militant Attacks 
As the SOFA negotiations intensified, the Iranian regime’s Shi’a proxies escalated 
attacks against U.S. troops. In southern Iraq, violence steadily rose from May onward, 
but since the Shi’a militants spared the ISF, most ISF units in the south were reluctant 
to defend U.S. troops and installations from the militias as the U.S.-Iraq security agree-
ment required them to do. Austin warned his superiors that if the attacks continued, 
USF-I would be forced to conduct unilateral operations against the groups, likely with 
U.S. casualties.140 The munitions used plus the increasing accuracy of the attacks pointed 
toward greater Iranian involvement particularly in the U.S. Division-South (USD-S) area 
of responsibility.141 Austin wanted U.S. training teams to partner with Iraqi units to dis-
rupt the smuggling routes for the Shi’a militants’ lethal supplies from Iran, but local gov-
ernments in southern Iraq resisted the kind of cooperation Austin desired.142 In one case, 
the Sadrist Provincial Council in Basrah attempted to outlaw the movement of USF-I 
throughout the province. Local courts appeared to operate a “catch-and-release” pro-
gram for any Shi’a militants detained.
On June 6, Kata’ib Hizballah fired an IRAM from the Iraqi-controlled portion of FOB 
Loyalty near Sadr City, killing 7 Americans and wounding 30.143 Further south, by mid-
June, the Iranian-backed militias continuously harassed USD-S with IRAM and EFP 
attacks. To fire the heavy, difficult-to-guide IRAMs, the Shi’a militants used launch points 
close to American bases and troop concentrations, sometimes building houses with a 
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false roof, such as a plastic tarpaulin, near the base perimeter, and then removing the roof 
just before firing the IRAM.144 In late June, a Kata’ib Hizballah IRAM at FOB Shocker, 5 
miles from the Iran-Iraq border, killed three Soldiers and wounded seven more just days 
before the outpost was due for transfer to the ISF. The attack brought the number of U.S. 
Soldiers killed in June to 14, with more than 50 wounded, making it the deadliest month 
for U.S. forces in over 2 years. Over April, May, and June, 21 Soldiers were killed and 
105 wounded—triple the previous 3 months’ casualties.145 Violence against the civilian 
population rose as well. Iraqis suffered 340 killed in June, the most recorded in a year.146
In response, Austin ordered CJSOTF to launch unilateral raids against Shi’a militant 
technicians and facilitators across the south.147 Nevertheless, in July the number of attacks 
in the country escalated to 13 per day, a 30 percent increase over the average of the pre-
vious 6 months.148 On July 10, AAH bombarded FOB Garry Owen with rockets, killing 
one American Soldier. On July 12, the group launched more than 40 rockets at the base, 
and on July 16, they followed with four IRAMs, though these attacks caused no casual-
ties. The same month, Stuart Bowen, the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction, 
declared in a report to Congress that Iraq was less safe than a year before.149
Following AAH’s July 16 attack, Austin bluntly told Maliki that the ISF were not 
engaging Shi’a militant groups. The USF-I commander also asked the Iraqi leader to 
warn Iran not to confuse USF-I’s restraint with weakness. Maliki replied that he had 
sent the same message to Tehran only days before and had dispatched his own national 
security advisor to emphasize the warning, but the Prime Minister also told Austin that 
USF-I’s unilateral raids against Shi’a targets were a political problem for him and pressed 
Austin to return to combined U.S.-Iraqi operations. After almost 2 months of elevated 
attacks and ISF failure to counter them, however, Austin received Maliki’s assurances 
with skepticism.150
Despite the Prime Minister’s entreaties, USF-I continued unilateral operations and 
captured one of the suspects in the late June attack against FOB Shocker. Partnered U.S.-
ISF operations, meanwhile, rounded up some of the Shi’a militants responsible for IRAM 
attacks in Basrah, while ISF-led operations in Maysan Province netted 70 low-level Shi’a 
militants in late July and early August. However, USF-I’s efforts to get the Iraqi Gov-
ernment and ISF to pressure the Shi’a militias met little success. Despite the rising Shi’a 
militant threat, the ISF continued to generate mostly Sunni targets for partnered coun-
terterrorism operations, and Iraqi judges often refused to issue warrants for individuals 
suspected of taking part in attacks.151 U.S. units and advisors also noted that the Shi’a 
militant groups regularly infiltrated ISF units, creating a problem that would continue to 
plague USF-I’s advisory mission.152
PREPARING FOR EXIT
The “Waterfall” and Withdrawal From the Green Line
As it became clearer to USF-I and U.S. Embassy negotiators that the residual U.S. 
force in Iraq would be much smaller than the 24,000 troops they initially recommended, 
Austin gradually began to decrease the U.S. military presence. First, he withdrew U.S. 
troops from the 22 combined security checkpoints along the Green Line in Major General 
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David Perkins’s USD-N, placing them into an overwatch role. As USD-N receded from 
the checkpoints, U.S. commanders hoped they could convince Arab and Kurdish units to 
continue cooperation along the Green Line, but this proved difficult.153 USD-N initially 
withdrew forces from the combined security checkpoints in Diyala and Ninawa, but had 
difficulty extricating themselves from the bilateral checkpoints manned by Iraqi police in 
Kirkuk. Eventually, USD-N and the Iraqis agreed the “Golden Lions,” the Iraqi unit con-
sisting of Iraqi Army, Iraqi police, and members of the peshmerga militia, would assume 
responsibility for the Kirkuk checkpoints as the last of the U.S. forces moved into over-
watch positions on July 22.154
Next, Austin consolidated the three U.S. division headquarters. Since its arrival in 
January, attacks on the 36th Infantry Division USD-S by Shi’a militants had increased, 
with local ISF in the south doing little to stop them.155 Concerned that the 36th Division 
headquarters devoted much of its effort to force protection, Austin redeployed the divi-
sion headquarters early and merged the remaining units in U.S. Division-Center (USD-C) 
and USD-S into a single division under Major General Bernard Champoux’s 25th Infantry 
Division headquarters. After the 36th Infantry Division’s departure, Champoux and his 
command served as the main command-and-control element for USF-I’s final maneuvers 
out of Iraq. This move allowed Austin to continue to staff the Arab-Kurd fault line in the 
north and Baghdad, but rendered southern Iraq an economy-of-force mission.156
The End of the Special Operations Mission
The realization that U.S. troop strength—including special operations forces—might 
drop to zero by the end of 2011 caught the CJSOTF off guard. Most special operations 
leaders had anticipated continued counterterrorism and advisory missions after conven-
tional forces left, believing that a full withdrawal was a “throw-away course of action 
. . . that’s never going to happen.”157 Yet the U.S. special operations mission already had 
undergone dramatic changes since 2008. By 2011 the ISOF, CJSOTF’s principal Iraqi part-
ner, had become a capable organization, described by several CJSOTF commanders as 
the best special operations unit in the Middle East. The unit had expanded from one to 
two brigades, one with two national-level counterterrorism battalions, and the second 
with regional commando battalions in Basrah, Mosul, Diyala, and Anbar.158 These Iraqi 
units conducted nighttime helicopter assaults in Mi–17 helicopters flown by Iraqi pilots 
as a matter of routine. They had developed their own human intelligence networks, and 
even had their own ISR aircraft and joint terminal attack controllers for close air support.
But the sectarianism that seeped into the organization since its 2007 transfer to the con-
trol of Prime Minister Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief degraded the CJSOTF’s 
ability to conduct operations with ISOF elements. The Prime Minister had used the ISOF 
to intimidate Sunni politicians and other political opponents in addition to targeting 
terrorists, and the CJSOTF slowly had distanced itself from the ISOF as the Iraqi force 
became politicized. In December 2008, the ISOF had arrested 35 politicians only weeks 
before Iraq’s provincial elections.159 In May 2009, the brigade arrested four of the nine 
newly elected provincial council members in Diyala.160 In May 2010, the brigade again 
arrested a politician in Diyala who had openly criticized the ISOF’s politicized role.161 
When these raids occurred, the CJSOTF declined to participate and raised objections with 
their Iraqi counterparts in the Counter Terrorism Service headquarters.
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While partnered operations with the ISOF against AQI continued, missions against 
Shi’a targets rarely were approved.162 In one instance, Cone submitted 10 potential tar-
gets, all of them involving rocket attacks. Counterterrorism director General Talib Kenani 
approved two Sunni targets immediately, but disapproved the remaining eight Shi’a tar-
gets because they did not have “the right intelligence.”163 In a further display of sectarian 
tone deafness, Counter Terrorism Service leaders chose to have the ISOF brigade’s elite 
Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force change uniforms. The uniform of Iraq’s national Army 
was replaced with jet black coveralls, which matched the all black clothing worn by the 
Mahdi Militia during the dark days of Iraq’s civil war—a similarity immediately recog-
nized by Sunni leaders across Iraq.
Because of these trends, the CJSOTF shifted its focus from the ISOF to a partnership 
with the Emergency Response Brigade (ERB), an Interior Ministry unit modeled upon the 
FBI hostage rescue and special weapons and tactics teams. The CJSOTF had formed the 
ERB as a police counterpart to the ISOF brigade, and some of the brigade’s elements, such 
as the Hillah special weapons and tactics (SWAT) battalion, had been paired with Special 
Forces advisors since 2003.164 The ERB commander, Brigadier General Noman Dakhil 
Jawad, was a Shi’a officer unafraid of arresting fellow Shi’a Iraqis who were accused of 
sectarian crimes or targeting American forces. This independence caused at least one 
CJSOTF commander to warn Jawad to lower his profile or risk drawing Prime Minister 
Maliki’s attention.165 It was a prescient warning. In March 2011, Maliki loyalists in the 
federal police tried to arrest Jawad on charges of corruption, but when the policemen 
arrived, his troops drove them off. Nevertheless, after Jawad’s subsequent arrest, a Sadd-
am-era officer whom USF-I linked to Kata’ib Hizballah took his place and abruptly ended 
the ERB’s partnered operations against Shi’a targets.166 The CJSOTF noted that the new 
commander exclusively targeted Sunnis, including Sunni political leaders, often without 
warrants. In July, after the ERB’s Hillah SWAT battalion and CJSOTF advisors conducted 
a series of operations against Iranian-backed Shi’a militias, several of the Hillah battal-
ion’s leaders were arrested and jailed.167 By August, the CJSOTF had collected enough 
evidence to persuade Austin to sever ties with the ERB. Breaking the news was difficult 
for the brigade’s Special Forces advisors, with some of the Green Berets and the ERB 
constables they had fought alongside nearly brought to tears when they learned of the 
decision.168
The Race to Build ISF Capacity
Building capacity within the Iraqi security forces always had been a crucial compo-
nent of the transition plan. As debate continued over the residual force question, Cone, 
who had once overseen the U.S. Army’s National Training Center, pressed Iraqi Army 
leaders to develop basic combined-arms capabilities through collective training.169 As he 
did so, the USF-I advisory brigades urged their Iraqi Army counterparts to pull units out 
of day-to-day operations to train, with mixed results. In April, the Iraqi military com-
menced Exercise Lion’s Leap, in which Iraqi units simulated hostage rescues; cordon 
and search operations; air assaults; and reconnaissance operations with a combination 
of air, land, and naval forces.170 In addition, the 8th, 9th, and 14th Iraqi Army divisions 
all conducted major training exercises in 2011, but the Iraqis’ capacity to undertake more 
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sophisticated training as the number of American military trainers diminished remained 
in question.171
Source: DoD photo by Captain Chad Ashe (Released).
Soldiers From the Iraqi Army’s 12th Division Take Part in Exercise Lion’s Leap.172
The effort to modernize the Iraqi Army created some additional challenges. As Amer-
ican-made equipment made its way to Iraqi units,173 the Iraqis required two separate 
logistics systems, one for the newer American-made systems and the other for the Soviet 
bloc equipment the Iraqis had fielded from 2003 to 2009. Many units ended up with a mix 
of Soviet and American equipment and encountered shortages of nearly every category 
of supply. The communications systems in the American tanks were not compatible with 
those in the eastern bloc legacy vehicles, so that many units had to rely on hand and arm 
signals or cell phones for tactical communications.174
Meanwhile, the United States continued to work with the Iraqi Government to pur-
chase F–16 fighter aircraft, which U.S. officials believed would tie the Iraqi military 
closer to the United States and serve as a counterbalance to Iran’s rising influence in the 
region.175 Iraq would pay for the F–16s from oil revenues, with an expected cost of $4.2 
billion, including parts and related weapons.176 However, the air force had a difficult 
time recruiting personnel, training its pilots, and maintaining its planes, leaving Austin 
concerned that the Iraqis might not be able to sustain an F-16 force over the long term 
without U.S. mentorship.177
USF-I found it difficult to work with Iraqi defense officials to solve these and many 
other similar problems. With Maliki serving as both Minister of Defense and Minister 
of Interior in addition to his responsibilities as Prime Minister, obtaining the necessary 
administrative approval for crucial ministerial functions was slow. USF-I officials noted 
that in the uncertain political environment, Iraqi bureaucrats feared making decisions 
that could have political implications, with the result that Iraq’s national-level defense 
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systems were incapable of planning more than 6 to 8 weeks in advance. As Cone described 
it, the national security ministries in 2011 were in “a general state of paralysis.”178
The “paralysis” had come in part from an unprecedented consolidation of power 
within the ISF, as Prime Minister Maliki purged professional officers in key leadership 
positions across the ISF and replaced them with his supporters. In 2011, Maliki replaced 
5 of the 14 division commanders, substituting Shi’a Da’wa party loyalists for proven 
Sunni and Kurdish commanders.179 The Kurds, who felt the reassignments most acutely, 
made their frustrations public, with General Babakir Zebari, Iraq’s Chief of Defense and 
commander of the Joint Headquarters, providing President Talibani a report that alleged 
General Mohan Freiji, who had become a senior advisor to the Minister of Defense after 
being removed as the Basra Operations Commander, had “spearheaded a campaign to 
rid all Kurdish influence and destroy Kurdish roles within the MoD.”180 Zebari’s report 
alleged that Prime Minister Maliki had orchestrated a slow takeover of Iraq’s security 
apparatus, a process that began with the creation of the Office of the Commander in 
Chief (OCINC), which Zebari described as “a shadow headquarters” that “diluted” and 
“stole” the power of the Joint Headquarters. Following the creation of the OCINC, Maliki 
quietly took control of Iraq’s special operations forces and its intelligence services, along 
with their substantial and secret budgets. With the most effective elements of the Iraqi 
security forces under Maliki’s control, OCINC and other Da’wa officers in key positions 
began a campaign “assigning officers with sectarian ties to various units and divisions in 
the Army.” Zebari asserted that in 2009 Kurdish loyalists intercepted a secret letter from 
General Freiji to other Shi’a conspirators in the Ministry of Defense describing meth-
ods to accomplish these objectives. These included forcing Kurdish and Sunni officers to 
retire, flooding unqualified Shi’a militia members into the senior ranks of the Army, and 
“finding charges” that could be levied against senior officers unwilling to support Mali-
ki’s sectarian consolidation.181
By 2010, Maliki’s labors had borne fruit, and in addition to the changes that left only 
two Kurds and two Sunnis in command of the 14 divisions in the Iraqi Army, Shi’a offi-
cers had taken control of all of the department and directorate level positions in the Min-
istry of Defense. Shi’a generals held three of the four service commands, with Sunnis 
completely excluded, and the Baghdad Operations Command was ordered to report 
directly to Maliki, bypassing the Joint Headquarters.182 Zebari’s report argued that as 
USF-I rushed to prepare the Iraqi security forces for the unanticipated complete with-
drawal of American forces, a slow cancer was overtaking the organization from within.
THE RETROGRADE
The Collapse of SOFA Negotiations
The new U.S. defense secretary, Leon Panetta, arrived in Baghdad on July 11, 2011, for 
talks with President Talabani and Prime Minister Maliki on the long-term U.S. presence 
in Iraq. Panetta emphasized the need for U.S. force protection and for the Iraqi Gov-
ernment to appoint defense and interior ministers. Maliki expressed confidence that the 
Iraqis could take care of Iraq’s internal security with limited U.S. assistance in intelli-
gence, logistics, border control, air space control, and collective training. Panetta replied 
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that if the Iraqis wanted U.S. assistance, they should formally request it sooner rather 
than later.183 Speaking to U.S. troops after his meetings, a frustrated Panetta said, “I’d 
like things to move a lot faster here, frankly, in terms of the decision-making process. I’d 
like them to make a decision, you know: Do they want us to stay? Don’t they want us to 
stay? . . . Damn it, make a decision.”184
Source: DoD photo by Technical Sergeant Jacob N. Bailey (Released).
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta Meets With U.S. Troops Following Negotiations 
With Iraqi Leaders About an Extension of the U.S.-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement.185
In late July, Jeffrey and Austin made their rounds of the Iraqi political leaders to stress 
the importance of arriving at a decision on the SOFA quickly, but when the political blocs 
met on August 2, ostensibly to decide Iraq’s policy on the SOFA, they adjourned for the 
30-day Ramadan holiday instead.186 In the meantime, Maliki’s acting Minister of Defense, 
Sadun al Dulaymi, agreed with Austin that there was an urgent need for a continued 
U.S. military mission, but declined to formalize arrangements without Parliamentary 
approval.187
On the eve of Obama’s August 1 deadline for a formal Iraqi request for a residual U.S. 
force, Ambassador Jeffrey and Brett McGurk reported that Maliki could meet all the U.S. 
administration’s requirements with two exceptions. He did not yet have Parliamentary 
approval for the extension of troops and, because of pressure from the Sadrist bloc, he 
could not guarantee U.S. troops immunity from prosecution in the Iraqi judicial system. 
Both points crossed redlines for the U.S. negotiators and leaders, although Panetta advo-
cated continuing the negotiations to maintain a 10,000-man residual force in Iraq.
Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, named director of the Office of Secu-
rity Cooperation that would succeed USF-I at the end of 2011, met with senior U.S. 
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officials in Washington as he prepared to deploy to Baghdad in August. In one meet-
ing, a senior White House official warned Caslen to be prepared not to have any troops 
under his command after 2011, because the President intended not to maintain a residual 
force in Iraq. Instead, the official said, the President would insist that the Iraqi Parliament 
approve the SOFA—a demand that would be a poison pill, since Maliki would not risk a 
no-confidence vote on his premiership. “We know it is not going to happen . . . and it will 
look like the Iraqis were the ones that made it happen,” the official told Caslen.188 Arriv-
ing in Baghdad shortly after the meeting, Caslen met with Austin and Jeffrey and relayed 
the warning, but the general and ambassador assured Caslen that U.S. leaders remained 
committed to leaving a residual force in the country.189
Back in Washington, the administration was reducing the size of the projected resid-
ual force. On August 13, Obama informed the National Security Council (NSC) principals 
that he had revised his earlier position and would now only authorize a maximum of 
3,500 U.S. troops to remain in Iraq, supported by an additional 1,500 troops that would 
periodically rotate in and out of the country as contingencies arose. The smaller force and 
rotational posture were ideas that General James Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, had suggested to White House officials without the knowledge of 
Panetta or Mullen. In Iraq, the revised numbers caught McGurk and Jeffrey off guard and 
unable to explain the change, as hours before they had been negotiating with the Iraqis 
for a residual force of 10,000. The smaller force would still require Iraqi Parliamentary 
approval and immunity from Iraqi law but would provide much less capability to help 
defend Iraq.
Assessing the costs and benefits of the SOFA and unnerved by the change in the size 
of the residual force, many Iraqi politicians concluded that they would expend far too 
much political capital and incur too much risk in exchange for a small force with limited 
capabilities. Thus, when the Iraqi Parliament returned from its Ramadan holiday in early 
September, the negotiating teams made no progress resolving these issues. As September 
passed without an agreement, Austin declared October 15 as the deadline for a decision, 
since beyond that point “the laws of physics,” as he put it, would make it impossible for 
USF-I to withdraw by the end of the year.190
As that deadline approached, Austin and USF-I began to realize that an agreement 
was unlikely. On October 1, Austin reported to Panetta that Maliki simply could not find 
a way to balance the need for a continued U.S. troop presence with the political fallout he 
anticipated if he pushed the Iraqi Parliament to a public vote on the matter.191 For a brief 
time, Austin considered “freezing” 5,000 troops in place to force the Parliament to vote 
on the SOFA.192 He also proposed signaling U.S. commitment to stay by accelerating the 
arrival of the 3d Infantry Division headquarters, which was scheduled to deploy to Iraq 
as a subordinate unit under OSC-I, and reflagging it as the United States Training Mis-
sion-Iraq by the beginning of December as USF-I redeployed.193
However, by October 7, Austin accepted that he would be unable to retain either the 
advise-and-assist brigades or aircraft within Iraq’s borders after 2011. He ordered USF-I 
to begin planning to augment Caslen’s OSC-I, which would have to assume responsibil-
ity for the entirety of the U.S. military mission by the end of the year.194 The official word 
came on October 21, when Obama spoke with Prime Minister Maliki via video telecon-
ference for the first time since June and informed the Iraqi leader that the United States 
would indeed reduce its forces in Iraq to zero by the end of 2011.
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Maliki’s Crackdown
Political turbulence followed in the weeks after the announcement that U.S. troops 
would withdraw. KRG President Massoud Barzani leveled the public charge that Maliki 
and his allies had submitted to pressure from Iran not to sign the SOFA. Acting Minister 
of Defense Sadun Dulaymi, considered a Maliki ally, charged that Maliki had violated 
the Iraqi constitution in an attempt to seize power.195 Meanwhile, the Prime Minister took 
steps to solidify control of an Iraqi military that would no longer be partnered with U.S. 
military units. In the Iraqi general officer ranks, Maliki removed several senior military 
leaders who had been closely associated with the United States, including General Nasier 
Abadi, an experienced air force officer who had been Iraq’s vice chief of defense. Maliki 
ordered Abadi’s retirement just days after finalizing the agreement to buy American 
F–16s, even though Abadi had overseen Iraq’s F–16 program for several years.196
With U.S. troops set to depart, U.S. officials saw signs that Maliki feared the prospects 
for a coup against him once his government no longer had the backing of American 
military units. Caslen observed that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s brutal murder 
by rebels on October 20, 2011, the day before Obama’s Iraq withdrawal announcement, 
panicked the Prime Minister. Recalling a meeting with Austin and Maliki shortly after 
Gaddafi’s death, Caslen said, “All Maliki could talk about was ‘that better not happen to 
me . . . there better not be a coup, or I will be dragged through the streets’.”197
Maliki’s fears probably drove what happened next. Three days after Obama 
announced the U.S. withdrawal, the Maliki government arrested 600 people across the 
country, mostly Sunnis, to quash what Maliki said was a Ba’athist coup plot revealed to 
him by the new Libyan Government. However, the government’s list of supposed plot-
ters made the allegations seem implausible, since it included people who had long since 
left the Ba’ath Party and others who were already dead.198 USF-I reported that the arrests 
aroused “the ire of Sunni officials and tribal sheikhs.”199 In Salahadin, the Sunni-majority 
provincial council responded to the crackdown by voting on October 27 for a federal, 
semi-autonomous region modeled upon the KRG—an arrangement they believed might 
insulate the province from what they viewed as Maliki’s authoritarian consolidation of 
power in Baghdad.200 Within days, the Sunni-led provincial councils in Ninewa, Diyala, 
and Anbar followed suit, fully reversing their provinces’ 2005 rejection of the federalism 
provisions in the Iraqi constitution.201 Maliki declared these moves unconstitutional and 
dispatched troops to Salahadin to suppress Sunni protests and to Baqubah to arrest the 
Diyala provincial governor.202
Similar trouble appeared on the Arab-Kurd front as U.S. troops began to leave. Even 
before it was decided there would not be a residual force, peshmerga forces had moved 
into the combined security areas in northern Iraq as U.S. troops departed. In November, 
when USF-I transferred FOB Warrior in Kirkuk to Iraqi Army control, Kurdish police 
attempted to block Iraqi Army units from entering the base. With only weeks before 
the departure of U.S. forces, Austin found himself making a final attempt to prevent 
Kurd-Arab tensions from escalating into war. One senior Kurdish politician visiting 
Washington summed up the situation shortly after Maliki’s crackdown and the Kirkuk 
confrontation. “Many Americans seem to think this [the U.S. military withdrawal] means 
the end of the power struggle in Iraq . . . it does not. Now that the Americans are going, 
we will see the real start of the struggle for power in Iraq, not the end.”203
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The Final Convoys
USF-I’s final withdrawal from Iraq over a 7-week period in 2011 was an extraordinary 
logistical feat for a U.S. force that had maintained large bases in the country for more 
than 8 years and for U.S. commanders who, until the last moment, had not expected to 
have to leave completely. The scale of the final retrograde movement out of Iraq—the 
“waterfall” that USF-I had planned for—was a sizable and rare effort. Austin’s decision 
to keep as many troops as possible working with the ISF until late 2011 meant that when 
it was announced on October 21 that U.S. forces would withdraw fully, USF-I had fewer 
than 60 days to redeploy 40,000 Soldiers and about 36,000 contractors. Those personnel 
would have to dispose of the vast amount of equipment that had accumulated since 2003, 
including 45,000 pieces of rolling stock and 13,000 shipping containers. Although a small 
portion of that equipment would be transferred to the ISF, most would have to be driven 
to ports in Kuwait or Jordan or flown from Baghdad. USF-I’s personnel would exit by 
convoying to Kuwait or flying out of Baghdad.204
Source: USF-I briefing slide (Released).
Chart 1. U.S. Military Base Closures (December 2010-December 2011).205
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Source: USF-I briefing slides (Released).
Chart 2. Troop Drawdown and Contractor Drawdown.206
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Source: USF-I briefing slide (Released).
Chart 3. Transportation Sustainment Spine in Iraq for Operation NEW DAWN.207
To manage the exit, Austin relocated USF-I’s command nodes to Al Asad airbase and 
to Kuwait and prepared to hand the enormous Victory base complex over to the Iraqis.208 
A CENTCOM contracting fusion cell helped manage the contractor drawdown, since 
USF-I had no mechanism to verify the whereabouts of individual contractors.209 A few 
U.S. military elements continued their operations in Iraq up to the last days of the USF-I 
presence. USF-I had asked the Iraqi Government to take custody of USF-I’s remaining 
detainees before the end of the year, but Prime Minister Maliki declined the request, 
forcing American detention operations elements to continue their work until the end of 
December.210
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Likewise, the remaining special operators of the CJSOTF continued daily operations 
up to the unit’s final day in Iraq, with many of the operations meant to protect the large 
American convoys leaving Iraq. With three battalion-sized task forces still in Iraq, the 
CJSOTF would have to manage a rapid drawdown at the same time Austin expected 
them to serve as a covering force as U.S. troops withdrew. As Colonel Scott Brower, 
the CJSOTF commander at the time, described it, the CJSOTF would be “screening for 
USF-I, literally doctrinally screening, as the conventional forces were withdrawing down 
route Tampa heading for Kuwait.”211 To keep the Shi’a militias off-balance and deter 
their attacks, Austin authorized the CJSOTF to launch preemptive strikes.212 At times, 
the CJSOTF operated unilaterally, but usually it conducted partnered operations—some-
times with its Soldiers wearing Iraqi uniforms and in vehicles painted to match the ISF as 
a way to lower their signature.213
 
Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Cecilio Ricardo (Released).
Airmen of the 407th Air Expeditionary Group Prepare to Depart Iraq in a C-17  
Globemaster III Cargo Aircraft.214
By the beginning of December 2011, USF-I had only 5 bases in Iraq, and between 500 
and 800 U.S. Soldiers were leaving the country each day.215 Austin had long worried 
about the vulnerability of U.S. troops as they convoyed through southern Iraqi territory 
where the Iranian-sponsored Shi’a militant groups had a heavy presence. His concerns 
had deepened in September after reports that IRGC Quds Force affiliates were occa-
sionally interfering with U.S. convoys, raising the prospect that attacks against USF-I’s 
last convoys might yield propaganda images of burning U.S. vehicles on the Iraqi high-
ways.216 As the retrograde movement unfolded, however, the U.S. convoys and their ISF 
escorts made their way to Kuwait unharrassed, indicating that the Iranian regime and its 
proxies decided ultimately not to impede USF-I’s exit.
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Source: DoD photo by Staff Sergeant Caleb Barrieau (Released).
General Lloyd Austin Cases the USF-I Colors at Camp Victory on  
December 15, 2011.217
By early December, Camp Victory, where more than 50,000 Americans had once been 
based, resembled a ghost town. A small air operations center remained at the Baghdad 
Airport to support the U.S. Embassy and OSC-I, but on December 1, USF-I handed its 
Iraqi counterparts possession of the empty Faw Palace, the former seat of American mil-
itary power. On December 15, Panetta and Austin presided over a final ceremony at 
Camp Victory to case USF-I’s colors. It was an event attended by Iraq’s senior military 
officers, but Prime Minister Maliki chose not to join them, and the front-row seat that 
USF-I reserved for him remained empty. “No words, no ceremony, can provide full trib-
ute to the sacrifices that have brought this day to pass,” Panetta told the crowd, adding 
that though the cost had been high for the United States and the Iraqi people, “Those 
lives were not lost in vain. They gave birth to an independent, free and sovereign Iraq.”218 
Following the ceremony, Austin boarded an aircraft and departed Iraq, taking JFSOCC-I 
commander Brigadier General Darsie Rogers and the last USF-I elements in Baghdad 
with him.
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***
Three days after the ceremony at Camp Victory, the final U.S. convoy assembled at 
Contingency Operating Base (COB) Adder near Nasiriyah in the early morning hours 
of December 18. To throw off any final symbolic enemy attack, the troops had spread 
disinformation to local officials the day before that they would be remaining in place for 
the time being. However, at 2:30 am, more than 500 Soldiers loaded into 110 vehicles and 
began their trek in the dark, arriving at the Kuwaiti border shortly before dawn.
Source: DoD photo by Master Sergeant Cecilio Ricardo (Released).
The Final USF-I Convoy Reaches the Kuwaiti Border as the Sun Rises  
on December 18, 2011.219
Among the troops in the last convoy was an American Soldier who had arrived in the 
United States as an Iraqi immigrant in 2009 and had enlisted in the U.S. Army the fol-
lowing year. As the convoy waited in the night to depart COB Adder, the Soldier spoke 
to a New York Times reporter, but declined to give his name out of fear for the safety of 
his family that remained in Iraq. Asked for his thoughts on the withdrawal, he observed, 
“The Iraqis are going to wake up in the morning, and nobody will be there.”220
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CHAPTER 15
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION  
AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
In December 2011, the decision not to leave a residual U.S. force in Iraq left Lieutenant 
General Robert Caslen and the 150 personnel of the new Office of Security Coopera-
tion-Iraq (OSC-I) unexpectedly in charge of the large-scale security assistance mission 
that a theater headquarters and more than 40,000 U.S. troops had been performing just 
weeks before. U.S. leaders made the change from a large U.S. military command to a 
small embassy-based cooperation office against the backdrop of what many U.S. observ-
ers believed was an increasingly stable Iraq, a strengthening Iraqi state and Iraqi security 
forces (ISF), and a manageable set of security threats. Over the ensuing 2½ years, the 
experiment of using a stripped-down OSC-I to consolidate the U.S. campaign gains fell 
fall short of the mark. From 2012 to 2014, Iraq slipped back into civil war, and the Islamic 
State of Iraq (ISI) regenerated fully into the new Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL/ISIS), with the U.S. military powerless to stop either event.
AFTER U.S. FORCES-IRAQ (USF-I): CRACKDOWNS AND DISARRAY
Maliki’s Purges
On December 12, 2011, as the few remaining U.S. troops in Iraq prepared to leave, 
President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki met in Washington, DC, to 
mark the end of the U.S. military presence in Iraq. Early in the day, the two leaders vis-
ited Arlington National Cemetery to lay wreaths at the graves of troops killed in the Iraq 
War. Later, in a joint press conference at the White House, they emphasized that their 
two countries would have a different relationship moving forward. Welcoming Maliki as 
“the elected leader of a sovereign, self-reliant, and democratic Iraq,” Obama noted that 
levels of violence in Iraq remained low despite the U.S. troop withdrawal and declared, 
“what we have now achieved is an Iraq that is self-governing, that is inclusive, and that 
has enormous potential.” As the President saw it, Iraq could be “a model for others that 
are aspiring to create democracy in the region.” Both Obama and Maliki acknowledged 
that their governments were at odds over the question of whether Syrian leader Bashar 
al-Assad should leave power, but in general, the two leaders hailed the future strategic 
partnership between their countries.1
Three days later, on the same day that General Lloyd Austin and Secretary of Defense 
(SECDEF) Leon Panetta cased U.S. Forces-Iraq’s (USF-I) colors in a ceremony at Camp 
Victory, Iraqi politics began to descend into chaos. Prime Minister Maliki’s seat would be 
empty during the December 15 ceremony ending the U.S. military mission in Iraq, as he 
had to tend to other matters. Maliki, back in Baghdad after his brief visit to Washington, 
instead used the day to call for the Iraqi Parliament to sack his own deputy Prime Min-
ister, Sunni politician Saleh Mutlaq. Mutlaq had given television interviews denouncing 
Maliki as a dictator and criticizing the United States for leaving Iraq in an authoritar-
ian state. “Maliki is worse than Saddam Hussein,” Mutlaq told an Iraqi TV channel on 
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December 13, “because at least Saddam was a builder, but Maliki has done absolutely 
nothing.” Mutlaq told CNN the same day that he had been “shocked” to hear Obama 
welcome Maliki as a “democratic” leader, considering that Maliki had arrested hundreds 
of people and deployed troops against some of Iraq’s provincial governments in the pre-
ceding weeks. Mutlaq told CNN that:
America left Iraq with almost no infrastructure. The political process is going in a very wrong 
direction, going toward a dictatorship. . . . People are not going to accept that, and most likely they 
are going to ask for the division of the country. And this is going to be a disaster. Dividing the 
country isn’t going to be smooth, because dividing the country is going to be a war before that and 
a war after that. . . . There will be a day whereby the Americans will realize that they were deceived 
by al-Maliki . . . and they will regret that.2
On the same day that Maliki announced his initiative to impeach Mutlaq, the Prime 
Minister’s security forces deployed across the Green Zone, surrounding the homes of 
several senior Sunni politicians, rendering them virtually under house arrest. Over the 
following days, Maliki government officials revealed that they had arrested several of 
Vice President Tariq Hashimi’s bodyguards and that the men had confessed that Hashimi 
had allegedly ordered them to bomb Maliki’s convoy as it passed through the Green 
Zone on November 28. On December 18, Iraqi state television broadcast the bodyguards’ 
videotaped confessions implicating the Vice President in terrorism, while elsewhere 
Iraqi judicial officials prepared to issue an arrest warrant for Hashimi. By that evening 
Hashimi, Iraq’s most senior Sunni politician, was a fugitive, having fled Baghdad on an 
Iraqi airways flight to Erbil to be sheltered by Kurdistan Republican Guard (KRG) Pres-
ident Massoud Barzani. From Kurdistan, Hashimi and his representatives made state-
ments declaring his innocence and claimed the bodyguards had confessed falsely under 
torture. Their claims would later be strengthened by the fact that one of the bodyguards 
who confessed on television died in the custody of Maliki’s security forces, with evidence 
indicating he was beaten to death.3
=
 
Hashimi (left), Tawfiq (center). Source: DoD photo by Sergeant Patrick Lair (Released).
Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi With Ninawa Operations  
Commander Lieutenant General Riyadh Jalal Tawfiq in 2008.4
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
571
On the same day that the Maliki government moved against Hashimi and Mutlaq, 
it also moved to consolidate power in the ethnic powder keg of Diyala Province. In 
response to the Diyala provincial council having passed a resolution that would begin 
the process to transform the province into an autonomous region similar to the Kurdish 
provinces, Maliki charged the Sunni governor with holding an illegal vote and ordered 
Iraqi security forces, aided by Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and Badr militiamen, to take control 
of the provincial government center. The governor, who like Hashimi was a member of 
the Iraqi Islamic Party, fled to Kurdistan along with a majority of the provincial council.5
Back in the Green Zone, as these events were unfolding in the immediate aftermath 
of USF-I’s departure, the Iraqiyah bloc to which Hashimi belonged suspended its par-
ticipation in Maliki’s cabinet and called for U.S. intervention to force Maliki to give up 
sole control of Iraq’s security forces and to implement the December 2010 power-sharing 
agreement. Throughout 2011, the Prime Minister had failed to fulfill his pledge to appoint 
new security ministers selected by the other parties. Instead, he had named himself as 
acting head of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and also retained control 
of the Iraqi intelligence community, signaling that he intended to consolidate personal 
control of the most potent arms of the Iraqi Government. Only with the pressure of the 
August bombings, did Maliki appoint one of his allies as acting Minister of Defense, itself 
a violation of the Erbil Agreement. After Hashimi’s removal, the Prime Minister paused 
his pressure against Mutlaq and other senior Sunni leaders, but the December crackdown 
still left the Iraqi political class in a state of shock. Maliki had shown by his actions that he 
was willing to use his security apparatus against any rival, with even the country’s most 
senior political leaders not protected. “Welcome to the post-occupation Iraq,” one senior 
Iraqi official in the Green Zone told his American counterparts.6
OSC-I’s Rocky Start
The jarring purge of Iraq’s top Sunni leader occurred as the U.S. military in Baghdad 
was going through a jarring period of its own. The U.S. decision to withdraw USF-I fully 
from Iraq without a residual force meant that as of December 18, 2011, Lieutenant Gen-
eral Robert Caslen’s OSC-I was the only U.S. military organization in the country. The 
U.S. Government had long planned to transition the military mission in Iraq from USF-I 
to OSC-I at the end of 2011, but Caslen and virtually all the planners involved in that pro-
cess had assumed that as OSC-I director, Caslen would still be a de facto operational com-
mander with thousands of troops at his disposal. Until very late in the decision-making 
process, U.S. military leaders had believed that Caslen would have a large OSC-I staff to 
inherit the functions of the USF-I headquarters and would have the 3d Infantry Division 
headquarters available to carry out a large training mission with thousands of military 
advisors and trainers. Instead, after the final ceremony marking the deactivation of USF-I 
in Baghdad on December 15, Caslen and the 157 personnel of OSC-I found themselves in 
charge of a military mission that had required the combined efforts of 40,000 U.S. troops 
just a few weeks before.
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Caslen (right), Perkins (left). Source: DoD photo by Specialist Brandon Bednarek (Released).
Lieutenant General Robert Caslen With U.S. Division-North (USD-N)  
Commander Major General David G. Perkins.7
The OSC-I mission almost collapsed before it could begin. The rapid withdrawal of 
USF-I’s 40,000 troops and more than 30,000 contractors in the space of 2 months in late 
2011 was a marvel of logistical planning and execution, but in that intense drawdown 
period the U.S. Government failed to resolve significant problems that endangered OSC-
I’s ability to function. With USF-I’s departure, OSC-I would be operating in the country 
as part of the U.S. diplomatic mission, covered by the Vienna Convention and given dip-
lomatic immunities and privileges by the Iraqi Government. But as the end of December 
2011 approached, Caslen and U.S. Embassy officials had difficulty getting the Maliki gov-
ernment to issue visas for the U.S. military personnel who would be arriving in Baghdad 
or staying behind from USF-I to make up the OSC-I staff. They had even more trouble 
getting the Iraqis to issue visas for the several thousand contractors who were meant 
to provide the bulk of OSC-I’s transportation, logistical, and security support, but who 
lacked legal protections under the Vienna Convention. Within the Iraqi Government, 
Maliki required that his own office approve U.S. military and contractor visas, greatly 
slowing the process.8 Most of OSC-I’s contractors had entered Iraq on a U.S. Government 
identification card, not a passport or visa, and thus as the end of December approached, 
more than half of them had to leave while they could still do so. Caslen also discovered 
in December that the U.S. Government had not yet acquired land-use agreements from 
the Iraqi Government for the training sites that OSC-I was supposed to continue oper-
ating. With just 2 days left before the end of the year and many U.S. Government offices 
in Washington shut down for the holidays, a desperate Caslen finally managed to enlist 
the aid of Undersecretary of Defense Ashton Carter to strike a last-minute ministerial 
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agreement with Iraqi Minister of Defense Sadoun Dulaimi that would allow OSC-I to 
continue to operate.9
Carter’s timely intervention saved Caslen’s mission, though many of OSC-I’s missing 
contractors would still have to spend several months working through a friction-filled 
visa process before returning to work inside Iraq.10 However, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) aspect of the U.S. security assistance mission did not survive the 
transition from USF-I to OSC-I. U.S. officials had assumed that the NATO Training Mis-
sion-Iraq (NTM-I), which had been present in Iraq since the early days of the war and had 
come to play a central role in the Iraqi Army’s officer education system, would continue 
beyond 2011 under a new agreement with the Iraqi Government. However, in the final 
weeks of 2011, NATO’s continued participation became unlikely. NATO officials were 
reluctant to leave their training mission in place without the substantial U.S. military pro-
tection that disappeared when USF-I withdrew from the country. They were also unwill-
ing to leave NATO personnel in Iraq without guarantees of immunity from Iraqi law that 
the Maliki government seemed unwilling to give, and in any case, Iraqi officials were 
just as slow to extend visas to NATO officials as to U.S. officials and contractors. Though 
Caslen traveled to Brussels ahead of the end of year deadline to lobby NATO officials to 
stay in Iraq, he and other U.S. officials were unable to convince NATO leaders to continue 
the training mission. As a result, NTM-I ceased work as the year ended.11
Despite the loss of a residual force and the departure of the NATO contingent, Caslen 
still considered OSC-I an operational component of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
with a mission to preserve the security gains already achieved in Iraq.12 There were sev-
eral tasks Caslen considered essential to this goal. Having served as the commander 
of Multi-National Division-North (MND-N) at the end of the surge and seen firsthand 
the damage that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and other extremist organizations could do, he 
believed it was OSC-I’s responsibility to assist the ISF in ensuring that these groups did 
not regain a foothold in the country. He also had to manage intra-Iraqi tensions along 
the Green Line in 2008-2009 and believed OSC-I had a role to play in preventing conflict 
between Arabs and Kurds in the north. In central Iraq and the south, he believed OSC-
I’s security assistance effort should mitigate Iran’s malign influence so that Iraqis could 
chart their own future without external manipulation. In a related area, he hoped OSC-I 
could help the Iraqi Government build security cooperation relationships with other Arab 
states in the region to counterbalance Iran’s influence. Finally, he believed OSC-I had an 
important role to play in restraining Prime Minister Maliki’s authoritarian tendencies, 
especially since he judged that security threats to the Iraqi Government tended to bring 
out the worst in the Prime Minister.13
These would prove to be ambitious tasks for a military organization with no combat 
power and few personnel, and they were made more complicated by a newly assertive 
Iraqi bureaucracy. As December 2011 waned, Caslen and his small staff were consumed 
in dealing with Iraqi Government requirements and processes not faced by previous U.S. 
military organizations in Baghdad. Senior Iraqi officials later admitted that the Maliki 
government purposely made things difficult for U.S. counterparts as USF-I departed as 
a way of signaling that there would be a new way of conducting business.14 Without the 
authorities that had come with being a named operation such as Operation IRAQI FREE-
DOM (OIF) or Operation NEW DAWN, OSC-I’s every move was subject to Iraqi law and 
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oversight by the Iraqi Government bureaucracy. In one example, USF-I left behind 1,200 
vehicles in Iraq for OSC-I’s use, but because they had been brought into the country before 
2012, Iraqi officials declared that they could not be registered with the Iraqi Government, 
leaving anyone driving them subject to arrest. Any new vehicles OSC-I brought into the 
country could be registered, Iraqi officials ruled, but that process might take as long as 9 
months.15 In other instances, Iraqi officials often delayed the movement of U.S. Embassy 
supply convoys until the proper paperwork could be produced, at one point forcing the 
Embassy to issue Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to its personnel for a short period.16
There were also difficulties fitting OSC-I into the U.S. diplomatic mission. U.S. inter-
agency planners in Washington had envisioned that the U.S. security assistance mission 
in Iraq could continue with little disruption by simply transferring USF-I’s training, advi-
sory, and foreign military sales (FMS) functions—and the personnel and equipment to 
execute them—to the U.S. Embassy’s control. The budgets to fund those activities would 
be transferred from the Department of Defense (DoD) to the State Department. However, 
this plan went astray from the start. With a large-scale security assistance mission and 
OSC-I grafted onto it, the U.S. Embassy that Ambassador James Jeffrey oversaw at the 
beginning of 2012 was the largest in the world, with more than 16,000 diplomats and 
contractors, its own fleet of helicopters, mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehi-
cles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), three hospitals, and large quick reaction forces. 
Despite its size, the Embassy simply was not postured to continue the vast array of tasks 
that had fallen to USF-I as a warfighting organization. Jeffrey believed that U.S. officials 
in Washington never understood that his and Caslen’s organizations were not simply 
“USF-I Lite” and had little capacity to conduct the security, governance, and rule of law 
activities that the U.S. military had carried out before 2012, or to continue to broker Sun-
ni-Shi’a and Arab-Kurd outreach. Jeffrey remarked in early 2012, “I don’t have the people 
to follow up. It’s all gone.”17
What military assets did remain behind did not necessarily mesh well with the 
Embassy. The expanded U.S. Embassy structure came with huge financial and adminis-
trative costs that forced Jeffrey and other senior diplomats to spend a great deal of their 
time trying to get the hybrid organization to operate effectively. USF-I and DoD planners 
had worked hard to bequeath the Embassy a range of military capabilities that the Amer-
ican diplomatic staff in Baghdad was unused to managing, and considered unnecessary 
for a diplomatic mission in any case. For example, the Embassy never used the MRAPs 
USF-I had left it and quickly abandoned the UAVs and helicopters as well.18
The presence of an unusually large military contingent inside the Embassy also cre-
ated friction. OSC-I worked under the umbrella of the U.S. Mission in Iraq (USM-I), but 
was not like any other security cooperation office in the world. Unlike the other division 
heads working in the Embassy, Caslen had been nominated for his position by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate, which made him and OSC-I an awkward fit within the 
Embassy’s hierarchy.19 Asked by Army researchers to describe the relationship between 
the Embassy’s other divisions and OSC-I after USF-I’s departure, one embassy official 
observed that the two sides “are going in the same direction, but we are still in different 
boats.”20 In a few instances, embassy officials bristled at some of OSC-I’s military trap-
pings. Many OSC-I service members continued to wear their uniforms, a practice that 
the Embassy’s regional security office (RSO) viewed as problematic for force protection. 
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
575
In the RSO’s view, the sight of uniformed Americans could lead Iraqis to think the U.S. 
military occupation had resumed and to respond violently.21 When Caslen created a J-2 
intelligence cell within his staff, senior embassy security officers opposed the move, argu-
ing that OSC-I had no need of an independent intelligence capability. Caslen and his J-2 
saw it differently, arguing that the increased level of militant attacks in Baghdad in 2012 
created a risk that OSC-I needed to monitor. With U.S. military officials embedded in 
key Iraqi Government offices, OSC-I was in a better position to gather information about 
what Iraqi leaders were thinking and planning than were many other U.S. agencies.22
OSC-I’s greatest bureaucratic difficulties lay in its authorities and funding. As an 
organization that was neither a military command nor a mere security cooperation cell 
within a standard embassy, OSC-I was caught between the models under which DoD 
and State Department organizations normally operated and received funding. Like other 
military organizations inside U.S. Embassies that oversaw security assistance, OSC-I was 
responsible for managing foreign military sales and foreign military financing to the Iraqi 
Government under Title XXII of the U.S. legal code—the section of U.S. law that gov-
erned State Department activities. The U.S. Foreign Assistance Act limited Title XXII mil-
itary security cooperation cells to no more than six people—very different from OSC-I’s 
157. At the same time, U.S. officials in Washington appeared to expect OSC-I to continue 
some of USF-I’s military activities, but without being a U.S. military command that had 
authorities under Title X of the U.S. code—the section of U.S. law that governed DoD. 
This awkward arrangement made it difficult for OSC-I to work with the DoD agencies 
that had previously worked with USF-I. Despite the fact that both Caslen and CENTCOM 
commander General James Mattis considered Caslen to be one of Mattis’s subordinate 
commanders and behaved accordingly, the two men’s respective organizations did not 
follow suit. Since OSC-I was not a Title X DoD organization, the CENTCOM bureaucracy 
was not technically OSC-I’s higher headquarters and was not bound to use its Title X 
operational funds to support the military organization in Baghdad.
In case after case, CENTCOM and the DoD bureaucracy behaved as though the State 
Department were responsible for reimbursing CENTCOM for any military costs to sup-
port OSC-I, and the State Department reciprocated. One example dealt with the C-130 
ring route that the U.S. Air Forces Central Command (AFCENT) flew in support of OSC-I 
personnel in Baghdad, Taji, and Tikrit. For years, AFCENT had funded the flights out of 
its Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation NEW DAWN contingency budgets, but 
with the end of those named operations, the source for continued funding was unclear. 
Since OSC-I was technically a division of the U.S. Embassy, CENTCOM sought to shift the 
cost for the flights to the State Department, but for their part, State Department officials 
considered the flights Title X activities being carried out by uniformed military person-
nel. Since the ring route flights were a vital lifeline that OSC-I could not operate without, 
the planes continued to fly amid the bureaucratic dispute, leaving Caslen and his staff 
caught in the middle trying to figure out who would fund the operations. The result was 
one DoD organization billing another DoD organization for the cost of supporting its own 
mission.23 An even thornier problem arose when ARCENT ruled that without a named 
military operation, it would not provide OSC-I with postal or finance service or even 
to deploy an Army veterinarian into Iraq to conduct the required inspections for MREs 
stored for emergencies. As far as U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) leaders were concerned, 
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the Iraqi Theater of Operations had closed and was no longer their responsibility.24 With 
ARCENT declining to support military activities inside Iraq, the U.S. Embassy passed 
their bills—such as the costs required to fly their fleet of military helicopters—directly to 
Caslen’s OSC-I, which had no way of paying for them.25
Working out these and many other such bureaucratic problems dominated OSC-I’s 
first several months of operation after USF-I’s departure. Caslen and other U.S. military 
officials in Baghdad found themselves expending the bulk of their energy in simply fig-
uring out how to secure the authorities and resources necessary to remain in Iraq, rather 
than in keeping up the momentum of USF-I’s relationships with and assistance to the ISF. 
Within weeks after USF-I’s departure, it was becoming painfully clear that OSC-I would 
not be able to perform all of the essential elements of the security assistance mission by 
itself without the personnel management, logistics, and signal support that would have 
come with a residual force.26
THE UNRAVELING OF IRAQI POLITICS
The wave of arrests in the Iraqi provinces carried out by Prime Minister Maliki’s offi-
cials from October onward and the crackdown on Sunni political leaders in the Green 
Zone had a significant political effect in 2012. After the broad Sunni rejection of the 
U.S.-sponsored political process in 2004-2006, the Awakening and the surge campaign 
had helped turn the vast majority of Iraqi Sunnis back to participation in the political pro-
cess. The elections of 2009 and 2010 had signified that Sunnis generally perceived their 
interests could be better secured through politics than through violence, and through 
mainstream Sunni political parties rather than through militant groups. The events of 
late 2011 and early 2012 showed that the Sunni community’s mainstream political center, 
represented by the Awakening and the Iraqiyah coalition, was weakening. As had been 
the case since 2009, local Awakening leaders in central Iraq were under constant pressure 
from ISI and other militant groups and faced harassment and pressure from Maliki’s 
government. Attacks against members of the Sons of Iraq were common, as were assas-
sinations of Awakening leaders. In one high-profile instance in January 2012, Mullah 
Nathem Jabouri, the Sunni cleric from Dhuluiyah who had been a founding member of 
the Mujahedin Shura Council but had later become a vocal anti-AQI Awakening leader, 
was shot to death in west Baghdad by suspected ISI assassins shortly after criticizing the 
group in a television interview. Jabouri had arrived in Baghdad only a short time before 
to assist Maliki’s office with outreach to Sunni groups who were willing to oppose ISI, 
but his killing sent a clear message that the government could not protect people like him 
from Sunni extremist groups.27
Vice President Hashimi’s case had a similar impact on mainstream Sunni politics. 
Hashimi was an abrasive politician whom many U.S. officials did not particularly care 
for, but he had received almost a quarter of a million votes in the 2010 election and thus 
represented a large Sunni constituency, especially in Baghdad’s Adhamiyah district. If 
mainstream Sunni politicians like him or Saleh Mutlaq were to be purged, then hundreds 
of thousands of Sunnis might drift toward more radical political options. As if on cue, just 
weeks after the purging of Hashimi, Saddam’s former Ba’athist deputy Izzat ad-Douri 
broke almost 9 years of silence by releasing a videotaped speech on April 7, 2012, in 
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which he called for Iraqis to unite with “the heroic Iraqi resistance” against “the Persian 
Safavid enemy,” claiming they had come to dominate the Iraqi Government in Bagh-
dad.28 The appearance of Douri, who in addition to leading a wing of the Ba’ath Party in 
exile was also the de facto leader of the Naqshbandi Army, indicated that the Ba’athist 
leader recognized there might be an opportunity to reoccupy some of the political space 
that Iraqiyah and the Awakening had dominated since 2006.
A final element in the weakening of the Sunni political center came as Maliki took a 
page from Saddam’s political playbook. Before 2003, Saddam had often kept Iraq’s Kurd-
ish and Shi’a communities under control by selecting politicians from those communities 
who were willing to work with his regime and then letting the largesse of the Ba’athist 
state flow through them to the Shi’a- and Kurdish-majority provinces. The politicians 
who volunteered to assist the Ba’athist dictator had no natural political following, but 
became powerful in their home communities because they were a gateway to the state’s 
resources. In 2012, Maliki adopted a similar approach toward Iraq’s Sunnis. Rejecting 
cooperation with the Iraqiyah politicians whom Iraqi Sunnis had elected to represent 
them, Maliki instead looked for Sunni political partners who had no grassroots following 
but could be counted upon to act as channels for state resources to the Sunni community 
that might buy some popular allegiance to Maliki’s rule. One such partner that Maliki 
chose was the former insurgent financier Mishaan Jabouri, the former ally of Uday Hus-
sein who had tried to take power in Mosul in 2003 and had had to flee the country to 
evade arrest on corruption charges in 2005. Once outside Iraq, he had become a militant 
ally of the Syrian regime and Muammar Gaddhafi and had also run a satellite TV station 
dedicated to broadcasting terrorist propaganda videos, including of attacks against U.S. 
troops. He had been charged in absentia with promoting terrorism, but in March 2012, 
Maliki and his allies invited Mishaan to return to Baghdad, cleared him of the terrorism 
charges, and encouraged him to form a political bloc to compete against Iraqiyah in Iraq’s 
northern provinces.29
The Reemergence of Ahl al-Haqq (AAH)
Maliki was taking a similar divide-and-rule approach to Shi’a politics, where he was 
attempting to sponsor a competitor to Moqtada Sadr’s political bloc in Baghdad and the 
south. Since late 2006, when Maliki and his allies had decided that Moqtada Sadr was too 
great a political threat to the Da’wa Party, the Prime Minister had been seeking a political 
pact with Qais al-Khazali’s militant group Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (AAH). Maliki had long 
believed that Khazali, as a former disciple of Moqtada Sadr’s father, could potentially 
draw grassroots support away from Sadr and shore up Maliki’s political coalition. In the 
last week of December 2011, Maliki brought 5 years of negotiations with Khazali and 
AAH to fruition, reaching an agreement under which all criminal charges against AAH 
would be dropped and the group would be allowed to operate in the open as a political 
party. By December 26, Khazali was back in Najaf after more than a year of exile in Iran. 
On January 1, with Maliki’s permission, Khazali held a large “victory” rally in west Bagh-
dad’s Tahrir Square to celebrate the departure of U.S. troops.30 As the Prime Minister and 
his Da’wa allies had hoped, the rift between AAH and the Sadrists was immediate―and 
violent. Within hours of the AAH victory rally, Khazali’s men were fighting gun battles 
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against Sadr’s followers in Sadr City and other parts of Baghdad, prompting Moqtada 
Sadr to accuse Khazali and AAH of being power-hungry “killers without a religion.”31
Maliki’s validation of AAH’s activities offered the group a way to advance its long-
term objective of developing an influential political-religious network in major Iraqi cities 
while maintaining a militant wing in a manner modeled upon Lebanese Hizballah. AAH 
was rebranding itself as a nationalist Islamic resistance organization that participated in 
local politics, but it also would continue to operate a large militia and take an active part 
in the regional “Axis of Resistance” led by the Iranian regime.32 By the end of January, 
AAH had opened political offices in Baghdad and Basra and was laying the groundwork 
to begin political activities as affiliates of Maliki’s State of Law coalition. They had also 
opened a think tank in Beirut affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah. As 2012 progressed, the 
group would open political offices in Hillah, Najaf, Khalis, and Tal Afar as well, expand-
ing the presence of their militia along with their new political deployment.33
Meanwhile, as the turf war heated up between AAH and the Sadrists, a reign of terror 
descended upon neighborhoods where Shi’a resistance groups had a significant presence. 
In several cities, Shi’a militants regularly attacked Iraqis whose behavior they considered 
sinful, killing dozens of owners of liquor stores and other establishments the militiamen 
deemed to be un-Islamic. In the first few weeks of 2012, Shi’a militants who were most 
likely AAH or Promised Day Brigade members also murdered or abducted hundreds 
of Iraqi youths who participated in the Western-style “Emo” trend of clothing and hair-
styles, a lifestyle the Shi’a militiamen believed involved homosexuality. The militiamen 
usually carried out the killings by stoning their victims to death. The wave of murders 
began after the Ministry of Interior itself pledged to stamp out what it considered the 
“Satanic” Emo subculture, showing that the ministry was on the side of the murderers 
rather than the victims.34 The Maliki government apparently had normalized AAH as a 
political organization without requiring that the group stop its extremist activities.
In late February, as part of a prisoner exchange with the Maliki government, the newly 
normalized AAH handed over to Iraqi officials a wooden casket containing the remains 
of U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Ahmed al-Taie. The Iraqi-born Taie, the last American Soldier 
missing in Iraq, had been abducted by Shi’a militiamen as he made an ill-advised visit 
to family members in south Baghdad on October 23, 2006, and had quickly wound up 
in AAH’s hands. AAH had sent Taie’s family ransom demands and proof of life videos 
in 2006 and 2007, but he died in the militia’s custody at some point after that, probably 
while in captivity in Iran. Under the exchange agreement with the Maliki government, 
AAH faced no criminal prosecution or legal measures for the American sergeant’s kid-
napping and murder.35
The Quest for a No-Confidence Vote
Meanwhile, in the weeks after the purging of Vice President Tariq Hashimi, Prime 
Minister Maliki continued his effort to consolidate power in Baghdad. For months, Maliki 
had gradually asserted control over the Iraqi Government’s independent institutions that 
had been created in the 2005 constitution as a check on just such a consolidation of power. 
By early 2012, the Iraqi judiciary, government auditors, and inspectors general were 
largely under the Prime Minister’s control. In mid-April 2012, Maliki arrested the head of 
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Iraq’s election commission, the official whom Maliki had accused of conspiring with the 
United States and United Nations (UN) to deny the Prime Minister his fraudulent victory 
in the Parliamentary elections of 2010. When the election chief was released after a few 
days in jail, the man fled to Kurdistan, leaving Iraq’s electoral body in disarray.36
Other Iraqi leaders watched these developments with growing concern. On April 28, 
just days after the purge of the election commission chief, KRG President Massoud Bar-
zani, Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujayfi, Ayad Allawi, 
and Moqtada Sadr met in Erbil and produced a written demand that Maliki accept a two-
term limit as Prime Minister and reverse his consolidation of control over agencies of the 
government.37 Maliki responded by declaring in a televised interview that he had become 
the target of a foreign-inspired coup attempt.38
Maliki’s opponents reached their breaking point by the summer of 2012. In June, Iraqi-
yya, the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), and Barzani joined forces to 
present to President Talabani a list of 173 Parliamentarians who had pledged to support a 
no-confidence vote that would end Maliki’s premier-
ship. Unfortunately for the Parliamentary factions, 
the list immediately found its way from Talabani to 
Maliki, who began pressuring individual Members 
of Parliament into recanting and quickly killed the 
initiative. The Iranian regime helped Maliki in this 
fracturing of the opposition bloc by making it clear 
to senior Iraqi politicians that the Iranians did not 
intend to allow Maliki to be unseated.39 By mid-2012, 
the Iraqi Prime Minister’s support for the embattled 
Bashar al-Assad in Syria had made Maliki indis-
pensable in Iranian leaders’ eyes, and the Iranian 
regime used its political advantage to help break 
up the opposition coalition. In the days following 
the opposition leaders’ joint call for a no-confidence 
measure, Iranian regime officials succeeded in pres-
suring both Moqtada Sadr and Jalal Talabani to 
abandon their support for an immediate vote, and 
the danger to Maliki dissipated for the time being.40
THE SPILLOVER OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR
Iraq’s domestic political dysfunction in 2012 was 
related to the deepening Syrian civil war. The Iraqi factions that had faced each other in 
a civil war of their own from 2005 to 2008 now found themselves on opposite sides of 
the brutal conflict.42 By the end of 2011, the Maliki government was in effect interven-
ing in the Syrian war on the side of Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite regime. Although 
Maliki and other Iraqi Shi’a leaders had long considered Assad an enemy because of 
the Syrian dictator’s support for AQI and other terrorist groups in Iraq and although 
Maliki had actually demanded a UN tribunal against Assad in late 2009, by mid-2011 
Iraqi Government policy had reversed itself. As popular uprisings spread and regional 
pressure mounted on the Syrian regime, the Maliki government came to its defense, 
Source: UN photo by Eskinder Debebe.
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extending political, economic, and security support to 
its one-time enemy. The change in the Iraqi Govern-
ment’s stance was partly induced by Iran, but Iraqi 
Shi’a leaders also feared that the fall of Assad’s Shi’a 
Alawite regime would lead to a Sunni Islamist regime 
in Damascus that would sponsor a renewed jihad 
against the Iraqi state.43
It was not an unfounded fear. Most of the Sunni 
opposition to Assad in 2011 and 2012 came from 
anti-regime activists and from the newly forming Free 
Syrian Army, but from the early stages of the Syrian 
war, ISI played a significant role as well, as did its 
network of Salafi allies inside Syria. Since 2003, AQI 
and other Salafi militant groups in Iraq had used Syria 
as their strategic depth, supported by a vast network 
of Syrian-based Salafi mosques, clerics, and militants 
that enabled AQI and others to conduct insurgent 
and terrorist operations inside Iraq. In 2011-2012, this 
arrangement began to reverse itself, as Iraqi militant 
networks became a logistical base that enabled mili-
tants to carry out operations inside Syria.
Al-Qaeda’s senior leadership also recognized the potential of expanding their global 
jihad into Syria. Assad’s regime had been weakened by months of internal strife, and 
the terrorist group already had a network of agents and support cells in place from the 
years of sanctuary that Assad had provided. As such, in August 2011, al-Qaeda’s senior 
leadership and ISI agreed to send a cadre of experienced Syrian and Iraqi jihadists back 
into Syria with the objective of creating an Islamic state there that would become part of 
a larger regional caliphate. The new group, named Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl al Sham (The 
Support Front for the People of the Levant) quickly became one of the most effective 
insurgent groups fighting against Assad’s government due to its discipline and military 
training.45
Support for the Syrian insurgency went far beyond militant networks, however. Iraqi 
Sunnis tended to sympathize with Syrian Sunnis, whom they viewed as fighting a Shi’a 
minority government backed by the Iranian regime—a situation many Sunnis believed 
analogous to their own position inside Iraq.46 After 8 years in which Iraq’s Shi’a Islamist 
parties had been in the ascendency, Iraqi Sunnis began to envision the establishment of a 
Sunni state in Syria to reverse their own fortunes. If Syria were to become a Sunni power, 
Iraqi Sunnis reasoned, then Iraq’s Sunnis might use the support of Syrian Sunnis to regain 
control of Baghdad or at least to renegotiate a greater share of power.47 As a result, from 
an early stage in the Syrian conflict, Iraq’s Sunni tribes provided material support for the 
Syrian opposition, particularly in eastern Syria, where large tribes such as the Shammar, 
Obeid, and Dulaim spanned the porous Iraq-Syria border. The tribes offered the same 
safe haven to Syrian insurgents that had once been offered to Iraqi insurgents, reversing 
the flow of weapons and militants that had in earlier years gone from Syria into Iraq.
Source: Photo courtesy of Kremlin.ru.
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In addition to the Iraqi Sunni tribes, ISI saw the Syrian civil war as a godsend, pro-
viding the organization with a much-need territorial refuge inside Syria where it could 
regroup, recruit new fighters, and then eventually resume operations in Iraq. Throughout 
2012, Syrian border towns such as Deir ez-Zor and Albu Kamal were flooded with Iraqi 
fighters, many belonging to ISI. For ISI and its allies, the conflicts in Iraq and Syria had 
merged into a single theater of jihad, with militant operations aimed both west toward 
Damascus and Aleppo, and east toward the Tigris River Valley and Baghdad.
Just as Iraq’s Sunni jihadis were becoming heavily involved in Syria, Iraq’s Shi’a mili-
tant groups were likewise deciding that they had a role to play in supporting their fellow 
Shi’a confessionals in the Syrian civil war. By mid-2012, Iraqi Shi’a militants were flowing 
into Syria from groups such as AAH, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Corps. The Iraqi 
Shi’a fighters’ deployment into Syria was part of the Iranian regime’s effort to reinforce 
Assad’s Alawite forces that could not match the rebel manpower in a country where 
Sunnis outnumbered Alawites by 15 to 2. As the Assad regime faced escalating military 
pressure from the rebels in 2012, Iran channeled Iraqi Shi’a fighters to Damascus and other 
Syrian cities, often routing them via Iran to be trained and equipped before joining Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guard Corps or Lebanese Hizballah. This flow of Shi’a militants increased 
once AAH leader Qais al-Khazali and KH leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis returned to 
Baghdad following the withdrawal of U.S. troops in late 2011.48 At first, the Shi’a mili-
tant groups kept their role in the Syrian fighting quiet, but signs of AAH’s involvement 
became unmistakable when funerals of AAH members killed in Syria began to take place 
with rising frequency.49
By fall 2012, the Shi’a militant groups’ involvement was overt and escalating. Several 
Iraqi Shi’a militant groups and Lebanese Hizballah teamed up to contribute fighters to 
the newly formed Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, an Iranian-sponsored militant conglom-
erate that operated as an auxiliary force for Assad.50 Throughout 2012, these Iraqi Shi’a 
militias circulated internet videos of themselves fighting in the streets of Damascus to 
defend the Shi’a shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab, the daughter of Imam Ali. Located southeast 
of Damascus, the Zeinab shrine was not just a symbolic location, but was also key terrain 
that the Assad regime needed to keep the Damascus Airport open.51 Back in Iraq, the Shi’a 
militant groups used the defense of the Zeinab Shrine as a recruiting tool and a pretext for 
providing auxiliaries to the Assad regime. The majority of the Iraqi Shi’a fighters in Syria 
traveled through the Baghdad International Airport, where they enjoyed tacit Iraqi Gov-
ernment support as they moved openly—and armed—through the facility. Iraqi officials 
also did little to stop Iranian overflights through Iraqi airspace to deliver military aid to 
Assad, despite entreaties by the Obama administration and other Western powers.52
The Syrian war had a profound effect on Iraqi Kurdistan as well. By late 2012, Syrian 
Kurdish militias were taking control of the Kurdish-majority areas of northern Syria 
where the regime’s power had receded. There they began setting up a new autonomous 
region they called West Kurdistan, or Rojava, that bordered on some Kurdish-held ter-
ritories of Iraq. In the autonomous zone, a Syrian branch of the PKK that called itself the 
Democratic Union Party (PYD) was dominant, and it fielded a militia called the People’s 
Protection Units (YPG) to hold its newly gained territory. As an offshoot of the PKK that 
had posed a serious danger to Turkey, the PYD was a rival of the Turkish-allied KDP of 
Massoud Barzani and was also affiliated with Kurdish separatists who would likely view 
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a new autonomous Syrian Kurdistan as a base from which to launch a renewed insur-
gency inside Turkey. The PYD would soon become a new force with significant implica-
tions for the stability of the KRG.
RETURN OF THE SUNNI INSURGENCY
The Issawi Crackdown and Sunni Protest Movement
Almost exactly a year after authorizing the December 2011 ISF raid against Iraq’s most 
senior Sunni politician, Vice President Tariq Hashimi, Prime Minister Maliki repeated the 
act, this time against the most senior Sunni minister in his own cabinet, Finance Minis-
ter Rafe al-Issawi. Well-regarded by the international community and fellow Iraqis as a 
non-sectarian, pragmatic technocrat, Issawi had been a tangential target in the Hashimi 
raids. Both he and Deputy Prime Minister Saleh Mutlaq 
had seemed to escape the purge by making peace with 
Maliki in early 2012 despite their vehement criticism of 
the Prime Minister before that. By late 2012, relations 
between Maliki and Issawi had soured, and the Finance 
Minister had become Maliki’s biggest political target. On 
December 19 and 20, Iraqi special operations forces sur-
rounded Issawi’s home and offices in the Green Zone as 
Iraqi Government spokesmen announced the Finance 
Minister was being sought on the charge of supporting 
terrorism through his alleged connections to the Sunni 
militant group Hamas al-Iraq. Issawi took refuge in the 
home of Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, where 
he reported in a news conference that 150 of his guards, 
staff, and family members had been arrested.53
The accusation that Issawi was a material supporter 
of Hamas al-Iraq was a familiar one to U.S. officials, 
since Maliki had previously leveled it in 2010. At that 
time, then-USF-I commander Odierno had given the 
Prime Minister a report from USF-I analysts concluding 
that the charge was false, and Odierno’s opposition to 
the charge had helped Issawi survive a potential purge. 
In December 2012, however, it seemed clear that Maliki intended to use the allegation to 
sideline yet another senior Sunni leader. U.S. officials had regarded Issawi as a moderate 
Sunni with whom Maliki could cooperate in 2011, but the push for his removal from the 
government in 2012 indicated that deeper purges would come.
One reason for Maliki’s lack of restraint against top Sunni leaders was that Iraqi Pres-
ident Jalal Talabani, who had often played a mediating role between Iraq’s Sunni and 
Shi’a parties and had helped defuse tensions between Maliki and Iraqiyah the year before, 
had suffered a debilitating stroke and had become incapacitated. With Vice President 
Hashimi already purged but no new Sunni Vice President nominated in his place, Tal-
abani’s absence meant that the Iraqi presidency council was not present to help restrain 
Source: U.S. Navy photo by Petty 
Officer 1st Class Mario A. Quiroga 
(Released).
Iraqi Sunni Leader Rafe  
al-Issawi.54
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Maliki’s targeting of his political opponents. For his part, Issawi described the attack 
against him as a larger “pre-election blow” intended to weaken Iraqiyah prior to the 
spring 2013 provincial elections.55 Within days of the raids, Issawi fled Baghdad to the 
relative safety of Ramadi, becoming a fugitive from his own government as Hashimi had 
been.
The Sunni community’s reaction to the purging of Issawi was not as calm as its reac-
tion to Hashimi’s arrest a year before. Unlike Hashimi, Issawi was a senior leader of a 
major Iraqi tribe, the Albu Issa of eastern Anbar, and he was also a popular civic leader 
who had worked as a surgeon in the Fallujah hospital in 2004. His arrest sparked immedi-
ate outrage among both his tribe and the Sunni communities of Anbar and the north. Able 
to take refuge in his tribe’s territory rather than flee the country, Issawi defied the Maliki 
government’s arrest warrant and spoke publicly throughout Anbar condemning Maliki’s 
treatment of Iraqi Sunnis and labeling the Prime Minister a dictator. The public demon-
strations of support for Issawi quickly grew into anti-government protests throughout 
Iraq’s Sunni territories, where youth unemployment reached 40 percent and accusa-
tions of unlawful detention of Sunnis by the Maliki government had provoked anger for 
months.56 Within days of the arrests in the Green Zone, the country had a full-fledged 
Sunni protest movement on its hands, with crowds numbering in the tens of thousands in 
Sunni cities such as Mosul, Fallujah, Ramadi, Tikrit, and Hawijah, and even in Baghdad’s 
Sunni-majority district of Adhamiyah. The protests were supported by powerful Sunni 
leaders inside and outside of Iraq, such as Khamis al Khanjar, a wealthy Sunni business-
man with Ba’athist ties living in Jordan, who helped fund supportive media broadcasts 
and the construction of camps for Anbari protestors.57 By mid-January, virtually every 
significant Sunni city had a large protest camp at its center, with near-continuous politi-
cal rallies and televised speeches by Sunni leaders airing their angry grievances against 
the Maliki government, including many Sunnis who had been leaders of the Awakening 
and Sons of Iraq.
In response, Maliki deployed Iraqi security forces to surround the Sunni protest camps 
nearest to Baghdad, especially Fallujah and Ramadi. In those cities and a few others, the 
government’s mostly Shi’a police and soldiers established a perimeter of checkpoints 
and outposts and kept a tense watch on the protest camps. Young Sunni protesters recip-
rocated, keeping watch on the government troops just dozens of yards away. With the 
armed soldiers and angry protestors in such close proximity, it was merely a matter of 
time before the situation became explosive. Maliki dispatched Sunni deputy Prime Min-
ister Saleh Mutlaq to Anbar in hopes of calming the protesters, but the move backfired 
when thousands of Fallujah protesters attacked Mutlaq with stones. The Deputy Prime 
Minister and his entourage barely escaped with their lives.58 Embarrassingly for Mutlaq, 
who had moved from being Maliki’s chief Sunni opponent to his chief Sunni ally in the 
space of a year, the assault was caught on video and televised throughout Iraq.
The situation soon deteriorated further. On January 25, demonstrators headed to a 
rally in Fallujah clashed with Iraqi soldiers at a checkpoint. When the protesters pelted 
the soldiers with rocks, the troops fired into the crowd, killing 9 demonstrators and 
wounding about 60 more. Hours later, Sunni gunmen retaliated by attacking an army 
checkpoint in northern Fallujah and killing two soldiers. These incidents signaled that 
Anbar was slipping into open rebellion, with tribal leaders who had once partnered with 
584
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
U.S. troops joining in the militant opposition to the Maliki government. Speaking on 
behalf of other tribal leaders, Awakening council chairman Sheikh Ahmed Abu Risha 
gave the government 1 week to deliver the soldiers responsible for the protesters’ deaths, 
after which, he warned, “if the government has not heeded our demand, we will launch 
jihad against army units and posts in Anbar.”59
The weeks following the Fallujah violence brought an escalation of violence across 
Iraq, including a return of the kind of bombings that had once been common in Shi’a 
neighborhoods in Baghdad. On January 27, for example, a bomb near a Shi’a funeral 
procession in Baghdad’s Zafraniyah neighborhood killed 31 people, including 8 police 
officers.60 Some of the violence took on overtones of the Syrian war. The large demonstra-
tions in Sunni cities often included flags and banners of the Free Syrian Army, indicating 
that the Syrian civil war was continuing to spill over into internal Iraqi matters, with Iraqi 
Sunnis on the rebel side of the Syrian conflict and the Maliki government on the Assad 
regime’s side. Eventually these dynamics came to a head in Iraq’s western desert. When a 
force of dozens of Syrian soldiers came under rebel attack at a border crossing point near 
Ninewa Province, the Syrian troops fled into Iraq, where government forces gave them 
shelter. The Iraqi troops then attempted to transport the Syrians to a safer part of Syria by 
busing them through Anbar Province, but on March 4, 2013, in western Anbar, the entire 
Iraqi-Syrian force of about 50 troops was ambushed and massacred by Sunni gunmen. 
A week later, ISI claimed responsibility for the killings in a statement that declared—not 
inaccurately—that the incident was proof of collusion between the Maliki government 
and Bashar al-Assad.61
With the situation in Anbar and Ninewa provinces growing worse by the week, Maliki 
decided in March that the provincial elections scheduled for the following month would 
not be held in those two provinces.62 Meanwhile, as sporadic clashes between Sunni pro-
testers and the Iraqi security forces continued, observers noted in March that the black 
flags of the ISI had appeared for the first time at rallies in Ramadi, an omen of what was 
to come.63
The Hawijah Massacre
The confrontation between Maliki’s government and the Sunni protest movement 
exploded into large-scale violence in April, just days after the country held its provincial 
elections. The flashpoint came in Hawijah, the restive Sunni town near Kirkuk that had 
long been a stronghold for Ba’athist insurgents loyal to Izzat ad-Douri and the Naqsh-
bandi Army, and by April 2013 home to a large protest camp. The provincial elections on 
April 20 took place largely without incident across the country, but on the following day, 
gunmen attacked an ISF checkpoint in Hawijah and killed an Iraqi soldier. Suspecting 
that the killers had blended in with the protesters, ISF commanders issued a deadline for 
the protesters to turn over the perpetrators. It passed without result.64 In response, during 
the early hours of April 23, 2013, Iraqi troops under the direction of Iraqi Ground Forces 
commander General Ali Ghaidan moved in to break up the camp and arrest suspects. The 
facts of what followed are in dispute, but what is clear is that gunfire quickly broke out 
between the two sides and left scores of casualties. According to an investigation by the 
Iraqi Parliament, when the shooting finally stopped, more than 40 civilians and 3 Iraqi 
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soldiers were dead, and more than 100 civilians were wounded.65 Other sources claimed 
more than 100 civilians had been killed; though the Ministry of Defense claimed only 3 
soldiers and 23 “militants who were using the demonstration as a safe haven” had died.66
The massacre in Hawijjah touched off the most intense fighting Iraq had seen since 
2008, most of it in sensitive areas along the Green Line. Hours after the Hawijah incident, 
Sunni militants who were likely affiliated with the Naqshbandi Army (JRTN) overran 
government troops in towns south of Kirkuk and cut the main Kirkuk-Baghdad high-
way, leading to several days of battles with government troops before the insurgents 
withdrew. On April 25, the clashes spread to Mosul, where large-scale gunfights left as 
many as 40 people dead. The violence expanded the following day to Baghdad, where 
several Sunni mosques were bombed. On April 27, Sunni gunmen in Fallujah pulled five 
plainclothes government security men out of a car and executed them, perhaps in an 
attempt to prevent the ISF men from reconnoitering for a Hawijah-like assault on the Fal-
lujah protest camp. The Maliki government suspected that Ahmed Abu Risha’s nephew 
was among those who executed the five government men, indicating the extent to which 
members of the Awakening in Anbar might have turned against the government. Four 
bombings in Shi’a towns south of Baghdad at the end of the weekend brought the death 
toll for April to more than 700, making it the deadliest month for Iraqis since 2008.67
The fighting led to a further breakdown in political dialogue and an intense escalation 
in sectarian tensions. When the violence reached the mixed-sect towns near Kirkuk, KRG 
President Massoud Barzani deployed peshmerga to the city to occupy positions beyond 
the normal Green Line. Parliament Speaker Osama Nujaifi blamed Maliki for the violence 
and called for the Prime Minister to resign and a new government to be formed.
Meanwhile, in a nationally televised speech amid the fighting, Maliki had warned that 
continued “sedition” against his government would lead to full-scale civil war. “What 
happened in Hawija . . . and other places, is a point in which we should stop and think 
because it might lead to sectarian strife,” the Prime Minister said. “Everyone would lose. 
Whether he is in the north, the south, east or west of Iraq, if the fire of sectarianism starts, 
everyone’s fingers will be burned by it.”68 The Prime Minister’s prediction—or threat—
would come true within months.
THE ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
The “Breaking the Walls” Campaign
The events of late 2012 and early 2013 were a godsend for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and 
his ISI, which since July 2012 had been engaged in a campaign aimed at reigniting Iraq’s 
civil war and unifying the wars in Syria and Iraq. For the 9 months preceding the Hawijah 
massacre, Baghdadi and his organization had carried out attacks that both exacerbated 
and exploited Iraq’s worsening political conflict. On July 21, 2012, Baghdadi announced 
the Islamic State’s “Breaking the Walls” campaign, an initiative that took many pages from 
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 2004-2006 playbook for provoking a large-scale Sunni-Shi’a civil 
war. Central to the strategy was the reliance on car bombs: 24 separate waves of AQI’s 
signature weapon aimed at fomenting sectarian strife through spectacular attacks that 
would garner disproportionate media attention. The waves were spread out over four 
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phases and demonstrated ISI’s technical capabilities, tactical skills, and ability to conduct 
an operational level campaign that adapted as the situation changed.
The first phase of “Breaking the Walls” from July through October 2012 consisted of 
137 car bombs that hit cities ranging from Basrah to Mosul and varied widely in targets 
and density. Government, military, and civilian targets were hit in patterns that made 
it difficult to discern a broader objective, but ISI’s ability to mass up to 30 car bombs on 
a single day indicated that they had fully regenerated AQI’s car bombing capabilities. 
While ISI replicated one of AQI’s most effective tactic by incorporating car bombings in 
its Breaking the Walls campaign, it added new elements such as attacking the Iraqi state’s 
detention facilities in order to free hardened fighters and return them to battle. The first 
such attack in September 2012 only freed 100 prisoners, including 47 death row inmates, 
but the operations would quickly grow to be more frequent and effective, eventually hit-
ting a total of eight prisons.69
Phase II, covering the next 4 months, saw a total of 112 car bombs that hit the Shi’a 
enclave of Sadr City, as well as the Green Line separating the Kurdish provinces and the 
remainder of Iraq. The Green Line attacks in particular indicated operational level flexi-
bility and tried to exacerbate Kurdish/Shi’a tensions caused by Maliki’s executive order 
creating the Tigris Operational Command that would inject non-Kurdish Iraqi Army 
units into Kurdish provinces. Phase III, with 137 car bombs, principally targeted Baghdad 
from February to May, with large waves of 20 or more hitting the capital about every 30 
days. Analysts suspected that the surge and pause periods indicated ISI needed time to 
construct the complex weapons, and that the car bomb factories were again located in the 
Baghdad belts—the same location as AQI’s brutal 2005-2007 campaigns. Also mirroring 
AQI’s earlier campaigns, a majority of the bombers themselves appeared to foreign fight-
ers who flowed into Iraq through Syria and down the same infiltration routes tracing the 
Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. A majority of the attacks targeted Baghdad’s Shi’a commu-
nity and were portrayed by ISI as reactions to the Maliki government’s excesses against 
Sunni protesters in Fallujah, Hawijah, and other parts of Anbar Province.70
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s Split From Zawahiri and al-Qaeda
Amid its spring 2013 attacks on the Iraqi Shi’a and the Maliki government, ISI sud-
denly precipitated a rift within the wider Salafi jihad that had far-reaching consequences. 
On April 8, 2013, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi announced that ISI had merged with Jabhat 
al-Nusra and formed the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), attempting to highlight 
the unity of jihadist forces and that fighting in Syria and Iraq effectively erased the post-
World War I interstate border. Baghdadi’s announcement was imprudent and prema-
ture. The next day, Abu Mohammed al Jolani, the leader of Jabhat al-Nusra, rejected the 
claim, insisting that he had not been consulted prior to the media announcement. For a 
time, Zawahiri attempted to mediate between the two groups, publicly intervening and 
ordering each operational level commander to wage war only in their respective theaters: 
Iraq for Bagdadi and Syria for Jolani.71 In the aftermath of this series of announcements, 
which also included promises from Jolani that his group would remain loyal to al-Qaeda, 
Jabhat al Nusra fractured, with a number of its followers leaving to join Baghdadi and 
ISIS. Less than a month later, open fighting broke out between the two groups.
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Much of the break between ISI and Jabhat al-Nusra had been long brewing and 
echoed some of the same disputes that had existed between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the 
leader of AQI, and his senior leadership in Pakistan, namely Ayman al-Zawahiri. Jabhat 
al Nusrah and al-Qaeda’s senior leaders had become uncomfortable with the brutal tac-
tics of ISI and the implementation of Sharia law in areas where it lacked popular sup-
port first. The mass executions—particularly of Shi’a Muslims―beheadings, and horrific 
online videos designed to inspire fear and terror as a prelude to civil war were seen by 
al-Qaeda and Jabhat al Nusra as dangerous moves that could ultimately damage public 
support and turn the population against the group in a replay of the 2007-2008 Sahwah. 
Instead of such tactics, Jabhat al Nusrah followed policies that aimed, more or less, to 
win “hearts and minds” through economic assistance and social services while avoiding 
overt demonstrations of radicalism and extremism that would antagonize local commu-
nities.72 With neither group willing to compromise on what they believed was the most 
effective strategy, splintering and conflict were inevitable.
To some degree, the rift between ISIS and al-Qaeda’s senior leadership also repre-
sented an attempt by the Iraqi franchise of al-Qaeda to challenge the organization’s lead-
ers in Pakistan. In claiming to lead the jihad in both Iraq and Syria and to have authority 
over Jabhat al-Nusrah, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was actually asserting authority over the 
entire jihadist enterprise in the northern Arab world and mounting a direct challenge to 
Zawahiri’s leadership. The relationship between Baghdadi and Zawahiri would deteri-
orate as the civil war in Iraq deepened and eventually fracture in February 2014 when 
Zawahiri formally disavowed any relationship with ISIS as an al-Qaeda affiliate.73
The Abu Ghraib Prison Break
The final 3 months, or Phase IV, of Breaking the Walls, from May to July 2013, were 
the temporal and operational culmination of the campaign for the newly renamed ISIS. 
The attacks were timed to magnify the effects of the Hawijah massacre and Maliki’s brutal 
reaction to the Sunni protests. ISIS car bombs surged with nearly half of the attacks of the 
entire campaign occurring in the 3-month period after the Hawijah incident. Statistically 
the change was breathtaking: during all of 2010 and 2011, there were between 5 and 10 
car bombs per month, but for the last 3 months of Breaking the Walls, this number shot 
up to 80 to 90 attacks per month.74 These attacks would help make 2013 become Iraq’s 
most deadly year since 2007, with a total of 7,818 civilian fatalities.75
The last phase of Breaking the Walls also saw the culmination of ISIS’s attacks on Iraqi 
prisons. On July 21, 2013, exactly a year after Baghdadi had announced the campaign, 
ISIS breached Abu Ghraib, the most heavily defended prison within the Iraqi deten-
tion system, in a highly sophisticated attack that was synchronized with a simultaneous 
attempted prison break in Taji. While their suicide bombers hit key guard posts, ISIS 
struck the prison’s security force with sustained mortar fire from multiple directions. 
Those attacks were followed closely by suicide car bombs that breached the prison gates 
to make way for a ground assault force that went cell to cell freeing somewhere between 
500 and 1,000 prisoners, including ISIS “minister of war” Abdul Rahman al Bilawi and 
several other ISIS leaders who were awaiting execution on death row.76
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ISIS’s operations expanded the group’s ranks with hardened fighters freed from the 
Iraqi prisons and prompted a return of the Shi’a militias in the Baghdad region. By May 
2013, checkpoints manned by Shi’a militiamen sprouted across Baghdad as they had 
done in 2006. Likewise, incidents of unidentified assailants wearing Iraqi police uniforms 
seizing Sunnis out of their beds in the middle of the night crept back into news reports, 
as well as the accompanying occurrence of the mejhool, or unidentified bodies, discov-
ered dumped in empty lots or floating in the Tigris.77 The Iraqi Government’s reaction 
to the renewed car bombing campaign—a policy of mass arrests of military age Sunni 
males—only served to worsen the situation and exacerbate tensions.78 ISIS exploited the 
militia and government reactions in its media messaging, connecting them with the gov-
ernment’s abuses in Fallujah, Hawijah, and other locations and creating an impression 
that Sunnis faced genocide and extinction. As in the dark days of the Iraqi civil war, many 
Iraqi Sunnis again had to choose between a government they considered a sectarian and 
authoritarian enemy or a brutal religious extremist group that at least offered them pro-
tection in exchange for submission. Typical of the Sunnis caught in this dilemma was one 
leader who told a former U.S. official in Baghdad, “I was never sectarian before . . . I love 
my country. I’m a nationalist. But I’ve become sectarian now because there’s nowhere 
else for a moderate or secularist to be. We’re losers. I’ve become as sectarian as the people 
I used to hate.”79
THE DETERIORATION OF THE IRAQI SECURITY FORCES, 2012-2014
As ISIS and other Sunni militant groups grew stronger during 2013, the Iraqi secu-
rity forces were not up to the challenge. ISIS’s July 2013 Abu Ghraib attack was a tacti-
cal tour-de force that displayed exactly the kind of combined-arms capability that USF-I 
had struggled to build in the Iraqi Army, while the terrorist bombing offensives of 2013 
showed that the ISF was struggling to protect Iraq’s vulnerable cities and population 
from attacks by the resurrected Sunni insurgency. By virtually any measure, the ISF in 
2013 were less capable than they had been in 2010 and were growing weaker in both 
capability and confidence, mostly because the worrisome trends that Austin and Cone 
observed in 2010-2011 had accelerated. As they had foreseen, the Iraqi Army’s training 
program dissipated as U.S. troops left the country, so that many Iraq divisions stopped 
sending units to collective training and commanders often diverted their training bud-
gets to other purposes or to corrupt practices. As Austin had predicted, the Iraqi Army’s 
maintenance practices continued to deteriorate without U.S. assistance. Iraqi officers who 
bought into the U.S.-inspired model of training and skills development watched with 
dismay as the Ministry of Defense and major units abandoned it.
After USF-I’s departure, the politicization of officer appointments that had begun 
the previous year accelerated, with appointments typically issued through Prime Min-
ister Maliki’s Office of the Commander in Chief. Changes first occurred at the regional 
headquarters outside of the traditional chain of command which had been effective 
at coordinated operations because they commanded all security forces in their area of 
responsibility—police, army, border security, infrastructure security, and others. During 
2012, 4 of the 10 commanders in these headquarters were replaced, and 1 new Opera-
tional Command created, with Maliki appointing the new commander himself. The new 
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command enflamed Arab-Kurd tensions as its area of responsibility included disputed 
areas in Kirkuk and parts of Salahadin province. Disagreements over the move’s imple-
mentation boiled over into open Kurd-Arab conflict in December 2012 when peshmerga 
forces briefly exchanged fire with Iraqi Federal Police in Tuz Khurmato.80
Similar sectarian consolidation occurred at the division level, with Maliki replac-
ing 6 of 14 commanders in 2012, capping the replacements of 5 other commanders in 
2011. All together, these changes left a massive ethnic imbalance, with 11 divisions led 
by Shi’a officers, including the 1st Division in Sunni dominated Anbar and the 2d Divi-
sion in Eastern Ninewa/Mosul. Only two Sunni commanders and one Kurdish com-
mander remained, and one of the Sunni commanders was known as a long-term Maliki 
loyalist who had been implicated in sectarian violence against Sunnis. In making his 
appointments, Maliki had bypassed Iraq’s constitution, refusing to submit his nominees 
for Parliamentary approval as required.81 Many of the newly appointed officers had little 
military experience and few qualifications other than personal loyalty to the Prime Minis-
ter. Politicization also occurred in the junior officer ranks as candidates for entry into the 
Iraqi military academy tended to be connected to Iraq’s political factions.82 These were 
bad omens for future performance of the Iraqi Army as inexperienced officers replaced 
veteran commanders.
Within the Iraqi military’s general staff, decision-making authority increasingly 
resided in the senior generals most closely associated with Maliki: OCINC director Faruq 
al-Araji, MOD chief of operations Abud Qanbar, counterterrorism director Talib Kenani, 
and IGFC commander Ali Ghaidan. These four, all Shi’a, effectively ran the ministry and 
its ground forces, even though the ministry was nominally under the direction of Defense 
Minister Sadoun Dulaimi and Chief of Defense Staff General Babakir Zebari. In reality, 
neither Dulaimi nor Zebari had any real authority.83
Under the direction of the four Maliki-loyalist generals, the Ministry of Defense made 
some consequential changes after 2011. Perhaps the most significant was the creation of 
a new command in spring 2012 to oversee operations in the Jazeera-Badiyah region, the 
vast desert area of western Iraq that spanned the country’s long border with Syria. Con-
cerned that ISI and other Sunni militant groups were once again establishing a cross-bor-
der sanctuary from which to attack Iraqi (and Syrian) cities, Maliki’s OCINC directed the 
Ministry of Defense to establish the new command not by raising new combat units, but 
by reassigning each Iraqi division’s existing commando battalion—generally the most 
experienced and best trained soldiers—to the control of the new headquarters. It was a 
disastrous move whose negative effects soon rippled across the Iraqi Army. By mid-2012, 
many of the Iraqi divisions had already lost the heightened manpower levels that Pet-
raeus, Dubik, and Odierno had convinced the Iraqi Government to give them during the 
surge period. As a result, most of the Iraqi divisions and brigades of 2012 operated at an 
effective strength of about 70 percent, a steep drop from the 120 percent (or more) staffing 
levels of the surge period. When the order came to give up their commando battalions to 
the Jazeera-Badiyah command, many of the remaining divisions suddenly found them-
selves with an effective strength of less than 60 percent of what they were authorized.84 
The problem was made worse by the fact that the prevalence of “ghost soldiers” in the 
Iraqi Army’s ranks—soldiers who received a salary from corrupt commanders but who 
were not actually present in the force--had increased sharply in 2012. One former Iraqi 
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division commander estimated that some Iraqi divisions might have 60 to 70 percent of 
their authorized troops on the rolls, but that once ghost soldiers were factored out, their 
effective strength would be little more than 40 percent.85
These trends were clear to many of the U.S. military officials assigned to the U.S. 
Embassy, such as U.S. defense attaché Colonel Charles “Tony” Pfaff, an experienced U.S. 
Army foreign affairs officer who had served in assignments throughout the Middle East. 
In an after action report written in early 2014, Pfaff documented the impressions he had 
formed after arriving in Baghdad in fall 2012. The Iraqi security forces had “good leaders, 
brave soldiers and police, as well as effective weapons and equipment,” he noted, but insti-
tutional issues such as “overlapping chains of command, poor administration, continued 
sectarian influences, and limited logistic, command and control, and intelligence capabil-
ities” resulted in “poor performance in the field.” On paper, the Iraqi security forces had 
expanded significantly from 2010 to 2013. The Ministry of Defense’s forces had ostensibly 
grown from 245,000 in 2010 to 271,400 in 2013, and the Ground Forces Command by 2013 
supposedly fielded more than 193,000 troops in 14 divisions and independent brigades. 
Across Iraq, these forces were augmented by the Interior Ministry’s 531,000 police—up 
from 413,613 in 2010. In addition to its local police, facilities guards, border guards, and 
oil police, the Interior Ministry had more than 30 SWAT teams as well as 44,000 Federal 
Police deployed in 4 divisions. Despite their notional strength, the forces that numbered 
more than 800,000 soldiers and police suffered a string of battlefield defeats from 2013 
onward. Pfaff concluded these factors were the culmination of “corrupt legacy practices 
that diverted resources away from the fight and created poor conditions for soldiers and 
police as funds for food, housing, fuel, and maintenance were siphoned off.” Command-
ers who often purchased their positions of authority—sometimes reportedly paying as 
much as half a million dollars for division or brigade commands—recouped their invest-
ment by diverting equipment and supplies or by striking bargains with “ghost soldiers” 
to remain home in exchange for splitting their salaries with their commanders. The sol-
diers who remained at their posts had to shoulder heavier burdens of combat under 
austere conditions, and from late 2012 onward Iraqi units fighting against ISIS tended to 
experience mass desertions in combat.86
As the Iraqi security forces were hollowed out in this manner, ISF units entered into 
what Pfaff described as “a vicious circle where risk aversion stemming from poor con-
ditions drove indiscriminate practices that alienated the population and empowered its 
adversaries. This, in turn, encouraged greater risk aversion, as not only was there little 
incentive to take risks on behalf of leaders responsible for these conditions, but also little 
reason to take risks on behalf of a population that resented them.” Pfaff listed a few sig-
nificant turning points in 2013 when the relationship between the Iraqi security forces 
and the country’s Sunni community broke down. The April 2013 incident in Hawijah, 
when General Ali Ghaidan’s troops had fired on a Sunni protest camp and had killed 
more than 40 people, had inflamed tensions and made “protesters elsewhere . . . afraid 
that the ISF would conduct similar attacks against them.” The situation worsened after 
the Hawijjah killings when ISF troops “reportedly under orders from Maliki, attempted 
to arrest Dulaymi tribal shaykh Ali Hatem al Sulaiman, killing three bodyguards [and] 
again setting the ISF against the Sunnis in Anbar,” Pfaff recounted. Finally, in late Sep-
tember 2013, hundreds of ISIS fighters entered the western Anbar towns of Rawa and 
Anah to attack government facilities and blow up bridges over the Euphrates River to 
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prevent the Jazeera-Badiyah command from sending reinforcements to the area. The 
attack against the two towns had foreshadowed the fall of Fallujah to ISIS 3 months later, 
Pfaff believed.87
OSC-I director Lieutenant General Robert Caslen reached many of the same conclu-
sions as Pfaff. Under Prime Minister Maliki’s leadership, the upper ranks of the Iraqi 
military became riven by sectarianism, Caslen observed. “The Iraqis preserved ethnic 
and sectarian diversity in the military’s upper ranks, as instructed by the Americans,” 
Caslen said in 2013. “But the nation’s divisions permeated even that arrangement. Offi-
cers routinely bypassed the chain of command to deal with soldiers from similar back-
grounds,” reflecting the deep distrust among military leaders of different sects.88 Caslen 
believed much of Maliki’s behavior, which appeared sectarian and authoritarian to out-
side observers, was the result of the Prime Minister’s insecurity in his position. Shortly 
after assuming his position as OSC-I director at the end of 2011, the American general 
had been surprised to realize that Maliki had considered it part of USF-I’s role inside 
Iraq to secure the Maliki government against major attacks or coup attempts. Meeting 
with Caslen to discuss OSC-I’s role, Maliki had made it clear that he assumed Caslen and 
OSC-I would somehow continue to provide that kind of security after USF-I’s departure 
and the expiration of the U.S.-Iraq security agreement. Caslen believed that when Maliki 
realized that OSC-I had no means to keep him in power and the U.S. Government no 
inclination to do so, the Iraqi leader decided to govern differently, greatly expanding his 
use of the ISF against political rivals to secure his own position.89
Like Pfaff, Caslen saw the Iraqi military deteriorate as it became more politicized. 
When tensions between the Maliki government and Massoud Barzani’s KRG flared in 
early 2013, Caslen believed that in the event of a clash between the Iraqi Army and the 
Kurdish peshmerga along the Green Line, the Army would find itself at a serious disad-
vantage. Maliki had attempted to intimidate Barzani and the Kurdish forces by deploy-
ing Iraqi units to the Kirkuk region in 2012. However, the Prime Minister’s troops could 
not match the peshmerga’s capabilities and coordination, Caslen believed, meaning that 
Baghdad would be unlikely to win in a military confrontation with the Erbil govern-
ment. As if to illustrate Caslen’s point, in May 2013 the Kurdish commander of an Iraqi 
brigade in the 4th Division refused orders to leave a disputed territory on the Green Line 
and instead defected to the peshmerga along with all of his Kurdish soldiers and their 
equipment.90
As fighting between the ISF and ISIS intensified in 2013, Pfaff noted some serious 
tactical and operational shortcomings within the Iraqi units. They had a good commu-
nications infrastructure but during the country’s frequent power outages, it was useless, 
and Iraqi commanders were often forced to rely upon unsecure cell phones or landlines 
to communicate. Meanwhile, in combat the ISF “often rely on large formations when 
engaging terrorist targets and facilities, which are easily spotted by ISIL . . . as a result, 
ISIL fighters often have sufficient time to depart the target area before the ISF troops 
arrive.”91 Iraqi logisticians were good at stockpiling supplies and ammunition on bases, 
Pfaff observed, but extremely poor at supplying units on the move, meaning that “when 
they do move, ISF often find themselves outgunned with limited ammunition when con-
fronted by ISIL fighters.” Overall, Pfaff noted, the ISF was a force that often lacked ade-
quate situational awareness in combat and had commanders who were afraid to take 
decisive action in a deteriorating security situation.92 Within months, the factors that Pfaff 
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observed would spell disaster for the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi Government they 
were meant to defend.
THE ASCENDANCY OF ISIS
The Fall of Fallujah
The weakness of the Iraqi security forces and the gathering strength of the Sunni 
militant groups that opposed them was on full display in Anbar in the last days of 2013 
and first days of 2014. For the third December in a row, Prime Minister Maliki ordered 
government security forces to arrest one of Iraq’s top Sunni leaders, this time target-
ing Ahmed Alwani, a Member of Parliament who was also a leader of the Albu Alwan 
tribe in eastern Anbar. On December 28, Iraqi troops raided Alwani’s home near Ramadi, 
arresting the Parliamentarian and killing his brother in the melee. The raid was the cul-
mination of months of tensions between the Maliki government and Anbaris. By late 
2013, Maliki and his security advisors concluded that western Anbar had become a safe 
haven for ISIS from which the group was staging its attacks against the government and 
against Baghdad’s population. They were particularly concerned with Wadi Horan, a 
remote but strategic area connecting Iraq to Jordan and Saudi Arabia that had long been 
studied by Iraqi staff colleges because of its frequent use by smugglers and insurgents. 
The staff college students were correct, and during 2012-2013, ISIS fighters established 
bases in Wadi Horan and used them to train recruits and mount attacks against Iraqi pop-
ulation centers. On December 21, ISIS fighters emerged from Wadi Horan to attack the 
7th Iraqi Division in Rutbah, killing 17 senior officers including the division commander 
and wounding scores more. The boldness of the attack shocked the Iraqi Army defenders 
throughout the province and buckled their morale.93
By then, the protest camps in Fallujah and Ramadi had become the epicenter of Sunni 
opposition to Maliki, and the Prime Minister believed ISIS and other terrorist groups 
were using the protesters as cover while they set up “headquarters” in both cities. Maliki 
said as much in a national speech on December 25 in which he announced his intention 
to raze the protest sites, and 3 days later, the same day as the Alwani raid, Iraqi security 
forces began dismantling the camps.94 The raid and the razing of the camps prompted 40 
Sunni Members of Parliament to resign in protest, while a prominent Sunni cleric called 
for Sunni ISF members to defect and defend the protest camps against the government.
On January 2, just 2 days after the camps were leveled, Sunni rebels attacked. In 
Ramadi, the rebels made only modest headway, but in Fallujah, the government forces 
quickly collapsed. On January 3, ISIS fighters seized Fallujah’s main mosque and declared 
the city an Islamic emirate. By January 4, most of Fallujah was in rebel hands, with var-
ious armed Sunni groups—some tribal, some associated with the Ba’ath Party, some 
ISIS—holding different parts of the city while the ISF retreated to areas outside it. Within 
days of the initial rebel attack, the insurgent cleric Abdullah Janabi, who had led Fallu-
jah’s rebels in 2004, had returned to the city and called for a general insurrection.95
The Maliki government had a larger problem than just ISIS. The rebels were a broad 
front that included ISIS, other longstanding insurgent groups, and some parts of the Sunni 
Awakening. One example was the rebel militia created by Dulaimi sheikh Ali Hatem 
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Suleiman, who formerly had been one of the leaders of the Ramadi Awakening council 
and had allied with Maliki in the 2009 and 2010 Iraqi elections.96 Nevertheless, as its pre-
decessor organization AQI had done in Fallujah in 2004, ISIS quickly seized leadership of 
the rebellion through its superior organization and resources, even though most rebels 
considered themselves to be fighting to topple Maliki rather than establish a caliphate. 
By mid-January, the Sunni rebels and the government forces had settled into a violent 
standoff throughout eastern Anbar, with each side launching near-daily local attacks and 
casualties mounting on both sides.
With a major city 30 miles from Baghdad in insurgent hands, Iraq held Parliamentary 
elections on April 30. The question of whether Nuri al-Maliki would return for another 
term as Prime Minister dominated the voting, despite the broad opposition to his pre-
miership from the political parties outside his State of Law coalition. Unlike 2010, Iraq’s 
Sunni and secular parties did not join in an electoral bloc as they had done under Ayad 
Allawi’s Iraqiyah. As a result, Maliki’s State of Law finished far ahead in the voting, 
taking 92 seats while the nearest second-place finisher, Muqtada Sadr, finished with just 
34. Maliki himself garnered more than 720,000 popular votes, almost half a million more 
than the next most popular candidate, Ayad Allawi. The Prime Minister had paused 
the military operations around Fallujah while the voting took place, but on May 9, he 
directed a force led by the Iraqi special operations forces to resume an offensive against 
the city. Though it stalled after a few days, the election result and Maliki’s control of the 
security forces made him seemed poised in late May to dominate the process of forming 
a government yet again.
The Fall of Mosul
Neither Maliki nor any other Iraqi leader knew it, but the country was about to be 
plunged into a deep crisis that would threaten the Iraqi state’s very existence. As Maliki 
and the other political parties prepared to negotiate a new government in early June 2014, 
Iraq’s second-largest city of Mosul fell into enemy hands. Though control of Mosul had 
always been tenuous, the Iraqi Government’s grip on the city and its 2-million-strong 
population had weakened after the U.S. withdrawal, largely due to the worsening rela-
tionship between the population and government security forces. In 2013, Maliki had 
appointed Lieutenant General Mehdi Gharrawi of the Federal Police to command Mosul’s 
security forces, despite Gharrawi’s notorious history as a National Police commander in 
west Baghdad. In 2006, Gharrawi’s troops had terrorized the Sunni population of west 
Baghdad, and Gharrawi himself had narrowly escaped prosecution on charges of murder 
and torture.97 He had been relegated to unimportant positions for a few years but had 
been dispatched to Ninewa by the Prime Minister as the security situation deteriorated 
there after USF-I’s withdrawal. Gharrawi’s checkered history made him a poor choice to 
take over a force that already suffered from poor training, low staffing, and tense rela-
tions with Moslawis. The weakness of Gharrawi’s troops led them to rely on checkpoints 
to screen for insurgent fighters, but the checkpoints also served to harass the local Sunni 
population.98 Ambassador James Jeffrey later noted that the security forces in Mosul “had 
lost the support of the people because they had a sectarian policy, and I saw it with my 
own eyes.”99
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The war against ISIS and other insurgents in Anbar also made Mosul vulnerable. By 
June 2014, the local brigades of the Iraqi Army had been stripped of significant man-
power, equipment, and heavy weapons to support operations in Anbar. The resulting 
shortfalls within the 2d and 3d Iraqi Army divisions in Ninewa were compounded by 
the rampant problem of ghost soldiers in their ranks, with thousands of soldiers splitting 
their salaries with their commanders in order to be excused from reporting for duty. The 
6th Brigade of the 3d Iraqi Division, for example, had only about 500 troops on hand in 
early June, significantly fewer than the 2,500 being reported to higher headquarters.100 
Similar manning issues afflicted the rest of Ninewa’s security forces. Local authorities 
later estimated that of the 25,000 soldiers and police who were supposed to be securing 
Mosul in June 2014, fewer than 10,000 were actually present.101
The thinness of the ISF ranks in Mosul was exposed in spectacular fashion in early 
June 2014. Before dawn on June 6, a force of perhaps 300 ISIS fighters assaulted the north-
west portion of the city.102 In Musherfa, a key entry point into Mosul, only about 40 Iraqi 
soldiers were on duty to oppose the ISIS attack.103 In nearby Tamoz 17 district, an ISIS 
column of 15 pickup trucks and two captured HMMWVs easily routed an Iraqi police bat-
talion owing to the ISIS fighters’ superior firepower.104 “In my entire battalion we ha[d] 
one machine gun,” recalled Colonel Dhiyab Ahmed al-Assi al-Obeidi, the police battalion 
commander, while “In each pickup, [ISIS] had one.”105 Over the next several days, ISIS 
flooded the city with hundreds of trucks carrying heavy weapons and fighters.106 By June 
9, approximately 2,000 ISIS fighters had entered the city, and assaulted the main force of 
ISF defenders at the Mosul Hotel. Attacking the hotel with a military water tanker loaded 
with explosives, the ISIS men set off an explosion large enough to be felt throughout city, 
shaking the confidence of the remaining government troops west of the Tigris.107
Source: ISIS propaganda image.
A Convoy of ISIS Fighters Moves Through Mosul Shortly After Capturing the City.108
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An ISF exodus from Mosul followed. ISF morale crumbled when the two senior Iraqi 
Army officers on the scene, General Abud Qanbar and General Ali Ghaidan, took their 
security details and left west Mosul on the evening of June 9. As word spread that the 
senior commanders had fled the battlefield, most of the remaining soldiers and police 
followed suit, abandoning thousands of vehicles and heavy weapons and leaving the 
city’s main military bases and airport undefended, shortly to fall into ISIS’s possession.109 
As the ISF fled, ISIS fighters also captured Mosul’s branch of the Iraqi Central Bank and 
seized what may have been more than $400 million in currency, instantly making them 
the wealthiest terrorist group in the world.110
The people of Mosul were dumbstruck by the sudden disappearance of the govern-
ment’s troops seemingly without a fight. As one businessman who witnessed the battle 
put it, “The city fell like a plane without an engine . . . [ISIS] were firing their weapons 
into the air, but no one was shooting at them.”111
Map created by the official cartographer at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.
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The Camp Speicher Massacre
The collapse of the ISF in Mosul opened the road down the Tigris River Valley. Taking 
advantage of the ISF retreat, ISIS pressed its offensive south toward Baiji, Tikrit, and 
Samarra. By midday on June 11, ISIS fighters in 30 unarmored trucks rolled into Tikrit, 
taking control of the city center without firing a shot. The Tikriti police force had already 
melted away the previous day as word of the disaster in Mosul spread.112 When ISIS 
seized downtown Tikrit on June 11, the thousands of Iraqi Army and Air Force troops 
based outside the city at Camp Speicher were thrown into confusion as they assumed that 
the ISIS juggernaut would soon swamp the base. Many troops at Camp Speicher were 
unarmed trainees at the base’s air force school, and among these trainees panic spread, 
especially after some found the base’s armory empty.113 Many trainees, spurred by phone 
calls from their families in Baghdad and the south, took the ill-advised decision to flee the 
base. On June 12, thousands of them shed their uniforms and forced their way through 
the main gate of Camp Speicher unarmed and in civilian clothes. The exact details of the 
flight from the base are unclear owing to conflicting accounts and the subsequent killing 
of most of those who fled. Lieutenant General Ali Freiji, who in 2006-2008 had partnered 
with U.S. troops to pacify the Triangle of Death south of Baghdad, was now the com-
mander of Camp Speicher, and though he raced to the gate with his security detail to 
stop the flood of deserters, more than 3,000 troops poured out of the camp.114 Many of the 
deserters walked down the highway in an orderly file toward waiting trucks that local 
Tikritis had apparently promised would escort them south to safety. Instead, those who 
boarded the trucks found themselves captured by ISIS fighters. After sorting the captives 
by sect, the ISIS men executed about 1,700 Shi’a troops, dumping their bodies into mass 
graves or the Tigris River Valley and posting photos on the internet.115
The mass murder shocked the country and threw the Shi’a population of Baghdad 
and the south into a panic. Blame for the incident was unclear. Many of the surviving 
soldiers claimed they had received orders from officers to abandon Camp Speicher.116 
Some said their instructions had come from Ali Freiji himself, and initial accounts of the 
massacre repeated that rumor, but military and Parliamentary investigations later in 2014 
cleared the general and assessed that he had done his best to stop the disaster.117 It was 
a dark moment for Freiji, who had worked effectively with U.S. troops during the surge 
and who former Minister of Defense Abdel Qader rated as the top officer in the Iraqi 
Army.
The Popular Mobilization
By the end of June, as the holy month of Ramadan approached, ISIS was in control of 
three major Iraqi cities (Mosul, Fallujah, and Tikrit) and a large swath of the upper Tigris 
River Valley. ISIS fighters were pressing against Sinjar, Tel Afar, Kirkuk, and the Shi’a 
shrine city of Samarra, with the ISF and the Kurdish peshmerga seemingly powerless to 
stop them. Having won an equally stunning military victory against the ISF, ISIS followed 
up with a stunning political and religious coup. On June 29, the group declared that it had 
reinstituted the worldwide Caliphate and that its leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, would 
henceforth rule as Caliph Ibrahim. On July 4, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi appeared publicly 
for the first time to give a sermon in the Nur al-Din Mosque in Mosul on the first Friday 
of Ramadan. He preached to a congregation of thousands of terrified Moslawis who 
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had been searched by armed ISIS fighters at the entrances, 
directed where to sit, and told only that the day’s sermon 
would be delivered by “the commander of the faithful.”118 In 
a 21-minute sermon, Baghdadi echoed the words of Islam’s 
first caliph, his namesake Abu Bakr, demanding Muslims’ 
obedience, asking for support for his caliphate, and empha-
sizing the theme of jihad.119 ISIS media specialists produced a 
professional-grade video of Baghdadi’s sermon and quickly 
broadcast it on the internet.
Baghdadi’s sermon was a masterstroke, demonstrating 
that he and his organization were more strongly positioned 
than the al-Qaeda leaders in hiding in Pakistan. By appearing 
in the open in a major city in the Arab heartland, Baghdadi 
had accomplished something Osama bin Laden and Ayman 
al-Zawahiri had never managed, a fact that vaulted him 
to a position of authority in the global jihadist movement. 
The Mosul appearance was useful as recruiting propaganda 
among jihadists across the globe, proving that ISIS’s caliph-
ate was a reality. Baghdadi’s declaration of re-establishing 
the caliphate, an issue that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ayman al-Zawahiri had hotly 
debated, had considerable religious significance. According to some religious figures, the 
reestablishment of the caliphate obligated Muslims to come to its defense, although such 
an interpretation was not uniform and many prominent scholars asserted Baghdadi had 
insufficient prominence to make such a declaration.
ISIS spokesmen declared that the group intended to attack Samarra, Baghdad, and 
Karbala. Baghdadi’s sermon and takeover of much of northern Iraq convinced the pop-
ulation of the capital that the threat was real.121 The fall of Mosul and Tikrit shattered 
Iraqi confidence in their Army and led many to conclude that ISIS was capable of defeat-
ing the roughly 60,000 Iraqi soldiers and police who defended the capital. On June 12, 
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa calling for volunteers to defend Baghdad, 
secure the country’s Shi’a shrines, and support Iraq’s Sunnis and other minorities against 
ISIS attack.122 Though Sistani may have intended his fatwa as a call to reinforce the Iraqi 
security forces, it spurred a vast expansion of the country’s Shi’a militias. Within days, 
Moqtada Sadr, AAH, the Badr Corps, and Kata’ib Hizballah had all formed new groups 
to accept tens of thousands of volunteers who were coming forward to respond to Sis-
tani’s call.123
On June 15, the Iraqi Parliament codified Sistani’s fatwa by declaring the volunteers 
official auxiliaries of the Iraqi military known as the Population Mobilization Forces 
(PMF). Overall command of the PMF fell to Iraqi national security advisor Falah Fayadh, 
with the Iranian-sponsored former Badr Corps operative Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis as the 
PMF’s deputy commander.124 Virtually every Shi’a political faction and leader formed 
their own popular mobilization units under the auspices of the PMF, while Prime Minis-
ter Maliki pledged a large government budget for their equipment and salaries, a move 
that incensed Sunnis as it laid bare the government’s motives for abandoning the Sons of 
Iraq. Within weeks, more than 90,000 volunteers had swelled the PMF ranks and drifted 
toward the front lines, where the remnants of the Iraqi security forces had established 
positions to slow ISIS’s advance.125
Source: Department of State 
photo (Released).
ISIS Leader Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi.120
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Iraq’s Shi’a parties and most Baghdadis considered the PMF necessary to prevent 
Baghdad from falling, even though by mid-July ISIS, with its lines of communications 
overextended, showed little intention of trying to attack the city. Instead of continuing 
toward Baghdad in large numbers, ISIS had turned toward smaller objectives such as 
the dams near Haditha and Mosul, isolated ISF garrisons in Salahadin and Kirkuk Prov-
inces, and areas north of Baqubah in the Diyala River Valley.126 Nevertheless, the Iranian 
regime’s Quds Force and its commander Qassem Soleimani launched a high-profile advi-
sory effort, rushing IRGC Quds Force advisors to the PMF in areas contested by ISIS, such 
as the Diyala valley. It was an excellent opportunity for Iranian strategists. For decades, 
Soleimani and other IRGC commanders who had lived through the Iran-Iraq War as 
their formative experience had considered the Iraqi Army a potential threat to the Iranian 
regime. With the collapse of several Iraqi Army divisions and the appearance of the PMF, 
Soleimani and his peers had an unexpected chance to promote a parallel security struc-
ture to compete with the Iraqi Army for legitimacy, under the overwhelming influence of 
the Quds Force and its militia proxies.
The fall of Mosul ended Maliki’s chance for a third term as Prime Minister. He had 
staked his reputation on his ability to provide security, but the swift collapse of the secu-
rity structure he had overseen and failure of the senior military leaders he had appointed 
created a political backlash he could not survive. Even as Maliki attempted to regain 
political legitimacy by pledging government funding for the PMF, the other political par-
ties began to organize against him in a way they had not done in 2010. On July 9, Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani tipped the balance against Maliki by writing privately to Da’wa Party 
leaders that Iraqi leaders needed “to speed up the selection of a new Prime Minister who 
has wide national acceptance” and a “new vision” in order to address the country’s “crit-
ical circumstances.”127 With top cover from Sistani, the Da’wa leaders and other parties 
moved to form a new government without Maliki. On July 15, the Parliament elected 
Diyala native Salim Jabouri, a Sunni, as speaker, following on July 24 by electing senior 
PUK official Fuad Masum as Iraq’s new President in place of Jalal Talabani. On August 
11, Masum nominated Da’wa Party Parliamentarian Haider Abadi, a British-educated 
engineer, as Iraq’s new Prime Minister.
 
Source: DoD photo by D. Myles Cullen (Released).
Prime Minister Haider Abadi.128
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THE START OF OPERATION INHERENT RESOLVE
The United States restricted its military support to the Iraqis while Maliki still served 
as Prime Minister. A small task force from U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) under the com-
mand of Major General Dana Pittard had arrived in Baghdad on June 15 to assess the mil-
itary situation and begin coordination with the Iraqi Army, but U.S. leaders had refrained 
from providing more direct support in the weeks after the fall of Mosul. U.S. officials 
believed Maliki needed to step aside in order for the campaign to halt ISIS to succeed, 
and they conditioned security assistance on his replacement by a new Iraqi premier. This 
policy stance created resentment among many Iraqis, especially Shi’a, who concluded 
that the United States had been willing to let ISIS threaten Baghdad in order to gain lever-
age to remove Maliki. The Iranian regime and its Iraqi allies highlighted the difference 
between the U.S. and Iranian responses to the crisis, and even some long-time U.S. part-
ners voiced their frustration. Mowaffak Rubaie summed up this attitude when he told 
journalists, “Who arrived here to save us three days after Mosul fell? Not the Americans. 
They only sent abysmal airstrikes 3 months later when their citizens were beheaded. The 
speed of the Iranian response to Baghdad and Erbil was the next day.”129
With Abadi in place, U.S. military involvement steadily increased and, in fact, direct 
U.S. activity against ISIS had already begun the week before Abadi’s appointment. From 
August 1-4, ISIS attacked outposts in Sinjar and near the Mosul Dam, sending the pesh-
merga reeling and forcing tens of thousands of Kurds, Yezidis, Christians, and other 
minorities to flee. At Jebel Sinjar, ISIS fighters massacred hundreds of Yezidis and pur-
sued Yezidi civilians who fled onto the bare mountain and became stranded there. At 
Mosul Dam, ISIS members came close enough to the dilapidated structure to worry Iraqi 
and U.S. officials that they could seize the dam’s controls and flood the Tigris River Valley 
from Mosul to Samarra. On August 6, ISIS attacked east from the Tigris River Valley and 
overran the Christian towns of eastern Ninewa, killing non-Sunni men and enslaving 
women and children. Within hours, the ISIS fighters were less than 20 miles from Erbil, 
with peshmerga defenses appearing to collapse and open the road to the Kurdish capital. 
In response to the threat, on August 8, U.S. aircraft began bombing ISIS positions west of 
Erbil, while U.S. special operations forces provided advisors to peshmerga units. The air-
strikes reversed the ISIS momentum immediately, halting the terrorist group’s advance 
and enabling peshmerga units to stabilize a defensive line.
On the same day, CENTCOM named ARCENT commander Lieutenant General James 
Terry as commander of the counter-ISIS campaign, and Terry began to organize a task 
force headquarters at ARCENT’s main base in Kuwait. Terry and a small staff—limited 
in size by a troop cap set by U.S. officials in Washington—joined Pittard’s organization in 
Baghdad and set up a Combined Joint Operations Center with Iraqi Army counterparts 
at forward operating base (FOB) Union III, across the street from the U.S. Embassy in 
the Green Zone. Terry’s task force also organized a small operations center in Erbil from 
which to coordinate with peshmerga counterparts. By August 18, under the cover of U.S. 
airstrikes, peshmerga troops had halted ISIS’s advance along the Green Line and had 
begun to push the group’s fighters slowly back toward the Tigris River.
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Carter (center), Jones (left), Terry (right). Source: DoD photo by U.S. Army Sergeant 
 1st Class Clydell Kinchen (Released).
SECDEF Ashton Carter With U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Stuart Jones and ARCENT 
Commander Lieutenant General James Terry.130
Significant changes in the military organization on both the Iraqi and American sides 
soon followed. On September 23, Prime Minister Abadi dissolved the Office of the Com-
mander in Chief, the organization Maliki and General Faruq al Araji had used to exert 
control over the Ministry of Defense, and ordered the immediate retirement of General 
Abud Qanbar and General Ali Ghaidan, the two senior officers whose flight from Mosul 
had demoralized the city’s defenders.131 The following day, SECDEF Carter ordered the 
Army’s 1st Infantry Division headquarters to deploy 500 Soldiers to Baghdad, Erbil, and 
Kuwait to take over for Pittard’s task force as a new Combined Joint Forces Land Com-
ponent Command-Iraq. The division would do so as part of the newly named Operation 
INHERENT RESOLVE, the name given to the campaign against ISIS in both Syria and 
Iraq under Terry’s command. Though the number of troops deployed inside Iraq as part 
of Operation INHERENT RESOLVE remained limited by the U.S. Government’s self-im-
posed cap, the operation included a large NATO contingent to train Iraqi units.
By the end of October, Major General Paul Funk and his 1st Infantry Division head-
quarters reached Baghdad and Erbil to begin their mission as Combined Joint Forces 
Land Component Command-Iraq, meant to repair the broken Iraqi Army and coordinate 
close air support for the Iraqi and peshmerga troops in contact with ISIS. Just shy of 3 
years after the last U.S. units had left Baghdad, the U.S. Army had returned.
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
601
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 15
1. Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister al-Maliki 
of Iraq in a Joint Press Conference,” Washington, DC: The White House, December 12, 2011, 
available from https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/12/remarks-president-obama-and- 
prime-minister-al-maliki-iraq-joint-press-co.
2. Arwa Damon and Mohammed Tawfeeq, “Iraq’s leader becoming a new ‘dictator,’ deputy warns,” 
CNN, December 13, 2011, available from http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/13/world/meast/iraq-maliki/.
3. Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Corruption in Iraq: ‘Your son is being tortured. He will die if you don’t pay’,” 
The Guardian, January 15, 2012, available from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/16/corruption-iraq-
son-tortured-pay; Rami Ruhayem, “Hashemi trial: Murder plots detailed in Iraqi court,” BBC News, June 3, 
2012, available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18301600.
4. DoD photo by Sergeant Patrick Lair, “Iraqi Vice President Visits Mosul [Image 2 of 4],” DVIDS 
Identifier 78254, February 24, 2008, Released to Public, available from https://www.dvidshub.net/image/78254/
iraqi-vice-President-visits-mosul.
5. Joel Wing, “Iraq’s PM Maliki Flexes his Muscles in Diyala Province Again,” Ekurd Daily, January 26, 
2012, available from http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/1/kurdsiniraq149.htm; Joel Wing, Musings on 
Iraq Blog, December 28, 2011, available from http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2011/12/push-to-make-iraqs-
diyala-province.html; “Iraqi Shi’ite rally against autonomy push in Diyala,” Reuters, December 15, 2011, 
available from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-autonomy-diyala/iraqi-shiite-rally-against-autonomy-
push-in-diyala-idUSTRE7BE1F920111215; Ramzy Mardini, “Iraq’s Recurring Political Crisis,” Washington, 
DC: Institute for the Study of War, February 16, 2016, available from http://www.understandingwar.org/
backgrounder/iraqs-recurring-political-crisis#_edn5.
6. E-mail, Lieutenant Colonel Joel Rayburn to Karim Sadjadpour, December 15, 2011.
7. DoD photo by Specialist Brandon Bednarek, “Generally speaking [Image 4 of 8],” DVIDS Identi-
fier 477278, October 20, 2011, Released to Public, available from https://www.dvidshub.net/image/477278/
generally-speaking.
8. Tim Arango, “U.S. Planning to Slash Iraq Embassy Staff by as Much as Half,” The New York Times, 
February 7, 2012, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/world/middleeast/united-states-planning-
to-slash-iraq-embassy-staff-by-half.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0, accessed January 8, 2015.
9. Interview, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) Study Group with 
Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, December 18, 2014, West Point, NY.
10. Interview, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) with Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, 
November 24, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 8.
11. Plans Notes, United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I), J-5, October 14-18, 2011, November 6-12, 2011, 
November 13-19, 2011, and November 20-29, 2011, Military History Institute (MHI), AHEC, Carlisle, PA.  
12. Interview, CALL with Lieutenant General Robert Caslen, March 23, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. 
I, p. 16.
13. Caslen, interview by CALL, March 23, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. I, p. 21; OSC-I, “Iraq and the 
Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq,” command briefing n.d., submitted by Caslen, p. 2.
14. Interview, CALL with Caslen, March 23, 2012, Newsletter OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. I, No. 12-12, 
Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, August 2012, p. 24; interview with Mark Hunter, 
602
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
November 26, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 56. Special Agent Mark Hunter served as the Senior 
Regional Security Officer at USM-I; CSA OIF SG with Caslen, December 18, 2014, West Point, NY.
15. Interview, CALL with Kenneth Harvey, J3 Director of Training and Operations Officer OSC-I, 
November 14, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 164; with Dean Raab, Legal Advisor for OSC-I, December 
15, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 106.
16. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Caslen, December 18, 2014, West Point, NY.
17. Ambassador James Jeffery, interview by CALL, March 30, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. I, p. 5.
18. Ibid., pp. 12-13; Interview, CALL with Mark Hunter, November 26, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. 
II, p. 56.
19. Interview, CALL with John Hall, November 16, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 91. Colonel John 
Hall served in the OSC-I Initiatives Group.
20. Interview, CALL with Mark Libby, November 18, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 52.
21. Interview, CALL with Hunter, November 26, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 60.
22. Ibid., p. 62; Interview, CALL with Harold Reeves, September 24, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, 
p. 155.
23. Interview, CALL with Karl Krause, J8 Director of Resource Management for OSC-I, January 14, 
2013, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 214.; CALL with Kenneth Harvey, November 14, 2012, OSC-I, Inter-
views, Vol. II, p. 163.
24. Interview, CALL with Dean Raab, December 15, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, pp. 103-104.
25. Interview, CALL with Kenneth Harvey, November 14, 2012, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 165; with 
Karl Kraus, January 14, 2013, OSC-I, Interviews, Vol. II, p. 213.
26. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Caslen, December 18, 2014, West Point, NY.
27. E-mail, Lieutenant Colonel Joel Rayburn to Mithal Al-Alusi, January 24, 2012.
28. “Leader of Saddam Hussein’s Baath party ‘criticises Iraq Government’,” The Telegraph, April 8, 2012, 
available from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/9193383/Leader-of-Saddam-Husseins-
Baath-party-criticises-Iraq-Government.html.
29. London Al-Hayah Online [in Arabic], March 24, 2012, Report from Baghdad by Mushriq Abbas: 
“Mish’an al-Jabburi Tells Al-Hayah: I Returned to Baghdad and Call for the Return of Izzat al-Duri and 
Harith al-Dari.”
30. Joel Rayburn, Iraq after America: Strongmen, Sectarians, Resistance, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution 
Press, Stanford University, 2014, p. 225; Wyer, p. 12.
31. Rayburn, Iraq after America, p. 225; Wyer, p. 12.
32. Wyer, pp. 6-10.
33. Ibid., p. 13.
34. Ahmed Rasheed and Mohammed Ameer, “Iraq militia stone youths to death for ‘emo’ style,” 
Reuters, March 10, 2012, available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/10/us-iraq-emo-killings-
idUSBRE8290CY20120310; Rayburn, Iraq after America, p. 206.
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
603
35. “Missing U.S. soldier killed by Shiite group,” USA Today, February 27, 2012, available from http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-02-27/iraq-us-soldier-shiite/53267618/1.
36. Ben Van Heuvelen, “Iraqi Leaders Criticize Nouri al-Maliki after Arrest of top Elections Official,” 
The Washington Post, April 17, 2012.
37. Joel Wing, “Why the Talk of a No Confidence Vote Against Iraq’s Premier Maliki Remains Just 
Talk,” Musings on Iraq, May 30, 2012, available from http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2012/05/why-talk-of-
no-confidence-vote-against.html.
38.  “Deja Vu All Over Again? Iraq’s Escalating Political Crisis,” Middle East Report No. 126, New York: 
International Crisis Group, July 30, 2012, available from https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/
gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iraq/deja-vu-all-over-again-iraq-s-escalating-political-crisis.
39. Rayburn, Iraq after America, p. 227.
40. Stephen Wicken, “Sadr’s Balancing Act on Maliki,” Washington, DC: Institute for the 
Study of War, June 18, 2012, available from http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/sadr’s-
balancing-act-maliki#_edn19; Kenneth Pollack, “Iraqi Elections, Iranian Interests,” Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, April 4, 2014, available from http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/
posts/2014/04/04-pollack-iraq-national-elections-2014-iranian-interests.
41. UN photo by Eskinder Debebe, “Secretary General Meets Prime Minister of Iraq,” Photo No. 404634, 
July 22, 2009, United Nations News and Media Photo, available from https://www.unmultimedia.org/s/photo/
detail/404/0404634.html.
42. William Young, David Stebbins, Bryan Frederick, and Omar al-Shahery, “Spillover From the Con-
flict in Syria: An Assessment of the Factors that Aid and Impede the Spread of Violence,” Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 45.
43. Rayburn, Iraq after America, pp. 228-229.
44. Photo courtesy of Kremlin.ru, “President of Syria Bashar al-Assad [photo 6 of 11],” October 21, 2015, 
Released to Public, available from http://en.kremlin.ru/events/President/news/50533/photos/42160.
45. Daniel L. Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, “The Syrian Spillover: Is anyone prepared for the unin-
tended consequences of the war for Syria?” Foreign Policy, August 10, 2012, available from http://foreignpolicy.
com/2012/08/10/the-syrian-spillover/.
46. Rayburn, Iraq after America, p. 231.
47. Phillip Smyth, “From Karbala to Sayyida Zaynab: Iraqi Fighters in Syria’s Shi’a Militias,” CTC Sen-
tinel, Vol. 6, No. 8, August 2013, p. 28.
48. Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” Washington, DC: Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, May 2013, pp. 23-24.
49. Michael Knights, “Iran’s Foreign legion: The Role of Iraqi Shiite Militias in Syria,” PolicyWatch 
2096, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 27, 2013, available from http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-foreign-legion-the-role-of-iraqi-shiite-militias-in-syria.
50. Fulton, p. 25.
51. Michael Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraqi Airspace,” The New York Times, 
September 4, 2012, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/05/world/middleeast/iran-supplying-syrian-
military-via-iraq-airspace.html.
604
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
52. Michael Gordon, “Tensions Rise in Baghdad with Raid on Official,” The New York Times, December 
20, 2012.
53. Gordon, “Tensions Rise in Baghdad with Raid on Official.”
54. U.S. Navy photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Mario A. Quiroga, “Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Dr. 
Rafi al-Issawi responds to inquires from Service Directorate-Generals and local media during the central 
services meeting at the Government Center in Baqubah, Iraq, Aug. 9, 2008. Ministry members, Diyala tribal 
sheiks, and Service Directorate-Generals discussed ongoing provincial reconstruction and funding for the 
Diyala province during the meeting,” DIMOC Identifier 75M2OT5_5V7AZBEB0, August 9, 2008, Released 
to Public, modified (cropped).
55. PBS, “The Rise of ISIS,” Frontline, season 33, episode 2, October 28, 2014, available from 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/rise-of-isis/.
56. Ibid.
57. Anthony Cordesman and Sam Khazi, Iraq in Crisis: A Report of the CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy, 
New York: Center for Strategic International Studies, May 2014, p. 98; “Protestors Attack Iraqi Deputy 
PM, Guards Open Fire,” Voice of America, December 30, 2012, available from http://blogs.voanews.com/
breaking-news/2012/12/30/protesters-attack-iraqi-deputy-pm-guards-open-fire/.
58. Ahmed Maher, “Iraq Sunnis Threaten Army Attacks After Protest Deaths,” BBC News, January 26, 
2013, available from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-21206163.
59. Michael Schmidt, “434 People Killed in Iraq Since US Pulled Out,” The New York Times, January 
27, 2012, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/28/world/middleeast/suicide-bomber-attacks-funeral-
procession-in-iraq.html.
60. Al-Salhy, Suadad, “Al Qaeda claims killing of Syrian soldiers in Iraq,” Reuters, March 11, 2013, 
available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/11/us-syria-crisis-iraq-qaeda- idUSBRE92A07B20130311.
61. Alistair Lyon, ed., “Iraq Postpones Local Elections in two Provinces,” Reuters, March 19, 2013, 
available from http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-iraq-elections-idUSBRE92I0A020130319, accessed 
June 1, 2015.
62. PBS, “The Rise of ISIS.” 
63. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with John Hall, March 16, 2015, with quotations derived from 
notebook excerpts from April 21-22, 2013; and e-mail from John Hall, March 19, 2015.
64. Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Implications of the Hawija ‘massacre’ and Kirkuk Protest Movement,” 
Today’s Zaman, May 12, 2013, available from http://www.todayszaman.com/orsam_implications-of-the-hawija-
massacre-and-kirkuk-protest-movement_315156.html, accessed June 1, 2015; Rayburn, Iraq after America, p. 238.
65. Priyanka Boghani, “In Their Own Words: Sunnis on Their Treatment in Mali-
ki’s Iraq,” PBS, October 28, 2014, available from http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/
in-their-own-words-sunnis-on-their-treatment-in-malikis-iraq/.
66. Joel Rayburn, “Iraq is Back on the Brink of Civil War,” New Republic, May 8, 2013, available from 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113148/iraqs-civil-war-breaking-out-again, accessed June 2, 2015.
67. Tim Arango, “Iraqi Premier Urges Talks but Vows to Battle Insurgents,” The New York Times, April 
25, 2013, available from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/world/middleeast/iraqi-premier-urges-calm-but-
vows-to-continue-military-strikes.html?_r=0.
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
605
68. Aki Peritz, “The Great Iraqi Jail Break,” Foreign Policy, June 26, 2014; Jessica D. Lewis, “Middle East 
Security Report 14: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, The Breaking the Walls Campaign, Part I,” Washington, 
DC: Institute for the Study of War, September 2013, p. 7.
69. Lewis, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part I.”
70. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror, New York: Regan Arts, 2015, 
pp. 184-185.
71. Hassan Hassan, “A Jihadist Blueprint for Hearts and Minds is Gaining Traction in Syria,” The 
National, March 4, 2014.
72. Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda Disavows any Ties with Radical Islamist ISIS group in Syria, Iraq,” The Washing-
ton Post, February 3, 2014.
73. Lewis, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part I”; Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. 93.
74. “Iraq’s annual death toll highest in five years—UN,” BBC News, January 1, 2014, available from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25568687.
75. Aki Peritz, “The Great Iraqi Jail Break,” Foreign Policy, June 26, 2014; Mushreq Abbas, “Al-Qaeda 
Militants Raid Iraq’s Abu Ghraib, Taji Prisons,” Al Monitor, July 25, 2013.
76. Jessica Lewis, Ahmed Ali, and Kimberly Kagan, “Iraq’s Sectarian Crisis Reignites as Shi’a Militias 
Execute Civilians and Remobilize,” Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of War, June 1, 2013, avail-
able from http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqs-sectarian-crisis-reignites-shia-militias- execute-
civilians-and-remobilize.
77. Lewis, “Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Part I.”
78. Weiss and Hassan, ISIS, p. 93.
79. Marisa Sullivan, “Maliki’s Authoritarian Regime,” Middle East Security Report 10, Washington, 
DC: Institute for the Study of War, April 2013, pp. 12-14.
80. Ibid., pp. 16-19.
81. Knights, “Iran’s Foreign legion.”
82. Babakir Report; Ibid.
83. Interview, Colonel Joel Rayburn, CSA OIF Study Group, with Major General (Ret.) Aziz Swaidy, 
May 11, 2016.
84. Ibid.
85. Paper, Colonel C. Anthony Pfaff, “Strength and Weaknesses of Iraqi Security Forces,” June 2014.
86. Ibid, p. 10.
87. Ibid., pp. 1-3, 7.
88. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Caslen, December 18, 2014, West Point, NY.
89. Ibid.
90. Pfaff, p. 10.
606
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
91. Ibid., p. 12.
92. Ibid.
93. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Swaidy, May 11, 2016.
94. Kirk Sowell, “Maliki’s Anbar Blunder,” Foreign Policy, January 15, 2014.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Rowan Allport, “A Year after Mosul,” June 2, 2015, available from http://www.hscentre.org/security-
and-defence/year-mosul/, accessed April 12, 2016.
98. Yasir Abbas and Dan Trombly, “Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s 2d Division,” July 1, 2014, 
available from http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/inside-the-collapse-of-the-iraqi-armys-2nd-division/, accessed 
April 12, 2016.
99. Suadad Al-Salhy and Tim Arango, “Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul,” available from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militants-in-mosul.html?_r=0, accessed April 12, 2016.
100. Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “How Mosul Fell: A General’s Story,” p. 6, available 
from http://graphics.thomsonreuters.com/14/10/MIDEAST-CRISIS:GHARAWI.pdf, accessed April 12, 2012.
101. Ibid.
102. The five districts were Musherfa, Haramut, Tamoz 17, Hay al-Islah al-Ziraie, and Hay Tanak; 
Parker, Coles, and Salman, “How Mosul Fell,” pp. 2, 4.
103. Parker, Coles, and Salman, “How Mosul Fell,” p. 6.
104. Ned Parker, Isabel Coles, and Raheem Salman, “Special Report: How Mosul fell - An Iraqi general 
disputes Baghdad’s story,” p. 7, available from http://uk.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-gharawi- special-
report-idUSKCN0I30Z820141014, accessed April 13, 2016.
105. Ibid., p. 6.
106. Ibid., p. 4.
107. Ibid., p. 6.
108. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) propaganda image, available from https://www.longwarjournal.
org/archives/2014/06/isis_holds_military_parade_in.php.
109. Parker, Coles, and Salman, “Special Report: How Mosul fell.”
110. Jack Moore, “Extremists In Iraq May Have Looted $430 Million From Mosul’s Central Bank,” June 
11, 2014, available from http://www.businessinsider.com/430m-looted-from-mosuls-central-bank-2014-6?IR=T, 




113. Raheem Salman, “Survivors demand justice after Iraq massacre,” September 5, 2014, available from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-crisis-massacre-idUSKBN0H021L20140905, accessed April 14, 2016.
EPILOGUE: THE OFFICE OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND THE RETURN OF THE IRAQ WAR, 2012-2014
607
114. Interview, CSA OIF Study Group with Lieutenant General Ali al-Freiji, September 2015.
115. Slater, “The Paper Tiger of the Tigris.”
116. Salman, “Survivors demand justice after Iraq massacre.”
117. “Iraqi probe delves into Speicher Camp massacre,” Al-Arabiya English, November 28, 2014, avail-
able from http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/11/28/Iraqi-probe-delves-into-Speicher-Camp-
massacre.html, accessed April 14, 2016.
118. Alissa J. Rubin, “Militant Leader in Rare Appearance in Iraq,” July 5, 2015, available from http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/07/06/world/asia/iraq-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-sermon-video.html?_r=0, accessed April 14, 
2016; Martin Chulov, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerges from shadows to rally Islamist followers,” July 6, 
2014, available from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-isis, accessed April 
14, 2016.
119. Chulov, “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi emerges from shadows to rally Islamist followers”; “ISIS Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi first Friday sermon as so-called ‘Caliph’,” al-Arabyia English, available from http://english.
alarabiya.net/en/webtv/2014/07/05/ISIS-s-chief-Baghdadi-in-first-purported-video-as-caliph-.html, accessed April 
15, 2016.
120. Department of State photo, “Wanted: Information that brings to justice . . . Abu Bakr al-Bagh-
dadi: Up to $25 Million Reward,” n.d., Released to Public, available from https://rewardsforjustice.net/english/
abu_dua.html.
121. “ISIS urges militants to march to Baghdad,” Al Arabiya English, available from http://english.
alarabiya.net/en/News/2014/06/12/ISIS-militants-plan-to-march-on-Baghdad.html, accessed April 19, 2016.
122. “The Iraqi People Voluntary Army of Al Hashd Al Shaabi Moralistic Democracy: The Popular 
Mobilization Forces,” available from https://www.nationstates.net/nation=al_hashd_al_shaabi/detail=factbook/
id=main, accessed April 19, 2016.
123. Ahmed Ali with Kimberly Kagan, “The Iraqi Shi’a Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offensive,” 
June 14, 2014, available from http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iraqi-shi’-mobilization-counter-
isis-offensive, accessed April 15, 2016.
124. “The Iraqi People Voluntary Army of Al Hashd Al Shaabi Moralistic Democracy: The Popular 
Mobilization Forces,” available from https://www.nationstates.net/nation=al_hashd_al_shaabi/detail=factbook/
id=main, accessed April 19, 2016.
125. Joel Wing, “Iran And Its Shiite Militias Mobilize In Iraq Interview With Phillip Smyth,” June 
16, 2014, available from http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2014/06/iran-and-its-shiite-militias-mobilize.html, 
accessed April 15, 2016; Ahmed Ali with Kagan, “The Iraqi Shi’a Mobilization to Counter the ISIS Offen-
sive”; Bilgay Duman, “A New Controversial Actor in Post-ISIS Iraq: al-Hashd al-Shaabi (The Popular 
Mobilization Forces),” ORSAM Report No. 198, May 2015, pp. 10-12, available from http://www.orsam.org.
tr/en/enUploads/Article/Files/2015527_198raporengweb.pdf, accessed April 15, 2016.
126. “Iraq: Security situation and internally displaced people in Diyala, April 2015,” Oslo, 
Norway: The Norwegian Country of Origin Information Centre, April 24, 2015, pp. 7-8, available from 
https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1115404/1226_1441804342_topical-note-security-situation-and-internally-
displaced-people-in-diyala.pdf, accessed April 20, 2016.
127. Loveday Morris, “A Letter from Sistani Turned the Tide Against Iraq’s Leader,” The Washington 




THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
128. DoD photo by D. Myles Cullen, “CJCS visits Baghdad [Image 10 of 15],” DVIDS Identifier 1834314, 
March 9, 2015, available from https://www.dvidshub.net/image/1834314/cjcs-visits-baghdad.
129. Janine Di Giovanni, “The Militias of Baghdad,” November 26, 2014, available from http://www.
newsweek.com/2014/12/05/militias-baghdad-287142.html, accessed April 19, 2016. U.S. citizens refers to the 
journalists James Foley and later Steven Sotloff, and Peter “Abdul-Rahman” Kassig.
130. DoD photo by U.S. Army Sergeant 1st Class Clydell Kinchen, “Secretary of defense walks [Image 
4 of 14],” DVIDS Identifier 2085574, July 23, 2015, Released to Public, available from https://www.dvidshub.
net/image/2085574/secretary-defense-walks.
131. Ned Parker, “Iraq PM Abadi retires two top generals after Islamic State conquests,” 




CONCLUSION: FROM SURGE TO WITHDRAWAL
The post-surge period was marked by dramatic changes in the character of the Iraq 
conflict and in the U.S. approach to it. By the end of 2008, the security situation had 
improved to a degree that had seemed unthinkable in early 2007, when U.S. casualties 
and incidents of violence had risen to their highest levels of the war. Where insurgent 
attacks inside Iraq had once averaged over 140 per day, by the end of 2008 the coalition 
routinely experienced days with no attacks at all throughout the entire country. The pro-
vincial elections of January 2009, in which Iraqi voters in almost every Arab province 
elected parties running on a nationalist law and order platform boded well for political 
stability as well. General Raymond Odierno and Multi-National Forces–Iraq (MNF-I) rec-
ognized the profound change in the character of the conflict, and as a result MNF-I and 
its units began to shift their focus from counterinsurgency to stability operations—the 
activities necessary to sustain the military victory won during the surge.
At the same time, however, interest in the United States was waning. By early 2009, 
the “Washington clock” that General Peter Petraeus had spoken about in 2007-2008 had 
run out. After the financial crisis of 2008, U.S. Government officials and American for-
eign policy experts began to argue that counterinsurgency was too costly during a time 
of shrinking resources. As a result, the Iraq strategy and plans put in place in early 2009 
reflected limits on U.S. military activity rather than the idea that the surge had created 
opportunities that could be exploited.
After its signing, the 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement and its provision that U.S. 
troops would withdraw fully from Iraq by the end of 2011 loomed over every aspect of 
the U.S. military campaign. The agreement forced MNF-I to adjust its operations and 
plans in significant ways, such as the stipulation that U.S. troops would withdraw from 
Iraqi cities in June 2009, as well as new requirements for almost all U.S. units to coor-
dinate their operations through their Iraqi military and police counterparts. The move-
ment of U.S. troops out of the cities created vulnerabilities that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
exploited in the massive autumn bombings of August-December 2009, which discredited 
the Maliki government to such an extent that it nearly collapsed.
As the date for withdrawal from the cities approached, civil-military cooperation suf-
fered and the relationship between MNF-I and the U.S. Embassy devolved into a level 
of dysfunctionality equal to that between Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) and the 
Coalition Provisional Authority. Still, MNF-I and its civilian counterparts were able to 
cooperate closely enough to implement Odierno’s vision of a “combined security mecha-
nism,” a de facto peacekeeping mission along the Green Line under which U.S., Iraqi, and 
Kurdish security forces operated and coordinated together to prevent the very real threat 
of an Arab-Kurdish war in the north.
While the Combined Security Mechanism was helping to stabilize northern Iraq, sev-
eral factors were undermining Iraq’s stability elsewhere. In 2010, the Sons of Iraq move-
ment that had helped turn the tables in 2007-2008 began to wilt under pressure from AQI 
on one hand and the Maliki government on the other. The Iranian regime’s Quds Force 
intensified its campaign to try to force the United States out of Iraq using militant proxies 
610
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
such as Kata’ib Hizballah and other Shi’a militias, while the Syrian regime of Bashar al 
Assad continued its involvement with AQI and other Sunni insurgents despite U.S. out-
reach to the Assad regime. Nevertheless, the Syrian regime could not save AQI from the 
most successful series of security operations of the entire war, which came in early 2010 
and nearly destroyed the terrorist organization. The Iraqi political deadlock that ensued 
after the country’s parliamentary elections of March 2010 undermined these successes 
by once again polarizing Iraqi politics along sectarian lines and setting Prime Minister 
Maliki against the Sunni political bloc associated with the Awakening. When the Arab 
Spring movement swept across the Middle East in 2011, the unpopular Maliki govern-
ment found itself the target of popular disaffection because of the government’s failure to 
improve governance and public services.
Against this backdrop, U.S. commanders raced against the clock in 2010-2011 to pre-
pare the Iraqi security forces (ISF) to defend the country by themselves after the depar-
ture of U.S. troops, and the U.S. Army’s specially designed Advise and Assist Brigades 
began to rotate to Iraq for that purpose. After United States Forces-Iraq’s (USF-I) August 
2010 change of mission from combat operations to advise and assist operations, however, 
USF-I leaders had fewer and fewer means with which to counter the Shi’a militants and 
other adversaries. By late 2010, USF-I leaders had to work hard to prevent retrograde 
operations from becoming the U.S. command’s main effort. At the same time, command-
ers had to develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures for the Advise and Assist 
Brigades that operated “by, with, and through” Iraqi forces. USF-I commander General 
Lloyd Austin and his headquarters also had to conduct continual planning to push the 
“waterfall” (of the ultimate U.S. troop withdrawal) as far to the right as possible, thereby 
leaving the greatest number of forces in place and preserving options to the last possible 
moment in 2011 as the United States formulated its policy on troop strength in Iraq.
As U.S. troops prepared to depart the country, clear signs emerged that USF-I’s main 
enemies were reemerging. Under new leadership and reinvigorated by the onset of the 
Syrian civil war, AQI rebounded during 2011 and began forming itself into what would 
eventually become the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Shi’a militant groups, mean-
while, stepped up their attacks against U.S. troops in mid-2011 in an attempt to position 
themselves to gain credit for driving USF-I out of Iraq, as Lebanese Hizballah had done 
before the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. The Iranian-backed militias also con-
ducted these attacks partly to better position themselves for political power in the post-
U.S. period.
Even before 2011, USF-I leaders were seeing early signs of the deep problems within 
the ISF that would later cause that force to unravel in the face of ISIS in 2014. Austin 
noted in particular the difficulty within the ISF of maintaining complex weapons systems 
and performing logistics functions. At the same time, signs of Prime Minister Maliki’s 
politicization of ISF leadership and establishment of regime protection forces—such as 
the Iraqi special operations forces—were unmistakable, pointing to the difficulty of com-
pleting a security assistance mission within a “sovereignty trap” in which a host nation 
government’s aims diverge increasingly from our own, but that host nation remains the 
means by which we intend to secure our interests. Falling oil prices also led the Iraqi Gov-
ernment to cut the ISF’s budget, making it impossible for USF-I and the ISF to remain on 
track with ISF development plans such as the generation of the new Iraqi Air Force. The 
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Iraqi Government also cut payments to the Sons of Iraq, partly due to its budget deficits 
and partly for sectarian reasons aimed at preventing a Sunni resurgence.
Most importantly for the completion of the USF-I mission, however, the effort to leave 
a residual force in place after 2011 failed. U.S. military plans did not anticipate the fall 
2011 decision to withdraw all troops. These plans were based on mistaken assumptions 
that the State Department would have the capacity and the will to sustain USF-I’s many 
military missions upon assuming control of the security assistance mission. The shift in 
security assistance and ISF development from military units to contractors failed after 
2010, and at the same time, “soft power” did not fill the vacuum as U.S. military planners 
had assumed and officials in Washington had asserted.
As a result, at the end of 2011 the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq—the organiza-
tion created to assume the security assistance mission after USF-I’s closure—was left in 
a situation similar to that of CJTF-7 in 2003: under-resourced and lacking the authorities 
and tools necessary to preserve U.S. interests. This mismatch of ends and means was 
more serious than U.S. Government leaders understood in 2011-2012, partly because of 
the U.S. misinterpretation of low reported levels of violence and the difficulty of main-
taining situational awareness as U.S. forces drew down.
The unfortunate aftermath of the U.S. military withdrawal is now well known: in 
2013, after a series of political moves by Maliki that alienated much of Iraq’s Sunni com-
munity, the country began to return to a state of civil war. By the first week of 2014, Fallu-
jah was back in insurgent hands, soon to become an ISIS stronghold. Five months later, in 
June 2014, Mosul fell to ISIS and the four Iraqi Army divisions in Ninewa and Salahadin 
Provinces evaporated. In the ensuing chaos, ISIS fighters advanced all the way to the out-
skirts of Baghdad and to the hinterland of Erbil, prompting a massive expansion by Iraq’s 
Shi’a militia organizations to defend the country’s capital. By the end of summer 2014, 
U.S. forces had begun to return to Iraq to stiffen the ISF and to conduct a new campaign 
against ISIS, but without the benefit of the military infrastructure the United States had 
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In a way, it would be reassuring to believe that the mistakes the United States made in 
the Iraq War were the result of unintelligent leaders making poor decisions. If that were 
so, then the United States could be assured of avoiding similar mistakes in the future 
simply by selecting better, more intelligent leaders. However, this is not the case. The 
overwhelming majority of decisions in the Iraq War were made by highly intelligent, 
highly experienced leaders whose choices, often in consensus, seemed reasonable at the 
time they were made, but nonetheless added up over time to a failure to achieve our 
strategic objectives. Examining the reasoning behind these decisions and the systemic 
failures that produced them should be the first task in analyzing the Iraq War’s lessons. 
What follow are examinations of some of those key decisions, and in some cases their 
unintended consequences, as well as their implications for future wars.
SELECTED STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WARS
State Collapse
The operation to change the Ba’athist regime of Saddam Hussein escalated into the 
unintentional collapse of the Iraqi state, an outcome that went beyond U.S. objectives and 
for which the U.S. military was not prepared. Part of the Iraqi state was bound to collapse 
because of the U.S.-led invasion, but coalition provisional authority (CPA) orders 1 and 
2 led to a far more sweeping implosion than U.S. leaders intended. A large part of the 
instability that followed between 2003 and 2011 was the predictable consequence of this 
implosion, after which factions of all kinds, including extremist militants, rushed to fill 
the void.
The invasion of Iraq showed that even an operation designed as a limited regime 
decapitation can precipitate state collapse in centralized, authoritarian political systems, 
after which must follow either martial law imposed by a large military presence or civil-
ian authority prepared to step in and immediately assume responsibility for governance―
itself a massive undertaking. If this does not happen, the void will at least partly be filled 
by malignant actors. In Iraq, coalition leaders made a conscious decision not to impose 
martial law in Iraq in the aftermath of the fall of Saddam’s regime, but they also had not 
prepared an interim authority ready to do more than manage a humanitarian crisis that 
did not materialize. The resulting power vacuum and governance gap have never been 
fully filled by the post-Saddam Iraqi state.
Technology Does Not Always Offset Numbers
The Iraq War demonstrated that technological advancements only go so far in 
enabling reduction of our military end strength and our forces on the ground. Stability 
and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, and in general, are troop-intensive 
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activities. In addition, irregular warfare by its nature is a political-military endeavor in 
which every operation has political implications, which is why establishing relationships 
with local Iraqis and developing an understanding of local socio-cultural dynamics was 
so important. That task requires human interaction more than it requires the application 
of technology. Against this backdrop, the de facto cap on U.S. troop strength in Iraq and 
the reduction of ground troops in the Army’s transformed brigade combat teams (BCTs) 
combined to create an absolute shortage of ground forces for the prosecution of stability 
and COIN operations in Iraq. In future wars, the United States must guard against its 
historical American predilection to assume technology or qualitative warfighting superi-
ority can be a substitute for troop numbers.
The Iraq War also highlighted the mistaken assumptions that influenced the pre-2003 
debate over whether the U.S. military would—or should—be capable in the future of 
fighting two major regional conflicts simultaneously. In the pre-2003 period, U.S. mili-
tary leaders and planners accepted that the United States need only maintain the combat 
power and forces required to win in one theater of war while holding in another, after 
which U.S. forces would be able to pivot to the second theater of war and win there as 
well—a concept nicknamed “win-hold-win.” In the simultaneous conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan—neither of which reflected the nature of a major regional conflict in defense 
planning—the U.S. military was not able to “win-hold-win.” Instead, long-term stability 
operations severely taxed ground forces optimized for decisive conflict such as Operation 
DESERT STORM and created a shortage of ground forces. Strategic defeat was almost 
assured by artificial constraints on combat power in either theater and by this overall 
shortage of ground forces. This fact holds implications for potential future contingencies 
around the world. It is not clear, after the Iraq War, that the U.S. military has retained 
sufficient ground forces to fight successfully in more than one major regional conflict at a 
time. Furthermore, the inability of ground forces to accomplish the objectives of the win-
hold-win concept indicate that the basic strategic premise itself is inadequate.
Coalition Warfare
The multinational coalition’s political and diplomatic value for the United States was 
not matched by its operational effectiveness inside the Iraq theater. Coalition warfare was 
largely unsuccessful for several reasons. Following the model established in the Balkans, 
the U.S. military allocated independent division battlespace to the coalition partners in 
Multi-National Division-Central South (MND-CS) and Multi-National Division-South-
east (MND-SE), but in doing so uncoupled most of southern Iraq from the broader U.S. 
military campaign. The Polish-led MND-CS operated under strict national caveats that 
restricted its units in restive, Shi’a-militant-influenced areas of the country. In the Brit-
ish case, MND-SE became increasingly disconnected from Multi-National Corps-Iraq’s 
(MNC-I) planning and operations, with both the U.S. command in Baghdad and the Brit-
ish command in Basra operating as though events in central Iraq and far southern Iraq 
were unrelated. As Iranian malignant influence mounted in 2006 and after, U.S. com-
manders pressed the British contingent in southern Iraq to disrupt the Islamic Revolution-
ary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its Shi’a militant proxies, a step that Whitehall prevented. 
When the United States adopted the surge strategy in 2007, the differences between the 
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new U.S. approach in central Iraq and the British transition strategy in southern Iraq 
could not be reconciled.
These differences illustrated problems that stemmed from assuming the coalition’s 
contributing nations held a common understanding of and commitment to the strate-
gic objective. They did not. The success of any coalition depends on the establishment 
and maintenance of such a common understanding and commitment. Without these 
elements, the predictable result is coalition partners who operate with caveats that can 
become self-defeating.
The United Kingdom’s (UK) operations in Iraq are a case in point. By 2006, the British 
Government had decided to withdraw its forces gradually from Iraq in order to increase 
significantly its troop presence in Afghanistan. This decision made deployments in Iraq 
and Afghanistan a zero-sum matter, a fact whose implications British policymakers 
apparently never discussed with their U.S. counterparts. The need to pull forces from 
Iraq to send to Afghanistan became even more critical after the 2003 strategic restructur-
ing and defense cuts that dramatically reduced the size of the British Army began to take 
effect.1 As a result, MND-SE was forced to reduce forces on a strict timetable, giving the 
command almost no flexibility as conditions changed. Resolving this strategic dilemma, 
as U.S. commanders in Baghdad wished to do, would have required discussions and an 
agreement between U.S. and British national leaders that did not take place.
Despite the disconnect between the operational commands in Baghdad and MND-
SE, the British contribution in Baghdad was significant. Until mid-2009, when the Brit-
ish national contingent departed Iraq, British special operators played a crucial role in 
the fight against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). British and Australian officers played key roles 
in Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), MNC-I, 
and Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) as well as MNSTC-
I’s North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) element, NATO Training Mission-Iraq 
(NTM-I). Senior British officers often led MNF-I’s planning, reconciliation, and gov-
ernance efforts, exerting outsized influence on the conduct of the coalition campaign. 
Over the course of this 6-year interaction, the working relationship between U.S. and 
British officers grew increasingly close and eventually shifted to Afghanistan. From 2002 
onward, a generation of U.S. Soldiers learned to assume that in any major operation they 
would be serving alongside British counterparts, especially at the operational level. From 
the British perspective, however, it is not clear that the same is true. Given the British 
Government and public’s deeply negative view of the Iraq War, participation of British 
forces in future U.S.-led campaigns cannot be taken for granted.
The Iraq War also showed that the under-resourcing of defense forces by almost all 
our allies, including the United Kingdom, would require a new approach to the integra-
tion of allies into future campaigns. Throughout the 1990s, the U.S. military assumed that 
any large-scale U.S. operation would include major allies. In the future, we can no longer 
assume our allies will be willing to participate, at least on the terms we require; nor can 
we assume they will retain the military capabilities to add value to operations when they 
do. If countries with limited capabilities and overly restrictive national caveats partici-
pate in future conflicts as allies, the challenge of integrating them can be mitigated some-
what by diffusing coalition contingents across U.S. headquarters rather than giving allied 
contingents their own independent battlespace as was done in MND-SE and MND-CS.
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Security Force Assistance and Security Sector Reform
U.S. national interests probably will require the military to conduct large-scale secu-
rity force assistance in the future, either in conflict or outside of conflict, so the Army must 
sustain institutional capabilities for missions of this kind. Building indigenous foreign 
forces on a scale of the Iraq War requires a specialized force structure and training base 
within the conventional Army, not just special operations forces. The U.S. military may 
be called upon to stand up MNSTC-I or Combined Security Transition Command-Af-
ghanistan type organizations in the future, and thus the Army should have the doctrine 
and force structure capable of doing so quickly. In Iraq, the Army waited 6 years before 
creating the Advise and Assist Brigades. In future conflicts, this should be done more 
rapidly, or it would be even better if the capability were retained in the peacetime Army.
In the future, security assistance and security sector reform must go hand in hand. 
Both are necessary; neither is sufficient by itself. In Iraq, the United States had to build 
military forces, self-sufficient administrative systems within the military and the Minis-
try of Defense, and law enforcement organizations. Building combat power through the 
construction of tactical units alone, as was done in the first 3 years of the Iraq War, was 
a short-term solution that squandered precious time and created an illusion of progress. 
Institutional development of combat support, combat service support, and ministerial 
functions must occur in parallel with the creation of tactical units.
Holistic security assistance means that the United States must also build law enforce-
ment institutions. This includes police, a confinement system, and an adjudication 
system, yet in Iraq, the United States did not have an integrated approach. U.S. leaders 
assigned responsibility for the police function to MNSTC-I and provided congressionally 
approved Iraqi security force (ISF) funds, but they assigned the other two functions to 
the U.S. Embassy’s Rule of Law Task Force, which could not access ISF funds. The result 
was a massive operational police force but an inadequate confinement and adjudication 
capability.
The effort to build an effective ISF also faced unity of effort challenges, with responsi-
bility for local police, paramilitary police, and military forces assigned at various times to 
different departments within the U.S. Government. After 3 years, this problem was finally 
resolved when authority, responsibility, and funding for all security forces, to include the 
police, were assigned to the Department of Defense (DoD). In the future, such an arrange-
ment should be the model. If regulatory or statutory change is not possible to attain unity 
of effort, organizations responsible for building non-military security forces—such as the 
police—must be appropriately organized and funded. They currently are not.
Building capable and independent security forces requires years, potentially decades, 
of interagency efforts. The insistence of senior military leaders, nearly consistently across 
the span of the Iraq War, that Iraqi forces would be able to stand on their own after “just” 
another year or two was counterproductive. If the United States is to undertake such 
projects in the future, senior military officers should caution their political leaders from 
the onset that their path will be long, slow, and frustrating. While such a commitment 
is costly, it does pay dividends. Maintaining involvement and presence not only helps 
protect the investment in training host nation security forces, but it also provides some 
degree of influence with local political leaders.
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Democratization and the Sovereignty Dilemma
Since the early 20th century, the United States has assumed that democratization brings 
greater stability. However, as the post-September 11, 2001 (9/11), wars have shown, elec-
tions are not always stabilizing events. U.S. commanders long believed the emergence 
of an elected Iraqi Government would have a calming effect, but the elections of 2005 
exacerbated ethno-sectarian conflict and contributed to the civil war that followed. The 
haste with which the Coalition carried out that process―holding two parliamentary elec-
tions, drafting a constitution, and hosting a referendum on that constitution―heightened 
tensions by raising the stakes of each event and provided insufficient time for reconcil-
iation. Iraq went from the removal of the Ba’ath regime to an approved constitution in 
roughly 30 months. By comparison, the fledgling United States―a nation with a tradition 
of democracy and a robust civil society―spent 12 years navigating a similar path. Iraq’s 
2010 parliamentary elections were similarly destabilizing, providing Prime Minister 
Maliki a pathway to consummate his authoritarian and sectarian tendencies.
The Iraqi political process demonstrated one of the enduring problems with the Amer-
ican approach to COIN. Once a partner government feels that its survival is assured, the 
U.S. ability to influence it declines. This often means that the partner government will 
arrest reform and reconciliation programs before they are complete―especially programs 
that would threaten the political or economic elite. As a result, often the root causes of 
insurgency will remain intact and ready to flare back up under the right conditions. U.S. 
leaders will continue to confront these dynamics in the future as the United States works 
through host nation governments to advance its national interests. Overcoming such 
a deep challenge will require a counterintuitive application of U.S. national power. As 
security improves, the United States will likely have to increase its commitment of key 
elements of national power—especially within the economic and diplomatic realms—in 
order to maintain sufficient influence so as to build a lasting peace.
U.S. misperceptions regarding democratization and sovereignty were linked directly 
to another key strategic error. The United States equated the end of fighting with the end 
of the war, but war involves more than fighting. By focusing heavily on metrics involving 
violent incidents, U.S. leaders assumed that Iraq was more stable than it actually was. As 
a result, they deluded themselves about the length of commitment required and gave 
away tactical and operational successes only to achieve strategic failure. Strategic success 
would have required an acceptably stable state that Iraqis considered legitimately rep-
resentative of majority and minority groups, but U.S. leaders struggled to define how to 
accomplish that objective and focused on comfortable tactical and operational tasks that 
were necessary but not sufficient.
The Role of External Actors
COIN and counterterrorism are exponentially more difficult if enemy groups enjoy 
sanctuaries, especially in neighboring countries. The United States must develop a 
whole-of-government approach for neutralizing such sanctuaries, which have posed a 
problem for the United States since the end of World War II. From an early stage in the 
war, Syria and Iran played a highly destabilizing role in Iraq. Both sought to bog the 
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U.S.-led coalition down to gain advantage in the regional political struggle and deter the 
United States from seeking regime change in their countries. They also opposed the cre-
ation of a new U.S.-allied Iraqi Government. They gave sanctuary and strategic assistance 
to the Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies, respectively, and contributed materially to the killing 
and wounding of tens of thousands of Iraqis and hundreds, if not thousands, of coali-
tion troops. U.S. military and civilian leaders recognized this problem early in the war 
but never formulated an effective strategy for ending or even neutralizing it. U.S. lead-
ers refrained from direct measures against those regimes, and instead left the matter to 
MNF-I, a U.S. theater command that could only operate against Syrian and Iranian opera-
tives and proxies inside Iraq itself—with very rare exceptions. As a result, the Syrian and 
Iranian regimes became more and more emboldened. In particular, the Iranian regime 
produced sophisticated and lethal technology for their Iraqi proxies to use against U.S. 
troops, and U.S. forces had difficulty keeping up with the evolution of Iranian weap-
ons such as explosively formed penetrators and improvised rocket-assisted munitions 
(IRAMs). These weapons killed and wounded scores of U.S. troops, but the United States 
responded to them only at the tactical and operational levels, not the strategic. By impos-
ing artificial geographic boundaries on the conflict, the United States limited the war in a 
way that made it difficult to reach its desired end states.
The United States also never formulated a successful strategy for addressing the desta-
bilizing influence of other regional states, including some U.S. allies. Turkey, Jordan, and 
the Gulf states all played roles of varying significance in Iraq, not all of them positive. 
The United States had difficulty persuading the Gulf States to crack down on terrorist 
facilitators who supported AQI and other Sunni militant groups in Iraq. The Jordanian 
Government was reluctant to crack down on facilitators and sympathizers for the Sunni 
insurgency based in Jordan. The Turkish Government came close to war with the Kurdis-
tan Regional Government (KRG) on several occasions. The Turkish air and ground oper-
ations against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) inside Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007-2008 
nearly collapsed the Iraqi governing coalition in Baghdad at a time when the United 
States was trying to parlay the security gains of the surge into political reconciliation. 
The United States also failed to persuade the Gulf States to fully embrace the new Iraqi 
Government and encourage its reintegration into the Arab world in political, economic, 
and security terms.
In any conflict with major regional implications, the United States must expect all of 
the countries in a region to respond to U.S. actions. From the initiation of hostilities, the 
motives and potential actions of regional players must be taken into account and an inter-
agency response developed. In the Iraq War, U.S. leaders seemed to believe that other 
regional nations would not react. When they did, U.S. leaders rejected strategic action 
and instead chose operational or tactical responses. Although the United States should 
always be wary of expanding a conflict to other nations, U.S. leaders should consider the 
option of escalation—including with military power—when neighboring states become 
de facto combatants. In Iraq, the U.S. inability to find an effective response to Syrian 
and Iranian proxies made accomplishing our political and military objectives almost 
impossible.
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Military Leadership and Strategic Implementation
Innovative commanders emerged during the war and were empirically successful, 
but the process of encouraging and institutionalizing innovations was uneven. It is also 
not clear that the Army rewarded their performance through the promotions process or 
by supporting the replication of their successful innovations. With only a few exceptions, 
it does not appear that the Army examined how the tactical leaders who innovated in 
Iraq became innovators in the first place. Most often, it appears they learned what was 
required through peer-to-peer interaction on the battlefield, not in institutional venues 
back home. Indeed, it seems that the most successful innovators were actually inverting 
policy rather than operating within policy, most notably in the case of the brigade and 
battalion-level COIN approaches of 2005-2006, which took place during a time of the 
transition strategy. This is a fact the Army has not really confronted, and it seems pos-
sible that the Army in the Iraq War actually tended to penalize successful leaders who 
challenged their commanders.
Some of these issues clearly extended to strategic leadership as well. Theater and oper-
ational commanders were continually forced to deal with problems that could only truly 
be resolved at the policy level, by higher authorities in Washington or in allied capitals. 
The two most significant examples were that Iraq theater commanders often operated 
without the benefit of a coherent regional strategy, and that Iraq theater commanders 
were forced to mitigate the national caveats and policies of coalition partners. In addi-
tion to these examples, at several points of the war—the surge most prominently—mili-
tary leaders found themselves in the awkward role of defending strategy in the political 
realm. As a result, the line between military and political roles at times became blurred.
A better concept for the role of military leaders in war might be that of shared respon-
sibilities of senior political and military leaders.2 The belief in a hard line between the 
civil and military spheres is a mistaken one, and the experience of the post-9/11 wars 
has shown that, while civil leaders unequivocally retain final decision authority, military 
leaders should share the responsibility for ensuring the quality of important decisions. 
Specifically, military and civil leaders who embark upon war have a shared responsibil-
ity to ensure that war aims are achievable and that strategies, policies, and campaigns are 
tied to those aims and have a reasonable probability of success. It is also incumbent upon 
them to ensure, together, the integrity of the decision-making process and the fidelity 
of the information used in that process; the organizational capacity to execute in a suffi-
ciently coherent way, then adapt quickly enough as change happens; and the sustained 
legitimacy of the war. 
There is an organizational dimension to the implementation of these strategic factors. 
Future conflicts will require the integration of different elements of national power, but 
the U.S. interagency often lacks the capability of managing this integration. The current 
methodology of making policy via the National Security Council is sufficient for setting 
policy parameters, but it is insufficient for implementing and adapting. As Robert Komer 
noted in “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing,” the U.S. system was too slow to adapt to the 
changing character and demands of the Vietnam war, and more than 3 decades later in 
Iraq, it remained too slow.
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OPERATIONAL LESSONS
The Operational Impact of Key Policy Decisions
The Short-war Assumption. U.S. leaders and planners operated under the constant 
assumption that the war would be short. At no point in the war, even during the surge, 
did U.S. leaders believe the campaign was more than 18 or 24 months from the point 
when U.S. troops could be withdrawn and responsibility for security handed over to the 
Iraqis.
The short-war assumption drove DoD’s planning, and the “patch chart” of units sched-
uled to deploy often drove operational planning in the theater. The same assumption, 
at times, drove procurement and modernization decisions, with the Army and Marine 
Corps often deciding to fund future capabilities ahead of the operational needs of the 
Iraq theater. Such a decision was wholly logical, given the assessment from the theater 
headquarters that the war would wind down within the next year or so. Some leaders, 
such as Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Robert Gates, were able to overcome institutional 
inertia temporarily and champion procurement projects that met the immediate opera-
tional needs of the conflict, but in general, the bureaucracy still “did its thing.”
The fact that U.S. leaders retained the short-war assumption for as long as they did 
created some long-term negative consequences within the U.S. military. One such con-
sequence was the creation of a de facto “away team” and “home team” within the U.S. 
officer corps, wherein a population of officers in certain career fields, services, and units 
deployed much more frequently than the rest. This phenomenon, in turn, created a divi-
sion in worldview among military leaders.
Constant Constraint on Force Levels. Throughout the war, the commands in Iraq had 
too few troops to accomplish their military missions. As a matter of policy, DoD leaders 
and strategic-level commanders enforced a de facto cap on U.S. troop strength in the 
Iraq theater and effectively discouraged lower-level commanders from requesting more 
troops. DoD and military leaders did this for a variety of reasons, including the belief 
that the U.S. ground services were too large, outdated and unwieldy, and therefore send-
ing more troops to Iraq would hinder building more agile forces against future threats. 
Another reason for the force cap was the assessment that additional forces could be coun-
terproductive by creating “antibodies” among the Iraqi public as well as a “dependency 
cycle” that could prevent the Iraqi Government and its security forces from taking full 
responsibility for their nation’s security. Institutional concerns also loomed large, with 
Washington worrying that extended and back-to-back deployments would burn out and 
even cripple the all-volunteer force. Requirements from other theaters, namely Afghani-
stan, competed for limited resources in what became a zero-sum game. At other points in 
the war, the cap was driven by domestic political considerations.
The consequence of the troop cap was that at no point during the war, even during 
the surge period, did the in-country commanders meet their troop-to-task ratios or 
have enough troops to defeat both the Sunni insurgency (including AQI) and the Ira-
nian regime-backed Shi’a militants simultaneously. The campaign to stabilize Iraq most 
likely required far more time than it would otherwise have needed as a result, time that 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS OF THE IRAQ WAR
623
ultimately would not politically be available. The dearth of U.S. troops in late 2003 and 
early 2004 gave room to the Sunni and Shi’a insurgencies to gather strength. As U.S. 
troops withdrew later in the war, it meant that their departure left the United States with 
little influence over the behavior, effectiveness, and development of the ISF, which were 
rendered far less capable and far more politicized as U.S. combat support waned.
The question of force levels was not just an operational one. Senior civilian and mil-
itary leaders did not always make accurate assessments of the force levels required to 
perform the missions they assigned, nor put in place personnel policies that would make 
those force levels available. The problem was further exacerbated by a reluctance to 
increase the size of the Army and Marine Corps because of concerns that such an expan-
sion would come at the cost of procurement and research and development.
Several steps should be taken to avoid these sorts of problems in future conflicts. 
First, strategy should be driven by the traditional method of balancing of ends, ways, and 
means rather than by force levels. This should be done in conjunction with civilian lead-
ership as a part of the national security decision-making process. That process should 
include discussions on what is actually feasible at different force constraints, and should 
incorporate a continuous discussion about risk that matches the changing operational 
situation. Second, the assumption that U.S. Soldiers, by their mere presence, create ill 
effects must be banished from our strategic thought. While Iraqis chafed at the continued 
presence of U.S. Soldiers, many Iraqis also considered it essential for Americans to stay 
until their country was truly stabilized and self-sufficient. American military personnel 
consistently served as the most effective brake to sectarian conflict, with U.S. forces often 
acting as the only honest broker trusted by a majority of Iraqis.
Another important step to address potential future force constraint challenges would 
be for senior military leaders to consider increasing the size of the force, especially the 
Army and Marine Corps, as soon as the United States is committed to a major conflict. 
Repeatedly, the military has downsized after a major conflict to the degree that it does 
not have enough forces to fight the next war. This historical reality, when paired with 
the time required to obtain funding and authority for expansion, as well as the interval 
needed to recruit and train those new forces, makes early action essential. If the decision 
is not made early enough to increase the size of the force sufficiently, it is possible or even 
likely that, by the time that additional forces become available, they will arrive too late 
to have an operational effect. Senior military leaders should be extremely skeptical of 
assessments that a conflict will be over too quickly to benefit from such a growth. It is far 
easier to cancel such growth than to deal with the operational and strategic consequences 
of having insufficient forces.
Ad Hoc Organizations. After the invasion of April-May 2003, which was executed 
at the operational level by standing headquarters (U.S. Central Command [CENTCOM], 
Third Army, and V Corps), the war was fought by ad hoc organizations. Rather than 
use standing headquarters and commands, the Army and DoD chose instead to create 
new organizations to perform the functions of the theater command and its subordi-
nate headquarters that handled the development of the ISF and detention operations. 
Almost all of the most important operational commands in Iraq, such as CJTF-7, MNF-I, 
MNSTC-I, and Task Force 134, were established mainly by joint manning documents and 
staffed by individual augmentees provided by the services. Only MNC-I did not fall into 
624
THE U.S. ARMY IN THE IRAQ WAR
this category, since it was based upon the standing U.S. Army corps headquarters that 
rotated into theater on a yearly basis. The ad hoc commands all suffered greatly from low 
staffing at the outset, though MNF-I eventually grew far larger than its original design.
DoD leaders chose to use ad hoc organizations partly because they believed the Iraq 
War would be short and therefore large standing headquarters would be costly and 
unnecessary, and partly because they wished to keep the standing commands—such 
as CENTCOM and other army-level commands—available for other operations. The 
large, capable Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), for example, sat 
under-utilized in Kuwait for the duration of the war, waiting to be used in a contingency 
that never came. The consequence of using an ad hoc manning process was that the U.S. 
operational commands in Iraq were mainly headquarters that did not train together, 
lacked cohesion, and suffered from high personnel turnover, all of which hampered their 
effectiveness. While the tactical units that fought the war avoided the pitfalls of the Viet-
nam war’s year-long individual replacement program, the headquarters that planned 
and managed the conflict were saddled with exactly that burden.
Since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, the trend toward ad hoc head-
quarters has accelerated as a number of standing headquarters have been eliminated or 
reduced as cost savings measures. V Corps, the headquarters that planned the invasion 
of Iraq, is no more; and the Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), which could 
form the basis for a future CFLCC, have had their personnel authorizations cut nearly in 
half. In 2014, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT) had sufficient manpower to assume the mis-
sion immediately as a CJTF for operations in Iraq in addition to its ASCC duties. Today 
such a shift would not be possible. Given the concrete value that standing headquarters 
demonstrated repeatedly during the Iraq War, it would be wise to arrest, if not reverse, 
the near free fall reduction in their strength.
Army Transformation and the War. The Army’s 2003-2004 decision to continue with 
transformation while fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan had severe operational implica-
tions. Army leaders decided that the transformation process would eventually produce 
a larger number of more capable BCTs for the Iraq theater and other contingencies, but 
by continuing with transformation in a time of conflict, they rendered some brigades 
unavailable for deployment as they were reorganized and refitted. The most serious con-
sequence of this decision was the Army’s need in 2005 to operationalize the strategic 
reserve, the Army National Guard, and deploy large portions of it to Iraq.
As a result, about half of the brigades deployed to Iraq during the 2005 rotation were 
National Guard units taking part in the first large-scale operational deployment of the 
National Guard since the Korean war. Though most of these units and individuals per-
formed admirably, their deployment meant that for the make-or-break year of Iraqi elec-
tions, which President George W. Bush considered the critical period for his Iraq strategy, 
half of the Army brigades in theater were reserve units rather than more experienced and 
trained active component units.
The deployment of transformed brigades had other unintended consequences. The 
tactical improvements gained through transformation generally were offset by losses in 
troop strength in each brigade, a factor of critical importance in COIN operations. The 
Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) squadrons, in particular, 
often proved unequal to their assigned tasks; and it would be hard to imagine a RSTA 
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squadron conducting a movement to contact as 3-7 Cavalry did while it fought its way 
to Baghdad in 2003. Breaking up division resources and decentralizing them into the 
transformed brigades also had other consequences. The demise of the Division Support 
Command and Division Artillery undoubtedly would make made it more challenging 
for a division commander to weight the main effort, and repeating the tactical success of 
the invasion could be more difficult. At times during the invasion, for example, all of the 
3d Infantry Division’s assigned and attached artillery battalions were firing in support of 
one brigade—a seemingly unrealistic scenario now that each brigade commander owns 
his own artillery battalion. While some of these division resources are making a fragile 
comeback, it is difficult to see how the partial reversals will have a decisive impact. When 
evaluated in the context of the Iraq War, transformation at best produced few concrete 
gains; at worst, it produced a net negative result.
Overly Optimistic Planning. Throughout the war, planners in DoD and in the theater 
assumed that the security situation in Iraq would improve over time, and that the theater 
would require fewer U.S. troops in the future. At no point other than in late 2006 and early 
2007 did strategic thinking reflect the idea that the security situation could worsen and 
require more U.S. troops. U.S. military plans generally were aligned with General John P. 
Abizaid and General George W. Casey, Jr.’s assumption that the new Iraqi Government 
would be seen as legitimate and dampen militant resistance. The opposite proved to be 
true. U.S. military leaders stuck with the campaign plan of 2004-2005 even though several 
studies done in 2005—including the ones completed by MNF-I and U.S. Embassy Red 
Team in Baghdad—concluded that it was not succeeding. The planning of large opera-
tions such as IRAQI FREEDOM is a shared civil-military responsibility, and both military 
and civil leaders failed to reassess the appropriateness of the 2004-2005 campaign plan 
despite evidence that it needed to change. Senior military leaders and their staffs must 
be able to better identify strategic inflection points and alter their plans when such tran-
sitions occur.
The Understanding of the Environment Across the Force
Throughout the war, U.S. units suffered from a limited understanding of the operat-
ing environment in Iraq. In the prewar planning and the execution of the invasion, U.S. 
units did not understand the inner workings of the Ba’athist regime or the Iraqi security 
sector, and assigned too much importance to the formal structures of the government. 
Intelligence reports underestimated the impact of decades of international sanctions 
and their effects on Iraq’s infrastructure and Iraqi society. The United States also did 
not understand the relationships and rivalries among the various Iraqi factions, political 
parties, communities, and tribes. As a result, U.S. units found it difficult to discern the 
enemy’s strategic and operational intent throughout the war—and to discern the motiva-
tions of the factions and individuals that comprised the post-Saddam Iraqi Government 
and security forces. As a result, U.S. units’ actions sometimes exacerbated preexisting 
conflicts among Iraqis, especially in cases in which Coalition forces inadvertently sided 
with one party against another in a long-standing local struggle. These struggles often 
appeared to be a matter of the Iraqi Government versus the insurgency (in which the 
Coalition naturally aligned with the representatives of the government) when in fact the 
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disputes often long predated the 2003 invasion. Too often U.S. units were manipulated 
into taking part in local conflicts that were not necessarily germane to the broader fight 
against our enemies.
U.S. units also had difficulty understanding the relationships among the various 
enemy groups, so that early in the war they failed to detect, among an array of insur-
gent groups that appeared loose and disparate, the existence of an insurgency that could 
coordinate and synchronize its activities at the operational level across the country. In 
the mid-years of the war, U.S. forces also failed to detect deep fissures among insurgent 
groups—on both the Sunni and Shi’a sides—that might have been exploited to fracture 
the insurgency well before the Sunni Awakening. U.S. units also did not appreciate the 
degree to which the former regime elements in the Sunni insurgency were linked to AQI 
and other Islamist extremist groups, so that the Ba’athist role inside AQI was opaque to 
the United States when it evolved into an Iraqi-led organization in 2009-2010.
Because U.S. forces often did not understand the dynamics that drove local political 
conflict, they did not grasp the linkages between local conflicts and national politics. The 
dictum that “all politics is local” was truer in Iraq than we generally understood: virtu-
ally every powerful faction in the central Iraqi state owed its national-level strength to 
a local constituency. As a result, Iraqi political figures often became directly involved 
in local matters to preserve or advance their national-level power, to either the benefit 
or detriment of the coalition. Though the coalition often had limited leverage over Iraqi 
factions at the national level, our units had virtually unlimited power at the local level, 
where they could issue contracts to whomever they pleased, arrest whomever it was nec-
essary to arrest, or partner with whomever it suited them to partner. Because U.S. leaders 
often did not understand the relationship between local politics and national politics, 
they rarely turned their ability to make or break any local Iraqi faction into advantage 
over national-level Iraqi factions or leaders.
Operational Art Considerations
The Army has not yet captured the operational art lessons of the Iraq War and incor-
porated them into doctrine or military education. At the time of this writing, Lieutenant 
General (Ret.) James M. Dubik’s monograph, Operational Art in Counterinsurgency, remains 
one of just a few works on this topic. What follow are a series of lessons that the Army 
should incorporate into its doctrine on operational art.3
The Absence of an Operational Reserve. The constraint on U.S. force levels through-
out the war meant that, aside from brief periods, the United States fought the Iraq War 
without an operational reserve inside the theater. At almost every stage of the war, U.S. 
forces inside Iraq were fully committed, meaning that U.S. commanders accepted more 
risk than U.S. doctrine would normally dictate. In several cases, U.S. commanders found 
it difficult to respond to operational-level surprises, such as the fall of Mosul in Novem-
ber 2004, the Samarra Mosque bombing in 2006, and the Basra and Sadr City battles of 
spring 2008.
In future conflicts, senior Army leaders should do everything possible to ensure that 
they have sufficient troops in theater to be able to maintain a capable reserve. In the case 
of Iraq, the reserve should have been at least two battalions in size and should have 
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been a mechanized or Stryker force. If strategic constraints prevent leaders from having 
enough aggregate forces to task unassigned units to the mission, it is better to maintain 
a reserve and accept risk in some locations rather than go without. Assigning a unit that 
already has battlespace to be an “on call” reserve, as was the case in 2004, is not a viable 
option and has the potential to create catastrophic results for both the location requiring 
a reserve force and the location from which the “on call” reserve is inevitably pulled.
Economies of Force. The dearth of U.S. troops also meant that operational command-
ers were forced to employ risky economies of force throughout the war, often under-re-
sourcing areas that were important to Iraqi stability or to the enemy. The need to employ 
economies of force meant that U.S. commanders faced a constant tradeoff between the 
need to disrupt the Sunni insurgency’s use of the Syrian border zone as a strategic base 
(and the Shi’a insurgency’s similar use of the Iranian border zone) and the need to employ 
enough troops in central Iraq to secure and stabilize the Baghdad region. In the most 
costly instance of this tradeoff, MNF-I shifted significant combat power from central Iraq 
to the Syrian border zone in 2005, dealing the Sunni insurgency tactical defeats in its 
border sanctuaries but leaving the Baghdad region open to sectarian violence that almost 
tore the country apart. At no point in the war, even during the surge, did U.S. command-
ers have enough forces at their disposal—either U.S. or Iraqi—to operate at an adequate 
level in both central Iraq and the border zones.
While nearly every military commander throughout history probably has wished 
for more forces, in Iraq, some of the causes of the malady of insufficient forces were 
self-induced. Particularly during the 2005-2006 timeframe, senior commanders sought to 
“starve” U.S. forces of manpower in order to force them to turn over more responsibility 
to Iraqis. This was thought to be a method that would empower and prepare the Iraqis 
more quickly to take responsibility for their own security, thereby attaining the theater 
end state more quickly. In reality, it had the opposite effect, creating considerable gaps 
in the coalition’s situational awareness and propelling the country more quickly toward 
civil war. Future operational leaders should recognize the ill effect of purposely creating 
risky economies of force and determine better methods of transitioning responsibility to 
host nation forces quickly.
Boundaries. Too often, coalition unit boundaries did not take local political, social, 
or tribal dynamics into account, thereby hampering a unit’s effectiveness and creating 
seams that our enemies could exploit. The U.S. units that occupied Iraq in 2003 made 
boundary choices that reflected U.S. military doctrine but sometimes made little sense in 
the Iraqi context. The most significant early example was the inclusion of Diyala in MND-
North Central’s (MND-NC) area of operations. Diyala was separated from much of the 
rest of the MND-NC area of operations by the Hamrin Mountains and was more linked to 
Baghdad than to the Tigris River Valley. This decision also artificially cut the upper Tigris 
River Valley, an insurgent hotbed, into two separate division areas of operation. Not until 
late 2005 were Mosul and Tikrit finally included in the same division area of operations, 
and even then, the Diyala Valley remained part of MND-North’s (MND-N) battlespace.
Similarly, the unfortunate arrangement of MND-CS’s battlespace made first Karbala 
and Najaf, and later Diwaniyah, artificially separate from the other major cities of central 
southern Iraq, creating many seams that the Sadrist insurgency and the IRGC Quds Force 
could exploit. Finally, at various times the vast Jazeera area north of the Euphrates—the 
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Ba’athist regime’s main smuggling area during the 1991-2003 sanctions period—was a 
seam between MNF-West (MNF-W) and MND-N which the Sunni insurgency heavily 
exploited.
To address these issues, boundaries must be constantly reevaluated, perhaps to the 
point of creating a doctrinal mandate to review unit boundaries quarterly or at least semi-
annually during sustained conflicts. In Iraq, with a few notable exceptions, shifting unit 
boundaries usually only occurred because of the surge or withdrawal of coalition forces. 
Even in those cases, often little thought was given as to how to restructure boundaries. 
In the future, boundaries must be reviewed on a recurrent basis to assess whether they 
adequately reflect the changing human terrain and enemy situation.
Key Terrain. The coalition’s arrangement of battlespace also failed in some cases to 
emphasize properly Iraq’s key terrain. The most significant example of this was that from 
2003 through 2006, the coalition’s operational commands did not recognize the impor-
tance of the “belts” around Baghdad and their critical role in securing the city. Only in late 
2006 did MNC-I realize what most Iraqis knew: that Iraqi Governments had for decades 
used the belts to secure the approaches to Baghdad and that the belts had been the basis 
of Saddam’s plans to defend the capital in 2003. From an early stage, AQI considered the 
belts vital to control Baghdad. Later the IRGC Quds Force and Badr Corps intended to 
use them to cleanse the Baghdad region of Sunnis. Nevertheless, not until the arrival of III 
Corps in late 2006 did the coalition formulate a comprehensive plan to control the belts.
It has become almost a cliché for operational level planners to assess a nebulous “will 
of the people” or “public support” as the center of gravity in a conflict against insurgents. 
While these issues are critical, they are more appropriately strategic centers of gravity 
and reflect tasks that do not fall wholly within the military’s purview. At the operational 
level—even in fights against insurgents and other irregulars—key terrain is still import-
ant and ignoring this fact is perilous. The U.S. military should reemphasize the doctrinal 
importance of terrain in insurgencies, noting that guerrillas need logistics bases, training 
areas, sanctuaries, and areas from which to launch large-scale attacks. Human terrain 
matters, but so does geographic terrain.
Decentralized Assets for a Decentralized Fight. The U.S. force that invaded Iraq in 
2003 was trained to maneuver and fight in divisions, meaning that scarce assets such 
as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and fire support were managed 
at division or corps level. As the war proceeded, U.S. operations became increasingly 
decentralized to the brigade and battalion level, and over time enabler resources such as 
ISR were pushed to lower and lower levels. By 2009, some battalion commanders con-
trolled more unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and intelligence assets than the V Corps 
commander had in the 2003 invasion.
In institutional terms, the Army needs to further integrate operational decentraliza-
tion in its organizational structures (tables of organization and equipment [TOEs]), rather 
than having units returning from a combat zone turn in the equipment and assets useful 
to them in war and recreate their prewar TOEs.
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Transitions
The decision to rotate units into the theater on an annual basis had significant impli-
cations for operations, as many units that rotated into the theater tended to only formu-
late plans that extended to the end of their 1-year rotation. Those plans often sought to 
conduct a successful 1-year campaign based on new approaches rather than sustaining 
whatever the units that preceded them had been doing. As a result, U.S. units tended to 
emphasize quick but sometimes short-lived effects rather than longer-term stability. In 
one example early in the war, U.S. leaders rejected as too slow Brigadier General David 
Perkins’s suggestion to build a new electrical infrastructure that would meet Baghdad’s 
full demand within 3 years. Perkins then returned to the theater 3 years later to find that 
no major upgrades to the Iraqi electrical grid had taken place, and Baghdad’s demand 
still far outpaced supply.
The turbulent unit transitions that took place at least once a year also hampered rela-
tionships between coalition units and local Iraqis. U.S. units came and went so frequently 
that productive relationships were forgotten. Often the extensive knowledge about the 
local operating environment that units developed was not fully transmitted to incoming 
units. This was made worse by the frequent changes that accompanied the drawdown of 
U.S. troops.
A potential solution could have been to align brigades and divisions permanently to 
one theater and one specific area of operations until the cessation of hostilities or the with-
drawal of forces. Under such a model, if a brigade operated in west Baghdad on its first 
deployment, it would expect to be deployed to that same area―even to the same forward 
operating bases (FOBs) and joint security stations (JSSs) if possible―for the remainder of 
the conflict. When that brigade redeployed to its home station, it would remain in virtual 
contact with the unit that replaced it, even reading its classified daily reports and con-
versing with the deployed unit’s leadership. Such a pattern, used by special operations 
units for the majority of the war, could have created long-term buy in and commitment 
for coalition forces and Iraqis alike as the unit would know that their actions had long-
term relevance. It might not be possible to assign units always back to their same area of 
operations given the turbulence associated with Army transformation and the ebb and 
flow of overall force structure. However, it would have been better than the haphazard 
assignment of forces that often saw brigades switched not only across different provinces 
in Iraq, but also between the Iraqi and Afghan theaters.
A second potential solution would be to deviate from the normal command rotational 
schedule, keeping commanders in key positions such as brigades, divisions, and corps 
headquarters deployed for multiple years or even the duration of the conflict. While such 
a solution would undoubtedly be an incredible personal and family burden, it would 
almost certainly have alleviated the dilemma of repeated annual transitions. Nor would 
such a solution be without historical precedent. In the Civil War and World War II, senior 
leaders knew that they were committed for the duration of the conflict, itself a consider-
able motivating factor to achieve success. Similarly, during the post-9/11 conflicts, some 
senior special operations commanders remained deployed for years at a time, and Casey 
commanded MNF-I for 2½ years.
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Metrics
Throughout the Iraq War, U.S. operational commands found it difficult to determine 
whether their plans were succeeding or failing, especially as conditions in the theater 
changed. U.S. commanders and their staffs never came to a consensus on what they 
ought to be measuring to know whether their units were effective. For most of the war, 
units and civilian agencies tended to measure their activities or inputs rather than the 
outcome of those activities: money spent, Iraqis trained, insurgents killed or captured, 
or other such measures. Until 2006, the coalition essentially measured success by the 
holding of Iraq’s three elections, the generation of ISF, and the drawdown of coalition 
troops. During the surge, the United States emphasized the completion of “benchmarks” 
to gauge strategic progress. But for both the pre-2007 measures of success and the 2007 
benchmarks, it would have been possible to show progress in every specified metric but 
still fail in the overall mission—exactly the situation in which the coalition found itself in 
late 2006. For future operations, the Army must reexamine its measures of effectiveness, 
and U.S. units must have better ways of determining whether they are succeeding in their 
missions.
At a different level, the Army should consider reassessing trends that emphasize the 
use of metrics at the expense of difficult to measure professional judgment. In some ways, 
Army leaders have become too enamored with the “fetishization” of statistics and met-
rics.4 At times in Iraq, metrics and statistics were seen as hard truths or facts, when they 
often only provided a snapshot in time of a portion of the situation. Examples of this phe-
nomenon include the transition readiness assessment, the size of the Iraqi security forces, 
and the calculation of whether U.S. brigades could be withdrawn in 2006. While our 
Army relishes quoting Carl von Clausewitz, in practice we have come to rely excessively 
on the Jominian theory of war and its emphasis on scientific method, an imbalance that 
requires adjustment. As a force, we should re-emphasize the traditional German military 
concept of “Fingerspitzengefuhl,” which loosely can be considered a commander’s sense 
and intuition of the battlefield in making decisions.
Iraqi Security Force Development
The years-long effort to create a self-reliant and effective ISF failed for a variety of 
reasons, highlighting the extreme difficulty and complexity inherent in building another 
nation’s institutions. Though the development of the ISF was often named as the U.S. 
operational commands’ main effort, it was never the top priority in terms of resources or 
manpower. The main vehicles for developing the ISF (MNSTC-I and the transition teams) 
were under-resourced for most of the war. The 2005 decision to have specialized units 
and transition teams rather than regular brigades and divisions lead ISF development 
meant that the mission never received the full attention of DoD or the theater command. 
For better or worse, the development of the ISF was effectively a secondary mission for 
most U.S. units until the arrival of the Advise and Assist Brigades in 2010.
The development of the ISF also suffered from disunity of effort for the first 2½ years 
of the war when the theater command did not have unified responsibility for the security 
ministries and their forces. Even after MNF-I gathered all ISF development functions 
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under MNSTC-I at the end of 2005, MNC-I and MNSTC-I did not unify their campaign 
plans until mid-2007 when Dubik and Lieutenant General Raymond T. Odierno synchro-
nized the generation of Iraqi forces with MNC-I’s campaign plan so that the ISF’s force 
generation and replenishment directly supported MNC-I’s counteroffensive.
Dubik and Odierno modeled their relationships with the ISF on the one within the 
U.S. Army between the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and U.S. Army 
Forces Command (FORSCOM). Dubik and MNSTC-I, as the ISF’s de facto TRADOC, took 
responsibility for the ISF’s initial training, retraining, and brigade-level combat training 
center. Odierno and MNC-I, as the ISF’s de facto FORSCOM, used embedded transition 
teams and unit partnership to continue training in the field. When the operational com-
mands adopted this approach in 2007, it helped achieve a greater unity of effort for ISF 
development.
The most significant problem in building the ISF was failing to account for the political 
pressure upon and corruption within the Iraqi forces. Too often, the coalition generated 
Iraqi military or police units or assisted offices of the Ministry of Defense or Ministry of 
Interior without fully understanding the ways in which political networks extended into 
the security forces and security ministries. Rarely did the coalition’s intelligence-gather-
ing apparatus invest as much effort in understanding the ISF and the Iraqi Government 
as it did analyzing the enemy. Iraqi commanders often operated under political pressures 
their coalition counterparts could not discern or answered to familial or political connec-
tions that were opaque, all of which made their behavior and decision making seem at 
times inexplicable and made full partnership between coalition and Iraqi units difficult 
to achieve.
Addressing this problem, likely one of the most vexing of the entire war, is not easy. 
Its roots return to the U.S. decision to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqis in June 2004—an 
action that was originally intended to occur years later. Once sovereignty is returned 
to a defeated or collapsed power, a large degree of control over the construction of that 
state’s institutions is lost. As difficult as it would be, given the host nation’s political push 
to return sovereignty as soon as possible, every effort must be made to delay the transfer 
of power to allow institutions to incubate under the umbrella of international protection 
from corruption. The longer institutions are able to grow without the threat of corruption 
and political pressure, the more likely those institutions will be able to resist them on 
their own. Furthermore, in Iraq, U.S. leaders usually acted as if the issue of sovereignty 
was black and white—once sovereignty had been granted, the United States should com-
pletely acquiesce to the will of the newly sovereign nation. While respecting sovereignty 
has usually been a bedrock of U.S. values and foreign policy, it does not mean that the 
United States should not apply the appropriate levers in order to convince host nation 
leaders to make the best decisions. As one U.S. general remarked to Army historians, 
the United States had the money and guns to try to influence Iraqi policy—including the 
selection of security force leaders—but often gave both away without caveat or condition.5
The Iraq War was the scene of a long debate between using standing units to develop 
host nation security forces through partnership and using specialized, ad hoc transition 
teams. Transition teams often faced challenges that inhibited their performance, includ-
ing poor cohesion, insufficient size, lack of unity of command, and haphazard staffing. 
As a result, their efforts to prepare ISF were inconsistent. By contrast, standing units 
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partnered with Iraqi forces experienced few of the problems that beset transition teams. 
While such a solution still had considerable challenges inherent to the monumental task 
of rebuilding a nation’s security forces and infrastructure, it appears that using standing 
units is the best approach to developing foreign indigenous forces. Constructing the ISF 
was also hindered by a series of decisions that inhibited their effectiveness from the tac-
tical to the institutional level. Formal partnership between U.S. advisors and Iraqi units 
often focused on staff functions and rarely occurred below the battalion level, preventing 
growth at the squad, platoon, and company level: the basic building blocks of tactical 
formations. Logistics functions were not built in parallel with tactical units, crippling the 
long-term ability of the Iraqis to sustain themselves and creating additional opportuni-
ties for corruption. Similarly, armor and artillery formations, as well as engineers, were 
neglected initially, delaying the possibility of developing true combined arms capabili-
ties. Combined together, these decisions enfeebled ISF development and delayed transi-
tion of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces.
Detainees
Throughout the war, U.S. forces struggled with the question of what to do with the 
enemy captured on the battlefield. Having decided at the outset not to treat them as pris-
oners of war who may be detained legally until the cessation of hostilities, the United 
States never found a workable solution to the problem of handling “security detainees” 
or “enemy combatants” within a sovereign nation. The improvised systems for review-
ing whether detainees were a security risk were so imperfect as to allow large numbers of 
Sunni insurgents in particular to return to the battlefield. So pervasive was this phenome-
non that most of the senior Iraqi leaders of AQI and later ISIS were at one time in U.S. cus-
tody but let go, including ISIS leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. The political dynamics that 
dominated the Iraqi Government, meanwhile, created a similar result among captured 
Shi’a insurgents, a large number of whom were released back onto the battlefield because 
of pressure from Baghdad or by the terms of the 2008 U.S.-Iraq security agreement.
The phenomenon of insurgents reappearing on the battlefield repeatedly after U.S. 
troops captured them created a deep level of distrust between the tactical units who fought 
and captured the militants and the higher echelon commands that designed policies that 
released them. The perception that the operational commands were following a “catch 
and release” policy became widespread among U.S. units, so much so that the detainee 
policies created perverse incentives among U.S. troops, especially on operations against 
militants who had been previously captured and released. The repeated reappearance of 
militants on the battlefield also undermined the Iraqi population’s confidence in the coa-
lition and gave life to conspiracy theories that the United States was releasing dangerous 
fighters back into the war in order to perpetuate sectarian conflict.
The likelihood that U.S. forces will continue to operate against militias or insurgents in 
the future means that the detention conundrum that began in Afghanistan and Iraq will 
recur. The Army must relook its doctrine, training, and organization for detention opera-
tions and ensure that it is as appropriate for the handling of security detainees as it is for 
the handling of enemy prisoners of war. At the national level, the United States should 
lead an effort to revisit and potentially update portions of the Geneva Conventions and 
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international law to reflect the current environment of nonstate actors and multinational 
terrorist organizations who exploit loopholes within current detention protocols.
At the same time, military leaders should press for a revision of U.S. policies that led 
to detainee problems in Iraq. If, in future conflicts, the United States again chooses to 
regard its captured enemies as something other than enemy prisoners of war, then U.S. 
leaders can expect once again to see the enemy released back onto the battlefield repeat-
edly through imperfect security review procedures, to see detainee abuse cases emerge, 
and to see our troops forced into debilitating moral dilemmas.
Multinational and Interagency Campaign Planning
Iraq showed that the United States needs better doctrine for strategic campaign plan-
ning. The United States and its coalition allies invaded Iraq without the detailed civil-mil-
itary plans necessary to stabilize the country after regime change. Over time, the theater 
command and the U.S. Embassy developed sophisticated plans for meeting coalition 
objectives in Iraq, but they did so in an ad hoc fashion, by trial and error. General David 
H. Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker refined multinational and interagency 
planning in the Joint Strategic Assessment Team and Joint Campaign Plan of 2007, which 
Odierno and Austin later carried forward, but these processes have not been captured in 
U.S. doctrine.
At no point during the war was the joint campaign planning that took place in Bagh-
dad matched by similar interagency planning or synchronization in Washington. Future 
conflicts will require the integration of many different elements of national power, but 
the Iraq War showed that the United States currently lacks the capability of manag-
ing this integration. The United States should actively support regulatory or statutory 
changes such as a “Goldwater-Nichols” for interagency reform. At a minimum, such 
reform should include interagency assignments as a requirement for General Officer or 
Senior Executive Service level promotions; increased funding for civilians to attend mil-
itary schooling at all levels (basic course, advanced course, command and general staff 
college, as well as senior staff college); mandatory civilian participation at combat train-
ing centers (CTCs), battle command training programs (BCTPs), and other training; and 
creation of a civilian quick reaction corps with short notice deployments included in their 
recruitment contracts.
Conventional-SOF Integration
At the outset of the Iraq War, U.S. conventional and special operations forces were 
unaccustomed to operating together in the same area. U.S. military doctrine at that time 
encouraged a segregation of conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) into 
different areas of operation, and this was the way U.S. forces conducted the invasion of 
2003. As the coalition settled into largely static geographic areas of operation after the 
invasion, conventional and SOF units found it necessary to share battlespace. For at least 
the first 2 years of the war, this arrangement was often awkward, as conventional com-
manders often found SOF raids disruptive and uncoordinated, while SOF commanders 
sometimes found conventional units constraining to the SOF mission. As early as fall 2003, 
however, conventional and SOF commanders found ways to integrate their operations, 
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and by 2005 Casey and MNF-I sought to institutionalize these methods at the theater 
level. By the time of the surge, most SOF and conventional units in Iraq had become 
highly adept at synchronizing their operations, able to generate intelligence, coordinate 
targeting, and execute operations together with astonishing speed―a factor that created 
heavy pressure on AQI in particular and nearly resulted in that organization’s defeat in 
2010. A generation of tactical commanders in both conventional and SOF units learned 
how to operate together between 2003 and 2011, to devastating effect. As with the war’s 
other innovations, the integration of special and conventional operations is a perishable 
skill that will atrophy over time if it is not captured in U.S. military doctrine, training, and 
organization. As one U.S. general officer observed after 2011, “everyone will be inclined 
to return to their own corners now.”6
Some Army leaders have also noted the role reversal between SOF and conventional 
units: before the 9/11 attacks, foreign internal defense (FID) had been nearly exclusively 
the role of special operations forces, specifically the Army Special Forces regiment. Spe-
cial Forces groups were oriented regionally and considerable effort and expenditure was 
put into training their personnel to speak foreign languages and understand different cul-
tures. The doctrinal mission of direct action, while still one of the regiment’s core tasks, 
was not of equal importance to FID. During the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Army Spe-
cial Forces groups increasingly focused on direct action, leaving large-scale FID missions 
to conventional forces—as is the case, at the time of this writing, in much of Operation 
INHERENT RESOLVE. It appears, for example, that the doctrinal guideline that a Special 
Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) should train a host nation battalion was 
ignored during certain periods of both conflicts. While this report recognizes U.S. special 
operations forces will never be of sufficient size to rebuild an entire country’s security 
forces, its leaders should revisit the current imbalance between FID and direct action, and 
shift the focus of Special Forces groups back toward their more traditional role in FID.
The Role of the Reserve Component
At an individual level, reserve component troops made significant contributions to 
the war. The operational commands could not have been staffed without them, especially 
as changes in the operating environment required the creation of new organizations to 
deal with specific problems, such as Task Force 134.
At the unit level, the Army’s 2004 decision to operationalize the nation’s strategic 
reserve, the Army National Guard, had important implications inside the Iraq theater. 
This was especially true during the pivotal election year of 2005, when the National 
Guard provided 8 of the 16 Army brigades in the theater. The majority of National Guard 
units and commanders performed well, especially at the platoon and company level. But 
the difficult experiences of the 48th BCT in the Triangle of Death, 1-184 Infantry Regi-
ment in Baghdad, 2-28 BCT in Ramadi, and 278th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) in 
Kirkuk―all in 2004-2006―left senior U.S. commanders with the impression that assign-
ing battlespace to National Guard brigades carried significantly more risk than assign-
ing battlespace to active brigades. As a result, MNF-I did not assign brigade or division 
battlespace to National Guard units again until 2009. The increased title 10 burden the 
National Guard will have in a shrinking Army requires significant reforms. Additional 
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funding is required to ensure Guard units are equipped on par with active forces, person-
nel rules should ensure deployable units are fully staffed, and policies should increase 
the number of mandatory annual training days.7
The Role of Contractors
The U.S. military’s reliance on contractors to provide services and other support in 
theaters of war, a development that followed the drawdown of uniformed U.S. troops in 
the 1990s, gave them a critical role throughout the Iraq War. This trend accelerated when 
senior military and civilian leaders substituted force management levels or troop limita-
tions for traditional strategic reviews. As a result, contractors performed military support 
tasks that the units in Iraq could not do themselves, such as some logistics functions, part 
of the training of the ISF, and even the securing of large coalition bases. At some points 
in the war, the coalition had more contractors inside the theater than uniformed troops.
Contractors came with their own challenges, however. Before the surge period, the 
operational commands did not have reliable systems for tracking the activities and 
locations of contractors, meaning that they occasionally disrupted military operations 
or strayed into dangerous situations without the awareness of battlespace owners. In 
addition, the Iraqi population mostly did not distinguish between the actions of coali-
tion military units and Western contractors and often held the coalition responsible for 
contractors’ negative activities. The most significant case was the Blackwater contractors’ 
killing of 17 Iraqis in Nisour Square in Baghdad in September 2007, an incident that had 
strategic implications for the remainder of the war because it made the Iraqi Government 
deeply reluctant to accept the presence of U.S. and coalition contractors without legal 
restrictions on their activities.
MNSTC-I faced two contractor-related issues. First, the requirements in theater 
changed faster than the contracting system could accommodate. The late summer 2007 
decision by coalition commanders that the police development contract should be 
changed to the advising of provincial chiefs of police took 8 months to implement, far too 
long for the operational needs of the campaign. Second, contracts in which contractors 
phase themselves out of work—a necessary part of “phasing in” host nation security 
forces to do the job themselves―are hard to write and provide incentives for contractors 
to underperform. In one case, coalition commanders realized in 2007 that the MNSTC-I 
contract to train the Iraqi National Police had failed—in 3 years—to produce a single 
policeman capable of training his fellow Iraqis. When the contract was passed to the 
Italian Carabinieri, the paramilitary force produced an Iraqi training cadre capable of 
instructing students in just 6 months.
The Importance of Headquarters
U.S. senior commanders learned over the course of the war to value tactical and oper-
ational headquarters. Stabilization and COIN operations generated a myriad of nonstan-
dard tasks that often required the hands-on involvement of leaders, such as engagements 
with political, ISF, or tribal leaders. Many of these tasks endured even as U.S. units gave 
up responsibility for tactical security so division, brigade, and battalion headquarters 
continued to play central roles in the campaign even as their companies and battalions 
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drew down. In some cases, missions required a full headquarters structure but few troops, 
such as the Combined Security Mechanism, the peacekeeping-style mission created by 
Odierno to prevent Arab-Kurd conflict along the disputed boundaries in northern Iraq.
U.S. commanders also learned the consequences of using ad hoc, joint manning doc-
ument headquarters rather than standing headquarters. Time after time, when creating 
new organizations in Iraq, DoD and CENTCOM relied on ad hoc headquarters rather 
than standing army, corps, or division headquarters, only to see the new organizations 
suffer from a lack of cohesion, inadequate training and proficiency, and low staffing. 
Senior leaders such as Petraeus concluded from their experience in Iraq that a standing 
headquarters of any kind will always outperform an ad hoc, individual augmentee-filled 
organization. Yet DoD favored ad hoc joint headquarters for a variety of reasons: to ensure 
all the services contributed to the headquarters; to leave standing commands intact for 
other contingencies and war plans; and because U.S. leaders assumed the missions for 
which the ad hoc organizations had been created would be short and need not disrupt 
future plans and operations. Iraq showed the pitfalls of such an approach.
The Role of the Division
The 2003 invasion was fought by divisions maneuvering through battlespace and 
synchronizing the operations of their brigades and other assets. Once the coalition divi-
sions took up largely static areas of operation after the invasion, the proper role of the 
division in the broader campaign was not entirely clear. Over time, the management 
of the Iraq campaign was decentralized to the brigade level. As the modular brigades 
became severed from their organic division headquarters, frequently operating under 
the control of divisions with whom they had little familiarity, divisions sometimes had 
difficulty finding an appropriate role in synchronizing tactical activities. In some extreme 
cases, divisions acted as the equivalent of area support groups for diverse and sometimes 
only loosely coordinated brigade operations, especially divisions with vast battlespace 
and diverse operating environments. In other cases, divisions found a productive role in 
maintaining an operational-level enemy picture and coordinating brigade and battalion 
operations to overcome seams that insurgents might exploit.
In either case, the Iraq War did not yield a clear picture of the future operational role of 
the division. Some divisions took on a level of responsibility, management of assets, and 
control of territory equivalent to that of a traditional corps headquarters. At the height of 
the surge, for example, Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) controlled five U.S. 
brigades, but also exercised de facto control, or at least controlling influence, over four 
Iraqi divisions, tens of thousands of Iraqi police, and more than 50,000 Sons of Iraq. Sim-
ilarly, in some cases U.S. brigades took on a level of responsibility equivalent to or even 
exceeding that of a traditional U.S. division. In 2007, Colonel Ricky Gibbs’s 4th Brigade, 
1st Infantry Division controlled no fewer than nine U.S. battalions and exercised de facto 
control of thousands more Iraqi troops. In the same year, Colonel Michael Kershaw’s 2d 
Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, had slightly over 5,000 U.S. troops in the “Triangle of 
Death” south of Baghdad, but also exercised de facto control over more than 20,000 Iraqi 
troops and Sons of Iraq, giving 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, more manpower and 
a span of control greater than that of a standard U.S. division.
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Stability Operations
Stability operations are a crucial part of fighting and winning the nation’s wars. How-
ever, large-scale stability operations require specialized skills and troop-to-task ratios. A 
stability operation on the scale of Iraq is likely to require more specialized expertise and 
combat support than the Army currently retains in its inventory. If—or when—tasked 
again to undertake a large-scale stability operation, the Army must be better prepared 
to deploy quickly combat support capabilities and specialized personnel. To do so, the 
Army should both maintain the civil affairs growth that occurred over the last decade 
and continue to balance stability training with combined arms maneuver training. At 
the same time, certain capabilities could be effectively “warehoused” within TRADOC 
to be able to be reactivated on short notice. Such capabilities would include military gov-
ernance, economic reconstruction, agricultural development, human assessment teams, 
and military assistance and advisory teams, at a minimum.
Strategic Communications
The coalition was never able to keep pace with the enemy’s strategic communica-
tions. Its process was reactive, bureaucratically slow and centralized, and not considered 
a critical mission. Commanders often remarked that strategic communications required 
approval at corps and force level―or often higher. One commander in south Baghdad 
noted that he could not obtain corps approval to display a billboard or distribute leaf-
lets featuring a wanted insurgent, but that he incongruously had the authority to drop 
joint direct attack munitions (JDAMs) on insurgent positions or buildings. The coalition’s 
inability to influence the informational battlespace in a timely manner or to provide the 
necessary authorities to commanders who were engaged in a decentralized and local 
conflict was a symptom of the U.S. military culture that did not place a high priority on 
strategic communications or information operations and a U.S. Government averse to 
the risks associated with fighting a war of ideas. As the world becomes more reliant on 
digital information, this challenge will become more acute, as most Army tactical capa-
bilities are still primarily flyer, leaflet, and loudspeaker platforms. Engaging in the digital 
conflict of ideas in real time or near real time, as our adversaries already do, will require 
structural, doctrinal, and legislative change across the joint and interagency spectrum.
TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL INNOVATIONS
The tone of this study of the Iraq War often has been critical, highlighting the signifi-
cant errors from which the United States and the Army must learn, but this is not meant to 
overshadow the Army’s significant tactical and operational adaptations and innovations. 
The units deployed to Iraq made strides in COIN warfare, stabilization operations, coun-
terterrorism, security assistance, and many other areas that would have been unthinkable 
in 2003. This flexibility and adaptability will be important for generations of future lead-
ers who may face similar tactical and operational problems. What follows is a selection of 
some of the more significant innovations and adaptations.
The initial adaptation to COIN from 2003 to 2006. Well before the publication of a 
COIN manual in December 2006, U.S. units had made great progress in applying such an 
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approach in their areas of operation. Many units demonstrated surprising flexibility in 
rediscovering and applying COIN tactics―albeit unevenly—often without any support 
from their institutional and educational systems. The campaign histories of 2003-2006 are 
replete with such examples of units and commanders who taught themselves to fight in 
a way they had not been instructed to do.
Agility from 2006 onward in reconciliation at the local level. Agile, flexible, and 
open-minded commanders and units made the Awakening possible. Later, U.S. units 
displayed great creativity in synchronizing bottom-up and top-down political accommo-
dation, so that by the time of the surge, battalion and brigade commanders had invented 
the concept of “maneuvering to reconciliation”—i.e., planning security operations with 
a view to opening up new reconciliation initiatives. In 2007, the operational commands 
created an entire infrastructure to manage and enable the Sons of Iraq, while creating the 
Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) to parlay local cease fires into political progress 
wherever possible. These innovations had little to guide them in existing doctrine.
The use of Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Army com-
manders and units developed the capacity and knowledge to use money as a COIN and 
stabilization tool, so much so that by 2007 most leaders acknowledged that money for 
projects had become as important as ammunition on the battlefield. By then, the pre-2003 
practice of centralized control of small funds by contracting officers and field ordering 
officers had given way to spending billions of dollars by U.S. units across a spectrum 
ranging from microeconomic projects to much larger-scale initiatives such as paying of 
the Sons of Iraq. While considerable debate exists on the long-term efficacy of such efforts, 
there is little question that Army commanders’ adroit use of the funds helped tamp down 
many of the underlying causes of instability for the short term, thereby buying time to 
re-establish security and rebuild the ISF. A more detailed review of this topic is war-
ranted, given the uneven long-term effects and the concern that such “expeditionary eco-
nomics” caused more harm than good.
The operational synchronization of military and civil activities. The U.S. units 
who fought after 2005 had learned to integrate their operations with civil activities and 
non-military organizations in ways the Army of 2003 could not have envisioned. The 
creation of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to pursue stabilization objectives; the 
integration of MNF-I (and USF-I) with U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, both organizationally and 
in planning; and the specific revision of MNF-I campaign plans by the civil-military Joint 
Strategic Assessment Team in 2007 (and by its successors in later years) are the most 
significant cases in point. In many instances, U.S. military leaders and units learned to 
connect their military operations explicitly to the achievement of a sustainable political 
outcome in their areas of operation, though this was not accomplished, ultimately, at the 
strategic level.
A series of intelligence innovations. During the war, a combination of organizational 
changes and technological improvements gave tactical level units, sometimes down to 
the brigade and even battalion level, access to national level intelligence from all of the 
three major intelligence collection disciplines. These made it possible for U.S. forces to 
identify enemy networks and target them for either disruption or political reconcilia-
tion. They also enabled an unprecedented increase in counterterrorism operations tempo 
(OPTEMPO). These changes coincided with an extraordinary forward deployment of 
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the defense intelligence community that made defense intelligence more responsive to 
operational demands and equipped commanders with better knowledge and capabili-
ties than could have been dreamt of in 2003. These deployments, coupled with the abil-
ity to reach back to national capabilities, enabled commanders to understand better the 
various threats the coalition faced and at times to get within the decision cycle of those 
adversaries.
Establishing an effective medical evacuation system. During the span of the war, 
the U.S. Army’s medical community constructed the most effective medical evacuation 
system in the history of warfare. At the point of injury, individual Soldiers were issued 
medical kits with tourniquets and advanced bandages with coagulant material. Front-
line medics were provided additional training and new trauma equipment that greatly 
increased a casualty’s chance of survival. In order to preserve the “golden hour,” casu-
alties were swiftly evacuated to forward-based surgical teams and then sent on to a 
regionally located combat support hospital where they received further treatment and 
stabilization. Those facilities pioneered many new trauma techniques, such as whole 
blood transfusions and massive blood loss protocols, which were later passed on to civil-
ian trauma specialists. If necessary, casualties were sent to the Landstuhl Regional Med-
ical Center in Germany where they were further stabilized before being sent on to the 
national military hospitals in the Washington, DC, area. Hundreds, if not thousands, of 
grievously wounded casualties lived because of these innovations, leading to unprece-
dented survival rates.
The creation of the Combined Security Mechanism. This initiative to prevent conflict 
along the disputed internal boundary (the “Green Line”) helped avert an Arab-Kurd war 
that had seemed inevitable in 2007-2008. For a critical period of 2 years, it kept the peace 
between the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and the KRG in Erbil until it was dismantled 
during the U.S. military withdrawal of 2011. It should serve as a model for peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement within the U.S. military.
***
The Iraq War has the potential to be one of the most consequential conflicts in Ameri-
can history. It shattered a long-standing political tradition against preemptive wars. John 
Quincy Adams’s presumption that America should not go “abroad searching for mon-
sters to destroy” was erased, at least temporarily.8 In the conflict’s immediate aftermath, 
the pendulum of American politics swung to the opposite pole with deep skepticism 
about foreign interventions.
In terms of geostrategic consequences, the war produced profound consequences. 
At the time of this project’s completion in 2018, an emboldened and expansionist Iran 
appears to be the only victor. Iraq, the traditional regional counterbalance for Iran, is at 
best emasculated, and at worst has key elements of its government acting as proxies for 
Iranian interests. With Iraq no longer a threat, Iran’s destabilizing influence has quickly 
spread to Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, as well as other locations. As the conflict expanded 
beyond its original boundaries, the colonial creation that was the Iraqi-Syrian border was 
effectively erased. Bashar al-Assad, having misjudged his ability to control the Salafist 
foreign fighters that he gave safe haven for the better part of a decade, found himself 
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threatened by the very forces that he had exploited to avert an American invasion―an 
invasion that in actuality was never forthcoming. Syria was plunged into a vicious civil 
war that devolved into a brutality only seen in the worst conflicts of the 20th century, 
resulting in a death toll that has topped half of a million, repeated use of chemical weap-
ons, and the worst refugee crisis since World War II. Kurdistan evolved from a proto-state 
into a de-facto nation, a development that has created deep tensions with Turkey. The 
danger of a Sunni-Shi’a regional conflict, with potentially globally destabilizing effects, is 
now greater than at any time since the original schism. Zarqawi’s goal appears to be on 
the cusp of becoming reality.
The human and material cost of the conflict was staggering. Nearly 4,500 American 
military personnel lost their lives in the fighting, and another 32,000 were wounded―
many of them grievously. More than 300 soldiers from other coalition nations also per-
ished. Estimates on Iraqi casualties vary wildly, ranging from roughly 200,000 killed to 
more than a million. Monetary costs, for the United States only, are similarly hard to 
approximate due to the challenge in estimating future costs for veterans’ care and the 
interest on loans taken out to finance the war. There is no question that the war has been 
expensive, ranging even among the lower estimates from a cost of over 800 billion to 
nearly 2 trillion dollars.
At the same time, there are those who argue that the Iraq War, as well as the con-
flict in Afghanistan, represent historical aberrations with few germane lessons. Support-
ers of this position posit that conflicts involving COIN and nation-building sit far from 
the World War II style of “traditional war” for which the Army typically has been held 
responsible. Such potentially existential conflicts are so much harder to prepare for, they 
argue, that investing time on COIN related tasks would be counterproductive, if not irre-
sponsible. Adherents of the position that the Army should return to its “traditional” war-
fighting role also suggest that it is relatively easy to train “down” from high intensity 
conflict against other armies.
The authors of this study conclude that such positions are intellectually specious. Iron-
ically, many of the same arguments were made before the invasion of Iraq and during the 
first few years of the war. As a result, precious lives and time were lost before the Army 
adapted to the character of the conflict and was able to regain the initiative. It is one of 
this study’s core premises that there are additional complexities in COIN that often do not 
exist in more conventional conflicts. Translating national political guidance into battles 
and campaigns that blend both traditional maneuver and deft political efforts that target 
the drivers of conflict is a complicated art. Leaders at all levels in COIN have to be able 
to integrate the fields of political science, culture, and regional history simultaneously 
with military strategy to achieve success. Long-term security force assistance, a staple of 
COIN, is difficult, dangerous, and frustrating. Peacebuilding, the process of nurturing 
reconciliation, building durable and tolerant institutions, and carrying out political and 
economic transformation are intensely challenging tasks. U.S. efforts toward this end in 
Iraq were inefficient, disjointed, and ultimately unsuccessful.
Given the consequences and the cost of the Iraq War, it is essential that the Army 
studies what went wrong and why. The Army must also capture the innovations and 
adaptations that produced tactical and operational successes. Above all, the United States 
must not repeat the errors of previous wars in assuming that the conflict was an anomaly 
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with few useful lessons. This project was commissioned by the Army’s senior leadership 
in part because they believed the Army had spent the first few years of the Iraq War 
relearning the lessons of the Vietnam conflict. Hopefully, The U.S. Army in the Iraq War 
will help prevent that error from being repeated.
While the next war that the United States fights may be different from the conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, it would be risky to assume that it will be so different as to render 
the lessons of those conflicts moot. The character of warfare is changing, but even if we 
face peer or near-peer competitors in future conflicts, they are likely to employ a blend 
of conventional and irregular warfare—what is often called “hybrid warfare” or “opera-
tions in the gray zone.” The United States may not have the luxury of choosing the next 
war it fights.  Our enemies are aware of the challenges we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and will incorporate lessons that they have derived from these conflicts against us. 
The failure of the United States to attain its strategic objectives in Iraq was not inev-
itable.  It came as a byproduct of a long series of decisions—acts of commission and 
omission—made by well-trained and intelligent leaders making what seemed to be rea-
sonable decisions. At one point, in the waning days of the Surge, the change of strategy 
and the sacrifices of many thousands of Americans and Iraqis had finally tipped the scales 
enough to put the military campaign on a path towards a measure of success. However, 
it was not to be, as the compounding effect of earlier mistakes, combined with a series of 
decisions focused on war termination, ultimately doomed the fragile venture.
It is for the efforts and immeasurable sacrifices of our Soldiers that this work is dedi-
cated. Above all, this history is meant to be a permanent record of their accomplishments 
and their willingness to give the last full measure of devotion for their own country and 
for the people of Iraq.
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The U.S. Army War College (USAWC) was honored to support the effort for this 
study and to publish these volumes. Since our vision is to develop strategic leaders and 
ideas invaluable to the Army, the Joint Force, and the Nation, the publication of these vol-
umes is emblematic of this study’s purpose. In fact, this study represents what Secretary 
of War Elihu Root envisioned when he established the USAWC in 1901. He directed its 
students to consider three important strategic issues: national defense, military science, 
and responsible command—aspects which are relevant to this study. 
It is our hope these volumes will prompt and enable further studies on other levels 
and aspects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition to hundreds of hours of 
interviews, as a byproduct of this work, over 30,000 pages of documents were declassi-
fied, and will be made available online. Over time, all of these primary sources will be 
reviewed and reassessed by others, including the Staff College and USAWC students, 
as a way to continue to improve as a profession. To further assist with studying these 
volumes, we are publishing them in a searchable digital format, negating the need for a 
lengthy index. Additionally, while this is an extensive study, it is by no means complete. 
Many areas fell outside the scope of this study and will require further in-depth research, 
areas such as logistics, humanitarian assistance, special operations, and conventional 
mutual efforts, along with U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM’s) decisions and wider 
U.S. and international partner decisions, which impacted the strategic and operational 
direction and resources in Iraq itself. 
This study reinforces the importance of what we do at the USAWC as part of profes-
sional military education and the need to continue to innovate and improve our efforts. 
The central problems in Iraq and Afghanistan typically started at the strategic level. We 
rightfully need to address the many operational and tactical issues highlighted through-
out this study. However, that is not sufficient to solve the overall challenges we will face 
in the foreseeable future. We have to get the strategy right and be prepared for the inev-
itable natural tendency toward strategic drift and strategic depreciation. The U.S. Army 
has traditionally had an almost overwhelming faith in technology and doctrine, on the 
changing character of war, which is often reflected in this study. We can and will analyze 
and learn from it. At the same time, we cannot overcommit to the lessons from this war. 
As Dr. Mike Neiberg, our USAWC Chair of War Studies, recently reinforced to me, “The 
next war we fight will be quite different and will render many of the operational and tac-
tical suggestions here overcome by events.” The question is which ones? At the USAWC, 
we are committed and will further reinforce the importance of the study of strategy, the 
nature of war, and the essence of leadership and decision-making at the strategic level, 
and at the sometimes “Gordian Knot” nexus of strategy and operations. 
On this the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, I am mindful that this study 
is part of a longstanding tradition within our Army to critically assess past strategies, 
operations, and decisions to inform decisions and actions in the future. This commitment 
to self-evaluation, study, and adaptation serves not only to ensure the future readiness 
of our Army, but honors those who likewise committed themselves to the security and 
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ISF Iraqi security forces
ISG Iraq Study Group
ISI Islamic State of Iraq
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISOF Iraqi special operations forces
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ITFC Iraq Threat Finance Cell
JAM Jaysh al-Mahdi (aka Mahdi Army)
JCPAT Joint Campaign Plan Assessment Team
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition
JFSOCC-I Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command-Iraq
JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
JRTN Jaysh ar-Rejal at-Tariq al-Naqsh bandi
JSAT Joint Strategic Assessment Team
JSS joint security stations
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
KH Kata’ib Hizballah
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
LNO liaison officer
LTC lieutenant colonel
MEF Marine Expeditionary Force
MeK Mujahedin e Khalq
MEU Marine Expeditionary Unit
MHI Military History Institute





MND-CS Multi-National Division–Central South
MND-N Multi-National Division–North






MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq
MOD Ministry of Defense
MRAP mine resistant ambush protected
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO noncommissioned officer
NDU National Defense University
NDU-CISA National Defense University-College of International Security Affairs
NPR National Public Radio
NSA National Security Agency
NSC National Security Council
NTM-I NATO Training Mission–Iraq
OCINC Office of the Commander in Chief
ODA Operational Detachment Alpha
ODIN Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize
OIF Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
OMC Office of Military Cooperation
OPDAN Operation DEFEAT AL-QAEDA IN THE NORTH
OPORD operation order
OPTEMPO operations tempo
OSC-I Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense
PIC Provincial Iraqi Control
PJCC Provincial Joint Coordination Center
PKK Kurdistan Workers Party
PM Prime Minister
PMF Population Mobilization Forces
POTUS President of the United States
PRT provincial reconstruction team
PSC private security contractor
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
PYD Democratic Union Party
RCT regimental combat team
ROE rules of engagement
RPG rocket-propelled grenade
RSO regional security office
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RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SDE TIR Strategic Debriefing Element Tactical Interrogation Report
SEAL Sea, Air, and Land Teams
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SFA strategic framework agreement
SG Special Groups
SGS secretary to the general staff
SIGACT significant activity
SOCCENT Special Operations Command Central
SOCOM Special Operations Command
SOF special operations forces
SOFA status of forces agreement
SPTT Special Police Transition Team
SSI Strategic Studies Institute
STT Stability Transition Team
STU Special Tactics Unit
SVEST suicide vest
SWAT Special Weapons and Tactics
TF Task Force
TFBSO Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
TOE table of organization and equipment
TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNSCR United Nations Security Council Resolution
USAHEC USAWC’s Army Heritage and Education Center
USAID United States Agency for International Development




USF-I United States Forces-Iraq
USIP U.S. Institute of Peace
USMC U.S. Marine Corps




WMD weapons of mass destruction












Battery, Company, or Cavalry Troop






II Marine Expeditionary Force
Multi-National Division–Baghdad 
1st Armored Cavalry Division
82d Airborne Division
2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)
6th Brigade, 2d National Police Division (Iraqi)
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment
1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Stryker)
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